ML20314A292

USGS Issuance of Amendment No. 14 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 for the USGS Triga Research Reactor Increasing the Special Nuclear Material Possession Limit

ML20314A292
Person / Time
Site:	U.S. Geological Survey
Issue date:	12/03/2020
From:	Geoffrey Wertz NRC/NRR/DANU/UNPL
To:	Horton R US Dept of Interior, Geological Survey (USGS)
Wertz G
References
EPID L-2020-LLA-0201
Download: ML20314A292 (27)

Text

December 3, 2020 Mr. Robert Horton, Reactor Administrator U.S. Geological Survey Denver Federal Center P.O. Box 25046, MS 911 Denver, CO 80225-0046

SUBJECT:

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 14 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. R-113 FOR THE U.S.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TRIGA RESEARCH REACTOR INCREASING THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL POSSESSION LIMIT (EPID L-2020-LLA-0201)

Dear Mr. Horton:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 14 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

TRIGA Research Reactor. This amendment consists of changes to the renewed facility operating license, in response to the application dated October 1, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20275A267), as supplemented by letters dated October 22 (two letters), November 5, (two letters), and December 1, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20296A490, ML20318A088, ML20310A335, ML20310A296, and ML20336A020, respectively). The amendment revises the renewed facility operating license by adding a license condition that increases the special nuclear material (SNM) possession limit to allow the licensee to receive and possess, but not to use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 4 kilograms of contained uranium-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The amendment also adds two license conditions to allow receipt and possession of the SNM and byproduct material associated with the receipt of this TRIGA-type reactor fuel.

The issuance of this amendment also approves a revision to the USGS physical security plan that addresses requirements associated with the authorized SNM possession limit and revises license condition 2.C.3. to reference the new revision.

R. Horton 2

A copy of the NRC staffs safety evaluation is enclosed. If you have any questions please contact me at 301-415-0893, or by electronic mail at Geoffrey.Wertz@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Geoffrey A. Wertz, Project Manager Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Licensing Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-274 License No. R-113

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 14 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113

2. Safety Evaluation cc: w/enclosures: See next page

U.S. Geological Survey Docket No. 50-274 cc:

Brian Nielsen Environmental Services Manager 480 South Allison Parkway Lakewood, CO 80226 James Grice Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment HMWM-RAD-B2 4300 Cherry Creek Drive South Denver, CO 80246-1530 Jonathan Wallick, Reactor Supervisor U.S. Geological Survey P.O. Box 25046, MS 974 Denver, CO 80225 Test, Research and Training Reactor Newsletter Attention: Ms. Amber Johnson Dept. of Materials Science and Engineering University of Maryland 4418 Stadium Drive College Park, MD 20742-2115

ML20314A292

• concurrence via e-mail NRR-058 OFFICE NRR/DANU/UNPL/PM* NRR/DANU/UNPL/LA* OGC/NLO* NRR/DANU/UNPL/BC* NRR/DANU/UNPL/PM*

NAME GWertz NParker MYoung GCasto (SLynch for)

GWertz DATE 11/12/2020 11/12/2020 12/2/2020 12/2/2020 12/3/2020

U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY DOCKET NO. 50-274 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TRIGA RESEARCH REACTOR AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 14 License No. R-113

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113, submitted by the U.S. Geological Survey on October 1, 2020, as supplemented on October 22 (two letters), November 5, (two letters) and December 1, 2020, and complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (the Act) and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance that (i) the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations of the Commissions set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied; and F.

Prior notice of this amendment was not required by 10 CFR 2.105, Notice of proposed action, and publication of a notice for this amendment is not required by 10 CFR 2.106, Notice of issuance.

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 is hereby amended, by the addition of license conditions 2.B.2.f and 2.B.2.g, to read as follows:

f.

to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 4 kilograms of contained uranium-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The ten damaged TRIGA-type fuel elements stored in the sealed damaged fuel canisters will be removed from the USGS TRIGA research reactor facility within two years following resolution of the final disposition plans by the U.S. Department of Energy.

g. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, such special nuclear material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

3.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 is hereby amended, by the addition of license condition 2.B.3.h, to read as follows:

h. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with operation of the facility, such byproduct materials as may be produced by operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

4.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 license condition 2.C.3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3. Physical Security Plan The licensee shall maintain and fully implement all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved physical security plan, entitled Security Plan for the DFC Reactor Facility, Revision XXI, dated November 2020, consists of documents withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 73.21.

5.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA SLynch for/

Greg A. Casto, Chief Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Licensing Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 Date of Issuance: December 3, 2020

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 14 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. R-113 DOCKET NO. 50-274 Replace the following pages of Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 with the revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Renewed Facility Operating License R-113 REMOVE INSERT 3

3 4

4 Amendment No. 14 December 3, 2020

e. to receive, possess, and use, but not separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, such special nuclear material as may be received in TRIGA-type fuel elements that are transferred to license R-113 after use in other reactor facilities.

f.

to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 4 kilograms of contained uranium-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The ten damaged TRIGA-type fuel elements stored in the sealed damaged fuel canisters will be removed from the USGS TRIGA research reactor facility within two years following resolution of the final disposition plans by the U.S. Department of Energy.

g. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, such special nuclear material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

3.

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 30, the following activities are included:

a. to receive, possess, and use, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 3 curies of sealed americium-beryllium in a single neutron source for reactor startup use;

b. to receive, possess, and use, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 10 curies of sealed polonium-beryllium in a single neutron source for reactor startup use;

c. to receive, possess, and use, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 10 millicuries of byproduct material (atomic numbers 1-88) that will be irradiated in the reactor after receipt;

d. to receive, possess, and use, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 5 curies of byproduct material used in reactor-based experiments, in sources for calibration of radiation detectors, and reference sources for use in reactor-based analytic techniques;

e. to receive, possess, and use, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 50 millicuries of byproduct material contained in (non-fuel) research reactor parts and components received for use under this facility operating license, No. R-113 from other research facilities;

f.

to receive, possess, and use, but not to separate, in connection with operation of the facility, such byproduct material as may be produced by operation of the reactor, except for byproduct material produced in non-fueled reactor experiments which is permitted to be separated; and

g. to receive, possess, and use, but not to separate, any amount of byproduct material contained in TRIGA fuel elements transferred to USGS Facility Operating License No. R-113 after use in other reactor facilities.

Amendment No. 14 December 3, 2020

h. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with operation of the facility, such byproduct materials as may be produced by operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

4.

Pursuant to the Act and Title 10 CFR, Chapter 1, Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material, in connection with the operation of the facility, to receive, possess, and use, up to 1 millicurie of source material for reactor-based experiments, sources for calibration of detectors, and reference sources for use in reactor-based analytical techniques.

C. This license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to the conditions specified 10 CFR Parts 20, 30, 40, 50, 51, 55, 70, and 73 of the Commissions regulations; is subject to all provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

1.

Maximum Power Level The licensee may operate the reactor at steady-state power levels not in excess of 1,000 kilowatts (thermal) and to pulse the reactor in accordance with the limitations in the Technical Specifications.

2.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised by Amendment No. 13, are hereby incorporated in their entirety in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

Physical Security Plan The licensee shall maintain and fully implement all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved physical security plan, entitled Security Plan for the DFC Reactor Facility, Revision XXI, dated November 2020, consists of documents withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 73.21.

This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight, 20 years from the date of issuance.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

/RA/

William M. Dean, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Appendix A, Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 14, 2016 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 14 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. R-113 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TRIGA RESEARCH REACTOR DOCKET NO. 50-274

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 1, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20275A267), as supplemented by letters dated October 22 (two letters), November 5, (two letters), and December 1, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20296A490, ML20318A088 - cover letter only, ML20310A335 - cover letter only, ML20310A296, and ML20336A020, respectively), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to amend its Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16074A141) for the USGS TRIGA Reactor (GSTR) facility.

Specifically, the LAR, as supplemented, proposes to add new license conditions (LCs), 2.B.2.f, 2.B.2.g, and 2.B.3.h to obtain TRIGA-type fuel (TRIGA fuel) from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The licensee is requesting to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the GSTR, up to 4 kilograms of contained uranium-235 (U-235) enriched to less than 20 percent as well as special nuclear material (SNM) and byproduct material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities, in the form of TRIGA fuel received from the VTT.

As a result of the proposed increase in SNM, the licensee also provided a revised physical security plan (PSP).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviewed the licensees LAR, as supplemented, and evaluated the proposed changes based on the regulations and guidance in:

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Section 50.54, Conditions of Licenses, paragraph (b), which states, [n]o right to the special nuclear material shall be conferred by the license except as may be defined by the license. Section 50.52, Combining licenses, which states, The Commission may combine in a single license the activities of an applicant which would otherwise be licensed severally.

10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection against Radiation, which establishes the regulatory requirements for protection against ionizing radiation resulting from activities conducted under licenses issued by the NRC.

10 CFR Part 30, Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material, which provides the regulatory requirements for the domestic licensing of byproduct material.

10 CFR 51.22, Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review, which identifies licensing, regulatory, and administrative actions eligible for categorical exclusion from the requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement.

10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material, which states that the regulations of this part establish procedures and criteria for the issuance of licenses to receive title to, own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, and transfer SNM; and to establish and provide for the terms and conditions upon which the Commission will issue such licenses.

10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, Section 73.2, Definitions, which defines SNM of low strategic significance as:

(1)

Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance in this section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, grams =

(grams contained uranium-235) + (grams plutonium) + (grams uranium-233);

or (2)

Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the uranium-235 isotope); or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotope).

This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material.

10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, Section 73.2, Definitions, which defines SNM of moderate strategic significance as:

(1)

Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combined quantity of more than 1,000 grams when computed by the equation, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium); or (2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope).

This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material.

10 CFR 73.21, Protection of Safeguards Information: Performance Requirements, which provides requirements for protecting safeguards information.

10 CFR 73.67, Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance, paragraph (d), Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, which specifies requirements for each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses SNM of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site, or contiguous sites.

10 CFR 70.24, Criticality accident requirements, which provides the quantities of SNM that invoke the requirements to implement a criticality monitoring system.

NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Part 1 Format and Content, and Part 2, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria, Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems, Section 9.5, Possession and Use of Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material, (ADAMS Accession Nos.: ML042430055 and ML042430048, respectively),

which provide guidance to the NRC staff that the 10 CFR Part 50 license should explicitly state the materials which may be possessed and used at the licensees facility.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.59, Standard Format and Content for a Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance, Revision 1, February 1983, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100341301), which explains the various provisions and requirements with respect to the physical protection of licensed activities against radiological sabotage or theft or diversion of SNM and provides guidance to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.2, Definitions, state, in part, that special nuclear material is defined as (1) plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope-233 or in the isotope-235, and byproduct material means [a]ny radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in, or made radioactive by, exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using special nuclear material. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 70 and Part 30 require that, with few exceptions, the transfer, receipt, possession and use SNM and byproduct material, respectively, occur as authorized in a specific or general license1. The NRC Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-113 by letter dated October 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16074A151), which authorizes the operation of the USGS research reactor facility.

License Condition (LC) 2.B.2. authorizes, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70, the receipt, possession, and use of SNM in connection with operation of the facility. Likewise, LC 2.B.3. authorizes, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 30, the receipt, possession, and use of byproduct material.

As part of its review of the proposed receipt and possession of TRIGA fuel from VTT, the NRC staff performed a regulatory audit, which included an on-site visit to the GSTR facility on October 15, 2020, to gain a better understanding of the planned storage locations of the TRIGA fuel elements. The NRC staff described its regulatory audit plan in a letter dated October 6, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20279A591), and described the results of the audit, including the on-site visit, by letter dated October 21, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20295A510). As a result of the audit, the licensee supplemented its LAR by letter dated October 22, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20296A490), proposing a revised LC 2.B.2.f, proposing additional LCs 2.B.2.g and 2.B.3.h, and providing supporting information and analyses regarding radiation protection and criticality safety. By letter dated October 22, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20318A088), the licensee provided an unredacted version of its planned modified fuel storage racks and pit storage shield plugs. Because the attachment to the letter contains security related information, only the cover letter is publicly available in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.

By separate letter dated November 5, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20310A335), the licensee provided a revised PSP. Because the PSP contains security-related information, it is withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390 and 10 CFR 73.21. Additionally, to address comments stated by the Radiation Program Manager from the Division of Hazardous Materials and Waste Management, Department of Public Health and Environment, State of Colorado, during an October 29, 2020, public meeting between the USGS and the NRC staff, the licensee supplemented its LAR, by letter dated November 5, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20310A296). The State representative expressed his concern that the damaged fuel elements be removed from the facility in a timely manner. In its LAR supplement, the licensee provided additional language, agreed upon by the State of Colorado representative, to proposed LC 2.B.2.f to address the removal of the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements from the USGS facility within two years following resolution of the final disposition plans (i.e., the ability to remove the fuel) by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Information regarding the public meeting can be found in the NRC staff public meeting summary letter, dated November 6, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20310A113).

By letter dated December 1, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20336A020), the licensee provided additional information regarding the receipt of the damaged fuel elements. The licensee stated that in order to receive lightly irradiated fuel from the VTT, all of the fuel, including those elements categorized as damaged, must be taken by USGS. The licensee also listed the advantages of receiving the used TRIGA fuel from the VTT.

3.1 Description of the Fuel Elements In its LAR, the licensee plans to receive 103 TRIGA fuel elements, which were all used (irradiated) in the operation of the VTT research reactor. DOE staff inspected the fuel elements 1 Any NRC regulatory approvals needed for the shipment, etc., of the material will be considered separately and are not evaluated in this Safety Evaluation.

at VTT during a visit from April 7 to May 4, 2016. The TRIGA Fuel Element Examination Sheet, FRM-898, documented the inspection of each fuel element and included details on the surface condition, element serial number, cladding type, and fuel element type. The inspection identified 10 fuel elements as damaged, and an additional 8 fuel elements to be re-examined later. DOE staff returned for another fuel inspection from June 10 to 18, 2019, and re-examined the 10 damaged fuel elements and the additional eight fuel elements. Both DOE fuel element inspections visually examined 100 percent of the surface of each fuel element, and verified, using a video scope, the surface flaws and serial numbers of the 18 fuel elements. The second DOE inspection confirmed that 10 fuel elements are damaged and no longer usable as research reactor fuel, and the additional 8 fuel elements are not damaged. The licensee indicated that it will not use the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements in the operation of the GSTR but will store the damaged elements until future removal by DOE. Storing the damaged fuel is consistent with the requirements of TS 3.1.4, Fuel Parameters, Specification 1, which states, [t]he reactor shall not operate with damaged fuel elements, except for the purpose of locating damaged fuel elements.

In the LAR, the licensee provided a comparison of the fuel characteristics of the current TRIGA fuel in use at GSTR and the proposed fuel elements from the VTT. The licensee stated that the characteristics (e.g., U content, enrichment, shape, length of fuel meat, element diameter, cladding material and thickness) are identical, confirming that the fuel elements are TRIGA fuel elements.

The NRC staff reviewed the fuel description in the licensees LAR and, during the NRC staff on-site audit, examined several of the referenced Fuel Element Examination Sheet, FRM-898 forms. The NRC staff finds that entries on FRM-898 forms listed each fuel element by serial number and included the results of the visual examination of the entire surface of the fuel element. Entries also documented anomalies (i.e., scratches, etc.) by graphic illustration as well as a written description, if needed. The forms contain clear descriptions of information used to assess and determine the damaged fuel elements (i.e., cracks, cladding perforations, etc.).

Based on DOEs examination and the documented results, the NRC staff finds that the fuel is properly characterized for possession and receipt at GSTR.

3.2 Fuel Storage Criticality Considerations In its LAR, the licensee indicated that all 103 TRIGA fuel elements would remain in storage until an analysis and future license amendment authorizes the use of these fuel elements in the GSTR core. The licensee also stated that there is enough storage capacity for the 103 fuel elements while maintaining the ability to fully offload all the fuel currently in the reactor core and stored in the reactor pool.

3.2.1 Intact (undamaged) TRIGA Fuel Elements In its LAR, the licensee indicated that the 93 intact, undamaged TRIGA fuel elements will be stored in hexagonal fuel storage racks located in the GSTR pool, as described in the GSTR safety analysis report (SAR). The licensee stated that it has additional hexagonal fuel storage racks available to install in the reactor pool to hold all 93 fuel elements. The additional hexagonal fuel storage racks are identical (same material, dimensions, and storage capacity) to the hexagonal storage racks currently installed and in use within the reactor pool. The licensee plans to maximize storage space in the reactor pool by replacing the existing linear fuel storage racks with hexagonal storage racks.

In its LAR, the license indicated that hexagonal racks would be spaced vertically and horizontally along the reactor pool wall such that neutrons exiting the fuel stored in a hexagonal rack would not contribute to the neutron activity in an adjacent hexagonal rack (i.e., neutronic de-coupling would exist between hexagonal racks). The licensee indicated that a 20-centimeter (7.87 inch) separation between the hexagonal fuel storage racks would result in an infinite (continuous) reflector and thus de-couple each hexagonal fuel storage rack from any neutrons released from an adjacent hexagonal fuel storage rack. In its supplemental letter dated October 22, 2020, the licensee provided additional information to demonstrate the degree of neutronic de-coupling that exists between adjacent hexagonal fuel storage racks.

The licensee provided information from an analysis entitled Benchmarking criticality analysis of TRIGA fuel storage racks, presented in the journal of Applied Radiation and Isotopes, issue 119 (2017), pages 16-22, which included the results of a Monte Carlo Neutron-Particle (MCNP) transport code effective neutron multiplication factor (k-effective) analyses, assuming all hexagonal racks are completely filled with 19 TRIGA fuel elements for two configurations: 1) the hexagonal fuel storage racks are stacked vertically up to three (3) racks high, and 2) the hexagonal fuel storage racks are arranged around the reactor pool wall, from one (1) to twenty (20) hexagonal fuel storage racks. The k-effective factor helps to ensure the safety of fuel storage by providing a limit to the subcritical multiplication for a given storage configuration.

K-effective values less than one indicate subcritical storage configurations. The MCNP k-effective results from 1 hexagonal fuel storage rack to 3 hexagonal fuel storage racks stacked vertically was 0.7185 to 0.7187, respectively. Similarly, the MCNP k-effective results from 1 to 20 hexagonal fuel storage racks around the reactor pool wall calculated k-effectives from 0.7056 to 0.7087, respectively.

During the on-site audit conducted on October 15, 2020, the NRC staff observed that the additional hexagonal fuel storage racks appeared to be consistent with the description of the hexagonal fuel storage fuel racks reviewed and approved for use in the Section 2.7, Fuel Storage, of the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report [SER], Renewal of the Facility Operating License for the United States Geological Survey TRIGA Research Reactor, (License Renewal SER) dated October 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16074A152). The NRC staff reviewed the licensees MCNP analyses for fuel storage during license renewal, as documented in the License Renewal SER, and it remains acceptable.

The NRC staff also finds that the License Renewal SER determined the k-effectives for both 8.5 and 12.0 wt.% U-235 TRIGA fuel elements stored in fully loaded hexagonal fuel storage racks to be less than the requirement in TS 5.4, Fuel Storage, Specification 1, which states: All fuel elements and fueled devices shall be stored in a geometrical array where the k-effective is less than 0.90 for all conditions of moderation and reflection.

Finally, the NRC staff finds that TS 5.4 provides the licensee flexibility to configure the hexagonal fuel storage racks as necessary to support reactor operations while requiring that the k-effective be maintained less than 0.90 to help ensure the fuel is maintained subcritical. Based on the information described above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has sufficient capacity to safely store the 93 intact TRIGA fuel elements using the hexagonal fuel storage racks in the reactor pool.

3.2.2 Sealed Damaged Fuel Canister TRIGA Fuel Elements In its LAR, the licensee indicated that the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements will be placed into sealed damaged fuel canisters (SDFCs) for shipment and storage. TS 3.1.4, Fuel Parameters, prohibits the use of the ten damaged fuel elements in reactor operation. The SDFCs will be stored in storage pits at USGS until they are removed by DOE for final disposition. Modified fuel storage racks will be constructed that will hold up to three SDFCs and each SDFC contains two damaged TRIGA fuel elements. The LAR included a list of the damaged TRIGA fuel elements in Table 2, Failed Elements for Permanent Storage, No Utilization, which provided a description of the damage. By letter dated, October 22, 2020, the licensee indicated that the total mass of U-235 in the 10 fuel elements is less than the criteria specified in 10 CFR 70.24. In its LAR, the licensee indicated that each modified fuel storage rack holding the SDFCs will contain fewer elements than the standard hexagonal fuel storage rack and thereby mitigate the potential for an inadvertent criticality in storage and provide a large margin due to the requirements in TS 5.4 for the k-effective, described in Section 3.2.1 above.

During its on-site audit, the NRC staff reviewed the licensees documents that list the total mass of U-235 contained in the damaged TRIGA fuel elements and finds that the mass of U-235 is significantly less than the 700 grams of U-235, and less than the 450 grams of any combination of U-235, U-233, and plutonium, as specified in 10 CFR 70.24(a), which states, in part:

Each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding 700 grams of contained uranium-235, [or] 450 grams of any combination shall maintain in each area in which such licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system meeting the requirements of either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2).... This section is not intended to require underwater monitoring when special nuclear material is handled or stored beneath water shielding.

Because the requirements in 10 CFR 70.24(a) apply to SNM not stored or handled beneath water shielding and the total mass of U-235 and other combinations of SNM contained in the 10 damaged fuel elements that would be stored in the modified fuel storage racks within storage pits is less than the amounts stated in 10 CFR 70.24, the NRC staff finds that a criticality monitoring system is not required for the SDFCs. The NRC staff reviewed the design of the proposed modified fuel storage racks based on the criticality safety analysis and finds them acceptable to safely store the SDFCs in the storage pits. Any planned modification to the fuel storage racks is subject to a review in accordance with the regulations in 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments, to determine if prior NRC approval is required. In addition, the NRC staff finds that subcriticality is maintained involving storage of the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements in the storage pits because the mass of U-235 is insufficient to create a self-sustaining neutron chain reaction (i.e., below a critical mass of U-235 given optimum geometry [a homogenous sphere, not a TRIGA fuel element], moderation and reflection).

Based on the information provided above, the NRC staff concludes that the storage of the damaged TRIGA fuel elements in the existing storage pits is acceptable.

3.3 Radiation Dose Considerations In its LAR, the licensee stated that the undamaged TRIGA fuel would be stored in the reactor pool in currently available (unused) hexagonal fuel storage racks. The licensee indicated that storage capacity existed for all the undamaged TRIGA fuel to be stored in the hexagonal fuel storage racks. During the on-site audit conducted on October 15, 2020, the NRC staff observed that the licensee has enough unused hexagonal fuel storage racks onsite to accommodate the additional fuel proposed by the LAR. The NRC staff review also finds that the 93 undamaged fuel elements could be stored in as few as 5 hexagonal fuel storage racks and the use of the hexagonal storage racks was previously approved, as described in the Section 2.7, of the License Renewal SER.

In its LAR, the licensee stated that the damaged fuel would be received in SDFCs and stored in existing fuel storage pits, approved for use, at the GSTR facility until DOE removes the damaged fuel for final disposition. Unlike the hexagonal fuel storage racks located under water (shielding) in the reactor pool, the damaged TRIGA fuel would be stored dry in the facilitys existing fuel storage pits. The licensee provided analyses for the radiation doses at the top of the storage pit for two cases: 1) the planned storage of 6 damaged fuel elements in SDFCs, and 2) for a complete, full core and reactor pool offload of all the TRIGA fuel. For the SDFC storage analysis, the licensee simulated a full storage rack of three SDFCs, six damaged elements total, and calculated the source term of the rack by multiplying the highest-activity SDFC element by six. The licensee indicated that the simulated shape of the source is conservative, and the analysis does not credit any self-shielding provided by the fuel and canister. The licensee stated that with the 8-inch thick lead shield plug in place, as described in the LAR, a full storage rack of three SDFCs (i.e., 6 TRIGA fuel elements) would result in a radiation dose rate of less than 1x10-3 millirem (mrem) per hour (i.e., background radiation). For the full core and reactor pool offload, the licensee simulated a full storage pit of four hexagonal storage racks stacked on top of each other, each rack holding nineteen fuel elements. The licensee again indicated that the simulated source term and the shape of the source are conservative, and the analysis does not credit any self-shielding provided by the fuel and structural material. The licensee stated that the use of a shield plug covering the storage pit containing four full hexagonal storage racks of the highest isotope inventory results in a radiation dose rate of less than 0.7 mrem per hour.

The licensee provided additional information, including the calculations supporting the doses described above, for the storage of the damaged TRIGA fuel in its LAR, Attachment 5, Shield Plug for Storage Pits Drawing, and Attachment 6, Dose Rate Analyses for Storage Pit Shield Plug, Multiple Configurations. In its supplement by letter dated October 22, 2020,, Microshield Cases - Assumptions and Detailed Summaries, the licensee provided additional description of the analyses.

During its on-site audit, the NRC staff observed the fuel storage pits and noted that the pits were in a dry condition. The NRC staff finds the calculations support the dose analyses to be consistent with generally accepted dose calculations performed at other research reactors. The NRC staff reviewed the design and use of the lead shield plugs and finds them acceptable to safely shield the radiation from the SDFCs in the storage pits based on the licensees dose analysis. The NRC staff also finds the shield plugs to be an effective engineering control method to reduce radiation exposure to the USGS staff and any members of the public at the facility. In addition, any change to the shield plugs requires a review in accordance with the regulations in 10 CFR 50.59 to determine if prior NRC approval is required.

As described in Section 3.1, Radiation Protection, of the License Renewal SER, the licensee implements a radiation protection program (RPP), which meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. TS 3.7.1, Radiation Monitoring Systems, requires continuous radiation monitoring in the reactor bay and environmental monitoring outside the reactor facility. Further TS 6.3, Radiation Safety, requires that:

The Reactor Supervisor, in coordination with the Reactor Health Physicist, shall be responsible for implementation of the radiation safety program. The requirements of the radiation safety program are established in 10 CFR 20.

The program should use the guidelines of the ANSI/ANS 15.11-2009, Radiation Protection at Research Reactor Facilities.

The NRC staff finds that the licensee adequately evaluated the expected radiation doses associated with the planned storage of the TRIGA fuel in its LAR by analyzing a proposed SDFC storage configuration and a potential full offload of all fuel in the pool. The NRC staff also finds that the engineering control in the form of the pit storage shield plug is consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1101, Radiation protection programs. The NRC staff further finds that the requirements of TS 3.7.1 and TS 6.3 for radiation monitoring and radiation safety will ensure any changes to the expected radiation levels are properly evaluated and the protection of the workers and any members of the public is maintained. Based on the information described above, the NRC staff concludes that the radiation considerations of the proposed LAR are acceptable for the receipt, possession, and storage of the TRIGA fuel.

3.4 Proposed New License Condition 2.B.2.f The licensee indicated in its LAR that its current license condition 2.B.2.a allows the facility to receive, possess, and use up to 9 kilograms of contained U-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel. The facility is expecting to receive 103 TRIGA fuel elements from the VTT. The elements are a combination of 8 weight percent (wt.%) U-235 aluminum clad, 8.5 wt.% U-235 stainless-steel (SS) clad, and 12 wt.% U-235 SS clad TRIGA research reactor fuel. In the LAR, the licensee stated that this LAR is limited to the receipt and possession of the fuel elements, and a subsequent LAR would be submitted for NRC staff review to authorize the use of the fuel. The licensee proposed new LC 2.B.2.f to allow the receipt and possession, but not the use or separation, of up to 4 kilograms of contained U-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT.

The proposed new LC 2.B.2.f states:

f.

to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 4 kilograms of contained uranium-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The ten damaged TRIGA-type fuel elements stored in the sealed damaged fuel canisters will be removed from the USGS TRIGA research reactor facility within two years following resolution of the final disposition plans by the U.S.

Department of Energy.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed license condition and finds that it accounts for the TRIGA reactor fuel mass, SNM, and enrichment that would be received from the VTT based on the quantity of SNM typically found in each TRIGA fuel element with a small margin to allow for uncertainties. GSTR LCs that state the requirements for the receipt and possession of TRIGA fuel at GSTR remain effective to ensure compliance with regulations. This LC would prohibit the licensee from using the slightly irradiated VTT fuel or separating the nuclear material it contains unless it obtains prior NRC approval via a license amendment.

Included in the proposed fuel transfer are 10 TRIGA-type fuel elements that were inspected and determined to be damaged and not suitable for use in reactor operation. By letter dated December 1, 2020, the licensee stated that in order to receive slightly irradiated fuel from VTT that can be used in reactor operation, USGS must also receive the small quantity of damaged fuel. The letter also explained that the acquisition of the used fuel would be less costly to U.S.

taxpayers and there is a 10-year backlog to acquire new TRIGA fuel because production is currently halted.

Because DOE does not currently have a location to store the damaged fuel, the licensee plans to store the 10 damaged fuel elements at its facility until DOE can remove the fuel. During a public meeting conducted on October 29, 2020, the Radiation Program Manager from the Division of Hazardous Materials and Waste Management, Department of Public Health and Environment, State of Colorado, raised a concern about the length of time that the damaged TRIGA fuel would remain at the USGS facility. By letter dated November 5, 2020, the licensee provided a revised LC 2.B.2.f, which states [t]he ten damaged TRIGA-type fuel elements stored in the sealed damaged fuel canisters will be removed from the USGS TRIGA research reactor facility within two years following resolution of the final disposition plans by the U.S. Department of Energy. The licensee also stated that the State of Colorado representative agreed to the language proposed in the revised condition and indicated that the resolution of final disposition plans means the DOE can accept the damaged fuel.

The NRC staff notes that TRIGA fuel damaged during operation is safely stored at research reactor facilities and can remain onsite until decommissioning. The NRC staff finds that the licensees analysis shows that the proposed storage of the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements is acceptable based on the evaluation described above addressing the radiological and criticality safety of the proposed storage. Therefore, the NRC staff does not have a safety concern regarding the proposed storage of damaged fuel. The NRC staff also finds that two years following DOEs ability to accept the damaged fuel provides sufficient time for the licensee to plan and coordinate DOEs removal of the damaged fuel elements. Based on the information provided above, the NRC staff finds the proposed addition of LC 2.B.2.f acceptable.

NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 9.5, Possession and Use of Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material, provides guidance that states that the 10 CFR Part 50 license authorizes SNM needed for operation of the reactor and experiments. However, given the unique opportunity to acquire an amount of slightly irradiated TRIGA fuel that could extend the operation of the facility for approximately 50 years, and the unavailability of new fuel from the manufacturer, the NRC staff finds it acceptable to include the damaged fuel on the license even though it will not be used in connection with the operation of the facility. This also enables USGS to continue its research and development activities consistent with Atomic Energy Act Section 104.c. The NRC staff also finds that the license condition authorizing the receipt and possession of the undamaged fuel is consistent with guidance in NUREG-1537 and therefore acceptable.

3.5 Proposed New License Condition 2.B.2.g In its LAR supplement, dated October 22, 2020, the licensee proposed to add LC 2.B.2.g to allow the receipt and possession, but not the use or separation, of SNM contained in TRIGA fuel elements received from VTT and produced by the operation of other reactor facilities. The licensee indicated that used TRIGA fuel from the VTT has SNM other than U-235 produced by past operation of the VTT research reactor.

The proposed new LC 2.B.2.g states:

g. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, such special nuclear material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed LC and finds that it accounts for SNM contained in TRIGA fuel elements that have undergone irradiation at another research reactor and the material must be stored in the reactor pool and storage pits under conditions that will prevent a criticality accident. Operation of the facility will continue to be controlled by GSTR LC and TS requirements that ensure compliance with regulations for the receipt, possession, and use of TRIGA fuel at GSTR. This LC would prohibit the licensee from using the added fuel or separating the nuclear material it contains unless it obtains prior NRC approval via a license amendment. Based on the information provided above, the NRC staff finds the addition of LC 2.B.2.g to be acceptable.

3.6 Proposed New License Condition 2.B.3.h In its LAR supplement, dated October 22, 2020, the licensee proposed new LC 2.B.3.h to allow the receipt and possession, but not the use or separation, of byproduct materials contained in the irradiated fuel elements received from the VTT.

The proposed new LC 2.B.3.h states:

h. to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with operation of the facility, such byproduct materials as may be produced by operation of other facilities in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel received from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

The NRC staff reviewed proposed LC 2.B.3.h, which would authorize the receipt and possession of byproduct material contained in the TRIGA fuel elements to be possessed under the GSTR reactor license. Because irradiated TRIGA fuel elements contain byproduct material, the NRC staff finds that this LC is necessary to authorize the receipt and possession of byproduct material contained in the TRIGA reactor fuel received from the VTT. This LC would prohibit the licensee from using or separating the byproduct material in the fuel unless it obtains prior NRC approval via a license amendment. Based on the information provided above, the NRC staff finds the proposed LC 2.B.3.h to be acceptable.

3.7 Emergency Plan In its LAR, the licensee indicated that a review of the emergency plan (EP) was conducted and no changes were required as a result of the LAR. The NRC staff reviewed the most recent version of the USGS EP, Revision 17, dated October 2019 (a redacted version is publicly-available at ADAMS Accession No. ML20134J116), to determine if any changes were needed for the proposed LCs. Because the EP contains the licensees general approach to responding to radiological emergencies and does not contain specific actions for the receipt, possession, and storage of SNM and byproduct material, the NRC staff finds no EP changes are necessary to reflect the increase of SNM and byproduct material.

3.8 Interagency Agreement with the Department of Energy Section 302(b)(1)(B) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10222(b)(1)(B),

specifies that the NRC may require, as a precondition to issuing or renewing an operating license for a research or test reactor, that the licensee have an agreement with DOE for the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel. In its LAR, the licensee provided its agreement with DOE, Interagency Agreement between United States Department of Energy and United States Geological Survey for Enriched Uranium, SNM Interagency Agreement Number 1012, Amendment 005, entered on September 30, 2018, which was updated and signed on September 10, 2020. The NRC staff finds that this agreement reflects DOEs continued commitment to accept all the TRIGA fuel at cessation of operation.

3.9 Physical Security Plan Review The LAR, as supplemented, proposes to add new LCs, 2.B.2.f, 2.B.2.g, and 2.B.3.h to obtain TRIGA reactor fuel from the VTT. The licensee is requesting to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the GSTR, up to 4 kilograms of contained U-235 enriched to less than 20 percent as well as SNM and byproduct material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities, in the form of TRIGA-type fuel received from the VTT. To address the proposed increase in SNM, the licensee also provided a revised PSP for NRC staff review, by letter dated November 5, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20310A335 - cover letter only). The PSP is titled Security Plan for the DFC Reactor Facility, Revision XXI.

The NRC staff review of the revised PSP is required to determine compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, because of the proposed increase in SNM. NRC staff also used the guidance provided in Revision 1 to RG 5.59, issued in February 1983.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensees proposed LAR and finds that the proposed change, if approved, would increase the quantity of SNM above the amount currently authorized in LC 2.B.2.a., which permits the facility to receive, possess, and use, but not separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 9 kilograms of contained uranium-235 enriched to less than 20 percent in the form of TRIGA-type reactor fuel.

The NRC staff finds that the amount of SNM currently authorized by LC 2.B.2.a, is Category III under the 10 CFR 73.2 definition of SNM of low strategic significance since it is [l]ess than 10,000 grams but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope), which is subject to the requirements provided in 10 CFR 73.67(f). The NRC staff finds that the addition of 4 kilograms of SNM in the form of TRIGA-type fuel, enriched to less than 20 percent U-235, proposed by the LAR, would increase total SNM to 13 kilograms and result in a Category II quantity in accordance with the definition in 10 CFR 73.2 for SNM of moderate strategic significance which is 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope). The requirements to possess Category II quantities of SNM are provided in 10 CFR 73.67(d).

Specifically, 10 CFR 73.67(d) includes requirements to: use the material only within an illuminated controlled accessed area; store the material within an illuminated controlled access area such as a vault-type room; monitor with an intrusion alarm or other means the controlled access area to detect unauthorized activities; conduct screening prior to granting unescorted access to the controlled area and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to limit access to authorized individuals; assure that visitors to the controlled access area are under constant escort; establish a security organization of at least one watchman per shift to assess and respond to any unauthorized activity, including an ability to communicate with an appropriate response force; and other requirements including random vehicle and package searches and the establishment and maintenance of written response procedures for threats of thefts or thefts of materials.

In addition to reviewing the regulations, NRC staff also used the guidance provided in RG 5.59, which explains the various provisions and requirements of 10 CFR 73.67 concerning the physical protection of licensed activities against radiological sabotage or theft or diversion of SNM. The NRC staff notes that RG 5.59 describes detection capabilities and security requirements for SNM in storage and provides guidance on responding to security events and communication procedures for contacting offsite response forces. Further, the NRC staff notes that RG 5.59 also specifies that security procedures may also be used to protect against theft of SNM, including random patrols by a watchman, in conjunction with detection devices. This defense-in-depth approach ensures early detection as required by 10 CFR 73.67 and described in RG 5.59.

Although not required under 10 CFR 73.67(d), the previously approved PSP already met a number of the requirements for category II quantities of SNM such as those in 10 CFR 73.67(d)(1), (4-6), and (8-10). These additional security measures were implemented in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Because the revised PSP continues to implement these security measures with no changes, USGS meets these now-applicable requirements under 10 CFR 73.67(d).

The PSP was, however, revised to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(d)(2), (3),

(7), and (11). The licensee revised the PSP to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 73.67(d)(2) by verifying the material will be stored only within a controlled access area such as a vault-type room. Compliance with 10 CFR 73.67(d)(3) was demonstrated by clarifying the capability of the intrusion detection system and updating procedures for early detection of unauthorized penetration or activities. As the previous PSP did not address escorting visitors in the controlled access area, the licensee revised the PSP to address 10 CFR 73.67(d)(7) by describing the areas to which visitors must be escorted, and how escorting is accomplished.

Finally, while the previous PSP included written procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of SNM, the licensee revised the PSP to clarify response times and ensure an adequate response in accordance with 10 CFR 73.67(d)(11).

Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that the revised USGS PSP complies with the applicable regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 73 and is consistent with the guidance provided in RG 5.59. In addition, this license amendment revises LC 2.C.3, Physical Security Plan, to reflect the NRC staff approval of the revised PSP. Based on the information provided above, the NRC staff concludes that the revised USGS PSP, Revision XXI, dated November 2020, is acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed amendment would change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental assessment or environmental impact statement is required for any action within the category of actions listed in 10 CFR 51.22(c), for which the Commission declared to be a categorical exclusion by finding that the action does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. The proposed change that would be authorized by the amendment is evaluated below.

4.1 Proposed LCs 2.B.2.f, 2.B.2.g, and 2.B.3.h The regulation in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), states, in part, that issuance of an amendment that changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined by 10 CFR Part 20, meets the definition of a categorical exclusion, provided that, the proposed change satisfies each of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) criteria listed below:

(i)

The amendment or exemption involves no significant hazards consideration;

[10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i)]

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, paragraph (c), a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or [10 CFR 50.92(c)(1)]

The proposed amendment adds new LCs, 2.B.2.f, 2.B.2.g, and 2.B.3.h, to receive, possess, but not use or separate, in connection with the operation of the facility, up to 4 kilograms of contained U-235 enriched to less than 20 percent, as well as SNM and byproduct material as may be produced by the operation of other facilities, in the form of TRIGA-type fuel received from the VTT. In License Renewal SER, Section 4.1.1, The Maximum Hypothetical Accident, the NRC staff evaluated the postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA). The MHA bounds all accidents at the facility, including fuel handling accidents, and assumes the release of fission products from a failed fuel element to the unrestricted environment results in radiological consequences. The NRC staff concluded that MHA calculated doses would remain below the limits in 10 CFR 20.1201, Occupational dose limits for adults, and in 10 CFR 20.1301, Dose limits for individual members of the public.

The proposed LCs do not alter any of the assumptions or limits used in postulating or evaluating the MHA because the MHA is not based on the amount of SNM authorized at the facility. The LCs only authorize the receipt and possession, and not the use or separation of the fuel. In addition, the facility workers are protected from the radiological consequences of an accident by the radiation monitoring, alarms, and evacuation requirements as described in TS 3.7.1, Radiation Monitoring Systems, which is not changed by the proposed amendment.

The TRIGA fuel that would be received and stored under the proposed amendment is identical in size and form to the TRIGA fuel currently licensed for use at the facility.

Any accident associated with the handling of the proposed TRIGA fuel is described in License Renewal SER, Section 4.1.6, Mishandling or Malfunction of Fuel, which states that the radiological consequences are less than the MHA, and thus acceptable. The 10 damaged fuel elements would be stored in SDFCs, thereby reducing the probability of a radiological release by providing an additional barrier to limit the release of any radioactive effluents. In addition, TS 5.4, in part, requires all fuel elements and fueled devices to be stored in a geometrical array where the k-effective is less than 0.90 for all conditions of moderation and reflection, which helps ensure fuel is maintained subcritical. In License Renewal SER, Section 4.1.4, Loss of Coolant Accident, the NRC staff concluded that the licensees loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis and results are acceptable, and the dose rates due to an uncovered core to the workers or members of the public remain less than the limits in 10 CFR Part 20. The proposed LCs do not alter any of the assumptions or limits used in the analysis of the LOCA and the dose rates due to an uncovered core will remain less than the limits in 10 CFR Part 20.

Moreover, the LC phrase but not use or separate ensures that the SNM and byproduct material remains in the form of TRIGA reactor fuel and reduces the potential for an accidental release because the material form may not be altered and SNM and byproduct material would not be released from its fuel form. The phrase prohibits use of the fuel in operation of the reactor or experiments unless the NRC staff issues an amendment that modifies the condition in response to the submission of another LAR. In addition, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because no changes are proposed to reactor design or hardware, or to structures, systems, and components that are relied upon for accident detection, mitigation, or response. Further, the proposed amendment does not change the licensed power level of the reactor, fission product inventory from reactor operations, and or change any potential release paths from the facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or [10 CFR 50.92(c)(2)]

The proposed increase in the SNM and byproduct material possession limits that would enable the licensee to receive, possess, but not use or separate, TRIGA fuel from the VTT does not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because there are no changes to any equipment that is relied upon for accident detection, mitigation, or response to an accident. In addition, the proposed LCs would not introduce any new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures, and there would be no adverse effect or challenges to any systems important to safety as a result of the proposed amendment. The proposed LCs do not authorize any changes in the hardware, design, function, or operation of any equipment important to safety, or in the authorized reactor power level. Further, a criticality accident involving the storage of the 10 damaged TRIGA fuel elements in the storage pits is not possible because the mass of U-235 is insufficient to create a self-sustaining neutron chain reaction. The proposed amendment also does not involve any changes to the operation of the reactor or create any new radiological accident release pathways. No changes to the licensees current SAR, TSs, RPP, and EP are required to ensure that the operation of the facility remains within regulatory limits because the licensee is currently authorized to receive, possess, and use of material of the same size and form as the TRIGA fuel from the VTT. Additionally, the proposed LCs do not alter or decrease the functional capability of any equipment used for defense in depth.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. [10 CFR 50.92(c)(3)]

The proposed increase in the amount of SNM and byproduct material that may be received and possessed by the facility does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The SNM and byproduct material is in form of TRIGA reactor fuel of the same size and form that is currently licensed for receipt, possession, and use at the facility. The damaged fuel elements will be stored in SDFCs in the storage pits until removal by DOE. The licensees RPP has procedures in place to minimize the potential for an accident. The proposed amendment also prohibits the use and separation of the added SNM and byproduct material, requiring that material remain in its licensed form thus preserving the margins of safety currently analyzed in the licensees SAR. The proposed LCs do not authorize any changes in the design, function, or operation of any equipment important to safety, or in the authorized reactor power level. The proposed amendment does not alter how safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined and does not adversely affect existing facility safety margins or the reliability of equipment assumed to mitigate accidents in the facility. Additionally, the proposed LCs do not alter or decrease the functional capability of any equipment used for defense in depth. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

(ii)

There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and [10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(ii)]

The proposed amendment authorizes receipt and possession of an increased amount of SNM and byproduct material in the form of TRIGA fuel at the facility, but the prohibited use and separation of the additional material thereby minimizes the potential for an accidental release. The proposed amendment does not change the types of effluents that may be released offsite or cause any significant increase in the amount of radioactive material that could be released offsite because the existing requirements for monitoring and release of radioactive effluents are unchanged. TS 3.7, Radiation Monitoring Systems and Effluents, continues to require that annual releases from the facility do not result in a radiation dose (to a member of the public) in excess of the annual dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1101 (10 mrem) and 10 CFR 20.1301 (100 mrem). The reactor power level, the amount of radioactive material used in the operation of the reactor, and the design of equipment important to safety are not changed. In addition, the small amount of damaged fuel will remain in SDFCs and placed in dry storage upon arrival. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite because the proposed LCs do not affect the offsite radiological material released from the facility.

(iii)

There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. [10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(iii)]

The proposed amendment adds new LCs to increase the SNM possession limit. The proposed LCs do not alter any technical or safety requirements for radiation monitoring at the facility or affect occupational radiation exposure. The reactor power level, the amount of radioactive material used in the operation of the reactor, and the design of equipment important to the safety of the reactor are not changed. The use of the pit storage shield plugs provides an effective engineering control method to reduce radiation exposure to the USGS staff and any members of the public at the facility.

Further, TSs 6.3 requires that the licensees radiation safety program controls radioactive material exposure to prevent exposures that exceed the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and TS 3.7.2 requires that any operational releases be below the limits in Table 2 of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20. Further, facility radiation protection program requirements remain unchanged. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

4.2 Revised Physical Security Plan The NRC staff determined that the proposed amendment approving changes to the PSP does not involve any significant construction impacts and are confined to organizational and procedural matters and administrative changes. Accordingly, the proposed PSP changes meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(12)(i) and (iii).

4.3 Environmental Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusions set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(12)(i) and (iii). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: G. Wertz, NRR MK. Gavello, NRR M. Balazik, NRR E. Reed, NRR Date: December 3, 2020