ML20076G260

Proposed Tech Spec Changes to Enhance Clarity & Provide Consistency W/Plant Design & Operation

ML20076G260
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	08/29/1983
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20076G242	List: AECM-83-0492, Application to Amend License NPF-13 Enhancing Clarity & Providing Consistency W/Plant Design & Operation ML20076G260
References
NUDOCS 8308310014
Download: ML20076G260 (51)

Text

TRANSMITTAL OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO CRAND GULF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

1. (GGNS - 97) (Partial resubmittal of Item 1, AECM-83/0449)

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Tables 3.3.2-1, 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, 3.6.4-1, 3.6.6.2-1, 4.3.2.1-1, Technical Specifications 3/4.6.4 and 4.6.1.1.b and Bases 3/4.6.6 and 3/4.6.4, pages 3/4 3-10 through 3/4 1-15, 3/4 3-17 through 3/4 3-20, 3/4 3-22, 3/4 3-23, 3/4 6-1, 3/4 6-27, 3/4 6-29 through 3/4 6-35, 3/4 6-37 through 3/4 6-42, 3/4 6-44, 3/4 6-48, B3/4 6-5, and B3/4 6-6.

DISCUSSION:

A.

The changes to Table 3.3.2-1 include the following:

1.

Delete valve group 5 and 9 from present item 1.b, Drywell Pressure-High and 1.d, Manual Initiation.

Delete valve group 5 from items 2.a and 2.h, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 and Manual Initiation.

2.

Add valve group 9 to 5.b, RCIC Steam Supply Pressure

- Low.

3.

Add new note (k) to 6.d. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High, to 6.e Drywell Pressure

- High and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14.

Note (k) states: Valves E12-F037A and E12-F037B are closed by high drywell pressure. All other group 3 valves are closed by high reactor pressure.

4.

Add new note (m) to 5.b page 3/4 3-12, RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14 to reflect that valve group 9 must receive concurrent drywell pressure-high and RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low signals to isolate.

5.

Add new 1.b,1.c,1.e and 1.f for ECCS initiated closure signals for primary containment isolation valves. These items are also added to Tables 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, and 4.3.2.1-1.

l

(

6.

Valve group 6 is split into groups "6A" and "6B" to identify valve closure signals from primary l

containment isolation instrumentation and from ECCS signals.

7.

Add notes (c) and (d) to Primary Containment Isolation (Manual Initiation) valve group column.

8308310014 830829 PDR ADOCK 05000416 p

PDR G14sp4

t

.~

l 8.

Add new note (n) to new items 1.c. 1.e. and to page 3/4 3-14 Note (n) states: Valves E12-F042A and E12-7042B are closed by Containment Spray System l

initiation signals.

9.

Add new ACTION statement 29 to apply to new ECCS instrumentation added to the subject table.

10. Delete valve group 6 from 3.a. 3.b, and 3.e.

11. Add notes (c), (d), and (h) to 3.e.

12. Add new 5.m. Drywell Pressure-High for valve group 9.

Also add note (m), 1 minimum operable channel per trip system, applicable operational conditions as 1, 2, 3, and ACTION statement 27. This item is also added to Tables 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, and 4.3.2.1-1.

13. Delete valve group 4 from 6.f.

l B.

Footnote (c) is added to Tabic 4.3.2.1-1 and applies to the Channel Calibration for the ECCS instrumentation added to the table as items 1.b 1.c 1.e. 1.f. and 5.m.

C.

Specification 4.6.1.1 is changed to exempt isolation valves located in the steam tunnel from the requirements of surveillance 4.6.1.1.b by modifying the ** footnote on page 3/4 6-1.

D.

Specification 3.6.4 is changed to ensure consistency between Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.6.4-1.

The proposed change is to add a "#" to the Applicability statement and a footnote to the bottom of page 3/4 6-27.

This note will require the isolation valves listed on Table 3.6.4-1 to be OPERABLE when the corresponding actuation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per Table 3.3.2-1.

E.

Table 3.6.4-1 lists the containment and Drywell Isolation Valves in four sections. Section 1 contains the Automatic Isolation Valves which are those valves that receive an automatic isolation signal from Table 3.3.2-1 instrumentation and are located on the Containment or Drywell penetrations.

The valves included in Section 2 are Manual Isolation valves which receive a remote manual signal from a handswitch and are located on the Containment or Drywell Penetrations.

Some of the valves in Section 2 may receive automatic signals, but not automatic isolation signals from instrumentation in Table 3.3.2-1.

The valves included in Section 3 are those which do not receive isolation signsis from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1 and do not utilize a remote manual handswitch. Section 3 includes check valves, local manual C14sp5

- ~ _

l 2-1 operated valves and power operated valves that do not utilize a handswitch. Section 4 of Table 3.6.4-1 contains test connection valves. The changes to Table 3.6.4-1 fall into the following categories:

1.

Correction of maximum isolation times 2.

Correction of valve group assignments 3.

Penetration number corrections 4

4.

Addition of new valves 5.

Addition to and correction of present footnotes 6.

Placement of valves in proper section of the table.

i 7.

Correction of typographical error.

i F.

Table 3.6.6.2-1 contains a list of secondary containment i

ventilation system automatic isolation dampers and valves.

Section "a" of the table lists dampers with their associated 4

i maximum isolation times. Section "b" lists valves and their associated maximum isolation times. The changes to Table 3.6.6.2-1 fall into the following categories:

1.

Correction of maximum isolation times 2

2.

Addition of dampers i

A more detailed description of the changes to Tables 3.6.4-1 and 3.6.6.2-1 is provided below in the justification section.

Bases Sections 3/4.6.4 and 3/4.6.6 are expanded to discuss the methods used for determining maximum valve isolation times.

Manual Initiation for the containment isolation function of the ECCS instrumentation has not been added to the tables. The affected valves can be isolated manually by initiating the appropriate Emergency Core Coolant System or by using each valve's remote manual handswitch (located in the control room).

l The ECCS manual initiation switches are addressed in Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1 items A.1.d. b.1.d, and C.1.f.

We do not feel that these switches need to be added to the Isolation Instrumentation Table since the valves can still be isolated by their individual handswitches.

4 The remote manual handswitches are not specifically addressed-i in the instrumentation tables for any of the containment l

isolation valves, but are associated with system operability because of the Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE.

The handswitches are regularly tested when the containment isolation valves are stroked pursuant to Technical Specification 4.6.4.3.

We believe the margin of safety in the Technical Specifications is maintained without adding an additional line item in the Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Table for manual isolation of the ECCS instrumented valves.

Appropriate Action statements would be complied with due to the Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE.

l; p

.G14sp6

, c..

JUSTIFICATION: A.

The changes to Table 3.3.2-1 are proposed to correct previous omissions and to more accurately describe the j

signals that operate valve groups. The changes to present items 1.b 1.d, 2.a. and 2.h delete valve groups 5 and 9 because these valve groups receive an isolation signal from ECCS rather than a containment isolation signal.

New items 1.b.1.c.1.e. and 1.f are added to Table 3.3.2-1 to indicate that the isolation actuation signals originate from ECCS rather than containment isolation actuation instrumentation. Minimum operable channels per 1

]

trip system for these new items is the same as on Table 4

I j

3.3.3-1 for the same instrumentation. Applicable Operational Conditions for the new ECCS items are the same as present similar isolation actuation instrumentation on Table 3.3.2-1.

Present ACTION statement 20 as applicable to isolation actuation instrumentation is inappropriate for the new ECCS instrumentation added to Table 3.3.2-1.

New ACTION statement 29 is proposed for new items 1.b.

1.c. 1.e. and 1.f.

ACTION statement 29 covers all operational conditions and requires declaration of component or system inoperable to satisfy ECCS requirements.

i The action of placing the affected system isolation valve (s) in the closed position provides the required isolation function for the affected containment penetrations. Systems affected by closure of these valve (s) are addressed through the Technical Specifications governing each individual system (i.e.,

LCO's and Action Statements for an ECCS system if one or more of its valves or instruments are inoperable).

Present ACTION statement 20 is considered overly restrictive for the systems being added to the subject instrumentation table. The action required by the proposed ACTION statement 29, in addition to required actions associated with the affected inoperable systems, addressed elsewhere in the technical specification, are considered adequate.

Additions are likewise made to Tables 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, l

l and 4.3.2.1-1 to is:crporate the setpoints, response times and surveillance re;uirements for the ECCS indtrumentation.

Valve group 6 is separated into "6A" and "6B" to show valves receiving isolation signals from containment isolation actuation instrumentation (6A) and ECCS signals (6B). Valve group 9 is added to 5.b. RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low along with footnote (m) to clarify that group 9 valves must receive concurrent drywell pressure and RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low signals to isolate.

Note (k) is added to 6.d and 6.e valve groups and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14.

Note (k) clarifies that valvee E12-F037A and F.12-F037B are closed by high drywell G14sp7

pressure and all other group 3 valves are closed by high reactor pressure. The addition of notes (c) and (d) clarifies that Manual Isolation also actuates Standby Gas Treatment and isolates Control Room Emergency Filtration.

Note (n) is added to clarify that Valves E12-7042A and E12-F042B are closed by Containment Spray System initiation.

Group 6 valves are deleted from items 3.a. 3.b. and 3.e on Table 3.3.2-1 because these valves are listed as closing from primary containment isolation instrumentation in Section 1 of the table. Since valve group 6 consists of primary containment isolation valves, placement in the secondary containment section of the table is not correct.

Notes (c), (d), and (h) are added to Item 3.e on Table 3.3.2-1.

These notes were inadvertently left off Item 3.

Manuel initiation of secondary containment isolation will actuate standby gas treatment, control room emergency filtration in the isolation mode, and secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers and valves.

New Item 5.m Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS Division 1 and Division 2) is added to Tables 3.3.2-1, 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, and 4.3.2.1-1.

Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS Division 1 and Division 2) is an isolation signal for valve group 9 and should be on the tables. Note (m) is added to valve group 9 on Item 5.m of Table 3.3.2-1 along with 1 minimum operable channel per trip system, applicable operational conditions 1, 2, 3 and ACTION statement 27. These additions to Section 5 of Table 3.3.2-1 are consistent with other items presently in Section 5.

On Table 3.3.2-2 new Item 5.m uses the ECCS trip setpoint and allowable values. On Table 3.3.2-3 new $. tem 5.n has a response time of less than or equal to 13 seconds with superscript (a) noting the diesel generator start time is included. This change to Table 3.3.2-3 is consictent with Drywell Pressure-High Response Times presently on the Table. The surveillance Requirements for new Item 5.m on Table 4.3.2.1-1 are consistent with other Drywell Pressure-High instrumentation presently on the table.

Valve Group 4 should be deleted from Item 6.f on Table 3.3.2-1 since manual initiation from RER system isolation does not close these valves.

B.

Footnote (c) is added to Table 4.3.2.1-1 and applies to the Channel Calibration for the ECCS instrumentation added to the table as items 1.b,1.c.1.e.1.f and 5.m.

This footnote is the same as footnote (a) on ECCS Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements. Table 4.3.3.1-1.

C14sp8

C.

The proposed changes to specification 3.6.1.1 will exempt from surveillance 4.6.1.1.b primary containment isolation valves located in the steam tunnel which are locked closed. The harsh environment and high radiation in the steam tunnel would preclude visual verification of these valves during normal operation as required by surveillance 4.6.1.1.b.

D.

The proposed change to Specification 3.6.4 is made to require the containment and dryvell isolation valves to be OPERABLE when their corresponding actuation instrumentation in Table 3.3.2-1 is required to be OPERABLE. This change provides consistency between the Instrumentation and the Containment Systems Sections of the Technical Specifications.

E.

The changes to Table 3.6.4-1 are justified as follows:

1.

All proposed valve closing time changes except E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B were derived by applying margins to previous test data. These margins were obtained from ASME Section XI which states that valves closing faster than 10 seconds are allowed a 50% change in closing speed and valves closing slower than 10 seconds are allowed a 25% change in speed before increased surveillance is required. To determine the maximum closing time for the valves, a factor of two times the allowable from previous test closure to next test closure (based on the 50% and 25% calues) was added to the stroke times obtained from previous test data. For example:

A valve for which previous test data indicates a 20 second closing time would have a 5 second (25%) from previous test to next test Allowable Value. Two times the Allowable Value (or 10 seconds) yould then be added to the tested closing time of 20 seconds to give the maximum closing time for the valve of 30 seconds.

The closing times for E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B were reduced from 93 seconds to 90 seconds. The analytical value of 90 seconds is used in FSAR accident analysis and is thus required. These valves have been tested and found to close in less than 80 seconds, well below their analytical time requirements.

The present maximum closure times in the table have no consistent basis and use values from design or purchase specification values. The proposed Technical Specification changes will provide a consistent basis for the maximum isolation times and will provide a realistic measure of valve performance l

G14sp9 1e-

through both the Technical Specification and ASME Section KI testing. The methodology used for determining maximum valve isolation times is added to Bases Sections 3/4.6.4 and 3/4.6.6.

Valves in Table 3.6.4-1 which have analytical closing time requirements era 1B21-F028A, B, C, D; IB21-F022A, B, C, D; 1E12-F008; 1E12-F009; 1E12-F024A, B; 1M41-F011. F012, 7034 F035; 1E12-F028A, B; 1M41-F015. F013. F016, F017; and E51-F063, E51-F064.

Only the following valve stroke times are increased by this item:

1E12-7011A-A 1P45-7068 1E61-7007 1E51-F031 1P11-F131 1E51-F077 1P60-7009 1E21-F012 1E61-F005A 1P44-F070 1E61-F005B 1G33-F034 1P52-F195 2.

E12-7023-B is corrected to read E12-F023-A.

3.

E12-F042A-A and E12-F042B-B have been left in Section 1.

However, these valves do not receive an automatic isolation signal from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1.

The automatic signal received for closing these valves is a " containment spray" signal. These valves would close on a " containment spray" signal to divert the RHR water to the containment spray header.

These valves may be operated by a remote handswitch.

New note (n) is added to Table 3.3.2-1 to clarify the source of isolation signals.

4.

E22-F023-C, E51-7031-A, and E21-F012-A should have superscript (d). The superscripts for these valves were apparently omitted.

5.

P44-F076-A, P44-F077-B, and P44-F074-B are moved from Section 2.b to Section 1.b.

Thesc valves receive automatic isolation signals, group 6A, from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1.

6.

E61-F003B, F003A, F005A, F005B, and F007 are in valve group 5 and not in valve group 6.

7.

E61-F020 is being added to the table. This valve was l

inadvertently left off the table. It receives group 5 isolation signals.

I l

8.

G33-F253 has the wrong valve group identified. This is a group 8 valve, not group 10.

G14sp10

~

9.

E12-F027B should be E12-F027B-B. This change makes the valve identification consistent with the rest of the table.

10 E12-F042C-B - The superscript (c) is being changed to superscript (c). This is apparently a typographical error. The valve will be tested per (c) as are other valves with similar piping configurations. This footnote describes the type of leak test required.

11.

E12-F064B-B is being moved from Section 3 to Section 2.

This is a minimum flow valve and serves the same function as E12-F064A-A which is already in Section 2.

The valve has a handswitch for remote manual operation.

12.

P41-F159A-A - The superscript (c) is being changed to superscript (c). This is apparently a typographical error. The valve will be tested per (c) as is P41-F159B-B. This footnote describes the type of leak test required.

13.

B33-F204 and B33-F205 are being moved to Section 3.b.

These valves are local manually operated valves.

14.

In Section 3 of the table, Cont. Leak Rate System penetration 40(I)(0) is being moved to page 3/4 6-40 to a new section for blind flanges. Cont. Leak Rate System penetration 82(I) is corrected to 82(I)(0) and also moved to new section for blind flanges on page 3/4 6-40.

15.

Superscript (c) is added to E12-F041C-B to indicate hydrostatic testing with water. This superscript was inadvertently omitted and is appropriate for this valve.

16.

Penetration numbers for M61-F015, M61-F019, and M61-F017 are corrected from Outboard (0) to Inboard (I). Penetration numbers for M61-F014, M61-F018, M61-F016, and B33-F017B are corrected from Inboard (I) to Outboard (0).

17.

M61-F021 and M61-F020 are being added to the table.

These valves were inadvertently left off the table.

18.

E51-F258 should be penetration #29(0)

E51-F257 should be penetration #29(0) l These changes constitute correction of errors.

19.

Change footnotes on page 3/4 6-29 as follows:

a.

Change (f) to read: Hydrostatically sealed by feedwater leakage control system. Type C test results not required to be included when deternining the combined leakage rate.

G14sp11

10 CFR SO Appendix J III.C.3 allows deletion of this Icakage from the combined leakage rate.

b.

Add footnote (g)to read: Normally closed or locked closed manual valves may be opened on an l

intermittent basis under administrative control.

I i

This footnote applies to sections 2, 3, and 4 of I

Table 3.6.4-1.

The addition of this footnote will enhance operational flexibility and provide control of valve position.

c.

Change (c) to read: Hydrostatically tested with water to 1.10 Pa, 12.65 psig. The "1.10" was inadvertently omitted. The present 11.5 is a typo and should be 12.65 psig ss in note (d).

3 1

20.

Add to section 4 b. Reactor Water Cleanup Test l

l Connection valve G33-F120 at penetration 366(I).

This valve was inadvertently omitted.

F.

The changes to Table 3.6.6.2-1 are justified as follows:

1.

Under dampers in Section a, the following changes are proposed and justification provided:

a.

Add Q1M41-F007, Q1M41-F008, Q1M41-F036, and Q1M41-F037. These dampers were inadvertently omitted from the table.

b.

All closing times in Table 3.6.6.2-1.a are based on accident analysis in Chapter 15 of the FSAR which used a 4 second closing time. This change will make the damper closing times consistent with the FSAR.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The proposed changes fall into the following major categories:

1.

Corrections.

2.

Additions to the tables.

3.

Changes to ensure consistency in the Technical Specifications between Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.6.4-1 Valve isolation tires (except for E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B) presently do not have a consistent basis. Some are from design or purchase specifications. The proposed change will make the basis for maximum isolation times consistent and follow ASME Section XI requirements. The closing times for E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B were reduced to correspond to their analytical closing times used in FSAR accident analysis. The changes to the footnotes on page 3/4 6-29 are proposed to follow 10CFR50 G14sp12

1

)

\\

Appendix J.III.C.3 requirements nnd to add administrative control to manually operated valves. The closing times for dampers listed in 3.6.6.2-1.a are based on Chapter 15, FSAR requirements.

The changes proposed constitute administrative changes, corrections of errors or imposition of more stringent requirements. These changes do not introduce a significant reduction in margin of safety and tney do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated nor does it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Thus, no significant hazards considerations are involved.

l G14spl3 l

n INSERT D To Bases Page B3/4 6-5 The maximum isolation times for containment and drywell automatic isolation valves are the times used in the FSAR accident analysis for valvss with analytical closing times. For automatic isolation valves not having analytical closing times, closing times are derived by applying sargins to previous valve closing test data obtained by using ASME Section XI criteria.

Maximum closing times for these valves was determined by using a factor of two times the allowable (from previous test closure to next test closure) ASME Section X1 margin and adding this to the previous test closure time.

INSERT E To Page 3/4 3-15 TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE b.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-greater than or greater than or Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS -

equal to -41.6"*

equal to -43.8" Division 3) i f

c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-greater than or greater than or Low Low Low, Level 1 (ECCS -

equal to -150.3"*

equal to Division 1 and Division 2)

-152.5" Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS -

less than or equal less than or e.

Division 1 and Division 2) to 1.89 psig equal to 1.94 Psig f.

Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS -

less than or equal less than or Division 3) to 1.89 psig equal to 1.94 Psig G14sp14

1 l

l l

INSERT F To Page 3/4 3-18 l

TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME b.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Less than or equal to 13(*

Level 2 (ECCS - Division 3)

Less than or equal to 13(*)

c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low l

Low, Level 1 (ECCS - Division 1 and Division 2) e.

Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS - Division Less than or equal to 13(*

1 And Division 2) f.

Drywell Fressure-High (ECCS - Division Less than or equal to 13(a) 3)

INSERT G To Page 3/4 3-20 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN CHANNEL WHICH CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION REQUIRED R ")

1, 2, 3, and #

I b.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-S M

Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS -

Division 3) c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-S M

R*

1, 2, 3 and i Low Low Low, Level 1 (ECCS -

Division i and Division 2)

Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS -

S M

R("

1, 2, 3 e.

Division 1 and Division 2)

I f.

Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS -

S M

R 1, 2, 3 Division 3)

G14sp15 w -

crr wr r

--M

r INSERT H To Bases Page B3/4 6-6 The maximum isolation times for secondary containment automatic isolation dampers / valves are the times used in the FSAR accident analysis for dampers / valves with analytical closing times. For automatic isolation valves not having analytical closing times, closing times are derived by applying margins to previous valve closing test data obtained by using ASME Section XI criteria. Maximum closing times f.or these valves was determined by using a factor of two times the allowable (tros previous test closure to next test closure) ASME Section XI margin and adding this to the previous test closure time.

1 G14sp16

i.-

CD

@ I.CCNS-1

~

~~

,E2C E

2 C

E EN C CN EDU$

9%

p

=[s 1

1 1

1]

g-

~, f ) Q,

~$

4 44 4

44

> d 44 is aaa a

a a aa a sa E

5$

qY 99

.l5$.

?

E E

l

~

N N

N N

N N

k b

G =-

i

=

I iS 4

-s O

2

~

2 4 ~~

~

• h

$4

+ 5 f

a7 l WI

%b a NE-14 4 y

aa N

a g

a4 :

d;'ite5 A

'8 8

I 5I 15 o

-sl

. n! - t 'e g e-

=

t~ ='

5.5 s! !,!

'E-E s

! lJ' !!i

$% h'O i

sE I Ig* s I i -. p4 j 5 -s - s i,I

!j5

E

,=-

t si.a Ig!' 3: j.s 3 sJA n=

a 3

m e

a ilsi= sis! s g s. p 5s,ajh n

53 s

jy!}_{I3]E k

p n.

ng.3 l

re p-v i.

e o

4,<

4e w e is <

WW a-

=4

$ 4 A

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-10

,,.,. _ -. _,. - _ _ _, _.. _. -. ~. - - _.,.,

Q QI 83/II 762.

78?.

7b?-

i l

men e ne

=

=

=

S S

W gyg a.a a.

-g aaa aa aaa a

aa aaa E,

aa4 a a.

aaa a

aa aaa E

E 1

[!

[

i i

^

E=m

~4

-s 3

~~~

.B g

N M

?

r mm Y

44 E.

XX ne55 M

a

.W" 994 A SE, "WE a8 xx.

c

.gE g

g E ~a ng i

5 E

5

~

E'.

s 's s

-l 5

5 t

" lE l i"E 5a I =E s is :

i--

l i

s s.

=

m= -

s a

s

j :rs' r

3 s

an s s-g a

=

e ma ss-s e e m 3"'

3 si is 5

i

'is E

aa5 53 E j" } ]y--- -"3 23 ) 553m}mjmg"j"I'g~j 3

g 1g

=

so e

,n oeo e

e

.2

.M GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-11

I. (GG Ns-97)

~

t t

t t

t t

t t

t t2y In,...,D i

i as IIl]l!

4 C{ I_

4 R

s Ei lll=1lg..~........24 15 r

t il 1

l i i b

8 i

8 ist 1

4

'1,g5]i;il._listi!,1

,n s

s.t s~i s i

.1

,d l s..II mulen}n!sisllile.g.'l!h

!5li i ll s

s-s i

=

si ei i

~

I IF.

4 4

3/4 > 32 SRAft EULF-WIIT 1

l gg

,.en - e n 5

a a

aam 1.a l

l1!

i i

i iii s'

@91

'Gt llslslil i

4 4

- - viw a

1 r!

4-l lg.g 2+

n n

e g,= n=

s l

1 f?a!

i.

s siti IsI:l11's Es?I i

v l gsg737IIEi l!

ii!illll l

b Y

I 4

3/4 3-13 SIWE SM-WIIIT 1

INSTRUMENTATION Ygg(E 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

!$0LATION ACTUATIDM INSTRW4ENTATIOk ACTION Se in at least MDT SHUTDOWN wi*.hin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN ACTION 20 within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 21 -

Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour y

i eri e

I'J:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HDT 5HUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and ist COLD $NUTDOWN f*i within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

f "*"'"Y Q{

b.

In Operational Condition *, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the containment and (ti-I

\\e-operations with a potential for draining the reactor b(,E vessel.

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within E

ACTION 22 6'h 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least ICT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> g; ACTION 23 and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Se in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed e f*'

N=

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HDT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 houn.

g 3

Jl ACTION 24 Se in at least STARTUP within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

o[OACTION25 Establish SECONDARY CONTAlle4ENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment systee operating within ene hour.

Eastore the manual initiation function b OPERASLE status

-ej' ACTION 26 I

within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or close the affected system isolation valves g

within the next hour and declare the affected systes inoperable.

k(. ACTION 27 Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour g{q and declare the affected system inoperable.

g ACTION 28 Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within one hour

'p, $wsam Dhand declare the affected systas inoperable.

g e 54* T,.7 'A,

~ - - - - NOTES

,,, m,.J5 is WhenhandlingirradiatedfuelinthechntainmentandduringCORE I

I

(

ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vesse g*

During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the

%s]#

reactor vessel.

(a) See Specification 3.G.4 Table 3.6.4-1 for valves in each valve group.

A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for dEh (b) required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped con-dition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip systen ls is monitoring that parameter.

Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.

(c)

(d) Also actuates the control roca emergency filtration system in the isolation a

3 ande of aperation.

i ;;;t:!: rd/ r te d=:::?: cetrt-tM *-*; p*-

Also ti,1ps and isolates the mechanical vacuum pueps.

e is OPERABLE if 2 af 4 instruments in that channel are OPERASLE.

g

%[ 1 A chantial;h7 Also ac'.uates secondary containment v t

valves per Table 3.6.6.2-1.

@8 Closes only RWCU sy) stem isolation valves G33-F001, $33-F004, and G (1)

A.7 ana tis ses ty Gar 't rsan.a r rpra.-.

m) is.l<bu Avvilis 7

()}

1 ArdJ.'.y p aa aL.T,'

s af 714 era Wl*We= rysNs wh vi,. Avs'itary A;U,.y.

SRAhD GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 a

r

.r c,'.

l

~...

l iq I.

..s

[r l(k'csaATA)

T Ds,Kor TIP FAeN M 3.gb O O Y$s 8 w e**.Jen.aar eseuva AS2V slaeers *

• y s*

n so Jaaese resuva ~

eyon.;e.Sr*1La h:

m awak = Q ueno evaan be 1 M r & imv 16 eM.w

\\

i, &sav j

p str y dem=p useer.e aA*TJews. or Av van g%sp>.i. Kn med byp we'll is us,= evah wA a*.

l ve, ts,. s v r,rf

.v.-

.a.

,4-e s.

f

'l j

e i

i NasAT *S one omsnue'sur 0

vast svsvan uusr nave er s.us,-m

• sees P = vue bi East OPEAa84.4

'{

l ern % u Sveam t.w.

O P5RASts.

v. m si..n.as vi sd s.xn.r>

aw TUh see s

<*~r :n r i -pe Lla g,,** or er c,uas r/m,y>.i,y. 3 ers arrowat

.. I.

eneVAa g

' *

• r fa laas V MOT SNU 700lVN e s-an.J in COLD S'#urcenew,,,y&lg

+. r~ orrurune e.a,z r,,a.g 5l,,,r a,,,$";

c jor a*va.*,,y^" *y~ka. pooari MM J* ra,,

,,,,, g,

s.ccr&ns s n

_-----,-.--_,-._...----,e-,--_-..-.m._

au

,. wa,-m nc 6

4=*2*

i d

g-af.

g-T; i

• 4 w J s

a in - p k

'".=a #. -.aa-1g i

=

m v.

1 4

kl vi vi I Al v1 AlviAlviviI Al vi vt VI E

.n E

-f

.1.

t :a i =]

i j.t 2:

e

-,=2 e

C~

1:

.=

s 5

n.. a n &. A m

.=

a

=.

~

m.s.

an t

a 1;

o

=

s To o

e v1 N AlviAlvigvlN A l v i,, v i N

N Al vi v1 N Al vi

'd R s s

z

.k 8

E 3

g s

y(

s es is E

C E

s s=

.5

-[

I E

8 t

E E

I.g-.

s jE "*

!- 3

%=

3s E

s

~

3~.

g St i Ias W

5--

E

,m 3~.

g.E l

sRE*

• es:

as -

s t I ]s i s3sg I

stltts E 3

3s as :

ia_

ss ssvss E rz - ri ri s m

a-est s-a !

,,ea : a. E : - - - e m.e

-e.

e es

..s I" O I" $

I" O E

j

$. f $.

1. , #.#..#.#f

$. f.3 3.0 0

5

=

5 4 KK

%E4 4

d i 4 4 o 4 'JI d 4d i

4 4 ( '. =.

m 5.

i-er*

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 Id 3/4 3-15 I

[

e TMLE 3.3.2-2 (Continued)

,lSOLATION ACTWTION INSTWl5ENTATIN SETPOINTS ALL M TRIP SETpOINT VALUE _

S Trip 6 q

MACTOR CSEE 151LATim C00 Lits 5YSTDI (Continued) d.

RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - Nigh i 199'F**

$ 195'F**

g e.

IICIC Equipment Reen & Teep. - Nigh i,g*'F **

<Ig*F**

w 1

r-

-e g a, 3 w

f.

Main Steen Line Tunnel Amelent Temperature - Mfgh

< W 9 F**

~ 101

~ 804 Main Steam Line Tunnel & Temp. - Nigh 1 M*F**

i f8*F**

op {

l g.

h.

Rain Stees Line Tunnel Teeperatore Timer i 30 minutes S 30 minutes 1.

RMR Egelpment Room Amstent Temperature - Migh i 189'F**

1 175'F**

l J.

155t Egelpeent Reem A Toeperature - Mfgh i 195*F**

< 198*F**

i*I 160 I

R, k.

MR/RCit Steen Line Flow - Migh i 145' M '

I"3"" # 8 2

2 a

11 4 11 4 w*

o,,wsto na sa,re.-u:,s. LEus W * ~~) Dh n 1 s.s4 rs 3 s s.s, ps:3 l

1.

Manuel Inttietfen 9

~

m.

s.

luut sv5 TEM 1 SOLATION Ingt Equipment Room Ashtent Temperature - Mfgh i 189'F**

5 175'F**

.k e.

b.

19W1 Egelpment Rose & Teeperature - Mtgh i 195'F**

$ 108*F**

9 V

Ilsector Vessel 1Anter Level - Low, Level 3 3 11.4 inches

• 1 10.8 inches i

i c.

1 d.

Reacter vessel (Iget Cut-in permissive) i 135 pois i 150 psig, Pressere - Nigh 1

i 1.73 psig

< 1.93 psig Drywell pressure - Migh e.

11 4 II4 f.

Moneel Initiation See Bases,,Ffgere B 3/4 3-1.

Any required change to Final setpoint to be detemined during startep test program.

initial setpoint.

this setpoint she11 be sutunf tted to the Consulssion within 90 days of test completion.

I

l.(G&NS-4 )

TABLE 3.3.2-3 ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME RESPONSE TIME'(Seconds)#

TRIP FUNCT j

1.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a)

< 13(I Reacto'r Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 7 13 ")

d a.

Drywell Pressure - High

)8.y.

S-C'"t'i""'"t*"d8'Y"'S)VentilationExhaust

< 13,)**

I Radiation - High High RA I

h. #.'

Manual Initiation

twaskT r*

2.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION a

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low,

< 1.0*/< 13,)**

I a.

Main Steam Line Radiation - High(b) 7 1.0* 8 13 *"}**

Level 1 I

c.

Main Steam Line Pressure - Low I 1.0* 8 13 "))**

I b.

C 7 0.5* 8 13 d.

Main Steam Line Flow - High

~

RA e.

Condenser Vacuum - Low f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High NA Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temp. - High NA g.

NA h.

Manual Initiation 3.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

< 13 ")

I Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 7 13 ")

I a.

b.

Drywell Pressure - High

~

Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust I8) c.

Radiation - High High(b)

< 13

~

d.

Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust

< 13(,)

Radiation - High High(b)

RA e.

Manual Initiation 4.

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION NA a.

A Flow - High NA b.

A Flow Timer NA E:;uipment Area Temperature - High NA d.

Equipment Area A Temp. - Nigh

< 13,)

g Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2

~

e.

f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient NA Temperature - High NA Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temp. - High g.

NA h.

SLCS Initiation NA 1.

Manual Initiation t

3/4 3-18 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1

~

E

,-,.,,---,-,,e

,,m

-n

,,,.,,-.,,_,,,,,,.,,-y.,,,m,.,.,,--.,,.

l. (&&NS -9 7)

INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3.2-3 (Continued)

ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)#

5.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

RCIC Steam Line Flow - High

< 13 *)

I b.

RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low I 13 ")

I c.

RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High NA d.

RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High NA e.

RCIC Equipment Room a Temp. - High NA f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temp. - High NA g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temp. - High NA h.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer NA 1.

RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High NA j.

RHR Eculpment Room A Temp. - High NA k.

RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow - High NA 1.

pry..H i{nitiation #4& (EW-Dier # nJ g',.3,) g,p3 ")

l Manual NA I

ussura -

m.

6.

RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION a.

RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High NA b.

RHR Equipment Room A Temp. - High NA c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

< 13(,)

d.

Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) 1 Pressure - High NA e.

Drywell Pressure - High NA f.

Manual Initiation NA (a) The isolation system instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as a part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.

Isolation system instrumentation response time specified includes the delay for diesel generator starting assumed in the accident analysis.

(b) Radiation detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Response time shall be measured from detector output or the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

• Isolation system instrumentation response time for MSIVs only.

No diesel generator delays assumed.

• • Isolation system instrumentation response time for associated valves except MSIVs.

1. Isolation system instrumentation response time specified for the Trip Function act.uating each valve group shall be aoded to isolation time shown in Tables 3.6.4-1 and 3.6.5.2-1 for valves in each valve group to obtain ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME for each valve.

1. 1. 1. Without 13 second time delay.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-19

-s.

,,w

.,,,.,,,,,_.,.,___n,

u cs s us-y _ >

si

.r

[Eg:

.]

ii g,

s m -

a aa a

a at a

a.:

gg cm aa aa a

a aa a

aa n

mig E

E

$5

,g

=

=

=

=

E a

[e E

5 2

8 d

h a

t-2 s

a a

c

.5 C

k

.i

.$~

J E

en h M M M

M m

th 4A m m

l i

0 8

s

! ! s1 s I-a is t

=

n25 i

' Ess :

c g

N c ' -m 5 g 3":s

"~ lj:a5!

l. ijs

=

als2 i

s s y sg s5!

is -

f

!:s:

ju 8

a s

2 2

w s

s s

si-s s1 9.3 3 v, s.,, j

_[ s.1 B4 lg s

-s -

3 aa aosa=

a i

i iiia 4sa a

i g % *p %

t i

I 2

-d*e' N.s!

C A

a

_y GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 h

3/4 3-20

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (C:ntinued)

E ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

>8 E

CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN %dHICH G

4 2

TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 5.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEN ISOLATION RCIC Steam Line Flow - High S

M R

1, 2, 3 a.

l b.

RCIC Steam Supply Pressure -

Low S

M R

1, 2, 3 c.

RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High 5

M R

1,2,3 I

d.

RCIC Equipment Room Ambient l

)

Temperature - High S

M R

1, 2, 3 w

RCIC Equipment Room a Temp. -

-l T

e.

S M

R 1,2,3 l

M High f.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High S

M R

1, 2, 3 i

'l g.

Main Steam Line Tunnel l

A Temp. - High S

M R

1, 2, 3 l

h.

Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer NA M

Q 1,2,3 l

1.

RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High S

M R

1,2,3 CN 5

M R

1, 2, 3 D

j.

RHR Equipment Room a Temp. -

i High k.

RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow -

S M

R 1,2,3 High I

M ")

MA 1,2,3 j

I i

1.

Manual Initiation MA DrywLfl Mssure - He'9L 5

y g

I, 2, 3 lV V)

CEcc5 - Div i. J D;g 1) 4 a

my an,,

1. cs c u s - n 3 tt/s

( Aotvs/st.

l 7

8' M s,

ig3 Il.

3 il,

~

5 El i

~.

i i "'. "'.

1

, ".j 1!2 8

8 8

15g R

• J =$

.c g as L+

1. 2 I

X T.,

5 ah '!:

w 'i 1

lga"s=l'2.!

• 4 l ;,

tg l

t g.

rI j!*<

E s

Ih 1 s

1Rg 25.g }( +3 4

5 5.

I

'l-i 5

4

! g,! b T +i.; 4 1lE J!

"I-2 3tr4 sl5 e

CE

=====%

! *i 3fe

=-

4 3 :, -t +t h '.

l s-e e-m

.i

= * - -

h 8 '*

• 1 2 s ;:.-4 8~

a l :n 1

r,=

s1 c=4

'a

'.5ptij 2 +a k g a,

C 5 UIv w

=I ~l 5

vE

}IsI2

• :t +g b:vu E

?s 3 r 1 '. W 5

38 z

- e,=l 5 i ).f

=

s g n l

.g 5 Ig = 8e,jr illlii 5

,1]

3 a

s

-I

,I*. ls!h o I(. I g..

I* Is

( 1 =2 l*

5

'Jgj:jg gy.]3laI_gogyr.;g.;j t

a mg se g

4

% -scesy8=

1 R

i. 3'* 8 4 ** t.e 3 EI s j{-[.h.

F p #Igi.} g) 1

't 5 k "E"

,!jg I

ca

.,-["g{d,)=E J

dd I"

AE w

2 i

,3 f.e5 i :-

T, kw C

d d

'd s

ep

~

E

.e J

3/4 3-23 anAND OULF-UNIT 1

l. (66NS ~ 9 7) 3/4.6 CONTA! MENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRI E RY CONTA1 MENT PRIERY CONTADetENT INTEGRITY-e

~

r j

, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.31 ptIERY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

$PPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.

Ad!0N:

Ifithout PRIERY CONTAlmENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIERY COLD $NUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PRIERY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

4.6.1.1 After inch closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, atacept the containment air locks, if opened following Ty a.

M.5 psig, and verifying that when the sensured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.0.1.2.d for all sther Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than er equal to 0.60 La.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all contateunent penetrations ** not capable of being closed by DPERAB b.

conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except as provided in Table 3.6.4-1 of Specification 3.6.4.

By verifying each containment air ler.k OPERABLE per c.

Specification 3.6.1.3.

By verifying the s gpression pool DPERABLE per Specification 3.6.3.1 d.

"5ee 3pecial Test Exception 3.10.1

• • Except walkes, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which, are located inside the containmengdevwelkand are locked, sealed or otherwise f

hese penetrations shall be verified closed secured in the closed positio!V. such verification need not be gierformed more during each COLD SHUTDOW exce eften than once per 92 days. et shw tunedy g

3/4 6-1 GRAND SULF-lpIIT 1 O

I gNTAIMNT $h5TEMS f,(ggnS-97) 3/4.5.4 C0"IAINMENT__AND ORYWELL 150LAT!0N VALVES LIMITING ENITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4 The containment and drywell isolation valves shown in Table 3.5.4-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to those shown in Table 3.6.4-1 APPLICA31LITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2.ead 3 e,md Eft, j

M:

With one or more of the containment er drywell isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.4-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve CPERABLE in each affected penetration that is op::n and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either:

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or a.

Isolete each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated b.

automatic valve secured in the isolated position," or Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed c.

manual valve or blind flange."

Otherwise, be in at least NOT $NUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and ir.

COLD $NUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

L

%eletten,valvesclosedtosatisfytheserequirementsmaybereopanedenen latersi,ttent basis under administrative controls.

s.

$ 7g.gameos vA6va.s snow # ess These 3.K.4 - 1 Ana A6so Rappen OPEmata wusw naam A*raciates Aevuames swerww=sm-l F. 3 1 -1, TAveu em mse vinas ve as cPEAAase sw Tao 6s to se 3/4 6-27 SAAND GUL M m1T 1

l. (&& NS - 9 7 )

I N TAI MENT $YSTEMS BASES DEPRE550RIZAT]ON SYSTEMS (Continued) excessive containment pressures and temperatures. The suppression bool cooling mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F The swpression pool cooling considerfog ail of the post-LOCA energy additions.

trains, being an.1.ntegral part af the RHR system, are redundant, safety-related component systems that are initiated following the recovery of the reactor vessel water level by ECCS flows from the RHR system. Nest rejection to the standby service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers.

TM suppression pool make-up system provides water from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow through two 100%

The quantity of water provided is capacity dump lines following a LOCA.

cufficient to account for all conceivable post-accident entrapment volumes, ensuring the long ters energy sink capabilities of the suppression pool and The minimum

)

maintaining the water coverage over the uppermost drywell vents.

freeboard distance above the suppression pool high water level to the top of

, the weir wall is adequate to preclude flooding of the drywell in the event of During refueling, neither automatic nor manual action en inadvertent dump.

can open the make-up dump valves.

3/4.5.4 CONTAl MENT AND ORYUELL ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environ-ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The operability of the drywell isolation valves' ensures that the drywell atmosphere will be directed to the suppression pool for the full spectrue of pipe Since the allowable value of drywell leakage is so breaks inside the drywell.

large, individual drywell penetration leakage is not measured. By checking valve operability on any penetration which could contribute a large fraction of the design leakage, the total leakage is maintained at less than the design value.

M

/4.6.5 DRYWELL POST-LOCA VACUUM BREAKERS The post-LOCA drywell vacuum breaker system is provided to relieve the Y

Contain-vacuum in the drywell due to steam condensation following blow-down.

ment air is drawn through the vacuum breaker check valves in the two branches of the separate post-LOCA vacuum relief line and in a branch of each drywell Wacuum relief initiates at a differential purge compressor discharge Ifne.This vacuum relief, in conjunction with the rest of the pressure of one psi.drywell purge system, is necessary to insure that the pos 2

concentratiopdoesnotexceed45byvolume.

Fo11owi bg vacuva relief, the drpell purge system pressurizes the drywell, forcing noncendensibles through the horizontal vents and into the conta at a rate designed to maintain the M2 There are two 2005 vacuum relief systems so that the plant may continue eperation with one system out of service for a limited period of time.

j SRAND GULF-ISIIT 1 8 3/4 6-5 n

s CONTAI MENT SYSTEMS

l. (GGNS ') 7) 3ASES 3/4.5.5 SECOWARY CONTAIMENT Secondaricontainmentisdesignedtominialzeartygroundlevelreleaseof The Auxiliary Building radioactive atterial which may result from an accident.

and Enclosure Buildinfl provide secondary containmer.t during nomal operation When the reactor is in COLD when the containment < s sealed and in service.

SHUTDOWN or REFUELING, the containment may be open and the Auxiliary Bu1Tding cnd Enclosure Building then become the only containment.

Establishing and natntaining a vacuun in the Auxiliary Building and Enclo-sure Building with the staney gas treatment system once per 18 months, along cith the surveillance of the doors, latches, dampers and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary c:ntainment.

The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systans ensures that suffi-The clerit iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LDCA.

reduction in containment fodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary The operation of this rcdiation doses associated with containment leakage.

system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters tsed in the LOCA analyses.

OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient te reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.

. Esm7@3/4.5.7 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL

~

The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the Iqydro-gen concentration within the containment below its flammable limit during post-The hydrogen recombiner and the hydrogen ignition systems are LOCA conditions.

capable of controlling the expected ttydrot,en generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.

control within Two 100% drywell purge systems,are the primary means of He the drywell purging hydrogen produced followin0 a LOCA into the containment 6tydrogen generated from the metal-water reaction and radiolysis is volume.

assumed to evolve to the drywell atmosphere and fem a homogenous sixture The w wwyn natural forces and mechanical turbulence (ECCS pipe break flow).

drywell purge system forces drywell atmosphere through the horizontal vents and into the containment and as a result no bypass path exists.

The Igydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7 Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The operability of at least 41 of 45 ignitors in either Itydroipn ignition subsystem wil) maintain an effective coverage throughout the centatraent and a

Ea@ subsystem of ignitors will initiate combustion of arty sig-This.

i drywell.

nificant amo st of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident.

system will ensure burning in a controlled manner as the flydrogen is released j

instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a randos igni-tion source.

B 3/4 6-5 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1

l f*

O TABLE 3.6.4-1 CONTAINMENT AND DRWELL ISOLATION VALVE 5 I

MAXIMUM l

SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME I

l VALVE NUPSER ItsSER YALVE GROUP ")

(Seconds) l 1.

Automatic Isolation Valves a.

Containment Main Steam Lines 821-F028A 5(0) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F022A 5(I) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F067A-A 5(0) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F0288 6(0) 1 5

Main 5 team Lines B21-7022B 5(I) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F0678-A 5(0) 1 6

Main Steam Lines B21-F02BC 7(0) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F022C 7(I) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 521-F067C-A 7(0) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F028D B(0) 1 5

Main Steam Lines B21-F022D B(I) 1 5

Main Steam Lines 821-F0670-A B(0) 1 6

8L5!R Reacter E12-F008-A 14(0)IC) 3 40 Shutoown Cooling Suction RHR Reactor E12-F009-B 14(I)I")

3 40 e

Shutdown Cooling Suction Steam Supply to E51-F063-5 17(I) 4 20 i

RHR and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply to E51-F064-A 17(0) 4 20 RNR and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply to E51-F076-B 17(I) 4 20 RHR and RCIC Turbine f

RHR to Head Spray E12-F023-18(0)(C) 3 90 Main Steam Line B21-F019-A 19(0) 1 15 Drains Main Steam Line B21-F016-B 19(I) 1 15 Drains RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F042A-A 20(I)IC) 5 22 "A" to LPCI (a) See specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that fa t./o operates each valve group.

(b) %drostatically tested to ASME Sect XI criteria. p'g

% drostatically tested with water

,4 h rpsig.

(c)

(d) Hydrostatically tested by pressurizing, system to 1.10 P,, 12.65 psig.

(e) $ drostatically tested during system functional tests.

i (f) %d "cally sealed by feedwater leakage control system.

Type C huired/ve er :=*weem wata attesMINiw9 rne commiweo seurge tes w

N,.an.=J.eieso n.ar.<ne e6a.s,o sa wa' wa'as may a,,,,,,..* * *,r,4 =rrvur-t s.

,. 4...

ue, c

=..

I GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-29 j

,,,,n.

-,,,,,,,,n-.,_,-_,,-,,.--_..,n,,,_,...,,,,--n

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (C:ntinued)

/,[66NS-97)

CONTAIMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME SYSTEM AND PENETRATION g

VALVE GROUP,)

(Seconds)

VALVE NUMBE.R

,,NUSER Containment (Continued)

RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F028A-A 20(I)(C) 5 78 "A" to LPCI J RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F037A-A 20(I)IC) 3 63 "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0428-8

.21(I)(*)

5 22 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0288-8 21(I)IC) 5 78 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0378-8 21(1)(C) 3 53 "B" *,a LPCI RHR "A" Teat Line E12-F024A-A 23(0)(d) 5 X TD to Supp. Pool RMR "A" Test Line E12-F011A-A 23(0)(d) 5 E'M to Supp. Pool

??(0)(d) 512-F280^ ^

'",_"{']::* ' p:

RHR " F Test U ne E12-F021-8 24(0)(d) 5 101 Y

to Supp. Pool MPCS Test Line E22-F023-C 27(0)N 59 50 Jir#

RCIC Pump Suction E51-F031-A 28(0)(d) 4 RCIC Turbine E51-F077-A 29(0)(C) 9 X 2A Exhaust LPCs Test Line E21-F012-A 32(0)fd) 5

1. f 14+

Cont. Purge and M1-F011 34(0) 7 4

Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M1-F012 34(I) 7 4

Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M1-F034 35(I) 7 4

and Vent Air Exh.

Cont. Purge and M1-F035 35(0) 7 4

and Vent Air Exh.

Plant Service P44-F070-8 36(I) 6A Jt33 Water Return Plant Service P44-F069-A 36(0) 6A 24 Water Return Plant Service P44-F053-A 37(0) 6A 24 Water Supply Chilled Water P71-F150 38(0) 5A 30 Seply Chilled Water P71-F148 39(0) 6A 30 I

Return GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-30

j,,.

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) l-[68NS-Th CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM.

SYSTER AND -

PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE: NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP ")

(Seconds)

I

~

Containeert (Continued)

Chilled Water P71-F149 39(I) 6A 30 Return Service Air P52-F105 41(0) 6A 4

Supply Inst. Air Supply PS3-F001 42(0) 6A 4

RWCU to Main 633-F034-A 43(0) 8

& 71 Condenser RWCU to Main G33-FC28-B 43(I) 8 23 Condenser RWCU Backwash to G36-F106 49(I) 6A 30 C/U Phase Sep. Tank RWCU Backwash to G36-F101 49(0) 6A 30 C/U Phase Sep. Tank Drywell & Cont.

P45-F067 50(I) 6A 4

Equip. Drain Sump Disch.

Drywell & Cont.

P45-F068 50(0) 6A 4-7 Equip. Drain Sump Disch.

Drywell & Cont.

P45-F061 51(I) 6A 4

Floor Drain Sump Disch.

Drywell & Cont.

P45-F062 51(0) 6A 4

Floor Drain Sump Disch.

Condensate Supply P11-F075 56(0) 6A 30 FPC & CU to Upper G41-F028-A 57(0) 6A 44 Cont. Pool Upper Cont. Pool G41-F029-5 58(0) 6A 40 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank

' Upper Cont. Pool G41-F044-B 58(I) 6A 40 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank-Aux.

dg. Fir.

P45-F273-A 60(0) 6A 23 '

and quip. Drn.

Tks to Supp. Pool Aux.Sbdg. Fir.

P45-F274-B 60(0) 6A 23 and Equip. Drn.

~

Tks. to Supp. Pool GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-31

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

/.[66NS-17)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTES AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME l

VALVE JouMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (,)

(Seconds)

Contatnment (Continued)

Camb. Gas tontrol E61-F009 65(0) 7 4

Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)

Comb. Gas control E61-F010 65(I) 7 4

Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)

Purge Rad.

E61-F056 66(I) 7 4

Detector Purge Rad.

E61-F0E7 66(0) 7 4

Detector 4S"# l RHR "B" Test Line E12-F024B-B 67(0)(d) 5 To Suppr. Pool RHR "8" Test Line E12-F011B-B 67(0)(d) 5 27 9

012-T2000 0 C7'0)(d) bt

%l Refue ng Water P11-F130 69(0)(c) 6A 4

Transf. Pump Suction Refuelihg Water P11-F131 69(0)IC) 6A

1. f Transf. Pump Suction Instr. Air to ADS P53-F003-A 70(0) 6A 4

RCIC Turbine Exh.

E51-F078-B 75(0) 9 7

Vacuum Breaker M H to Feedwater G33-F040-B 83(I) 8 30 RWCU to Feedwater G33-F039-A S3(0) 8 29 Chemical Waste P45-F098 84(I) 6A 4

Sump Discharge Chemical Waste P45-F099 84(0) 6A 4

Sump Discharge Supp. Pool Clean-P60-F009-A 85(0) 6A

-4" #

r op Return Supp.

1 Clean-P60-F010-8 85(0) 6A 4

up urn Domin. Water P21-F017-A 86(0) 6A 10 Supply to Cont.

Domin. Water P21-F01B-B 86(I) 6A 10 Supply to cont.

RWCU Pump Suction G33-F001-B 87(I) 8 30 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-32 i

.o

'b TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES

..:.~

0.'-

IEXIMUM

$YSTEp AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE. NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP,)

(Seconds)

I Containment (Continued)

RWCU Pump Suction G33-F252-A 87(I) 8 30 RWCU Pump Suction G33-F004-A 87(0) 8 30 RWCU Pump Disch.

G33-F053-B 88(I) 8 22 RWCU Pump Disch.

G33-F054-A 88(0) 8 22 b.

Drywell l

Instrument Air P53-F007-B 327(0) 6A 4

M$

RWCU Pump Suction G33-F250-A 337(I) 8 30 RWCU Pump Suction G33-F251-B 337(0) 8 30 Combustible Gas E61-F0038-B 338(0)

SF 60 Con.

Combustible Gas E61-F003A-A 339(0)

EN 60 Con.

Combustible Gas E61-F005A-A 340(0)

S#

Er-F9 Con.

Combustible Gas E61-F005B-B 340(0)

SF

& F4 l

Con.

Combustible Gas E61 F007 341(0)

S#.

+T Cen.

NNDrywell Air Purge M1-F015 345(I) 7 4

Supply Drywell Air Purge M1-F013 345(0) 7 4

Supply Drywell Air Purge M1-F016 347(I) 7 4

Exhaust Drywell Air Purge M1-F017 347(0) 7 4

Exhaust Equipment Drains P45-F009 348(I) 6A 4

Ecuipment Drains P45-F010 348(0) 6A 4

Floor Drains P45-F003 349(I) 6A 4

Floor Drains P45-F004 349(0) 6A 4

Service Air PS2-F195-B 363(0) 6A W /4

. Chemical Sump P45-F096-A 364(1) 68 8

Disch.

Chemical Sump P45-F097-B 364(0) 6A 8

Disch.

i RWCUdoHeat G33-F253 365(0)

WF 30 l

Exett Reacto'r Water 833-F019 465(I) 10 28.4 Sample Line Reactor Water B33-F020 465(0) 10 28.4 Sample Line 1

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-33

i 9

l. C&&NS-9 7)

%Wssef A j

(p V4 6-ss) 7 Pt A S w wJ W 4.e P44 -ro76-A 331 0) 6A 32 Cs+.e.s FLt ' Seres W.A.e Pet-Fo77 - 8 33 f(o) 6A at ta%en Pl h Secc.. w 4er Pet-re74-5 J32(c) 6A 32 Orth ra s.A. s (p we 6-35)

Cmb.kW Gas, m - For.o JV/ Co) 5 ff (CM.

9 9

9 e

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAl MENT AIS DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM M PENETRATION VALVE liUISER Ip eER g

2.

90anual Isolation Valves (9) l a.

Containment Main Steam Lines E32-F001A-A 5(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001E-A 6(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001J-A 7(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001N-A S(0)

Feedwater Inlet 821-F065A-A 9(0)(b)

Feedwater Inlet 821-F0658-A 10(0)(b)

RHR Pump "A" E12-F004A-A 11(0)(d)

Suction RHR Pump "B" E12-F0048-8 12(0)(d)

Suction RHR Pump "C" E12-F004C-8 13(0)(d)

Suction RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F027A-A 20(0)(c) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F0278-S 21(0)IC) to LPCI g,

5 RHR Pump "C" to E12-F042C-B 22(5)N)

LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F064A-A 23(0)(d)

To Suppr. Pool RHR "C" Test Line E12-F064C-B 24(0)(d)

To Suppr. Pool 25(0)((d)

MPCS Suction E22-F015-C 26(0) C)

HPCS Discharge E22-F004-C 27(0)((d)

HPCS Test Line E22-F012-C 29(0) *)

iiCIC Turbine Exh.

E51-F068-A LPCS Pump Suction E21-F001-A 30(0)

LPCS Pump E21-F005-A 31(0)

LPCS Min. Flow E21-F011-A 32(0)(d)

Discharge CRD Pump C11-F083-A 33(0)

Discharge CCW Supply P42-F066-A 44(0)

CCW Return P42-F067-A 45(0)

CCW Rd. urn P42-F068-B 45(1)(d)

RCIC lbmp E51-F019-A 46(0)

Discharge Min. Flow Reactor Recire.

333-F128-8 47(1)

Post Accident Sampling 3/4 6-34 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) g, (gggf. 9 7)

{

_CONTA_}lMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSThAND PENETRATION GRMIER

. VALVE IRSSER Containment (Continued)

Reactor Recire.

533-F127-A 47(0)

Post Accident 48( Q)(d) y p, Td O (o) O

.,. 7

7. g.g Sampling 0

. Vent Header to E12-F073B-B Esa.-Fe a-a 718(0)I )

Supp. Pool RHR "C" Relief E12-F346-B V1v. Vent Hdr.

to Suppr. Pool

& Fost-Acc.

RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F073A-A 77(0)(d)

Sample Ret.

Relief Reactor Recire.

533-F126-B 81(1)

Accident Sampling Reactor Recire.

833-F125-A 81(0) '

l Accident Sampling 89(0)g)

SSW Supply "A" P41-F159A-A 90(I)IC) 55W Return "A" P41-F168A-A 55W Return "A" P41-F160A-A 90(0)I*)

91(I)f*gl SSW Return "B" P41-F1688-B 55W Return "B" P41-F160B-B 91(0)(g)

SSW Supply "B" P41-F1598-B 92(0)

Drywell Press.

M71-F593-A 101C(0)

Inst.

Drywell Press.

M71-F591A-A 101F(0)

~

Inst.

Drywell Press.

M71-F5918-8 102D(0)

Inst.

Ctat. Press. Inst. M71-F592A-A 103D(0)

Ctat. Press. Inst. N71-F5928-8 104D(0)

Drywell Ha E61-F595C 106A(0)

Analyzer Sample E61-F595D 106A(I)

Drywell H: Sample Analyzer D

11 H Ana-E61-F597C 106B(0) yzer Sample Ret.

. Drywell H Ana-E61-F597D 106B(I) lyzer Sample Ret.

Ctat. H.

E61-F596C 105A(0) lyzer Sample

. Na E61-F5960 105A(I)

Analyrer Sample Ctat. Hg Ar.alyzer E61-F598C 106E(0)

Sample Ret.

Ctat. H Analyzer E61-F59BD 106E(I)

Sample Ret.

3/4 6-35 SRAND SULF-UNIT 1

~~

TABLE 3.5.4-1 (Continuen) i.eas-9n CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER b.

Oriwell Cont. Coolin's P42-F114-8 322(0) l Water Inlet Cont. Cooling P42-F116-A 330(I)

Water Outlet Cont. Cooling P42-F117-8 330(0)

Water Outlet

?::(?)

""-F0?5-?

??:r.t k rv. S:t:r

-Se4wsm-s.,

"- t r -

as._.

u....

_ca,._.

... m

___g-f

':[_ht{Tj.;P

" ;-TOO'

(:)

-::2aEE~n =>

-T:::

(c)

C:r.;;;i:-

3.

Other isolation Valves @)

a.

Containment Fuel Transfer F11-E015 4(I)

Tube

=0e,.t. :.eek Rete "O(!)(0)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F010A 9(I)(f)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F032A 9(0)(f)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F010B 10(I)II)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F0328 10(0)U)

RHR "A" Suction E12-F017A 11(0)Id)

RHR "B" Suction E12-F017B 12(0)

RHR "C" Suetion E12-F017C 13(0)IC)

RHR Shutdown E12-F308 14(I)

Cooling Suction RHR Head Spray E51-F066 18(I)IC) 18(I)f*g RHR Head Spray E12-F344 RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F044A 20(I) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F025A 20(I)(*)

to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F107A 20(,1)IC) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "S" E12-F025B 21(I)IC) te LPCI RHRHeptEx."B" E12-F044B 21(1)IC) to WCI RHR Hent Ex. "B" E12-F1078 21(I)I'}

l l

to LPCI GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-37

f (fr&NS-1'))

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (C:ntinued)

CONTAllMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE i4 UMBER NUMBER Containment (Continued)

RHR Heat Ex. "C" E12-F234 22(0)(c) to LPCI 22(I)(,c)

RHR Pump "C" to E12-F041C-8 LPCI RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F259 23(0)(')

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F261 23(0)I')

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F227 23(0)(*)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F262 23(0)(')

~

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F228 23(0)(')

R RR."A' Tat LNe. 4 o Line to Suppr.

5g Pool Suppe. Po.t 15.12. -F250 A-A, I "

i RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F336 23(0)(c) 2 3 (,0Y Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F339 23(0)(C)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F260 23(0)(')

j Line to Suppr.

Pool l

RHR Pump "C" Test E12-F280 24(0)N) l Line to Suppr.

Pool l

RHR Pump "C" Test E12-F281 24(0)(')

l Line to Suppr.

i Pool 25(0)((d)

HPCS Suction E22-F014 26(I)(C) l HPCS Discharge E22-F005 26(I) C)

HPCS Discharge E22-F218 HPCS Discharge E22-F201 26(I)

HPCS Test Line E22-F035 27(0)(')

MPCS Test Line E22-F302 27(0)( )

i HPCS Test Line E22-F301 27(0)Id)

LPCS Pump E21-F031 30(0)

Suction LPCS Bischarge E21-F006 31(I) l LPCS Discharge E21-F200 31(I)(g)

LPCS Discharge E21-F207 31(I)(,)

LPCS Test Line E21-F217 32(0)(')

LPCS Test Line E21-F218 32(0)

GRAND' GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-38 s

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) 1.(CCNS-47)

C M TAllmENT AND DRYWELL !$0LATION VALVES SYSTE4AND PENETRATICN i

VALVE DUMBER NupSER Con'tal' ament'(Continued)

CRD himp C11-F122 33(1)

Discharge-P5W Supply P44-F043 37(I)

Plant Chilled M1-F151 38(I) t

~ Water Supply Service Air P52-F122 41(1)

Supply Instr. Air Supply P53-F002 42(1)

CCW Supply P42-F035 44(I)I*)

RCIC Disch.

E51-F251 46(0)

Min. Flow RCIC Disch.

E51-F252 46(0)I')

Min. Flow RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F055B 48(0)Id)

Relief Vent Needer RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F103B 48(0)(d)

Relief Vent RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-FIG 4B 48(0)(d)

Header Relief Vent Needer Refueling Wtr.

G41-F053 54(0)

Stg. Yk. to Upper Ctat. Pool Refueling Wtr.

G41 F201 54(I)

Stg. Tk. to Upper Ctat. P.>ol Condensate Supply P11*F034 56(I)

FPC & CU to Upper G41-F040 57(I)

Cont. Pool 5tby. Liquid C41-F151 51(1) 6;ontrol Sys.

Mix. Tk.

(future use) 5tby. Liquid C41-F150 61(0)

Control Sys.

. Mix. Tk.

?

t

!?ON 67(0)(e)

RHR PI up *B" Test E12-F276 Lin i 67(0)ge)

RHR Peep "B" Test E12 F277 Line 67(0)(,)

RHR Pump *B" Test E12-F212 Line 3/4 6-39 SRAND GULF-UNIT 1 o

m w

m

• ---------,-e---------v--

a-euw-r--

---w-

~

TASLE 3.5.4-1 (Continued)

/,[66Nf-97)

C"TAIMENT AND ORWELL ISOLATION VALVES i

SYSTEN AND PENETRATION VALVE ItseER IR#SER Centairment (Continued)

RHR Pump "B" Test E12-F213 57(0)I'}

~

Line RHR Pump "B" Test EU-F249 57(0)I'}

RHR Pump "B" Test E12-F250 57(0)I,} [gng "g"Ted L.we. b Q

Line Line Q (s 9 pr. m \\ p(o)f 905-6 E11-F RHR P op "B" Test EU-F334 57(0)

Line RHR Pump "B" Test EU-E335 57(0)(*)

Line Inst. Air to ADS P53-F006 70(I) (d)

LPCS Relief valve E21-F018 71A(0)

Vent Header RHR Pump "C" EU-F025C 718(0)(d)

Relief Valve Vent Header RNR Shutdown E12-F036 73(0)(d)

Vent Header RHR Shutdown E12-F005 758(0)(d)

Suction Relief Valve Disch.

RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F055A 77(0)(d)

Relief Vent RNR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F103A 77(0)(d)

Header Relief Vent RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F104A 77(0)(d)

Nescler l

Relief Vent

_j Jg f.4o Header MOVE To u

fCont.LeakRate NA

$2(I)(o) m INssnv

( Sys.

• )

89(1)(Ig}

$5W "A" Supply P41-F169A SSW "R" Supply P41-F1698 92(I)

Ctat. Leak Rate II61-F015 H0A(et(I)

Test Inst.

Ctat. Leak Rate II61-F014 11046&fCO)

Test Inst.

Cts {. Leak Rate 9161-F019 HOC 647(Z)

Test Inst.

Cts (.LeakRate II61-F018 HOCfff(d) l tat Inst.

H0F467(,T)

I Ctat. Leak Rate 1961-F017 Test Inst.

Ctat. Leak Rate II61-F015 HOF447(O)

Tyst.3y 7 Test Inst.

= =-

g s.y 3 ~~>.w 3/4 6-40 l

SRAND RULF-lplIT 1

_~

T N56M 7 3[4 b'YOM PENETRhT'*A BLIND FLMNGES N U MsE A.

d*NT, bCAK h ATg N4 40(I)CO)

OcNT, krAK bete Nh gg, (y)(o}

Sys.,

I i

e p, s/46-4o~

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAlletENT AE ORYWELL !$0LATION VALVES 1

SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE EseER HUW ER.

3 containment (Continued)

W R "B" Test Line E12-F350 67(0)(c) l T/C l

W R "B" Test Line E12-F312 67(0)(*)

T/C l

AHR "B" Test Line E12-F305 67(0)(c)

T/C Refueling Water P11-F425 69(0)(*)

Transf. Pump Section T/C l

Refueling Water P11-F132 69(0)(c) l Transf. Purp suction T/C Inst. Air to ADS P53-F043 70(0)

T/C Cont. Leak Rate M61-F010 82(I)

T/C RWCU To Feedwater G33-F055 83(0)

T/C Suppr. Pool P60-F011 85(0)

Cleanup T/C Sopr. Pool P60-F034 85(0)

Cleanup T/C RWCU Pump Suction G33-F002 87(0)

T/C RWCU Pump G33-F061 88(0)

Discharge T/C 89(0)((c)

SSW T/C P41-F163A

~

92(0) c)

SSW T/C P41-F1638 b.

Orwell LPCI "A" T/C E12-F056A 313(0)

LPCI "B" T/C E12-F0566 314(0)

Int usent Air T/C P53-F493 327(0)

SLCS T/C C41-F026 328(0)

Service Air T/C P52-F476 363(0) m

" Reactor Sample R33-F021 465(0)

T/C Rwcu T/c.

GM-Fito 3GG CE) l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-44 Amenhent No. f. 7

I nLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) 7, gg_g CON 1AllMENT AfG DRWELL !$0LAT10N VALVES ShTEMAND PENETRATION VALVE IRDSER 1RSSER b.'

9fywe11

~

PCI "A" E12-F041A 313(1)

LPCI "B" E12-F0418 314 (1)

LPCI "B" E12-F236 314 (o)

CRD to Recirc.

833-F013A 326(1)

Pump A Seals CtD to Recirc.

333-F017A 326(0)

Pump A Seals Instrument Air P53-F008 327(1)

Standby Liquid C41-F007 328(1)

Control 5tandby Liquid C41-F006 328(0)

Control Cont. Cooling P42-F115 729(1)

Water Supply Conkus.te Fles! Ga.

Plant Service P44-F075 332(1) g33.rasv 3D CK)

Water Supply e

c j,,,,y.

m. A c.%.

CRD to Recire.

533-F0138 346(1) I k,y pg g 333 by Pump B 5eals CRD to Recirc.

833-F0178 346(o)

Pump B 5eals j

5ervice Air P52-F196 363(!)

)

I SLIND FLANGES 343 ( 1 ) ( o )

l Containment NA Leak Rate System f

Cont. L e er Agg.

segd 1 - Fa 2.1 at1f A (f.)

\\

mr rnar c a. te.isr JtJ4.

A4 f-Few

+ 3r A(c) e

~ @ RILF-tplli 1 3/4 6-41

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

/,[66Nf-9 7)

CONTAINMENT AND DRWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTE AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER ORMIER 4.

Yest Connections $)

-l a.

Containment Main Steam T/C 321-F025A 5(0) h in Steam T/C 321-F025B 6(0)

Main Steam T/C 321-F025C 7(0) min Steam T/C 321-F025D 8(0)(f)

Feedwater T/C B21-F030A 9(0)gf)

Feedwater T/C R21-F063A 9(0) gg)

Feedwater T/C 421-F063B 10(0)gf)

Feedwater T/C B21-F0308 10(0)IC)

RHR Shutdown Cool.

E12-F002 14(0)

Suction T/C RCIC Steam Line E51-F072 17(0)

T/C RHR to Head E12-F342 18(0)IC)

Spray T/C RHR to Head E12-F061 38(0)gg)

Spray T/C 22(0)((c)

LPCI "C" T/C E12-F056C 23(0) *)

RHR "A" Pump E12-F322 Test Line T/C RHR *A" Pump E12-F336 23(0)IC)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" P ap E12-F349 23(0)IC)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F303 23(0)IC)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" P op E12-F310 23(0)IC}

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F348 23(0)IC)

Test Line T/C RHR"C" Pump E12-F311 24(0)(*)

Test Line T/C RHR"C" Pump E12-F304 24(0)I")

Test Line T/C taPCS Discharge T/C E22-F021 26(0)IC) 27(0)fC HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F303 27(0) c HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F304 RCIC Turbine E51-F258 afJ410)(c)

Exhoost T/C RCIC Ti chine E51-F257 sS M(0)IC)

Enheost T/C LPCS T/C E21-F013 31(0)

LPCS Test Line E21-F222 32(0)

T/C LPCS Test Line E21-F221 32(0)ICI T/C GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-42

e

' ' ~

1. [ 6 6 N S - 9 7 ) '

TABLE 3.5.6.2-1 SECONDARY CONTAINME T VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLA _' LION DAMPER 5NALVES 4

MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME DAMPERNALVE;FUNCT70N(Nebar)

(Seconds) a.

Dagers Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T41FOCS)

F 4 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T41F007)

X4 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Damper (Q1T42F003)

X '+

Fuel. Handling Area ventilation Exhaust Damper (Q1742F004)

X 't Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T42F011)

1. 4 i

Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T42F012) 49 Fuel Pool Sweep Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T42F019)

XV Fuel Pool Sweep Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T42F020)

1. 4 Coa:Ya.%.an J-DarwslI has 67.'lat.'e m 4

k yf y Ds y s> E4tMst90*7) l C a r. h b a t & D r il Arm WTll 7.'ea at 4

57t'Y L e#

vsFooS) y ConTm.'n~enf & beyweiI has Vmhh%

't E=A.vsr Da~yur C4le ysya34)

Cene%\\meer b~ bey wsIl Avon Vt'4hhh'* k

't Eukovs7 bnmpar (QIMyiF011) l 9

l l

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-48 1

- ~

1

2. (CCNS - 855)

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7, 4.6.4.1, 4.6.4.2, and 4.6.4.3, pages 3/4 4-22 and 3/4 6-28.

DISCUSSION:

Present technical specification testing requirements for the MSIV's require stroking in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING but no more often than once every 92 days (Technical Specification 4.0.5).

The proposed change to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.4.7 and 4.6.4.3 include a testing exemption for I

MSIV's. This exemption is requested to allow MSIV testing prior to reaching 600 psig in the reactor for startups from an extended cold shutdown. Present Technical Specificatiens 4.4.7 and 4.6.4.3 could require cold testing of MSIV's.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1 is changed to allow reaching 600 psig in the reactor prior to testing MSIV's following maintenance on the valves. This change is made to prevent cold stroking of the MSIV's.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2 is modified by deleting the words "durirg COLD SHUTbOWN or REFUELING" to allow valve testing in any operational condition for which testing can be accomplished.

JUSTIFICATION: The request to allow MSIV testing during heatup following an extended cold shutdown and before reaching 600 psig in the reactor is based on possible valve seat damage if cold testing is conducted. Cold testing without steam flow to clean the MSIV seats could result in scoring of the seats and leak rate problems. The NSSS vendor recommends stroking the MSIV's only when the plant is hot to ensure proper seat flushing and to obtain more accurate valve stroke times. The changes to l

Surveillance Requirements 4.4.7 and 4.6.4.3 request exemptions from the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.4 up to 600 i

psig in the reactor to allow hot testing of the MSIV's.

The testing exemption requested for Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1 allows MSIV_ valve stroking with the plant hot but before reaching 600 psig in the reactor. This exemption applies if maintenance has been performed on the valve (s).

' The change to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2 affects not only MSIV's but any valves that can be tested in oth-er than COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING. The valve testing procedures at Grand Gulf are written to test a portion of the automatic isolation valves on Table 3.6.4-1 at any one time. For MSIV's, testing l

is preferred at about 600 psig fellowing an extended cold shutdown. The testing frequency (18 months) of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2 is not modified by this requested change.

G85spl-i

,,c

~...7

.,w__

ls l

Relief from ASME Section IX testing requirements for the MSIV's is being requested in the new Revision submittal to the NRC of the pump and valve testing program. Approval of this technical specifiestion change will document the relief granted by the Commission pursuant to 10CFR50. Section 50.55a(g)(b)(1) in addition to the exemption from Technical Specification 4.0.4 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The change allowing MSIV testing with the plant hot and with the valve seats properly flushed will decrease the possibility of seat damage and resultant increased leakage rates. Seat damage to the MSIV's will increase maintenance on the valves (and consequently require additional stroking) which this change is attempting to avoid.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2 does not alter the frequency of the required testing, but rather expands the operational conditions in which the testing can be performed. This change does not alter the testing provizions of ensuring operability of the automatic isolation valves on applicable containssot and dryvell penetrations.

This change dces not involve the reduction of safety margins and no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is involved nor is the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previeusly evaluated created. Thus the proposed change to the Technical Specification does not involve any siEnificant hazards consideration.

G85spl.1

s l

E.(Cr&NS ~ f.g3 }

REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES 9

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.4.7 Two main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) per main steam line shall be OPERABLE with closing times greater than or equal to 3 and less than er equal to 5 seconds.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one or more MSIVs inoperable:

1.

Maintain at least one MSIV OPERABLE in each affected main steam line that is open and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, either:

~

a)

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or b)

Isolate the affected main steam line by use of a deactivated MSIV in the closed position.

2.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4

i 4.4.7 Each of the above required MSIVs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by l

verifying full closure between 3 and 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

l hThe grads /-,,z,

.5 Spe; L 1l-~

4.o.'r m n or y p ti U c pro s40s) tesTom9

)e any areJ pr 1, <

ro ra-ek;9 600p;y l

G erTv)'2 Evem m Tande).shv T),+.e,

T en i

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 4-22

.g

2. (GGNS - 8.5.C)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 ch isolation valve shown in Table 3.6.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or l

replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

4.6.4.2 Each automatic isolation valve shown in Table 3.6.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE dr' ; COLO 'MUT00"" a ".:TU:L:"O at least once per l

18 months by verifying that on an isolation test signal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.4.3 The isolation time of each power operated or au atic valve shown in Table 3.6.4-1 shall be determined to be within its limi en tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.4.4

[ DELETED]

The. yrovisi s

of Sp.ec3ic<flon 4.o. 4 ar+ n T ay,,& 6la.

Toe r%.

A%:n Ste an Isolar % 41vas pov;)<.)

1ra ar:q.from : s lat=J ?r:or r-nachl, teUV co on cTeTvy s

.n.w s,,

)

g l,,t ),,,,

y GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-28 e,

w-e-

ree---,,-n-----

--w-

~. '

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY CRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 sarrusassuno INSERVICEINSPECTION PROGRAM POWtn otVISION PUMP AND VALVE RELIEF REQUEST B21-2:

NUCLEAR BOILER SYSTEM REV. 3 SHEET 1 0F 1 I

VALVES:

F022A, F028A (M-1077A, G-5, G-3) l F0228, F028B (M-1077A, D-5, D-4)

F022C, F028C (M-1077A, C-5, C-4)

F022D, F0280 (ll-1077A, A-5, A-4)

CATEGORY:

A CLASS:

1 TYPE:

AFS GL FUNCTION:

Main steam isolation valves TEST REQUIREMENTS:

Exercise every 3 months BASIS FOR RELIEF:

These valves are poppet-type globe valves for which leakage requirements are very stringent.

Their design requires that steam be flowing across the seat during closing to prevent scoring of the valve seat.

ALTERNATIVE TESTING:

Therefore, it is desirable to do full-stroke exercising during start up from cold shutdown at approximately l

600 psig.

Partial stroking of the valve shall be per-formed every 92 days during power operation.

l e

T 9i m

QD m3 Q.

l M

O r

N '-

h% 2 y g o di Ak

=

-