NL-20-0275, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues

ML20150A329
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/29/2020
From:	Gayheart C Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-20-0275
Download: ML20150A329 (29)

Text

A South,ern Nucllear May 29, 2020 Docket Nos.: 50-348 50-364 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Cheryl A. Gayheart Regulatory Affairs Director 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 205 992 5316 tel 205 992 7601 fax cagayhea@southernco.com NL-20-0275 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues" Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2.

SNC requests adoption of TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues,"

which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), into the FNP, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 0, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown.

The enclosure provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes. Attachment 1 provides the existing TS pages marked to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides revised (clean) TS pages. Attachment 3 provides existing TS Bases pages marked to show the proposed changes for information only.

SNC requests approval of the proposed license amendments by November 30, 2020 under the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) to allow timely implementation of containment debris limits into the FNP licensing basis. The proposed changes would be implemented within 120 days of issuance of the amendment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application is being provided to the designated Alabama Official.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Jamie Coleman at 205.992.6611.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-20-0275 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 29th day of May 2020.

Respectfully submitted, Cheryl G eart Director, Regulatory Affairs Southern Nuclear Operating Company CAG/RMJ

Enclosure:

Attachments: 1.

2.

3.

Description and Assessment Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)

Revised Technical Specification Pages Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-Up) for Information Only cc:

Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager-Farley Senior Resident Inspector-Farley Director, Alabama Office of Radiation Control RTYPE: CFA04.054

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues" Enclosure Description and Assessment

Enclosure to NL-20-0275 Description and Assessment

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests adoption of TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues," which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), into the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS).

The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 0, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.

The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation SNC has reviewed the safety evaluation for TSTF-567 provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force in a letter dated July 3, 2018. This review included the NRC staff's evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-567. SNC has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-567 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to FNP Units 1 and 2 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the FNP TS.

2.2 Variations SNC is proposing the following variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-567 or the applicable parts of the NRC staff's safety evaluation. These variations do not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 or the NRC staff's safety evaluation to the proposed license amendment.

The required action and Notes of proposed Condition B in TSTF-567 are revised to require declaring the affected ECCS and CSS trains inoperable immediately instead of a requirement to restore the containment sump to operable status within a specific completion time and two notes requiring entry into the associated ECCS and CSS TS actions. In addition, Condition Cis revised to state, "Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met," since the proposed required actions of Condition B to "declare" affected trains inoperable are immediate and can easily be accomplished rendering Condition C unnecessary. The TS Bases markups have also been revised to reflect the changes to the actions.

When the containment sump is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, such as blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant, one or more ECCS or CSS trains are rendered inoperable, therefore, declaring the affected trains inoperable immediately will ensure appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the required actions of the ECCS and CSS TS.

E-1

Enclosure to NL-20-0275 Description and Assessment As indicated in TSTF-567, the completion time of TSTF-567 Required Action 8.1 is specified as either 7 days or 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> depending on the completion time established for a single CSS train inoperable. This action is redundant to an action that will also be required when one CSS train is inoperable since TSTF-567, Required Action 8.1, Note 2 will require the action of TS 3.6.6 to be applied. In addition, if more than one train of CSS is inoperable or a combination of CSS and ECCS trains are inoperable as a result of the inoperable containment sump, the TSTF-567 Condition 8 notes will require more restrictive actions than Required Action 8.1. The proposed required actions (Required Actions 8.1 and 8.2) achieve the same goal while providing simplified action requirements.

This plant-specific variation is considered administrative since the proposed requirements will result in equivalent action taken for the condition and, therefore, does not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 or the NRC staff's safety evaluation to the proposed license amendment.

The FNP Technical Specifications contain a Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Therefore, the Frequency for Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1 0.1 is "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program," consistent with the Frequency of SR 3.5.2.7.

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 0, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.

The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.

SNC has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump. An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

E-2

Enclosure to NL-20-0275 Description and Assessment The containment sump is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The containment sump is a passive component and the proposed change does not increase the likelihood of the malfunction. As a result, the probability of an accident is unaffected by the proposed change.

The containment sump is used to mitigate accidents previously evaluated by providing a borated water source for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Containment Spray System (CSS). The design of the containment sump and the capability of the containment sump assumed in the accident analysis is not changed. The proposed action requires implementation of mitigating actions while the containment sump is inoperable and more frequent monitoring of reactor coolant leakage to detect any increased potential for an accident that would require the containment sump. The consequences of an accident during the proposed action are no different than the current consequences of an accident if the containment sump is inoperable.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump. An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

The proposed change does not alter the design or design function of the containment sump or the plant. No new systems are installed or removed as part of the proposed change. The containment sump is a passive component and cannot initiate a malfunction or accident. No new credible accident is created that is not encompassed by the existing accident analyses that assume the function of the containment sump.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump. An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported E-3

Enclosure to NL-20-0275 Description and Assessment debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

The proposed change does not affect the controlling values of parameters used to avoid exceeding regulatory or licensing limits. No Safety Limits are affected by the proposed change. The proposed change does not affect any assumptions in the accident analyses that demonstrate compliance with regulatory and licensing requirements.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, SNC concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

3.2 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

E-4

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues" Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)

3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.1 0 3.4.11 3.4.12 3.4.13 3.4.14 3.4.15 3.4.16 3.4.17 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.5.5 3.5.6 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.6.9 3.6.10 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 TABLE OF CONTENTS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)................................................. 3.4.1-1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.................................................. 3.4.1-1 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality...................................... 3.4.2-1 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits................................. 3.4.3-1 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2...................................................... 3.4.4-1 RCS Loops-MODE 3.................................................................. 3.4.5-1 RCS Loops-MODE 4.................................................................. 3.4.6-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled............................................. 3.4.7-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled....................................... 3.4.8-1 Pressurizer..................................................................................... 3.4.9-1 Pressurizer Safety Valves.............................................................. 3.4.1 0-1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)..................... 3.4.11-1 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System.......... 3.4.12-1 RCS Operational LEAKAGE........................................................... 3.4.13-1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage................................. 3.4.14-1 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation....................................... 3.4.15-1 RCS Specific Activity...................................................................... 3.4.16-1 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity............................................ 3.4.17-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)............................ 3.5.1-1 Accumulators................................................................................. 3.5.1-1 ECCS-Operating......................................................................... 3.5.2-1 ECCS-Shutdown........................................................................ 3.5.3-1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)......................................... 3.5.4-1 Seal Injection Flow......................................................................... 3.5.5-1 ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System................................ 3.5.6-1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS................................................................... 3.6.1-1 Containment................................................................................... 3.6.1-1 Containment Air Locks................................................................... 3.6.2-1 Containment Isolation Valves......................................................... 3.6.3-1 Containment Pressure.................................................................... 3.6.4-1 Containment Air Temperature........................................................ 3.6.5-1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems...................................... 3.6.6-1 Deleted........................................................................................... 3.6.7-1 Hydrogen Mixing System (HMS).................................................... 3.6.8-1 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System...................................... 3.6.9-1 Containment Sump........................................................................ 3. 6. 10-1 PLANT SYSTEMS................................................................................. 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs).............................................. 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)............................................. 3.7.2-1 Farley Units 1 and 2 ii Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.5 SR 3.5.2.6 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.8 SURVEILLANCE Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each position stop is in the correct position.

Valve Number CVC-V-8991 A/B/C CVC-V-8989 A/B/C CVC-V-8996 A/B/C CVC-V-8994 A/B/C RH R-HV 603 AlB Verify, by visual inspection, each EGGS train containment sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris and the suction inlet trash racl<s, screens, and inner cages are properly installed and show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion. Deleted.

Verify ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

ECCS-Operating 3.5.2 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the SuF¥eillance F"requency Control Program In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Farley Units 1 and 2 3.5.2-3 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C.

Required ECCS C.1 Restore required ECCS centrifugal charging centrifugal charging subsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE status.

D.

Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 5.

associated Completion Time of Condition B or C not met.

AND At least one RH R subsystem OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:

SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.6 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.8 ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.3 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 hours FREQUENCY In accordance with applicable SRs Farley Units 1 and 2 3.5.3-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3. 6. 10 Containment Sump Containment Sump 3.6.10 LCO 3. 6. 10 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Containment sump A.1 inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding analyzed AND limits.

A.2 AND A.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 Initiate action to mitigate Immediately containment accident generated and transported debris.

Perform SR 3.4.13.1.

Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Restore the containment 90 days sump to OPERABLE status.

3.6.10-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

ACTIONS B.

Containment sump B.1 Declare affected inoperable for reasons Emergency Core Cooling other than Condition A.

System train(s) inoperable.

AND B.2 Declare affected containment spray train(s) inoperable.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

C.2 Be in MODE 5.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.10.1 SURVEILLANCE Verify, by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.

Containment Sump 3.6.10 Immediately Immediately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.10-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues" Revised Technical Specification Pages

3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.1 0 3.4.11 3.4.12 3.4.13 3.4.14 3.4.15 3.4.16 3.4.17 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.5.5 3.5.6 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.6.9 3.6.10 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 TABLE OF CONTENTS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)................................................. 3.4.1-1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.................................................. 3.4.1-1 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality...................................... 3.4.2-1 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits................................. 3.4.3-1 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2...................................................... 3.4.4-1 RCS Loops-MODE 3.................................................................. 3.4.5-1 RCS Loops-MODE 4.................................................................. 3.4.6-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled............................................. 3.4.7-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled....................................... 3.4.8-1 Pressurizer..................................................................................... 3.4.9-1 Pressurizer Safety Valves.............................................................. 3.4.1 0-1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)..................... 3.4.11-1 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System.......... 3.4.12-1 RCS Operational LEAKAGE........................................................... 3.4.13-1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage................................. 3.4.14-1 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation....................................... 3.4.15-1 RCS Specific Activity...................................................................... 3.4.16-1 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity............................................ 3.4.17-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)............................ 3.5.1-1 Accumulators................................................................................. 3.5.1-1 ECCS-Operating......................................................................... 3.5.2-1 ECCS-Shutdown........................................................................ 3.5.3-1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)......................................... 3.5.4-1 Seal Injection Flow......................................................................... 3.5.5-1 ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System................................ 3.5.6-1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS................................................................... 3.6.1-1 Containment................................................................................... 3.6.1-1 Containment Air Locks................................................................... 3.6.2-1 Containment Isolation Valves......................................................... 3.6.3-1 Containment Pressure.................................................................... 3.6.4-1 Containment Air Temperature........................................................ 3.6.5-1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems...................................... 3.6.6-1 Deleted........................................................................................... 3.6.7-1 Hydrogen Mixing System (HMS).................................................... 3.6.8-1 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System...................................... 3.6.9-1 Containment Sump........................................................................ 3.6.1 0-1 PLANT SYSTEMS................................................................................. 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs).............................................. 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)............................................. 3.7.2-1 Farley Units 1 and 2 ii Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.5 SR 3.5.2.6 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.8 SURVEILLANCE Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each position stop is in the correct position.

Valve Number CVC-V-8991 A/B/C CVC-V-8989 A/B/C CVC-V-8996 A/B/C CVC-V-8994 A/B/C RH R-HV 603 AlB Deleted.

Verify ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

ECCS-Operating 3.5.2 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Farley Units 1 and 2 3.5.2-3 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C.

Required ECCS C.1 Restore required ECCS centrifugal charging centrifugal charging subsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE status.

D.

Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 5.

associated Completion Time of Condition B or C not met.

AND At least one RH R subsystem OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:

SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.6 SR 3.5.2.8 ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.3 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 hours FREQUENCY In accordance with applicable SRs Farley Units 1 and 2 3.5.3-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 0 Containment Sump Containment Sump 3.6.10 LCO 3.6.1 0 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Containment sump A.1 inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding analyzed AND limits.

A.2 AND A.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 Initiate action to mitigate Immediately containment accident generated and transported debris.

Perform SR 3.4.13.1.

Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Restore the containment 90 days sump to OPERABLE status.

3.6.10-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

ACTIONS B.

Containment sump B.1 Declare affected inoperable for reasons Emergency Core Cooling other than Condition A.

System train(s) inoperable.

AND B.2 Declare affected containment spray train(s) inoperable.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

C.2 Be in MODE 5.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.10.1 SURVEILLANCE Verify, by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.

Containment Sump 3.6.10 Immediately Immediately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.1 0-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

(Unit 2)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues" Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-Up) for Information Only

B 3.4.3 B3.4.4 B 3.4.5 B 3.4.6 B 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.1 0 B 3.4.11 B 3.4.12 B 3.4.13 B 3.4.14 B 3.4.15 B 3.4.16 B 3.4.17 B 3.5 B 3.5.1 B 3.5.2 B 3.5.3 B 3.5.4 B 3.5.5 B 3.5.6 B 3.6 B 3.6.1 B 3.6.2 B 3.6.3 B 3.6.4 B 3.6.5 B 3.6.6 B 3.6.7 B 3.6.8 B 3.6.9 B 3.6.10 B 3.7 B 3.7.1 B 3.7.2 B 3.7.3 TABLE OF CONTENTS RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits.............................. B 3.4.3-1 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2................................................... B 3.4.4-1 RCS Loops-MODE 3............................................................... B 3.4.5-1 RCS Loops-MODE 4............................................................... B 3.4.6-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled.......................................... B 3.4.7-1 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled.................................... B 3.4.8-1 Pressurizer.................................................................................. B 3.4.9-1 Pressurizer Safety Valves........................................................... B 3.4.1 0-1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).................................................................... B 3.4.11-1 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L TOP)

System.................................................................................. B 3.4.12-1 RCS Operational LEAKAGE....................................................... B 3.4.13-1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage............................. B 3.4.14-1 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.................................... B 3.4.15-1 RCS Specific Activity................................................................... B 3.4.16-1 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity......................................... B 3.4.17-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)......................... B 3.5.1-1 Accumulators.............................................................................. B 3.5.1-1 ECCS-Operating..................................................................... B 3.5.2-1 ECCS-Shutdown..................................................................... B 3.5.3-1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)...................................... B 3.5.4-1 Seal Injection Flow...................................................................... B 3.5.5-1 ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System............................. B 3.5.6-1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS................................................................ B 3.6.1-1 Containment............................................................................... B 3.6.1-1 Containment Air Locks................................................................ B 3.6.2-1 Containment Isolation Valves...................................................... B 3.6.3-1 Containment Pressure................................................................ B 3.6.4-1 Containment Air Temperature..................................................... B 3.6.5-1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems................................... B 3.6.6-1 Deleted....................................................................................... B 3.6.7-1 Hydrogen Mixing System (HMS)................................................. B 3.6.8-1 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System (RCHDS).................................................................. B 3.6.9-1 Containment Sump..................................................................... 8 3.6.10-1 PLANT SYSTEMS.............................................................................. B 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)........................................... B 3.7.1-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)......................................... B 3.7.2-1 Main Feedwater Stop Valves and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves................... B 3.7.3-1 Farley Units 1 and 2 ii Revision 29

BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Farley Units 1 and 2 ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 The centrifugal charging subsystem of the ECCS also functions to supply borated water to the reactor core following increased heat removal events, such as a main steam line break (MSLB). The limiting design conditions occur when the negative moderator temperature coefficient is highly negative, such as at the end of each cycle.

During low temperature conditions in the RCS, limitations are placed on the maximum number of ECCS pumps that may be OPERABLE.

Refer to the Bases for LCO 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L TOP) System," for the basis of these requirements.

The ECCS subsystems are actuated upon receipt of an Sl signal. The actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in a programmed time sequence. If offsite power is available, the safeguard loads start immediately in the programmed sequence. If offsite power is not available, the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating loads and are connected to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed time sequence. The time delay associated with diesel starting, sequenced loading, and pump starting determines the time required before pumped flow is available to the core following a LOCA.

The active ECCS components, along with the passive accumulators, aR1--the RWST, and the containment sump are covered in LCO 3.5.1, "Accumulators," aR1--LCO 3.5.4, "Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)," and LCO 3.6.10, "Containment Sump," and provide the cooling water necessary to meet GDC 35 (Ref. 1 ).

The LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2), will be met following a LOCA:

a.

Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ::::;; 2200°F;

b.

Maximum cladding oxidation is::::;; 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;

c.

Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is

~ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; (continued)

B 3.5.2-3 Revision 69

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.5.2.6 ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 Realignment of valves in the flow path on an Sl signal is necessary for proper ECCS performance. These valves have stops (RHR valves) or locking devices (other ECCS valves) to allow proper positioning for limiting total pump flow and/or restrict flow to a ruptured cold leg, ensuring that the other cold legs receive at least the required minimum flow. The required verification for the RHR valves, 603 AlB, assures that the associated pump will not be run out. For other ECCS valves, the locking device is verified in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.7 Periodic inspections of the containment sump suction inlet ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in proper operating condition. The inlet screens consist of perforated plates arranged such that their outer edges form a trash racl< to reduce clogging of the screen surface by large debris. Each plate is covered by wire mesh to further protect against clogging by smaller debris. Separation between plates is maintained by spacers and each plate is joined to a central perforated cylinder, or inner cage, which collects the flow through each plate.

Inspection of the screen plate structure, wire mesh screen, perforated plates and inner cage for evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion ensures that the inlet trash racl<:s, screens and inner cages are properly installed and will perform their intended function. The Surveillance rrequency is controlled under the Surveillance rrequency Control Program.Deleted.

SR 3.5.2.8 ECCS piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS locations susceptible to accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm (continued)

B 3.5.2-10 Revision 70

ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.3 ECCS-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO Farley Units 1 and 2 The Background section for Bases 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating," is applicable to these Bases, with the following modifications.

In MODE 4, only one ECCS train consisting of two separate subsystems: centrifugal charging (high head) and residual heat removal (RHR) (low head) is required operable.

The ECCS flow paths consist of piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps such that water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the containment sump can be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following the accidents described in Bases 3.5.2.

The Applicable Safety Analyses section of Bases 3.5.2 also applies to this Bases section.

Due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the reduced probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the ECCS operational requirements are reduced. It is understood in these reductions that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation is not available. In this MODE, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

Only one train of ECCS is required for MODE 4. This requirement dictates that single failures are not considered during this MODE of operation. The ECCS trains satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

In MODE 4, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, (continued)

B 3.5.3-1 Revision 0

Containment Sump B 3.6.10 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3. 6. 10 Containment Sump BASES BACKGROUND Farley Units 1 and 2 The containment sump provides a borated water source to support recirculation of coolant from the containment sump for residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, and containment atmosphere cleanup during accident conditions.

The containment sump supplies both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System (EGGS) and the Containment Spray System (CSS) during any accident that requires recirculation of coolant from the containment sump. There are four independent containment sump suctions, two for the EGGS trains and two for CSS trains. During recirculation mode, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (EGGS low head) pumps supply the centrifugal charging (EGGS high-head) pumps. The EGGS system recirculation mode is initiated when the RHR pump suctions are manually aligned to the containment sump when the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) reaches the low level setpoint.

The CSS recirculation mode is initiated when the CSS pump suctions are manually aligned to the containment sump when the RWST reaches the low-low level setpoint. This ensures the containment sump has enough water to supply the net positive suction head to the EGGS and CSS pumps. The use of a single containment sump to supply both trains of the EGGS and CSS is acceptable since the containment sump is a passive component, and passive failures are not required to be assumed to occur coincident with Design Basis Events.

The containment sump contains strainers to limit the quantity of the debris materials from entering the sump suction piping. Debris accumulation on the strainers can lead to undesirable hydraulic effects including air ingestion through vortexing or deaeration, and reduced net positive suction head at pump suction piping.

While the majority of debris accumulates on the strainers, some fraction penetrates the strainers and is transported to downstream components in the EGGS, CSS, and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Debris that penetrates the strainer can result in wear to the downstream components, blockages, or reduced heat transfer across the fuel cladding. Excessive debris in the containment sump water source could result in insufficient recirculation of coolant during the accident, or insufficient heat removal from the core during the accident.

B 3.6.10-1 Revision

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS LCO Farley Units 1 and 2 Containment Sump B 3.6.10 During all accidents that require recirculation, the containment sump provides a source of borated water to the EGGS and CSS pumps. As such, it supports residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, and containment atmosphere cleanup during an accident. It also provides a source of negative reactivity (Ref 1 ). The design basis transients and applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable Safety Analyses section of B 3. 5. 2, "EGGS - Operating, " B 3. 5. 3, "EGGS -

Shutdown," and B 3. 6. 6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."

FSAR Chapter 6 Appendix 60 (Ref 2) describes evaluations that confirm long-term core cooling is assured following any accident that requires recirculation from the containment sump.

The containment sump satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The containment sump is required to ensure a source of borated water to support EGGS and CSS OPERABILITY. A containment sump consists of the containment drainage flow paths, the containment sump strainers, the pump suction trash racks, and the inlet to the EGGS and CSS piping. An OPERABLE containment sump has no structural damage or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant and will not be restricted by containment accident generated and transported debris.

Containment accident generated and transported debris consists of the following:

a. Accident generated debris sources - Insulation, coatings, and other materials which are damaged by the high-energy line break (HELB) and transported to the containment sump. This includes materials within the HELB zone of influence and other materials (e.g.,

unqualified coatings) that fail due to the post-accident containment environment following the accident;

b. Latent debris sources - Pre-existing dirt, dust, paint chips, fines or shards of insulation, and other materials inside containment that do not have to be damaged by the HELB to be transported to the containment sump; and

c.

Chemical product debris sources - Aluminum, zinc, carbon steel, copper, and non-metallic materials such as paints, thermal insulation, and concrete that are susceptible to chemical reactions within the post-accident containment environment leading to corrosion products that are generated within the containment sump pool or are generated within containment and transported to the containment sump.

Containment debris limits are defined in Table 60-8 of FSAR Chapter 6, Appendix 60 (Ref 2).

B 3.6.10-2 Revision

BASES APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Farley Units 1 and 2 Containment Sump B 3.6.10 In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment sump OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by the EGGS and CSS OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the EGGS and the CSS must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the containment sump must also be OPERABLE to support their operation.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the containment sump is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 or 6.

A.1. A.2. and A.3 Condition A is applicable when there is a condition which results in containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. Containment debris limits are defined in Table 6D-8 of FSAR Chapter 6, Appendix 6D (Ref 2).

Immediate action must be initiated to mitigate the condition. Examples of mitigating actions are:

Removing the debris source from containment or preventing the debris from being transported to the containment sump; Evaluating the debris source against the assumptions in the analysis; Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of the affected systems and other loss of coolant accident (LOCA) mitigating equipment; Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of primary defense-in-depth systems, such as containment coolers; Briefing operators on LOCA debris management actions; or Applying an alternative method to establish new limits.

While in this condition, the RCS water inventory balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed at an increased Frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An unexpected increase in RCS leakage could be indicative of an increased potential for an RCS pipe break, which could result in debris being generated and transported to the containment sump. The more frequent monitoring allows operators to act in a timely fashion to minimize the potential for an RCS pipe break while the containment sump is inoperable.

(continued)

B 3.6.10-3 Revision

BASES ACTIONS Farley Units 1 and 2 A.1. A.2. and A.3 (continued)

Containment Sump B 3.6.10 The inoperable containment sump must be restored to OPERABLE status in 90 days. A 90-day Completion Time is reasonable for emergent conditions that involve debris in excess of the analyzed limits that could be generated and transported to the containment sump under accident conditions. The likelihood of an initiating event in the 90-day Completion Time is very small and there is margin in the associated analyses. The mitigating actions of Required Action A. 1 provide additional assurance that the effects of debris in excess of the analyzed limits will be mitigated during the Completion Time.

B.1 and B.2 When the containment sump is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, such as blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant, one or more EGGS or CSS trains are rendered inoperable, therefore, the affected EGGS and CSS trains must be immediately declared inoperable. Declaring the affected trains inoperable ensures appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the Required Actions of the EGGS and CSS Specifications.

C.1 and C.2 If the containment accident generated and transported debris cannot be restored to within analyzed limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

B 3.6.10-4 Revision

BASES Containment Sump B 3.6.10 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.10.1 REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 Periodic inspections are performed to verify the containment sump does not show current or potential debris blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion to ensure the OPERABILITY and structural integrity of the containment sump (Ref 1).

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.

2. FSAR, Chapter 6, Appendix 6D, "Containment Sump Description and Emergency Core Cooling System Recirculation Sump Strainer Design."

B 3.6.10-5 Revision