05000395/FIN-2013005-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.18 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.18 | ||
| Inspector = A Sengupta, E Coffman, J Reece, J Rivera, J Rivera, | | Inspector = A Sengupta, E Coffman, J Reece, J Rivera, J Rivera Ortiz, P Cooper, R Hamilton, R Kellnere, Coffmanj Laughlin, J Reece, M King, R Williams, D Bacon | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = An unresolved item (URI) regarding ECR-50780 was identified by the inspectors for a performance deficiency associated with inadequate post modification testing for the ASI system. During the Fall, 2012 refueling outage, the licensee completed ECR-50780 and placed the ASI system in service to provide a backup for reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection in the event of a station blackout (SBO) or other events resulting in low normal RCP seal injection flow. The inspectors noted during their review that the ASI system has a mission time of 24 hours with no operator action required and consists of a positive displacement pump powered by a dedicated diesel generator, valves,piping, flow transmitters, and other components. The inspectors noted that the RWST provides the suction source, and the discharge of the ASI system ties in to the chemical volume control system (CVCS) upstream of the normal seal water injection filters (SWIFs) of which there are two in parallel, one normally in service and manual operator action required to realign on high differential pressure. The inspectors also noted that the filters used for normal operation are sized at .1 micron. The inspectors review of post modification testing identified that the potential clogging of the SWIFs was not considered as an impact on the mission time. The licensee initiated CR-13-000642 for an evaluation and initiated a Special Order for heightened awareness of a SWIF differential pressure annunciator occurring during those events resulting in actuation of the ASI system. The inspectors also reviewed technical work record (TWR) 14809 dated December 10, 1997, which allowed the use of .1 micron filters via the licensees equal to better than process (ETBT) #157A and respective 50.59 screening. The inspectors determined that the impact of filter clogging during a design basis accident was not considered. The licensee initiated CR-13-01853, to evaluate this problem. Pending completion of evaluations in determining related PDs and their characterization, this issue is identified as URI 05000395/2013005-01, Seal Water Injection Filter Impact on Alternate Seal Injection System and Design Basis Accidents. | | description = An unresolved item (URI) regarding ECR-50780 was identified by the inspectors for a performance deficiency associated with inadequate post modification testing for the ASI system. During the Fall, 2012 refueling outage, the licensee completed ECR-50780 and placed the ASI system in service to provide a backup for reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection in the event of a station blackout (SBO) or other events resulting in low normal RCP seal injection flow. The inspectors noted during their review that the ASI system has a mission time of 24 hours with no operator action required and consists of a positive displacement pump powered by a dedicated diesel generator, valves,piping, flow transmitters, and other components. The inspectors noted that the RWST provides the suction source, and the discharge of the ASI system ties in to the chemical volume control system (CVCS) upstream of the normal seal water injection filters (SWIFs) of which there are two in parallel, one normally in service and manual operator action required to realign on high differential pressure. The inspectors also noted that the filters used for normal operation are sized at .1 micron. The inspectors review of post modification testing identified that the potential clogging of the SWIFs was not considered as an impact on the mission time. The licensee initiated CR-13-000642 for an evaluation and initiated a Special Order for heightened awareness of a SWIF differential pressure annunciator occurring during those events resulting in actuation of the ASI system. The inspectors also reviewed technical work record (TWR) 14809 dated December 10, 1997, which allowed the use of .1 micron filters via the licensees equal to better than process (ETBT) #157A and respective 50.59 screening. The inspectors determined that the impact of filter clogging during a design basis accident was not considered. The licensee initiated CR-13-01853, to evaluate this problem. Pending completion of evaluations in determining related PDs and their characterization, this issue is identified as URI 05000395/2013005-01, Seal Water Injection Filter Impact on Alternate Seal Injection System and Design Basis Accidents. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Summer  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000395/2013005 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sengupta E Coffman J Reece J Rivera J Rivera Ortiz P Cooper R Hamilton R Kellnere Coffmanj Laughlin J Reece M King R Williams D Bacon |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |