05000395/FIN-2013008-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Design the Safety-related Chiller Modification to Appropriate Quality Standards |
Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to review the application of design processes prescribed for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system chillers for suitability, to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and included in design documents, and to ensure that deviations from such standards were controlled. This was a performance deficiency. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition reports 13-04803, 13-04804, and 13-04665. The licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the A chiller was inoperable with the two remaining operable chillers providing compliance with technical specifications. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish adequate design control measures that required the review of applicable design processes for suitability resulted in a failure to meet specified quality objectives, which decreased the availability and reliability of the A chiller. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because although the finding was a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating system, structure, or component which failed to maintain its operability, it did not represent a loss of the system function or a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The HVAC system remains operable with the two remaining chillers, B and C, in operation. The team determined the finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of supervisory and management oversight, within the Work Practices component of Human Performance area which states that, the licensee ensures supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, V. C. Summer management did not ensure management oversight of work activities that provided for the administration of quality assurance necessary to support nuclear safety. |
Site: | Summer |
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Report | IR 05000395/2013008 Section 1R17 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Alen E Stamm N Coovert R Nease T Fanelli |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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