05000313/FIN-2013004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = M Hairea, | | Inspector = M Hairea, Fairbanksb Tindell, G Werner, J Laughlin, J Melfi, L Carson, M Young | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors documented a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1.a for the licensees failure to implement procedures specified by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a preventive maintenance task to periodically replace matrix test switches after the switches were installed. A new test switch was installed and replacement of similar switches was scheduled for the next refueling outage. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2013-0005. The inspectors determined that the failure to implement preventive maintenance to replace the matrix test switches was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and was therefore a finding. Specifically, the degraded switch caused a safety system actuation, which resulted in the high pressure safety injection and the low pressure safety injection pumps to be placed in pull-to-lock, adversely affecting the availability of this equipment. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because it represented a loss of function. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation. The exposure period was 48 minutes. The change to the core damage frequency was of 2.3 E-7 (Green). The dominant core damage sequences included inadvertent safety valve openings and small break loss of coolant accidents without injection available. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of current licensee performance. | | description = The inspectors documented a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1.a for the licensees failure to implement procedures specified by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement a preventive maintenance task to periodically replace matrix test switches after the switches were installed. A new test switch was installed and replacement of similar switches was scheduled for the next refueling outage. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2013-0005. The inspectors determined that the failure to implement preventive maintenance to replace the matrix test switches was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and was therefore a finding. Specifically, the degraded switch caused a safety system actuation, which resulted in the high pressure safety injection and the low pressure safety injection pumps to be placed in pull-to-lock, adversely affecting the availability of this equipment. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because it represented a loss of function. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation. The exposure period was 48 minutes. The change to the core damage frequency was of 2.3 E-7 (Green). The dominant core damage sequences included inadvertent safety valve openings and small break loss of coolant accidents without injection available. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:48, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Hairea Fairbanksb Tindell G Werner J Laughlin J Melfi L Carson M Young |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |