05000382/FIN-2011009-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71124.02 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71124.02 | ||
| Inspector = G Werner, L Ricketson, N Greenej, | | Inspector = G Werner, L Ricketson, N Greenej, Drakel Ricketsona, Vegelg Werner, J Drake, L Ricketson, N Greene, R Kellar, S Garry, T Blount | ||
| CCA = P.5 | | CCA = P.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.1 | | INPO aspect = CL.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified an apparent White finding because the licensee failed to use effective engineering controls as part of pre-job planning to reduce contamination and subsequent exposure. The primary reason for the dose overage was the licensee\\\'s failure to prevent radioactive water from leaking into work areas and raising radiation dose rates. As corrective action, the licensee installed a trough system to collect and route the radioactive water away from the work area and to the reactor containment floor drain system. This issue was placed in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2011-05672. The failure to use effective engineering controls as part of pre-job planning to reduce contamination and subsequent exposure is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it was similar to (the more than minor) Example 6.i in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example of Minor Issues, in that the actual collective dose exceeded 5 person-rem and exceeded the planned, intended dose by more than 50 percent. Additionally, the finding is associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that it increased collective radiation dose. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, to analyze the significance of the finding. The finding was preliminarily determined to be White (low to moderate safety significance) because it involved ALARA planning or work controls; the average collective dose at the time the finding was identified was greater than 135 person-rem; and the actual dose associated with a work activity was greater than 25 person-rem. Alternately, there were greater than four occurrences in which the actual collective dose exceeded 5 person-rem and the estimated/planned dose by more than 50 percent. The finai significance of this finding is to be determined. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the operating experience component, because the iicensee did not institutionalize operating experience concerning the effects of reactor coolant pump leakage on work area dose rates. | | description = The inspectors identified an apparent White finding because the licensee failed to use effective engineering controls as part of pre-job planning to reduce contamination and subsequent exposure. The primary reason for the dose overage was the licensee\\\'s failure to prevent radioactive water from leaking into work areas and raising radiation dose rates. As corrective action, the licensee installed a trough system to collect and route the radioactive water away from the work area and to the reactor containment floor drain system. This issue was placed in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2011-05672. The failure to use effective engineering controls as part of pre-job planning to reduce contamination and subsequent exposure is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it was similar to (the more than minor) Example 6.i in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example of Minor Issues, in that the actual collective dose exceeded 5 person-rem and exceeded the planned, intended dose by more than 50 percent. Additionally, the finding is associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that it increased collective radiation dose. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, to analyze the significance of the finding. The finding was preliminarily determined to be White (low to moderate safety significance) because it involved ALARA planning or work controls; the average collective dose at the time the finding was identified was greater than 135 person-rem; and the actual dose associated with a work activity was greater than 25 person-rem. Alternately, there were greater than four occurrences in which the actual collective dose exceeded 5 person-rem and the estimated/planned dose by more than 50 percent. The finai significance of this finding is to be determined. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the operating experience component, because the iicensee did not institutionalize operating experience concerning the effects of reactor coolant pump leakage on work area dose rates. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:44, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2011009 Section 2RS2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: White |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.02 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Werner L Ricketson N Greenej Drakel Ricketsona Vegelg Werner J Drake L Ricketson N Greene R Kellar S Garry T Blount |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
| ' | |