05000255/FIN-2010005-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | ||
| Inspector = M Holmberg, B Jose, J Cassidy, M Mitchell, J Ellegood, T Taylor, J Corujo | | Inspector = M Holmberg, B Jose, J Cassidy, M Mitchell, J Ellegood, T Taylor, J Corujo-Sandin, G Hansen | ||
| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to follow Procedure CEP-NDE-0955, Visual Examination of Bare-Metal Surfaces, and perform a bare metal visual examination of vessel head penetration nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 within 4 feet. Instead, the licensee performed the examination at approximately 5 feet and the illumination level at this distance had not been demonstrated as adequate to detect primary coolant system leakage. As a corrective action, the licensees examiner repeated the bare metal visual examination of nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 and surrounding head surfaces at a distance of less than 4 feet. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) PLP-2010-05188. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would have continued to perform inadequate examinations of the surfaces of the vessel head near nozzles Nos. 1 and 3, which could allow throughwall nozzle cracks to go undetected. Undetected cracks returned to service would place the vessel head at increased risk for leakage and/or nozzle failure, which affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance (barrier integrity). The licensee promptly corrected this issue by repeating the examination of nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 in accordance with the procedure to confirm that no evidence of nozzle leakage existed. The inspectors answered No to the Significance Determination Process Phase I screening question Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any Primary Coolant System (PCS) leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation? Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices because the licensee did not effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures. Specifically, the failure to perform a bare metal visual examination of vessel head penetration nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 within four feet occurred because the licensees management staff did not adequately stress or enforce procedure adherence for this activity. In particular, procedure CEP-NDE-0955 was issued as an Informational Use type procedure that was not required to be present at the worksite and thus allowed licensee staff to rely on memory to perform the procedural steps. (H.4(b)) (Section 1R08.2) | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to follow Procedure CEP-NDE-0955, Visual Examination of Bare-Metal Surfaces, and perform a bare metal visual examination of vessel head penetration nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 within 4 feet. Instead, the licensee performed the examination at approximately 5 feet and the illumination level at this distance had not been demonstrated as adequate to detect primary coolant system leakage. As a corrective action, the licensees examiner repeated the bare metal visual examination of nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 and surrounding head surfaces at a distance of less than 4 feet. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) PLP-2010-05188. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would have continued to perform inadequate examinations of the surfaces of the vessel head near nozzles Nos. 1 and 3, which could allow throughwall nozzle cracks to go undetected. Undetected cracks returned to service would place the vessel head at increased risk for leakage and/or nozzle failure, which affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance (barrier integrity). The licensee promptly corrected this issue by repeating the examination of nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 in accordance with the procedure to confirm that no evidence of nozzle leakage existed. The inspectors answered No to the Significance Determination Process Phase I screening question Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any Primary Coolant System (PCS) leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation? Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices because the licensee did not effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures. Specifically, the failure to perform a bare metal visual examination of vessel head penetration nozzles Nos. 1 and 3 within four feet occurred because the licensees management staff did not adequately stress or enforce procedure adherence for this activity. In particular, procedure CEP-NDE-0955 was issued as an Informational Use type procedure that was not required to be present at the worksite and thus allowed licensee staff to rely on memory to perform the procedural steps. (H.4(b)) (Section 1R08.2) | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2010005 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg B Jose J Cassidy M Mitchell J Ellegood T Taylor J Corujo-Sandin G Hansen |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |