05000361/FIN-2009002-05: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of engineering personnel to properly perform an evaluation of reactor coolant pump vapor seal boric acid accumulation caused by a clogged vapor seal drain line, in accordance with boric acid corrosion control program procedures. Specifically, engineering personnel failed to follow the requirements of Procedures SO23-XV-85 and SO23-XV-8.15 to properly evaluate the impact of boric acid leakage to reactor coolant system pressure boundary components. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Nuclear Notification 200258836. The finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, excessive boric acid buildup would have a potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because engineering personnel did not use conservative assumptions to identify possible unintended consequences associated with the identified boric acid accumulation [H.1.(b)] | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of engineering personnel to properly perform an evaluation of reactor coolant pump vapor seal boric acid accumulation caused by a clogged vapor seal drain line, in accordance with boric acid corrosion control program procedures. Specifically, engineering personnel failed to follow the requirements of Procedures SO23-XV-85 and SO23-XV-8.15 to properly evaluate the impact of boric acid leakage to reactor coolant system pressure boundary components. This finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Nuclear Notification 200258836. The finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, excessive boric acid buildup would have a potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because engineering personnel did not use conservative assumptions to identify possible unintended consequences associated with the identified boric acid accumulation [H.1.(b)] | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 20 February 2018
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2009002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Elkman T Steadham J Reynoso G Warnick C Osterholtz M Hay |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |