05000293/FIN-2011005-04: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Severity Level lV NCV of 10 CFR 55.53 (e) and (f), Conditions of Licenses, because Entergy incorrectly credited two individuals for proficiency watch-standing experience and then these operators subsequently stood watch without meeting the minimum proficiency requirements necessary to maintain an active license. Entergy implemented immediate corrective action that included discontinuing the practice of crediting the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and Extra Balance of Plant (BOP) positions for proficiency. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-PNP-201 1-04649). The inspectors determined that Entergy incorrectly credited two individuals for proficiency watch-standing experience and then these operators subsequently stood watch in the control room. This error constitutes a performance deficiency that was within Entergy\'s ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that Traditional Enforcement applies, as the issue had the potential to impact the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because if a licensed operator fails to meet the conditions of their license, the NRC may need to perform a review for consideration of a licensing action, and if the information regarding an individual\'s qualifications is not accurately presented, the NRC could potentially make an incorrect licensing decision based on the inaccurate information. Specifically, Entergy did not ensure that two reactor operator (RO) licensed individuals maintained their RO licenses in an active status in the 2nd quarter 2011, prior to standing RO watches in the 3rd quarter 201 1 which violated a license condition as specified in 10 CFR 55.53 (e) and (f). The performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, lssue Screening. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. This issue is similar to violation example 6.4.c.1(c) in the NRC Enforcement Policy for a Severity Level lll violation because it involves noncompliance with a condition stated on an individual\'s license. However, since there were no adverse impacts to nuclear safety, the NRC has determined that this issue constitutes a Severity Level lV NCV in accordance with the NRC\'s Enforcement Policy. | | description = The inspectors identified a Severity Level lV NCV of 10 CFR 55.53 (e) and (f), Conditions of Licenses, because Entergy incorrectly credited two individuals for proficiency watch-standing experience and then these operators subsequently stood watch without meeting the minimum proficiency requirements necessary to maintain an active license. Entergy implemented immediate corrective action that included discontinuing the practice of crediting the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and Extra Balance of Plant (BOP) positions for proficiency. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-PNP-201 1-04649). The inspectors determined that Entergy incorrectly credited two individuals for proficiency watch-standing experience and then these operators subsequently stood watch in the control room. This error constitutes a performance deficiency that was within Entergy\\\'s ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that Traditional Enforcement applies, as the issue had the potential to impact the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because if a licensed operator fails to meet the conditions of their license, the NRC may need to perform a review for consideration of a licensing action, and if the information regarding an individual\\\'s qualifications is not accurately presented, the NRC could potentially make an incorrect licensing decision based on the inaccurate information. Specifically, Entergy did not ensure that two reactor operator (RO) licensed individuals maintained their RO licenses in an active status in the 2nd quarter 2011, prior to standing RO watches in the 3rd quarter 201 1 which violated a license condition as specified in 10 CFR 55.53 (e) and (f). The performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, lssue Screening. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. This issue is similar to violation example 6.4.c.1(c) in the NRC Enforcement Policy for a Severity Level lll violation because it involves noncompliance with a condition stated on an individual\\\'s license. However, since there were no adverse impacts to nuclear safety, the NRC has determined that this issue constitutes a Severity Level lV NCV in accordance with the NRC\\\'s Enforcement Policy. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:48, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2011005 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Smith C Newport J Caruso J Tomlinson K Mangan M Catts M Schneider R Bellamy R Rolph T Fish |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |