IR 05000352/2014008: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML14310A099 | | number = ML14310A099 | ||
| issue date = 11/05/2014 | | issue date = 11/05/2014 | ||
| title = Limerick Generating Station- | | title = Limerick Generating Station-NRC Problem Identification And Resolution Inspection 05000352/2014008 and 05000353/2014008 Public Document | ||
| author name = Bower F L | | author name = Bower F L | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB4 | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB4 | ||
Revision as of 21:39, 15 February 2018
| ML14310A099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2014 |
| From: | Bower F L Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2014008 | |
| Download: ML14310A099 (19) | |
Text
November 5, 2014
Mr. Michael Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION 05000352/2014008 AND 05000353/2014008
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On October 3, 2014, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results discussed on October 3, 2014, with Mr. David Lewis, Plant Manager and other members of your staff. This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that Exelon was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Exelon personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Exelon prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors documented a minor violation containing security-related information, which is provided as Enclosure 2. This deficiency was promptly corrected or compensated for and the plant was in compliance with applicable physical protection and security requirements within the scope of this inspection, before the inspectors left the site. If you contest the minor violation or the team's observations in Enclosure 2, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Limerick Generating Station. As this information is security-related, please ensure your response is properly marked and handled.
Enclosure 2 contains Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information. When separated from enclosure, the transmittal document is decontrolled. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-352; 50-353 License Nos.: NPF-39, NPF-85
Enclosure 1 (Public): Inspection Report 050000353/2014008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information Enclosure 2 (Non-Public): Inspection Report 05000353/2014008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information (CONTAINS (OUO-SRI)) cc w/Enclosure 1; w/Enclosure 2; w/OUO-SRI K. Kemper, Manager, Site Security D. Allard, Director, PA DEP cc w/Enclosure 1; w/o Enclosure 2; w/o OUO-SRI Distribution via ListServ In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-352; 50-353 License Nos.: NPF-39, NPF-85 Enclosure 1 (Public): Inspection Report 050000353/2014008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information
Enclosure 2 (Non-Public): Inspection Report 05000353/2014008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information (CONTAINS (OUO-SRI)) cc w/Enclosure 1; w/Enclosure 2; w/OUO-SRI K. Kemper, Manager, Site Security D. Allard, Director, PA DEP
cc w/Enclosure 1; w/o Enclosure 2; w/o OUO-SRI Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/Encl 1; w/Encl 2; w/OUO-SRI: (via email) C. Bickett, DRP R. Powell, DRP F. Bower, DRP G. DiPaolo, DRP, SRI R. Albert, NSIR C. Johnson, NSIR S. Coker, NSIR B. Desai, DRS, RII R. Skokowski, DRS, RIII M. Haire, DRS, RIV Distribution w/Encl 1; w/o Encl 2; w/o OUO-SRI: (via email) D.Lew, Acting RA V. Ordaz, Acting DRA H. Nieh, DRP M. Scott, DRP R. Lorson, DRS J. Trapp, DRS F. Bower, DRP R. Montgomery, DRP, RI N. Esch, DRP, AA J. Jandovitz, RI OEDO DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection\Reports\Draft\2014 (ROP15)\2014 Limerick PIR report_Final Public.docx ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML14310A099 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME RBarkley ADimitriadis RPowell FBower DATE 10/31 /14 11/3/14 11/5/14 11/5/14 1 Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
Docket Nos.: 50-352; 50-353 License Nos.: NPF-39, NPF-85
Report Nos.: 05000352/2014008 and 05000353/2014008 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: Limerick Units 1 and 2 Location: Sanatoga, Pennsylvania
Dates: September 15 - 19, 2014 September 29 - October 3, 2014
Team Leader: R. Barkley, PE, Senior Project Engineer Inspectors: E. Andrews, Project Engineer B. Lin, Project Engineer R. Montgomery, Resident Inspector - Limerick Approved by: Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects 2 Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000352/2014008, 05000353/2014008, 09/15/2014 - 10/03/2014; Limerick Units 1 and 2;
Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This NRC team inspection was performed by one senior project engineer, two regional inspectors, and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that Exelon was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Exelon personnel typically identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. Exelon appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Exelon implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.
The inspectors concluded that Exelon adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Limerick operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Exelon's self-assessments and audits were thorough.
Based on limited interviews of employees and contractors the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment. 3 1
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Exelon's corrective action program at Limerick Unit 1 & 2. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and Exelon procedure PI-AA-125, Revision 0, "Corrective Action Program Procedure." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed issue reports (IRs) selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended plan-of-the-day, station ownership committee, and management review committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.
(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, operator logs, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various buildings onsite, including the reactor, turbine, radwaste, and circulating water buildings as well as the spray pond pump house. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of IRs written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Exelon entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.
(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of IRs issued since the last NRC biennial problem identification and resolution inspection completed in early November 2012. The inspectors also reviewed IRs that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.
(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed Exelon's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed IRs for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of IRs associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings to verify that Exelon personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Exelon actions related to the condition of the 13 kV electrical system and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)piping system. b. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Exelon identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Exelon staff at Limerick initiated nearly 30,000 IRs between November 2012 and September 2014. The inspectors observed supervisors at the plan-of-the-day, station ownership committee, and management review committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging issue reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Exelon trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in issue reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through these reviews were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at a low threshold.
With few exceptions, inspectors found that issues or concerns had been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. However, in response to questions and equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns in the radwaste building and the spray pond pump house, Exelon personnel promptly initiated IRs and/or took prompt action to address the issues. The material condition of equipment in these two areas was distinctly different than the rest of the facility. In response, Limerick management noted an effort recently initiated to improve the material condition of the radwaste control room as well as the procedures governing its conduct of operations.
(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues In general, the inspectors determined that Exelon appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem, with the exception of the issues documented in Enclosure 2. Exelon screened IRs for operability and reportability, categorized the issue reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The IR screening process considered human performance issues, radiological and industrial safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and the potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.
Based on the sample of issue reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by Exelon corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. This was supported by the review of four SOC packages, attendance at two MRC meetings, and the review of approximately 200 IRs.
(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were typically timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Exelon identified actions to prevent recurrence and corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs, issued since the last problem identification and resolution inspection, were also timely and effective.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of IRs associated with the review of industry operating experience to determine whether Exelon appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Limerick, and had taken appropriate actions when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Exelon adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that Limerick appropriately considered both Exelon-fleet and industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during daily meetings.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits and self-assessments, including recent reviews of the corrective action program, selected departments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if Exelon entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether Exelon initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Exelon assessments were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Exelon personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments, and that individuals across the Exelon fleet were brought in to support these assessments and provide diverse and objective insights. Exelon completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. The station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
During interviews station and contractor personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Limerick. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed station Employee Concerns Program counselors to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed selected Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that Exelon entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate, and that senior Limerick management was promptly informed of sensitive performance issues involving department supervisors or managers.
b. Assessment During interviews of staff conducted in multiple departments, Limerick staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information. One observation made during these interviews was passed onto Limerick management, specifically that the majority of employees interviewed thought that they could submit an IR anonymously in the CAP. While this process once existed, it was discontinued several years ago, although employees do have the option of providing such a concern to the ECP, or place it anonymously in an "Ask the SVP" drop box. Limerick management acknowledged the inspectors' observation and were evaluating how best to reemphasize to their employees the available avenues to communicate concerns anonymously.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 3, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. David Lewis, Plant Manager, and other members of the Limerick staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
- M. Arnosky, Shift Manager
- J. Berg, System Engineer
- J. Brittain, System Engineer
- G. Broillet, EP Manager
- G. Budock, Senior Regulatory Engineer
- F. Burzynski, Fire Marshall
- I. Choudhry, ECP Counselor
- R. Dickinson, Manager - Regulatory Assurance
- M. Gillen, Shift Operations Superintendent
- C. Gulotta, Manager Site Security Operations
- J. Karkoska, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- M. Klick, Performance Improvement Director
- L. Lail, Maintenance Engineer
- A. Lambert, System Engineer
- N. Lampe, System Engineer
- A. Lopez, Security Shift Supervisor
- J. MacDonald, EP Specialist
- R. McCall, Principal Regulatory Engineer
- J. Mills, System Engineer
- J. Murphy, Senior Operations Supervisor
- R. Nealis, Chemistry Supervisor
- D. Nugent, System Engineer
- D. Poindexter, Security Program Lead
- W. Pulford, Senior Reactor Operator
- B. Shultz, Manager Operations Support
- R. Smith, Operations Engineer
- G. Sprissler, Chemistry analyst
- J. Thoryk, Fire Protection Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
None A-2 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Action Requests
- A0059917 A0117920
- A0218375
- A0239406
- A0316095 A0514224 A0535205
- A0558461
- A0859101
- A0826195 A0961772 A0993204
- A1011891
- A1062403
- A1084700
- A1188765 A1274351 A1295026 A1321733 A1334180 A1346798
- A1358486
- A1360280 A1366280
- A1368222
- A1370445
- A1371755
- A1390418 A1412661 A1438827
- A1469144
- A1511763
- A1517485 A1525212 A1546800
- A1548613
- A1549475
- A1592062
- A1632606 A1633981 A1634017
- A1635331
- A1637448
- A1647449 A1673115 A1682037 A1684387 A1691672
- A1692284
- A1696403
- A1698299 A1699228 A1699909
- A2236912
- A2345103
- A2382443 A2382446 A2382448
- A2382452
- A2382453
- A2382830
- A2384560 A2385027 A2385474
- A2385504
- A2386376
- A2389068
- Audits and Self-Assessments
- FASA, CAP Process Quality Maintenance (1453872) FASA, Preparation for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Procedure 71152 (1607113) FASA, Protective Strategy (IP. 71130.05), (1610339)
- 4.0 critiques - crew response to 124A LC Transformer Failure, (1390776)
- NO-AA-10, Quality Topical Report (1486097) North Anna Lessons Learned (1266661)
- NOS: ID - Operations Fundamental Deficiencies (1492631)
- NOSA-LIM-13-02: Security Programs Audit Report (1451226)
- NOSA-LIM-13-03, Emergency Preparedness Audit (1460475 & 1625239)
- NOSA-LIM-13-04, Corrective Action Plan Audit Report (1486097)
- NOSA-LIM-13-05, Engineering Design Control Audit (1520662)
- PI-AA-126-1001-F-01, Focused Area Self-Assessment: Permanent Plant Modifications 50.59 (1605341)
- PI-AA-126-1001-F-01, Focused Area Self-Assessment: Inservice Test Program (1605381)
- A-3
- Attachment
- Issue Reports
- 202873
- 502066
- 536788
- 670949
- 859270
- 930525
- 958120
- 1033351
- 1040098
- 1042812
- 1065596
- 1080954
- 1083741
- 1112134
- 1132208
- 1153478
- 1156338
- 1164290
- 1197843
- 200464
- 25849
- 25955
- 27038
- 230257
- 1239155
- 1262728
- 1266661
- 1282048
- 1306455
- 1306713
- 1316885
- 1317145
- 1317228
- 25162
- 1337334
- 1337813
- 1338537
- 1355888
- 1356794
- 1359672
- 1363381
- 1369889
- 1371755
- 1382311
- 1390019
- 1390033 14189171419420
- 1419423143310414331871434678143620814376571438827
- 143928414419341442748144763414480051448416145095414516401451714
- 145215614521591452196145373714551791456033145603414587941459314
- 14593171461065146204214691441473255 1473751147886614816911482020
- 14862751486278149019114902811490765149263114935301493735
- 1496014
- 1496078
- 1503427
- 1507365
- 1509125
- 1511763
- 1511869
- 1512745
- 1514337
- 1514746
- 1515025
- 1516342
- 1516809
- 1517065
- 1517485
- 1518728
- 20662
- 23844
- 1524096
- 1524143
- 1524270
- 1524287
- 1524304
- 24310
- 1524313
- 1524318
- 1525474
- 1525669
- 1526780
- 28088
- 1529195
- 1529292
- 1534114
- 1535683
- 1535897
- 1543347
- 1543499
- 1545695
- 1547115
- 1547152
- 1547159
- 1548613
- 1549475
- A-4
- Attachment
- 1550706
- 1550721
- 1550818
- 1569907
- 1574357
- 1581024
- 1586340
- 1593110
- 1594739
- 1596974
- 1610339
- 1620364
- 1621417
- 1621964
- 1622015
- 23028
- 1623088
- 1625519
- 1627435 16292881633040
- 1633875
- 1633876
- 163388016338821639507
- 1646747
- 1649873
- 16560571680988 168750416985081656634
- 165929816656581675612177705717770601942432 *2236912*2382443*2382446*2382448*2382452*2382453*2382911
- 2385477*2385504*2385703 *2386376
- 2385634
- 2388643
- 2389170
- 2389173 (* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)
Work Orders
- 247697
- 248463
- 251801
- 252445
- 253721
- 253808 25393912141861241103
- 262455128342712803311294703
- 1596973
- NCV 2012-05-02: Failure to revise EDG tank cleaning work instructions (IR 1453737)
- NCV 2012-07-01: Inadequate evaluation of voltage of safety-related equipment with offsite power available (IR 1418917)
- NCV 2013-07-02: Fire Safe Shutdown Transfer Switches Not Periodically Tested (1515025)
- NCV 2013-02-01: Failure to adequately assess battery charger operability in a timely manner (IR 1486275)
- NCV 2013-03-01: Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with EDG No. D24 (IR
- 1507365,
- 1509125,
- 1511869,
- 1512745,
- 1526780 & 1528088)
- NCV 2012-10-01: Failure to take timely corrective actions to address the 144D load center ODM contingency actions. (IR 2012010)
- NCV 2013-04-01: License Condition 2.C.3 - inadequate guidance for fire brigade transportation to the spray pond pump house. (IR 2013007)
- NCV 2013-04-03: Failure to prevent installation of a defective card into the 1A Redundant Reactivity Control System (1569907)
- A-5
- Attachment
Procedures
- ARC-BOP-1CC514 F3, F.O STR Diff Press Hi, Revision 2
- CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening, Revision 27
- E-1691, Sheet 1, Communication & Fire Alarm Layout Radwaste Enclosure Plan Above
- EL. 217"-0', Revision 10
- ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)
- ER-AA-310-1005, (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template (Attachment 3), Revision 6 (IR1639507 - Control Enclosure Chilled Water, System 090)
- ER-AA-310-1005, (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template, Revision 6 (IR
- 1449120 - Seismic Monitoring System, System 365) F-D-311A (Fire Area 79), D11 Diesel Generator and Fuel Oil-Lube Oil Tank Room, Rooms 311A and 312A (El217), Revision 10 F-D-311A (Fire Area 79), D11 Diesel Generator and Fuel Oil-Lube Oil Tank Room, Rooms 311A and 312A (El217), Revision 11 F-W-410, Common, Radwaste Control Room, Laboratories, Laundry, Decontamination and Change Area, Waste Drum Storage Room, and Cask Loading Area Rooms 410-424 (El 217), Revision 3 M-095-006, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Battery Chargers, Revision 6
- OP-AA-106-101-1005, Quarantine of Areas, Equipment, and Records, Revision 0
- OP-AA-108-115-1002, Supplemental Consideration for On-Shift Immediate Operability Determinations (CM-1), Revision 2
- OP-LG-201-008, Limerick Generating Station Fire Protection (F) Pre-Fire Plan Strategies, Revision 4
- PI-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 0
- PI-AA-125-1001, Root Cause Analysis Manual, Revision 0
- PI-AA-125-1003, Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual, Revision 1
- PI-AA-126-1001, Focused Area Self-Assessments, Revision 0
- PI-AA-126, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Program, Revision 0
- PI-AA-1001, Performance Improvement Integrated Matrix, Revision 2
- S92.3.N Receiving Diesel Fuel Oil Delivery, Revision 37SE-8, Fire, Revision 50
- SE-8 Fire, Revision 50
- SE-8 Fire Hard Card, Revision 0
- SE-23, Security Threat, Revision 24
- ST-5-020-810-0, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Receipt Analysis, Revision 29
- ST-6-092-365-0, Inoperability Unit 1 Safeguard Power Supply Actions for Both Units,
- Revision 44
- SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities, Revision 22
- SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities, Revision 22
- WC-AA-106, Work Screening and Processing, Revision 13
- Root and Apparent Cause Evaluations
- Ineffective Collective Effectiveness Review (1524693)
- Oil leak discovered when HPCI shutdown (1490191)
- NOS ID: Procedure for boiler chemical addition not performed as written (1473751)
- A-6
- Attachment
- 124A Load Center Tripped (1390033) Safety-Related Raw Water Treatment Program (1665658)
- Generic Communications & Operating Experience
- Information Notice 85-30, Microbiologically Induced Corrosion of Containment Service Water Systems Information Notice 2013-01, Emergency Action Level Thresholds Outside the Range of Radiation Monitors Information Notice 2013-15, Willful Misconduct / Record Falsification & Nuclear Safety Culture Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Generic Letter 90-05, Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repairs of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping (A01635331) Generic Letter 2006-02: Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power OPEX Review of NRC
- IN 2013-01, EAL Thresholds and Radiation Monitors (1481380) OPEX Evaluation - Information Notice 2013-15, Willful Misconduct (1592062) NUREG 1801, Generic Aging Lessons Learned
Miscellaneous
- 2014 Organizational Effectiveness Survey results covering SCWE (a)(1) Action Plan for Control Enclosure Chilled Water System (a)(1) Action Plan for Seismic Monitoring System Additional documentation related to (a)(2) status for RHRSW
- AD-AA-101, Processing of Procedures and T&RMs
- ASME Code Case N-513-2 Calculation
- LF-0007, Fixed Combustible Loading Data Sheet for room 423, Revision 2 Completed surveillances for RHRSW for April 15, 2014 Control Room Log Entries Report, 12/14/2012
- CY-LG-120-1102, Outside chemistry/NPDES-related sampling and analysis schedule
- CY-LG-120-1117, Spray Pond Chemistry Guide
- CY-AA-170-300, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Administration
- CY-LG-170-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 25
- CY-AA-170-3100, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revisions
- ECR-11-00418, 2012 Security FOF project, Revision 0
- Engineering technical evaluation for Identification of Augmented Examination Locations for Residual Heat Removal Service Water Piping on
- HBC-507 (1691672-07) Engineering technical evaluation for Identification of Augmented Examination Locations for Residual Heat Removal Service Water Piping on
- HBC-507 (2385027-04)
- EP-AA-1008, LGS EAL Technical Basis
- ER-AA-310-1005, (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template, Attachment 3 for IR1525669, Revision 5
- ER-AA-5400-1001, Raw Water Corrosion Program Guide Event Summary for D23 Fire,
- IR 1065596 FBP07, Emergency Response Training Fire Brigade Program, Revision 7
- HU-AA-1101, Change Management
- LIM-93935, Failure Evaluation of a 20" NPS, Schedule 20, carbon steel RHRSW piping leak on 2A RHRSW HX inlet from Unit 2 Limerick Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (3Q 2012 - 2Q 2014)
- A-7
- Attachment
- Limerick Semi-Annual Senior Leadership Team Nuclear Safety Culture Health Review (3Q 2012 - 2Q 2014)
- Limerick Generating Station Radwaste Hit Team Maintenance Rule Online Tracking System
- MRC Package for Tuesday, September 16
- MRC Package for Wednesday, September 17
- OP-AA-201-002, Fire Event Report, Revision 4, for Limerick Unit 2 D23 Emergency Diesel Generator. 217' Elevation/Diesel Bay Room 315C fire on May 5, 2010 P&ID - Emergency Service Water (Unit 1 and Common) - 8031-M-11, Rev. 91
- Radwaste Improvement Benchmark Report (016838777-02)
- Reactor Operator Shift Turnover Checklist for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for September 26, 2014 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information, dated June 21, 2012, related to LGS License Renewal Application Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Limerick Unit 1 & 2 license renewal application, dated March 13, 2014 Root Cause associated with the Manual Reactor SCRAM on July 18, 2012 due to a Fault on the 124A Load Center Switchgear, Revision 10 Sally Port Vehicle Search Mentoring Expectations Spray Pond Monthly System Report
- ST-2-010-400-1, Radiation Monitoring - SW Radiation Monitor Calibration/Functional Test
- ST-2-012-404 and 405, Radiation Monitoring - RHR Service Water Radiation Monitor Division 1, Channel A/B
- ST-4-095-966-1, Div. IV 1DD103 Safeguard Battery Charger 24 Month Load Test, Revision 4
- ST-4-095-966-2, Div. IV 2DD103 Safeguard Battery Charger 24 Month Load Test, Revision 5
- ST-6-090-230, Control Enclosure Chilled Water Pump Valve and Flow Test, Revision 35
- ST-6-090-231-0, Control Enclosure Chilled Water Comprehensive Test, Revision 33
- Station Ownership Committee Agenda for August 27, and September 09, 12 & 29, 2014 System Health Report 4/1/2014-6/30/2014 UFSAR, Appendix 9A, Revision 17
- White Paper Comparing the Impact of Seismic Agitation of Diesel Day Tank Sediment to Mixing Caused by Refilling from Tank Bottom and Impacts on Diesel Generator Operability
- A-8
- Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
SOC Station Ownership Committee