ML18348A198

License Event Report 1978-003-00 Re CV-3025 Failed Closed

ML18348A198
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/01/1978
From:	Hoffman D, Skibitsky W Consumers Power Co
To:	James Keppler NRC/RGN-III
References
LER 1978-003-00
Download: ML18348A198 (3)

Text

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• Power company General Offices: 212 West .Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201
• Area Code 517 788-0550 February 1, 1978

Mr- James G Keppler Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Gl~n Ellyn, IL 60137 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - ER-78-003

• The attached LER is reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(2) (operation in a mode less conservative than the least conservative limiting condition for operation) for the Palisades Plant.

      'I'he late transmittal of this report was discussed with Mr R Warnick of the Region III office on January 19, 1978.

• Y-/ ~1 r;. fU+:t

[J_)1J--zJu.L~bµ_LA~* David P Hoffman f Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC: ASchwencer, USJ\TRC

• FEB 3 1978

                   ,,                                                                                                                                             Palisades NRCFORM366                                                                                                                            U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORVeOMMISslON
        '11-n1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:              I                                   !G)                   (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION!

I 6 r2J2J 7 8 .9 I Mir IP I Al.1 L.ICENSEE'*COOE I 1101* o lo Io I o lo Io I ol o I o lo I o 101*4 1111 1111 1©1 14 ~5 . L.1.CENSE NUMBER ~5 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 I 10 57* 'CAT 5B \V CON'T

         !IE]                     ~~~~~~ Lb.J©lo I 5 I oI .oI o I 2 I 51 5 l(?)I o fl I o I 8 17 I 8 l@I o 11 I 3 I l I 7 I 8 10 7           8                         60            61              DOCKET NUMBER                68    69        EVENT DATE             74       75      REPORT DATE          80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

[]JI] I With the reactor ip. cold shutdown, CV-3025 (shutdown cooling system HX (]]I} outlet valve) failed closed, causing a loss of shutdown cooling flow and 1 (]JI) I allowing PCS temperature to rise to approximately 215 degrees. 'Because (]]]] I the containment building equipment hatch was open, the LCO of TS []]]]I 3.6 . .lA was exceeded. The condition lasted for about 20 minut~p* [[TI] I Redundant* mE:;!thods of restoring cooling flow were available. Event had [[[[] I no effect on public health or safety. I 7 B 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE . COMPONENT CODE SUBCOOE SUf1ZODE []TI] I Cl Fl@ 1!!.J@ ~@ I VjA IL I VtO I Pl@ ~@ LJ@ 7 8 9 . 10 11 12 - 13 18 19 . 20 SEQUENTIAL. . OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION* t:::'I uN'O LE A/RO LVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE me 17 I 8 I L:J

                          ~ REPORT NUMBER I      I       I o I 01 3 I             I /I          Io I   1    J                        1=J 21          22          23             24             26        27            28        29           30            31    .       32 ACTION FUTURE                       EFFECT            SHUTDOWN                          (22\
                                                                                                                ~ AJJ:C~~~T                FO~R~B l!J@

TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD H URS PRIME COMP. COMPONENT L!J@l2!.J@ E.J@ ~@) I o I 8 I 01 I t!J~ srNj~ 11rt0Jf~RI~ 1126' 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 \::;I 43 ~ 44 . . . 47. ~ CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS {27) o::::J]] I Closure of CV-3025 was caused by water in the air line to the valve operator. Entry of water into the air system resulted from improper l"":"'T":;"' air dryer operation. Water was removed from the air line to restore valve L..l...1.2..J ._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---~~~~...JI r::I:]]J I operation and thereby reduce PCS* temperature to within specs. To IIlIJ I prevent recurrence, training in air system operation will be strengthened.

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80 I

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FACILITY STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS ~ METHOD OF DISCOVERY Q t DISCOVERY DESCFUPTION IJTI] LlLJ@ IO Io I Ol@)I N/A I ~~.!~:--~-p_e_r_a~o_r~o~os_e_r_v_a_~_i_o_n~~--~-----l 45 . 46 cci~TENT 7 12 13 44 80 B AgTIVITY RELEASED OF REL.EASE I AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE @ OJI]~@) ~@I NA I 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES IITIJ I ONUMBOERO I I t::;.,(Z;E l~L.::..J@).__ ~ __________________________________________~ DEscai7ioN@ 7 8 9 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL. INJURIES ~ C.. DEW)lilON6 ITIIJ

                             ,./llUM!aeR O I. Uj u1                            /

I~ ~12,---------------------------------------------------------------------...J 7 8 9 11 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY f.i3\ TYPE DESCRIJ'TION \::::;J ITliJ sL_3@ ~ioi-----~--------------------------------------------------------------------_J NI A 1 8 80 PUBLICITY (.';;\ NRC USE ONLY r::;-r,::"1 ISSUEDf,;';;\ DESC.,IPTION ~

         ~ ~~ !";;'-N.;..../A                   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-....J                                                                    II II II 1111 11 I 10                                                                                                                   68   69                           80

Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant Attachment to LER 78-003/0lT-O, Docket 050-255

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On January 8, 1978, a loss of shutdown cooling system flow occurred. At the

• time of this occurrence, the reactor was in cold shutdown and. prim!3-ry; ... coolant system (PCS) temperature was being maintained by the shutdown c~Q9iii-~~~o'~$s'BM1&.t'S As a result of the loss of shutdown cooling system flow, PCS tem~er~~lir.~~

rose to approximately 215 degrees, thereby taking the reactor out of the cold shutdown condition. Concurrent with this. change in reactor plant condition, the containment building equipment hatch was open. This violates Technical Specification 3.6.1.a, which requires containment integrity to be maintained whenever the reactor is not in cold shutdown. Redundant methods of restoring flow were.available. It is possible to open CV-3025 by moving the valve stem with hand tools. An alternate means of providing core cooling can be provided by recycling Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW) tank water through the PCS. This cooling method could have been used to provide additional time to restore normal operation of CV-3025. Based on the above, it is concluded that this event could not have adversely affected public health or safety. CV-3025 failed closed because water had become entrained in the line supplying air to the valve operator. Water entered the system as a result of improper operation of the instrument air system air dryer. Specifically, the dryer air purge valves had been excessively throttled, which resulted in insufficient airflow during the dryer's regeneration cycle. Immediate corrective action included: Evacuation of personnel from the containment building. Attempted closure of the equipment hatch. Removal of water from the air line to restore operation of CV-3025. Restoration of CV-3025 operability permitted restoration of cold shutdown temper-ature. The reactor was out of the cold shutdown condition for about 20 minutes. To prevent recurrence, the following actions will be implemented: Removal of water from other portions of the instrument air system (already in progress). Revision of training program to provide additional emphasis on proper operation of the air dryers. Addition of air dryer checks to the operator's rou..1ds. Tagging of the air dryer purge valves to indicate their function. Preliminary investigation has revealed an apparent discrepancy in the piping arrangement to the air receiver tanks. The piping exits the tanks from the bottom, and therefore could potentially carry water away from the tanks into the air system. Appropriate modifications will be performed if deemed necessary after future investigation and evaluation.

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