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{{#Wiki_filter:R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-1 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 B 3.3  I NS TRU ME NTA TI ON B 3.3.6.5 Rel i ef and Lo w-Low Set (LLS) I nst r um ent at i on BAS ES BA C KG R O U N D T he s af et y/r el i ef v al v es (S/R Vs) pr ev ent ov er pr ess ur i z at i on of t he nuc l ear s t e a m s y s t e m. I n s t r u me n t a t i o n i s p r o v i d e d t o s u p p o r t t w o mo d e s o f S/RV oper at i on - t he r el i ef f unct i on (al l v al v es) and t he LLS f unct i on (sel ect ed v al v es). R ef er t o LCO 3.4.4, " Saf et y/R el i ef Val v es (S/R Vs)," and LC O 3.6.1.6, " Low-Low Set (LLS) Saf et y/R el i ef Val v es (S/R Vs)," f or A p p l i c a b i l i t y B a s e s f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r ma t i o n o f t h e s e mo d e s o f S/RV oper at i on. T hi s i s ac hi ev ed by spe ci f y i ng l i m i t i ng s af et y sy st em set t i ngs (L S S S) i n te rm s o f p a ra m e te rs d i re c tl y m o n i to re d b y th e P ri m a ry C ont ai nm ent I sol at i on I nst r um ent at i on, as we l l as L C O s on ot her r eact or s y s t e m p a r a m e t e r s a n d e q u i p m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e. Th e s u b s e t o f L SSS t hat di r ect l y pr ot ect agai nst v i ol at i ng t he r R eact or C cor e Saf et y Li m i t s an d o r th e R e a c to r C o o la n t S ys te m (R C S) p P re s s u re b o u n d a ry S s a f e ty L li m its d u rin g a n tic ip a te d o p e ra tio n a l o c c u rre n c e s (A O O s) a re re f e rre d to a s S a fe ty L i m i t L S S S (S L-L S S S).10 CF R 50.36(c)(1)(i i)(A) r equi r es t hat T Ss i ncl ude LSSS s f or v ar i abl es t hat hav e si gni f i cant s a f e t y f u n c t i o n s. F o r v a r i a b l e s o n w h i c h a SL h a s b e e n p l a c e d , t h e L SSS m ust be c hose n t o i ni t i at e aut om at i c pr ot ect i v e ac t i on t o co r r ect abnor m al s itu a tio n s b e f o re th e S L is e x c e e d e d. Te c h n i c a l Sp e c i f i c a t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d b y 1 0 CFR 5 0.3 6 t o c o n t a i n L SSS d e fi n e d b y t h e r e g u l a t i o n a s "...s e t t i n g s for a u t o m a t i c p r o t e c t i ve dev i ces...so c hose n t hat aut om at i c pr ot ect i v e ac t i ons wi l l cor r ect t he abnor m al si t uat i on bef or e a Saf et y Li m i t (SL) i s ex ceed ed."  T he Anal y t i cal Li m i t i s t he l i m i t of t he pr oces s v ar i abl e at whi ch a saf et y act i on is in iti a te d , a s e s ta b li s h e d b y th e s a f e ty a n a ly s is , to e n s u re th a t a n S L is not ex ceed ed. Any aut om at i c pr ot ect i on ac t i on t hat occ ur s on r each i ng th e A n a ly tic a l L im it th e re f o re e n s u re s th a t th e S L is n o t e x c e e d e d. H owev er , i n pr act i ce, t he ac t ual set t i ngs f or aut om at i c pr ot ect i v e dev i ces m u s t b e c h o s e n to b e m o re c o n s e rv a tiv e th a n th e A n a ly tic a l L im it to accou nt f or i nst r um ent l oop unce r t ai nt i es r el at ed t o t he se t t i ng a t wh i ch th e a u to m a ti c p ro te c ti v e a c ti o n w o u l d a c tu a l l y o c c u r.-------------------------------- R E V IE W E R'S N O T E ----------------------------------T he t er m " Li m i t i ng T r i p Set poi nt (LT SP)" i s ge ner i c t er m i nol ogy f or t he set poi nt v al ue c al cul at ed by m eans of t he pl ant-spec i f i c s et poi nt m e th o d o lo g y d o c u m e n te d in a d o c u m e n t c o n tro ll e d u n d e r 1 0 C F R 5 0.5 9. T he t er m Li m i t i ng T r i p Set poi nt i ndi cat es t hat no add i t i onal m ar gi n has b e e n a d d e d b e tw e e n th e A n a ly tic a l L im it a n d th e c a lc u la te d trip s e ttin g. W her e m ar gi n i s ad ded bet ween t he Anal y t i cal Li m i t and t r i p se t poi nt , t he te rm N o m in a l T rip S e tp o in t (N T S P) is p re f e rre d. T h e trip s e tp o in t (f ie ld s e ttin g) m a y b e m o re c o n s e rv a tiv e th a n th e L im iti n g o r N o m in a l T rip Set poi nt. W her e t he [LT SP] i s no t doc um ent ed i n SR 3.3.6.5.3 f or t he pur pose of com pl i ance wi t h 10 CFR 50.36, t he pl ant-spec i f i c t er m f or t he R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-2 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 L im iti n g o r N o m in a l T rip S e tp o in t m u s t b e c ite d in N o te 2 o f  S R 3.3.6.5.3. T he br ack et s i ndi cat e pl ant-spec i f i c t er m s m ay appl y , as r ev i ewed and a p p ro v e d b y th e N R C. T h e a s-f o u n d a n d a s-le f t to le ra n c e s w il l a p p ly to th e a c tu a l s e tp o i n t i m p l e m e n te d i n th e S u rv e i l l a n c e p ro c e d u re s to c o n firm c h a n n e l p e rf o rm a n c e. Li cens ees ar e t o i nser t t he nam e of t he doc um ent (s) con t r ol l ed unde r 10 C FR 50.59 t hat con t ai n t he [LT SP] and t he m et hodol ogy f or cal cul at i ng t he as-l ef t and as-f ound t ol er ance s, f or t he phr ase "[a doc um ent c o n tro ll e d u n d e r 1 0 C F R 5 0.5 9]" in th e s p e c ific a tio n s.]--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------BAS ES BA C KG R O U N D (cont i nued)T h e [L i m i ti n g T ri p S e tp o i n t (L T S P)] i s a p re d e te rm i n e d s e tt i n g fo r a pr ot ect i v e dev i ce c hose n t o ens ur e aut om at i c ac t uat i on pr i or t o t he pr oces s v ar i abl e r each i ng t he Anal y t i cal Li m i t and t hus ensu r i ng t hat t he SL woul d not be ex ceed ed. As suc h, t he [LT SP] acc ount s f or unce r t ai nt i es i n se t t i ng t he dev i ce (e.g., cal i br at i on), unc er t ai nt i es i n how t he dev i ce m i ght act ual l y per f or m (e.g., r epeat abi l i t y), cha nges i n t he poi nt of act i on o f t he d evi ce over t i m e (e.g., dr i f t dur i ng su r v ei l l ance i nt er v al s), and an y ot her f act or s whi ch m ay i nf l uenc e i t s ac t ual per f or m ance (e.g., har sh a cc i dent env i r onm ent s). I n t hi s m anner , t he[L T S P] e n s u re s th a t S L s a re n o t e x c e e d e d. A s s u c h , th e [L T S P] m e e ts th e d e f in iti o n o f a n L S S S (R e f. 1). T echn i cal Speci f i cat i ons cont ai n v al ues r el at ed t o t he O PE R AB I LI T Y of e q u ip m e n t re q u ire d f o r s a f e o p e ra tio n o f th e f a c il ity. O P E R A B L E is d e f in e d in T e c h n ic a l S p e c ific a tio n s a s "...b e in g c a p a b le o f p e rf o rm in g its s a f e ty fu n c tio n (s)."  U s e o f th e [L T S P] to d e f in e O P E R A B IL IT Y in T e c h n ic a l S p e c ific a tio n s w o u ld b e a n o v e rly re s tric tiv e re q u ire m e n t if it w e re a p p l i e d a s a n O P E R A B I L I T Y l i m i t fo r t h e "a s-fo u n d" va l u e o f a p ro te c tiv e d e v ic e s e ttin g d u rin g a S u rv e il la n c e. T h is w o u ld re s u lt i n T echn i cal Speci f i cat i on c om pl i ance pr obl em s, as we l l as r epor t s an d c o rre c ti v e a c ti o n s re q u i re d b y th e ru l e w h i c h a re n o t n e c e s s a ry to e n s u re saf et y. For ex am pl e, an aut om at i c pr ot ect i v e dev i ce wi t h a s et t i ng t hat has been f ound t o be di f f er ent f r om t he [LT SP] due t o so m e dr i f t of t he s e ttin g m a y s til l b e O P E R A B L E s in c e d rif t is to b e e x p e c te d. T h is ex pect ed dr i f t woul d hav e been spec i f i cal l y acc ount ed f or i n t he s et poi nt m e t h o d o l o g y for ca l c u l a t i n g t h e [L T S P] a n d t h u s t h e a u t o m a t i c p r o t e c t i ve a c tio n w o u ld s til l h a v e e n s u re d th a t th e S L w o u ld n o t b e e x c e e d e d w ith t he " as-f oun d" set t i ng o f t he p r ot ect i v e de v i ce. T her ef or e, t he d evi ce w o u ld s til l b e O P E R A B L E s in c e it w o u ld h a v e p e rf o rm e d its s a f e ty f unct i on and t he onl y cor r ect i v e ac t i on r equi r ed woul d be t o r eset t he d e vi c e t o t h e [L T S P] t o a c c o u n t for f u r t h e r d r i ft d u r i n g t h e n e xt s u rv e il la n c e in te rv a l.
{{#Wiki_filter:Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.5 Relief and Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND            The safety/relief valves (S/RVs) prevent overpressurization of the nuclear steam system. Instrumentation is provided to support two modes of S/RV operation - the relief function (all valves) and the LLS function (selected valves). Refer to LCO 3.4.4, "Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," and LCO 3.6.1.6, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," for Applicability Bases for additional information of these modes of S/RV operation. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. The subset of LSSS that directly protect against violating the rReactor Ccore Safety Limits and or the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pPressure boundary Ssafety Llimits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are referred to as Safety Limit LSSS (SL-LSSS).
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-3 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 H o w e ve r , t h e r e i s a l s o s o m e p o i n t b e y o n d w h i c h t h e d e vi c e w o u l d h a ve not been a bl e t o per f or m i t s f unct i on due, f or ex am pl e, t o gr eat er t han expect ed d r i f t. T he A l l ow abl e V al ue sp eci f i ed i n S R 3.3.6.5.3 i s t he l east c o n s e r va t i ve va l u e o f t h e a s-fou n d s e t p o i n t t h a t a c h a n n e l c a n h a ve d u rin g te s tin g s u c h th a t a c h a n n e l i s O P E R A B L E if th e trip s e tp o in t is f ound c onse r v at i v e wi t h r espe ct t o t he Al l owabl e Val ue dur i ng t he C H AN N EL C ALI BR AT I O N. N ot e t hat , al t hough a cha nnel i s O PE R AB LE under t hese ci r cum st ance s, t he s et poi nt m ust be l ef t adj ust ed t o a v al ue wi t hi n t he as-l ef t t ol er ance of t he [LT SP] and c onf i r m ed t o be op er at i ng wi t hi n t he s t at i st i cal al l owanc es o f t he unc er t ai nt y t er m s as si gned i n t he s e t p o i n t c a l c u l a t i o n. As s u c h , t h e Al l o w a b l e Va l u e d i f f e r s f r o m t h e [L TSP]b y a n a m o u n t e q u a l to [o r g re a te r th a n] th e a s-f o u n d to le ra n c e v a lu e. In t hi s m anner , t he ac t ual set t i ng of t he dev i ce e nsur es t hat an SL i s no t BAS ES BA C KG R O U N D  (cont i nued)ex ceed ed at any gi v en poi nt of t i m e as l ong as t he dev i ce h as n ot dr i f t ed b e yo n d th a t e x p e c te d d u rin g th e s u rv e il la n c e in te rv a l.I f t he a ct ual set t i ng o f t he d evi ce i s f oun d t o be conse r v at i v e w i t h r espe ct t o t he Al l owabl e Val ue but i s be y ond t he as-f ound t ol er ance band, t hen t hi s c ondi t i on i ndi cat es t hat t he i nst r um ent i s de gr aded an d i s no t p e rf o rm in g in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y a s s u m p tio n s. Th i s c o n d i t i o n mu s t b e e n t e r e d i n t o t h e p l a n t c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n p r o g r a m, t h e t ri p s e t p o i n t m u s t b e l e ft a d j u s t e d t o a va l u e w i t h i n t h e a s-l e ft t ol er ance band, and an i m m edi at e det er m i nat i on of oper abi l i t y dec i si on m u s t b e m a d e. If th e a c tu a l s e ttin g o f th e d e v ic e is f o u n d to b e n o n-c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith r espe ct t o t he Al l owabl e Val ue, t he dev i ce c hannel woul d be c onsi der ed i noper abl e f r om a T echn i cal Speci f i cat i on per spec t i v e. T hi s r equi r es cor r ect i v e ac t i on i ncl udi ng t hose act i ons r equi r ed by 10 CF R 50.36 when aut om at i c pr ot ect i v e dev i ces do not f unct i on as r equi r ed.T he r el i ef f unct i on of t he S/R Vs pr ev ent s ov er pr ess ur i z at i on of t he n u c le a r s te a m s ys te m. T h e L L S f u n c tio n o f th e S/R V s is d e s ig n e d to m i t i gat e t he ef f ect s of pos t ul at ed t hr ust l oads on t he S/R V di sc har ge l i nes by pr ev ent i ng s ubse quent act uat i ons wi t h an el ev at ed wat er l eg i n t he S/R V d i s c h a rg e l i n e. I t a l s o m i ti g a te s th e e ff e c ts o f p o s tu l a te d p re s s u re lo a d s o n th e c o n ta in m e n t b y p re v e n tin g m u lti p le a c tu a tio n s in ra p id suc ces si on of t he S/R Vs subs equent t o t hei r i ni t i al act uat i on.U pon any S/R V act uat i on, t he LLS l ogi c as si gns pr eset openi ng and re c l o s i n g s e tp o i n ts to s i x p re s e l e c te d S/R V s. T h e s e s e tp o i n ts a re s e l e c t e d t o o v e r r i d e t h e n o r m a l r e l i e f s e t p o i n t s s u c h t h a t t h e L L S S/RVs wi l l st ay open l onger , t hus r el easi ng m or e st eam (ener gy) t o t he R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-4 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 supp r ess i on pool; henc e m or e ener gy (and t i m e) i s r equi r ed f or re p re s s u riza tio n a n d s u b s e q u e n t S/R V o p e n in g s. T h e L L S lo g ic i ncr ease s t he t i m e bet ween (or pr ev ent s) sub sequ ent act uat i ons t o al l ow th e h ig h w a te r le g c re a te d f ro m th e in iti a l S/R V o p e n in g to re tu rn to (o r f a ll bel ow) i t s no r m al wat er l ev el , t hus r educ i ng t hr ust l oads f r om sub sequ ent a c tu a tio n s to w ith in th e ir d e s ig n li m its. In a d d iti o n , th e L L S is d e s ig n e d to l i m i t S/R V subse quent act uat i ons t o one v al v e, so t hat con t ai nm ent l oads wi l l al so b e r educ ed.T h e re li e f in s tru m e n ta tio n c o n s is ts o f tw o trip s ys te m s , w ith e a c h trip sy st em act uat i ng one sol enoi d f or eac h S/R V. T her e ar e t wo sol enoi ds per S/R V, and ea ch s ol enoi d ca n open i t s r espe ct i v e S/R V. T he r el i ef m ode (S/R Vs and as soc i at ed t r i p sy st em s) i s di v i ded i nt o t hr ee s et poi nt gr oups (t he l ow wi t h one S/R V, t he m edi um wi t h 10 S/R Vs, and t he hi gh wi t h ni ne S/R Vs). T he S/R V r el i ef f unct i on i s ac t uat ed by t r ansm i t t er s t hat m o n i to r re a c to r s te a m d o m e p re s s u re. T h e re a c to r s te a m d o m e p re s s u re t r ansm i t t er s s end s i gnal s t o t r i p uni t s whos e out put s ar e ar r anged i n a t wo-out-of-t wo l ogi c f or eac h t r i p sy st em i n eac h of t hr ee s epar at e R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-5 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 BAS ES BA C KG R O U N D  (cont i nued)set poi nt gr oup s (e.g., t he m edi um gr oup of 10 S/R V s ope ns w hen at l east one of t he as soc i at ed t r i p sy st em s t r i ps a t i t s as si gned s et poi nt). O nce an S/R V h a s b e e n o p e n e d , i t w i l l re c l o s e w h e n re a c to r s te a m d o m e p re s s u re decr ease s be l ow t he open i ng pr ess ur e se t poi nt. T hi s l ogi c ar r angem ent ensu r es t hat no s i ngl e i nst r um ent f ai l ur e ca n pr ecl ude t he S/R V r el i ef f unct i on.T he LLS l ogi c c onsi st s of t wo t r i p sy st em s s i m i l ar t o t he S/R V r el i ef f unct i on. Ei t her t r i p sy st em can act uat e t he LLS S/R Vs by ener gi z i ng t he a s s o c ia te d s o le n o id s o n th e S/R V p il o t v a lv e s. E a c h L L S trip s ys te m is enabl ed and seal ed i n upon i ni t i al S/R V act uat i on f r om t he ex i st i ng r eact or st eam dom e pr ess ur e se nsor s of any of t he nor m al r el i ef set poi nt g ro u p s. T h e re a c to r s te a m d o m e p re s s u re c h a n n e l s u s e d to a rm L L S a re a r r a n g e d i n a o n e-o u t-o f-t h r e e t a k e n t w i c e l o g i c. T h e r e a c t o r s t e a m d o me p r e s s u r e c h a n n e l s t h a t c o n t r o l t h e o p e n i n g a n d c l o s i n g o f t h e L L S S/RVs a re a rra n g e d in e ith e r a o n e-o u t-o f-o n e o r a tw o-o u t-o f-tw o lo g ic d e p e n d in g o n w h ic h L L S S/R V g ro u p is b e in g c o n tro ll e d. T h is lo g ic ar r angem ent ens ur es t hat no s i ngl e i nst r um ent f ai l ur e ca n pr ecl ude t he L L S S/R V f u n c tio n. T h e c h a n n e ls in c lu d e e le c tro n ic e q u ip m e n t (e.g., trip uni t s) t hat com par es m easu r ed i nput si gnal s wi t h pr e-est abl i shed set poi nt s. W hen t he s et poi nt i s ex ceed ed, t he c hannel out put r el ay act uat es, whi ch t hen out put s a L LS or r el i ef i ni t i at i on s i gnal , as a ppl i cabl e, t o t he i ni t i at i on l ogi c.AP PLI C AB LE T he r el i ef and LL S i nst r um ent at i on ar e des i gned t o pr ev ent SA FE T Y ov er pr ess ur i z at i on of t he nuc l ear st eam sy st em and t o ens ur e t hat t he A N A L Y S E S c o n ta in m e n t lo a d s re m a in w ith in th e p rim a ry c o n ta in m e n t d e s ig n b a s is (R e f. 1).R el i ef and LL S i nst r um ent at i on s at i sf i es Cr i t er i on 3 of 1 0 C F R 5 0.3 6 (c)(2)(i i).T r i p Set poi nt s t hat di r ect l y pr ot ect agai nst v i ol at i ng t he r eact or cor e or R eact or C ool ant Sy st em (R C S) pr ess ur e bound ar y Saf et y Li m i t s du r i ng ant i ci pat ed oper at i onal occ ur r ence s (AO O s) ar e Saf et y Li m i t-Li m i t i ng S a f e ty S ys te m S e ttin g s (S L-L S S S). P e rm is s iv e a n d in te rlo c k s e tp o in ts a ll o w b yp a s s o f trip s w h e n th e y a re n o t re q u ire d b y th e S a f e ty A n a ly s is. T h e s e p e rm i s s i v e s a n d i n te rl o c k s e n s u re th a t t h e s ta rti n g c o n d i ti o n s a re cons i st ent wi t h t he s af et y anal y si s, bef or e pr ev ent at i v e or m i t i gat i ng act i ons occ ur. Becaus e t hese per m i ss i v es o r i nt er l ock s ar e onl y one of m ul t i pl e co nser v at i v e st ar t i ng as sum pt i ons f or t he ac ci dent anal y si s, t hey a re g e n e ra ll y c o n s id e re d a s n o m in a l v a lu e s w ith o u t re g a rd to m easu r em ent acc ur acy , (i.e. t he v al ue i ndi cat ed i s s uf f i ci ent l y cl ose t o t he n e c e s s a ry v a l u e to e n s u re p ro p e r o p e ra ti o n o f th e s a fe ty s y s te m s to tu rn t he AO O). T her ef or e per m i ss i v es a nd i nt er l ock s ar e not con si der ed t o be SL-L SSS.
10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) requires that TSs include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. For variables on which a SL has been placed, the LSSS must be chosen to initiate automatic protective action to correct abnormal situations before the SL is exceeded.
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-6 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 LC O T he LCO r equi r es OP ER AB I LI T Y of suf f i ci ent r el i ef and LL S in s tru m e n ta tio n c h a n n e ls to p ro v id e a d e q u a te a s s u ra n c e o f s u c c e s s f u ll y a c c o m p li s h in g th e re li e f a n d L L S f u n c tio n , a s s u m in g a n y s in g le in s tru m e n ta tio n c h a n n e l fa il u re w ith in th e L L S lo g ic. T h e re f o re , tw o trip s ys te m s a re re q u ire d to b e O P E R A B L E. T h e O P E R A B IL IT Y o f e a c h trip s y s t e m i s d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e OP E R A B I L I TY o f t h e r e a c t o r s t e a m d o me pr essur e cha nne l s associ at ed w i t h r equ i r ed r el i ef and LLS S/R V s. E ach re q u ire d c h a n n e l s h a ll h a v e its s e tp o in t w ith in c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith re s p e c t to th e s p e c ifie d A ll o w a b le V a lu e. A c h a n n e l i s in o p e ra b le if its a c tu a l trip s e tp o in t is n o t w ith in c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith re s p e c t to its re q u ire d A ll o w a b le V a lu e. T h e a c tu a l s e tp o in t is c a li b ra te d c o n s is te n t w ith a p p li c a b le set poi nt m et hod ol ogy assum pt i ons.
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices...so chosen that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that an SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-7 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 BAS ES LC O  (cont i nued)Al l owabl e Val ues ar e sp eci f i ed f or eac h ch annel i n SR 3.3.6.5.3.  [Li m i t i ng Tr i p Se t po i nt s] ar e s pe c i f i ed [i n a do c ument c on t r ol l ed un de r 10 CFR 5 0.5 9]. N o m in a l trip s e tp o in ts a re s p e c ifie d in th e s e tp o in t c a lc u la tio n s. T he nom i nal set poi nt s ar e se l ect ed t o ens ur e t hat t he s et poi nt s do not ex ceed r em ai n co nser v at i v e wi t h r espe ct t o  t he as-l ef t t ol er ance band A l l ow abl e V al ue b et we en C H A N N E L C A LI B R A T I O N S.  . A f t er each cal i br at i on t he t r i p se t poi nt sho ul d be r eset t o wi t hi n t he as-l ef t band a ro u n d th e [L T S P]  T h e A l l o w a b l e V a l u e s p e c i fi e d i n T a b l e 3.3.5.2-1 i s t h e l e a s t c o n s e r va t i ve v al ue of t he as-f ound s et poi nt t hat t he c hannel can hav e when t est ed, s u c h t h a t a c h a n n e l i s O P E R A B L E i f t h e a s-fou n d s e t p o i n t i s c o n s e r va t i ve w ith re s p e c t to th e A ll o w a b le V a lu e d u rin g th e C H A N N E L C A L IB R A T IO N. As suc h, t he Al l owabl e Val ue di f f er s f r om t he [LT SP] by an am ount[gr eat er t han or] equ al t o t he e x pect ed i nst r um ent chan nel unce r t ai nt i es, suc h as dr i f t , dur i ng t he s ur v ei l l ance i nt er v al. I n t hi s m anner , t he ac t ual set t i ng of t he dev i ce ([LT SP]) wi l l ens ur e t hat a SL i s no t ex ceed ed at any gi v en poi nt of t i m e as l ong as t he dev i ce h as n ot dr i f t ed bey ond t hat e x p e c te d d u ri n g th e s u rv e i l l a n c e i n te rv a l. T h e s e u n c e rta i n ti e s a re d e s c r ib e d in th e s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y.N ot e t hat , al t hou gh t he ch ann el i s O P E R A B LE und er t hese ci r cum st ance s, t he t r i p se t poi nt m ust be l ef t adj ust ed t o a v al ue wi t hi n t he a s-le f t to le ra n c e ,  in a c c o rd a n c e w ith u n c e rta in ty a s s u m p tio n s s ta te d in t he r ef er ence d se t poi nt m et hodol ogy (as-l ef t cr i t er i a), and c onf i r m ed t o be o p e ra ti n g w i th i n th e s ta ti s ti c a l a l l o w a n c e s o f th e u n c e rta i n ty te rm s a s s ig n e d (a s-f o u n d c rite ria). I f t he a ct ual set t i ng o f t he d evi ce i s f oun d t o be conse r v at i v e w i t h r espe ct t o t he Al l owabl e Val ue but i s be y ond t he as-f ound t ol er ance band, t hen t hi s c ondi t i on i ndi cat es t hat t he i nst r um ent i s de gr aded an d i s no t p e rf o rm in g in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y a s s u m p tio n s. Th i s c o n d i t i o n mu s t b e e n t e r e d i n t o t h e p l a n t c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n p r o g r a m, t h e t ri p s e t p o i n t m u s t b e l e ft a d j u s t e d t o a va l u e w i t h i n t h e a s-l e ft t ol er ance band, and an i m m edi at e det er m i nat i on of oper abi l i t y dec i si on m u s t b e m a d e. If th e a c tu a l s e ttin g o f th e d e v ic e is f o u n d to b e n o n-c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith r espe ct t o t he Al l owabl e Val ue, t he c hannel woul d be c onsi der ed i noper abl e. T hi s r equi r es c or r ect i v e ac t i on i ncl udi ng t hose act i ons r equi r ed by 10 CF R 50.36 when a ut om at i c pr ot ect i v e dev i ces do not f unct i on as r equi r ed.
However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-8 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04[LT SP s] ar e t hose pr edet er m i ned v al ues of out put at whi ch a n ac t i on shou l d t ake p l ace. T he se t poi nt s ar e com par ed t o t he a ct ual pr ocess par am et er (e.g., r eact or v ess el wat er l ev el), and when t he BAS ES AP PLI C AB LE S AF ET Y AN ALY SE S, LC O , and APP LI C AB I LI T Y  (cont i nued)m e a s u re d o u tp u t v a lu e o f th e p ro c e s s p a ra m e te r e x c e e d s th e s e tp o in t, th e a s s o c ia te d d e v ic e (e.g., trip u n it) c h a n g e s s ta te. T h e a n a ly tic a l l im its ar e der i v ed f r om t he l i m i t i ng v al ues of t he pr oces s pa r am et er s ob t ai ned f r om t he s af et y anal y si s. T he Al l owabl e Val ues ar e der i v ed f r om t he anal y t i cal l i m i t s, cor r ect ed f or cal i br at i on, pr oces s, and s om e of t he i nst r um ent er r or s. T he [LT SP s] ar e t hen det er m i ned, acc ount i ng f or t he re m a in in g in s tru m e n t e rro rs (e.g., d rif t). T h e trip s e tp o in ts d e riv e d in th is m anner pr ov i de adeq uat e pr ot ect i on bec ause i nst r um ent at i on unce r t ai nt i es, pr oces s ef f ect s, cal i br at i on t ol er ance s, i nst r um ent dr i f t , and sever e en v i r onm ent er r or s (f or chan nel s t hat m ust f unct i on i n ha r sh e n v i ro n m e n ts a s d e fin e d b y 1 0 C F R 5 0.4 9) a re a c c o u n te d fo r.O p e ra tio n w ith a trip s e tp o in t le s s c o n s e rv a tiv e th a n th e n o m in a l trip s e tp o in t, b u t w ith in c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith re s p e c t to its A ll o w a b le V a lu e , is acc ept abl e.T r i p se t poi nt[Li m i t i ng T r i p Set poi nt s]s ar e t hose pr edet er m i ned v al ues of out put at whi ch a n ac t i on s houl d t ake pl ace. T he s et poi nt s ar e co m par ed t o t he ac t ual pr oces s pa r am et er (e.g., r eact or v ess el pr ess ur e), and when t he m easu r ed out put v al ue of t he pr oces s pa r am et er ex ceed s t he set poi nt , t he as soc i at ed dev i ce (e.g., t r i p uni t) cha nges st at e. T he ana l y t i cana l y t i cal l i m i t s ar e de r i v ed f r om t he l i m i t i ng val ues o f t he p r ocess p a ra m e te rs o b ta i n e d fro m th e s a fe ty a n a l y s i s. T h e A l l o w a b l e V a l u e s a re der i v ed f r om t he anal y t i cana l y t i cal l i m i t s, cor r ect ed f or cal i br at i on, pr ocess, and som e of t he i nst r um ent er r or s. T he t r i p set poi nt s[LT S P s]a re th e n d e te rm in e d , a c c o u n tin g f o r th e re m a in in g in s tru m e n t e rro rs (e.g., d rif t). T h e trip s e tp o in ts d e riv e d in th is m a n n e r p ro v id e a d e q u a te pr ot ect i on b ecau se i nst r um ent at i on u ncer t ai nt i es, pr ocess e f f ect s, cal i br at i on t ol er ance s, i nst r um ent dr i f t , and s ev er e env i r onm ent er r or s (f or chan nel s t hat m ust f unct i on i n har sh e nv i r onm ent s as def i ned by 1 0 C F R 5 0.4 9) a re a c c o u n te d fo r.For r el i ef , t he ac t uat i ng Al l owabl e Val ues ar e bas ed on t he t r ansi ent ev ent of m ai n st eam i sol at i on v al v e (M SI V) cl osur e wi t h an i ndi r ect sc r am (i.e., n e u t r o n f l u x). Th i s a n a l y s i s i s d e s c r i b e d i n Re f e r e n c e 2. F o r L L S, t he ac t uat i ng and r ecl osi ng Al l owabl e Val ues ar e bas ed on t he t r ansi ent e v e n t o f M S IV c lo s u re w ith a d ire c t s c ra m (i.e., M S IV p o s iti o n s w itc h e s). T hi s an al y si s i s de sc r i bed i n R ef er ence 1.A P P L IC A B IL IT Y T h e re li e f a n d L L S in s tru m e n ta tio n is re q u ire d to b e O P E R A B L E in M O D ES 1, 2, and 3, si nce cons i der abl e ener gy ex i st s i n t he nuc l ear s te a m s ys te m a n d th e S/R V s m a y b e n e e d e d to p ro v id e p re s s u re re li e f. If th e S/R V s a re n e e d e d , th e n th e re li e f a n d L L S f u n c tio n s a re re q u ire d to e n s u re th a t th e p rim a ry c o n ta in m e n t d e s ig n b a s is is m a in ta in e d. In R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-9 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 M O D ES 4 and 5 , t he r eact or pr ess ur e i s l ow enoug h t hat t he ov er pr ess ur e l i m i t can not be app r oach ed by ass um ed oper at i onal t r ansi ent s or acc i dent s. T hus, pr ess ur e r el i ef , ass oci at ed r el i ef , and LL S i nst r um ent at i on ar e not r equi r ed.A C T IO N S
                      -------------------------------- REVIEW ER'S NOTE ----------------------------------
-----------------------------------R E V IE W E R'S N O T E-----------------------------------C e rta in L C O C o m p le tio n T im e s a re b a s e d o n a p p ro v e d to p ic a l re p o rts. In or der f or a l i cens ee t o us e t he t i m es, t he l i cens ee m ust j ust i f y t he C o m p l e ti o n T i m e s a s re q u i re d b y th e s ta ff S a fe ty E v a l u a ti o n R e p o rt (S E R) f o r th e to p ic a l re p o rt.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term "Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)" is generic terminology for the setpoint value calculated by means of the plant-specific setpoint methodology documented in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-10 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 BAS ES AC T I O N S  (cont i nued)A.1 Because t he f ai l ur e of any r eact or st eam dom e pr ess ur e i nst r um ent chan nel s [pr ov i di ng r el i ef S/R V openi ng and LLS openi ng and cl osi ng pr ess ur e se t poi nt s] i n one t r i p sy st em wi l l not pr ev ent t he as soc i at ed S/R V f ro m p e rf o rm in g its re li e f a n d L L S f u n c tio n , 7 d a ys is a ll o w e d to r est or e a t r i p sy st em t o O PE R AB LE st at us. I n t hi s c ondi t i on, t he r em ai ni ng O PE R AB LE t r i p sy st em i s ad equat e t o per f or m t he r el i ef and LLS i ni t i at i on f unct i on. H ow ever , t he o v er al l r el i abi l i t y i s r edu ced b ecau se a si ngl e f ai l ur e i n t he O PE R AB LE t r i p sy st em cou l d r esul t i n a l oss of r el i ef or LLS f unct i on.T he 7 da y C om pl et i on T i m e i s c onsi der ed appr opr i at e f or t he r el i ef and LLS f unct i on bec ause of t he r edunda ncy of sen sor s av ai l abl e t o pr ov i de in iti a tio n s ig n a ls a n d th e re d u n d a n c y o f th e re li e f a n d L L S d e s ig n. In addi t i on, t he pr obabi l i t y of m ul t i pl e r el i ef or LLS i nst r um ent at i on c hannel f ai l ur es, whi ch r ender s t he r em ai ni ng t r i p sy st em i noper abl e, occ ur r i ng t oget her wi t h an ev ent r equi r i ng t he r el i ef or LLS f unct i on dur i ng t he 7 da y Com pl et i on Ti m e i s v er y l ow.B.1 a n d B.2 If th e in o p e ra b le trip s ys te m is n o t re s to re d to O P E R A B L E s ta tu s w ith in 7 day s, per C ondi t i on A, or i f t wo t r i p sy st em s ar e i noper abl e, t hen t he p l a n t mu s t b e b r o u g h t t o a MOD E i n w h i c h t h e L CO d o e s n o t a p p l y. To a c h ie v e th is s ta tu s , th e p la n t m u s t b e b ro u g h t to a t le a s t M O D E 3 w ith in 12 h our s and t o M O D E 4 wi t hi n 36 hou r s.T he al l owed Com pl et i on T i m es a r e r easo nabl e, bas ed on o per at i ng ex per i ence , t o r each t he r equi r ed pl ant con di t i ons f r om f ul l power cond i t i ons i n an or der l y m ann er and wi t hou t chal l eng i ng p l ant sy st em s.S U R V E IL L A N C E
The term Limiting Trip Setpoint indicates that no additional margin has been added between the Analytical Limit and the calculated trip setting.
-----------------------------------R E V IE W E R'S N O T E-----------------------------------R E Q U IR E M E N T S C e rta i n F re q u e n c i e s a re b a s e d o n a p p ro v e d to p i c a l re p o rts. I n o rd e r fo r a l i cens ee t o us e t hese Fr equenc i es, t he l i cens ee m ust j ust i f y t he F re q u e n c ie s a s re q u ire d b y th e s ta f f S E R f o r th e to p ic a l re p o rt.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- R E V IE W E R'S N O T E ------------------------------------T he Not es i n SR 3.3.6.5.2 and SR 3.3.6.5.3 r equi r i ng r eset of t he c hannel t o a pr edef i ned as-l ef t t ol er ance and t he v er i f i cat i on of t he as-f ound t ol er ance ar e on l y associ at ed w i t h S L-LS S S v al ues.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- R E V IE W E R'S N O T E ------------------------------------
W here margin is added between the Analytical Limit and trip setpoint, the term Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is preferred. The trip setpoint (field setting) may be more conservative than the Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint. W here the [LTSP] is not documented in SR 3.3.6.5.3 for the purpose of compliance with 10 CFR 50.36, the plant-specific term for the BW R/6 STS                                  B 3.3.6.5-1                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-11 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 N o te s 1 a n d 2 a re a p p li e d to th e s e tp o in t v e rif ic a tio n S u rv e il la n c e s f o r a ll S L-L S S S F u n c tio n s u n le s s o n e o r m o r e o f th e f o llo w in g e x c lu s io n s a p p ly: 1.
 
N o te s 1 a n d 2 a re n o t a p p l i e d to S L-L S S S F u n c ti o n s w h i c h u ti l i ze m echa ni cal com ponent s t o se nse t he t r i p se t poi nt or t o m anual i ni t i at i on c i r cui t s (t he l at t er ar e not ex pl i ci t l y m odel ed i n t he ac ci dent ana l y si s). E x am pl es of m echa ni cal com pon ent s ar e l i m i t swi t ches, f l oat swi t ches , pr ox i m i t y det ect or s, m anual act uat i on s wi t ches , and ot her suc h dev i ces t hat ar e nor m al l y onl y che ck ed on a " go/no go" basi s. N ot e 1 r equ i r es a co m par i son o f t he p er i odi c sur v ei l l ance r equi r em ent r esul t s t o pr ov i de an i ndi cat i on of cha nnel (or i ndi v i dual devi ce) per f or m ance. T hi s com par i son i s not v al i d f or m ost m e c h a n ic a l c o m p o n e n ts. W h il e it i s p o s s ib le to v e rif y th a t a li m it s w itc h f u n c tio n s a t a p o in t o f tra v e l, a c h a n g e in th e s u rv e il la n c e re s u lt pr obabl y i ndi cat es t hat t he s wi t ch h as m ov ed, not t hat t he i nput/out put r el at i onsh i p ha s chan ged. T her ef or e, a com par i son o f sur v ei l l ance r equi r em ent r esul t s woul d not pr ov i de an i ndi cat i on of t he c hannel or com ponent per f or m ance.2.
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint must be cited in Note 2 of SR 3.3.6.5.3.
N ot es 1 and 2 a r e not appl i ed t o T echn i cal Speci f i cat i ons ass oci at ed wi t h m echa ni cal l y oper at ed s af et y r el i ef v al v es. T he per f or m ance of t hese com ponent s i s al r eady con t r ol l ed (i.e., t r ended wi t h as-l ef t and a s-f o u n d l i mi t s) u n d e r t h e A S M E S e c t i o n X I t e s t i n g p r o g r a m.3.
The brackets indicate plant-specific terms may apply, as reviewed and approved by the NRC. The as-found and as-left tolerances will apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance.
N ot es 1 and 2 a r e m ay not appl y i ed t o SL-LSS S F unct i ons and Sur v ei l l ance s whi ch t est onl y di gi t al com ponent s. For pur el y di gi t al com pon ent s, such a s act uat i on l ogi c ci r cui t s and associ at ed r el ay s, t her e i s no e x pect ed ch ang e i n r esul t bet we en su r v ei l l ance per f or m ance s ot her t han m easu r em ent and t est er r or s (M&T E) and, t her ef or e, j ust i f i cat i on i s ne eded t o co nf i r m t hat com par i son of Sur v ei l l ance r esul t s do es n ot pr ov i de an i ndi cat i on of cha nnel or com ponent per f or m ance.An ev al uat i on of t he pot ent i al SL-LSS S F unct i ons r esul t ed i n N ot es 1 and 2 be i ng a ppl i ed t o t he F unct i ons sh ow n i n t he T S m ar kups. E ach li c e n s e e p ro p o s in g to f u ll y a d o p t th is T S T F m u s t re v ie w th e th e p o te n tia l SL-LSS S F unct i ons t o i dent i f y whi ch o f  t he i dent i f i ed f unct i ons ar e  SL-L S S S a c c o rd in g to th e d e f in iti o n o f S L-L S S S a n d th e ir p la n t s p e c ific saf et y anal y si s. T he t wo T ST F N ot es a r e not r equi r ed t o be ap pl i ed t o any of t he l i st ed Func t i ons whi ch m eet any of t he ex cl usi on c r i t er i a or ar e not S L-LS S S base d on t he p l ant speci f i c desi gn a nd a nal y si s.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------T he Sur v ei l l ance s ar e m odi f i ed by a Not e t o i ndi cat e t hat when a c hannel i s pl aced i n an i noper abl e st at us s ol el y f or per f or m ance of r equi r ed Sur v ei l l ance s, ent r y i nt o as soc i at ed Condi t i ons and Requi r ed Act i ons m ay be del ay ed f or up t o 6 hou r s, pr ov i ded t he as soc i at ed Func t i on m ai nt ai ns r el i ef or LLS i ni t i at i on c apabi l i t y , as a ppl i cabl e. U pon c om pl et i on of t he R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-12 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 BAS ES SU R VE I LLAN C E R EQ U I R EM EN T S  (cont i nued)Sur v ei l l ance , or ex pi r at i on of t he 6 ho ur al l owanc e, t he c hannel m ust be r et ur ned t o O PE R AB LE st at us o r t he appl i cabl e C ondi t i on ent er ed and R e q u ire d A c tio n s ta k e n. T h is N o te is b a s e d o n th e re li a b il ity a n a ly s is (R ef. 3) ass um pt i on of t he av er age t i m e r equi r ed t o per f or m cha nnel sur v ei l l ance. T hat ana l y si s dem onst r at ed t he 6 hou r t est i ng a l l ow ance does not si gni f i cant l y r educ e t he pr obabi l i t y t hat t he r el i ef and LL S v al v es w ill in itia te w h e n n e c e s s a r y.S R  3.3.6.5.1 A C H AN N EL FU N C T I O N AL T ES T i s pe r f or m ed on e ach r equi r ed c hannel to e n s u re th a t th e e n tire c h a n n e l w il l p e rf o rm th e in te n d e d f u n c tio n. A suc ces sf ul t est of t he r equi r ed c ont act (s) of a ch annel r el ay m ay be per f or m ed by t he v er i f i cat i on of t he c hange o f st at e of a si ngl e co nt act of t h e r e l a y. Th i s c l a r i f i e s w h a t i s a n a c c e p t a b l e CHANNEL FUNCTI ONAL T ES T of a r el ay. T hi s i s ac cept abl e bec ause al l of t he ot her r equi r ed cont act s of t he r el ay ar e v er i f i ed by ot her T echn i cal Speci f i cat i ons and n o n-T e c h n ic a l S p e c ific a tio n s te s ts a t le a s t o n c e p e r re f u e li n g in te rv a l w ith a p p li c a b le e x te n s io n s. A n y s e tp o in t a d ju s tm e n t s h a ll b e c o n s is te n t w ith th e a s s u m p tio n s o f th e c u r r e n t p la n t s p e c if ic s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y.T he Fr equenc y of 92 day s i s ba sed on t he r el i abi l i t y anal y si s of R ef er ence 3.S R  3.3.6.5.2 T h e c a li b ra tio n o f trip u n its p ro v id e s a c h e c k o f th e a c tu a l trip s e tp o in ts. T he c hannel m ust be dec l ar ed i noper abl e i f t he t r i p se t t i ng i s di sc ov er ed to b e le s s c o n s e rv a tiv e th a n th e A ll o w a b le V a lu e s p e c ifie d in SR 3.3.6.5.3. I f t he t r i p se t t i ng i s di sc ov er ed t o be l ess con ser v at i v e t han acc ount ed f or i n t he appr opr i at e se t poi nt m et hodol ogy but i s no t bey ond t he Al l owabl e Val ue, t he c hannel per f or m ance i s s t i l l wi t hi n t he r equi r em ent s of t he pl ant saf et y anal y si s. U nder t hese con di t i ons, t he set poi nt m ust be r eadj ust ed t o be eq ual t o or m or e co nser v at i v e t han a c c o u n te d f o r in th e a p p r o p r ia te s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y.T he Fr equenc y of 92 day s i s ba sed on t he r el i abi l i t y anal y si s of R ef er ence 3. S R 3.3.6.5.2 f or S L-LS S S f unct i ons i s m odi f i ed b y t wo N ot es. T he f i r st N o te re q u i re s e v a l u a ti o n o f c h a n n e l p e rfo rm a n c e fo r th e c o n d i ti o n w h e re t he as-f ound s et t i ng f or t he c hannel set poi nt i s ou t si de i t s as-f ound to le ra n c e b u t c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith re s p e c t to th e A ll o w a b le V a lu e. E v a lu a tio n o f in s tru m e n t p e rf o rm a n c e w il l v e rif y th a t th e in s tru m e n t w il l R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-13 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 cont i nue t o behav e i n ac cor danc e wi t h sa f et y anal y si s s et poi nt m e th o d o l o g y a s s u m p ti o n s. T h e p u rp o s e o f th e a s s e s s m e n t i s to e n s u re conf i denc e i n t he i nst r um ent per f or m ance pr i or t o r et ur ni ng t he i nst r um ent t o se r v i ce. T hese cha nnel s wi l l al so b e i dent i f i ed i n t he Cor r ect i v e Act i on Pr ogr am. Ent r y i nt o t he Cor r ect i v e Act i on Pr ogr am wi l l ens ur e r equi r ed re v ie w a n d d o c u m e n ta tio n o f th e c o n d iti o n f o r c o n tin u e d O P E R A B IL IT Y. T he s econ d N ot e r equi r es t hat t he as-l ef t set t i ng f or t he i nst r um ent be r et ur ned t o wi t hi n t he as-l ef t t ol er ance of t he [LT SP]. W her e a s et poi nt m or e con ser v at i v e t han t he [LT S P] i s used i n t he p l ant sur v ei l l ance pr oced ur es, t he as-l ef t and as-f ound t ol er ance s, as a ppl i cabl e, wi l l be appl i ed t o t he s ur v ei l l ance pr oced ur e se t poi nt. T hi s wi l l ens ur e t hat s u f f ic ie n t m a rg in to th e S a f e ty L im it a n d/o r A n a ly tic a l L im it i s m a in ta in e d. I f t he as-l ef t i nst r um ent set t i ng c annot be r et ur ned t o a s et t i ng wi t hi n t he as-l ef t t ol er ance of t he [LT SP], t hen t he i nst r um ent cha nnel sha l l be decl ar ed i noper abl e.T he s econ d N ot e al so r equi r es t hat [LT SP] and t he m et hodol ogi es f or cal cul at i ng t he as-l ef t and t he as-f ound t ol er ance s be i n [a doc um ent c o n tro ll e d u n d e r 1 0 C F R 5 0.5 9].
Licensees are to insert the name of the document(s) controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 that contain the [LTSP] and the methodology for calculating the as-left and as-found tolerances, for the phrase "[a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]" in the specifications.]
R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-14 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 BAS ES SU R VE I LLAN C E R EQ U I R EM EN T S  (cont i nued)S R  3.3.6.5.3 A C H AN N EL C ALI BR AT I O N i s a c om pl et e ch eck of t he i nst r um ent l oop and t he s enso r. T hi s t est v er i f i es t he c hannel r espo nds t o t he m easu r ed p a r a m e t e r w i t h i n t h e n e c e s s a r y r a n g e a n d a c c u r a c y. CHANNEL C ALI BR AT I O N l eav es t he c hannel adj ust ed t o ac coun t f or i nst r um ent d rif ts b e tw e e n s u c c e s s iv e c a li b ra tio n s c o n s is te n t w ith th e p la n t s p e c ific s e tp o in t m e th o d o lo g y.T he Fr equenc y i s ba sed upon t he as sum pt i on of an 18 m ont h ca l i br at i on i nt er v al i n t he det er m i nat i on of t he m agni t ude of equi pm ent dr i f t i n t he set poi nt ana l y si s.S R 3.3.6.5.3 f or S L-LS S S f unct i ons i s m odi f i ed b y t wo N ot es. T he f i r st N o te re q u i re s e v a l u a ti o n o f c h a n n e l p e rfo rm a n c e fo r th e c o n d i ti o n w h e re t he as-f ound s et t i ng f or t he c hannel set poi nt i s ou t si de i t s as-f ound to le ra n c e b u t c o n s e rv a tiv e w ith re s p e c t to th e A ll o w a b le V a lu e. E v a lu a tio n o f in s tru m e n t p e rf o rm a n c e w il l v e rif y th a t th e in s tru m e n t w il l cont i nue t o behav e i n ac cor danc e wi t h sa f et y anal y si s s et poi nt m e th o d o l o g y a s s u m p ti o n s. T h e p u rp o s e o f th e a s s e s s m e n t i s to e n s u re conf i denc e i n t he i nst r um ent per f or m ance pr i or t o r et ur ni ng t he i nst r um ent t o se r v i ce. T hese cha nnel s wi l l al so b e i dent i f i ed i n t he Cor r ect i v e Act i on Pr ogr am. Ent r y i nt o t he Cor r ect i v e Act i on Pr ogr am wi l l ens ur e r equi r ed re v ie w a n d d o c u m e n ta tio n o f th e c o n d iti o n f o r c o n tin u e d O P E R A B IL IT Y. T he s econ d N ot e r equi r es t hat t he as-l ef t set t i ng f or t he i nst r um ent be r et ur ned t o wi t hi n t he as-l ef t t ol er ance of t he [LT SP]. W her e a s et poi nt m or e con ser v at i v e t han t he [LT S P] i s used i n t he p l ant sur v ei l l ance pr oced ur es, t he as-l ef t and as-f ound t ol er ance s, as a ppl i cabl e, wi l l be appl i ed t o t he s ur v ei l l ance pr oced ur e se t poi nt. T hi s wi l l ens ur e t hat s u f f ic ie n t m a rg in to th e S a f e ty L im it a n d/o r A n a ly tic a l L im it i s m a in ta in e d. I f t he as-l ef t i nst r um ent set t i ng c annot be r et ur ned t o a s et t i ng wi t hi n t he as-l ef t t ol er ance of t he [LT SP], t hen t he i nst r um ent cha nnel sha l l be decl ar ed i noper abl e.T he s econ d N ot e al so r equi r es t hat [LT SP] and t he m et hodol ogi es f or cal cul at i ng t he as-l ef t and t he as-f ound t ol er ance s be i n [a doc um ent c o n tro ll e d u n d e r 1 0 C F R 5 0.5 9].S R  3.3.6.5.4 T he LO G I C SYST EM FU N C T I O N AL T ES T dem onst r at es t he O PE R AB I LI T Y of t he r equi r ed ac t uat i on l ogi c f or a sp eci f i c c hannel. T he sy st em f unct i onal t est i ng per f or m ed f or S/R Vs i n LCO 3.4.4 and LC O 3.6.1.6 ov er l aps t hi s Sur v ei l l ance t o pr ov i de c om pl et e t est i ng of t he ass um ed s af et y f unct i on. T he 18 m ont h Fr equenc y i s ba sed on t he need t o per f or m t hi s Sur v ei l l ance under t he c ondi t i ons t hat appl y dur i ng a pl ant R el i ef and LL S I nst r um ent at i on B 3.3.6.5 BW R/6 ST S B 3.3.6.5-15 R ev. 3.0, 03/31/04 out age and t he p ot ent i al f or an u npl ann ed t r ansi ent i f t he S ur v ei l l ance wer e per f or m ed wi t h t he r eact or at power. O per at i ng ex per i ence has shown t hese com ponent s us ual l y pas s t he Sur v ei l l ance when per f or m ed a t th e 1 8 m o n th F r e q u e n c y.R E F E R E N C E S 1.
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F S A R , S e c tio n [5.2.2].2.
BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
FS AR, Ap p e n d i x 5 A.3.
The [Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)] is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the
G E N E-7 7 0-0 6-1 , "B a s e s f o r C h a n g e s to S u rv e il la n c e T e s t In te rv a ls and Al l owed O ut-of-Ser v i ce Ti m es f or Sel ect ed I nst r um ent at i on T echn i cal Speci f i cat i ons," Febr uar y 1991.}}
[LTSP] ensures that SLs are not exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 1).
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Use of the [LTSP] to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the [LTSP] due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the [LTSP] and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the [LTSP] to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.
BW R/6 STS                            B 3.3.6.5-2                                          Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. The Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.6.5.3 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during testing such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP] and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP]
by an amount equal to [or greater than] the as-found tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ensures that an SL is not BASES BACKGROUND (continued) exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.
If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.
This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.
If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the device channel would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.
The relief function of the S/RVs prevents overpressurization of the nuclear steam system. The LLS function of the S/RVs is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the S/RV discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the S/RV discharge line. It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the containment by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the S/RVs subsequent to their initial actuation.
Upon any S/RV actuation, the LLS logic assigns preset opening and reclosing setpoints to six preselected S/RVs. These setpoints are selected to override the normal relief setpoints such that the LLS S/RVs will stay open longer, thus releasing more steam (energy) to the BW R/6 STS                        B 3.3.6.5-3                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 suppression pool; hence more energy (and time) is required for repressurization and subsequent S/RV openings. The LLS logic increases the time between (or prevents) subsequent actuations to allow the high water leg created from the initial S/RV opening to return to (or fall below) its normal water level, thus reducing thrust loads from subsequent actuations to within their design limits. In addition, the LLS is designed to limit S/RV subsequent actuations to one valve, so that containment loads will also be reduced.
The relief instrumentation consists of two trip systems, with each trip system actuating one solenoid for each S/RV. There are two solenoids per S/RV, and each solenoid can open its respective S/RV. The relief mode (S/RVs and associated trip systems) is divided into three setpoint groups (the low with one S/RV, the medium with 10 S/RVs, and the high with nine S/RVs). The S/RV relief function is actuated by transmitters that monitor reactor steam dome pressure. The reactor steam dome pressure transmitters send signals to trip units whose outputs are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic for each trip system in each of three separate BW R/6 STS                  B 3.3.6.5-4                                Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) setpoint groups (e.g., the medium group of 10 S/RVs opens when at least one of the associated trip systems trips at its assigned setpoint). Once an S/RV has been opened, it will reclose when reactor steam dome pressure decreases below the opening pressure setpoint. This logic arrangement ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude the S/RV relief function.
The LLS logic consists of two trip systems similar to the S/RV relief function. Either trip system can actuate the LLS S/RVs by energizing the associated solenoids on the S/RV pilot valves. Each LLS trip system is enabled and sealed in upon initial S/RV actuation from the existing reactor steam dome pressure sensors of any of the normal relief setpoint groups. The reactor steam dome pressure channels used to arm LLS are arranged in a one-out-of-three taken twice logic. The reactor steam dome pressure channels that control the opening and closing of the LLS S/RVs are arranged in either a one-out-of-one or a two-out-of-two logic depending on which LLS S/RV group is being controlled. This logic arrangement ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude the LLS S/RV function. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. W hen the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LLS or relief initiation signal, as applicable, to the initiation logic.
APPLICABLE      The relief and LLS instrumentation are designed to prevent SAFETY          overpressurization of the nuclear steam system and to ensure that the ANALYSES        containment loads remain within the primary containment design basis (Ref. 1).
Relief and LLS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
Trip Setpoints that directly protect against violating the reactor core or Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary Safety Limits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are Safety Limit-Limiting Safety System Settings (SL-LSSS). Permissive and interlock setpoints allow bypass of trips when they are not required by the Safety Analysis.
These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventative or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy, (i.e. the value indicated is sufficiently close to the necessary value to ensure proper operation of the safety systems to turn the AOO). Therefore permissives and interlocks are not considered to be SL-LSSS.
BW R/6 STS                          B 3.3.6.5-5                            Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 LCO        The LCO requires OPERABILITY of sufficient relief and LLS instrumentation channels to provide adequate assurance of successfully accomplishing the relief and LLS function, assuming any single instrumentation channel failure within the LLS logic. Therefore, two trip systems are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of each trip system is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the reactor steam dome pressure channels associated with required relief and LLS S/RVs. Each required channel shall have its setpoint withinconservative with respect to the specified Allowable Value. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not withinconservative with respect to its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
BW R/6 STS                  B 3.3.6.5-6                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES LCO (continued)
Allowable Values are specified for each channel in SR 3.3.6.5.3. [Limiting Trip Setpoints] are specified [in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.
The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceedremain conservative with respect to the as-left tolerance band Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. . After each calibration the trip setpoint should be reset to within the as-left band around the [LTSP]
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP] by an amount
[greater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ([LTSP]) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.
This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.
If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel would be considered inoperable. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.
BW R/6 STS                        B 3.3.6.5-7                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5
[LTSPs] are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The [LTSPs] are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but withinconservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
Trip setpoint[Limiting Trip Setpoints]s are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analyticanalytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analyticanalytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints[LTSPs]
are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g.,
drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.
For relief, the actuating Allowable Values are based on the transient event of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure with an indirect scram (i.e., neutron flux). This analysis is described in Reference 2. For LLS, the actuating and reclosing Allowable Values are based on the transient event of MSIV closure with a direct scram (i.e., MSIV position switches).
This analysis is described in Reference 1.
APPLICABILITY  The relief and LLS instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since considerable energy exists in the nuclear steam system and the S/RVs may be needed to provide pressure relief.
If the S/RVs are needed, then the relief and LLS functions are required to ensure that the primary containment design basis is maintained. In BW R/6 STS                        B 3.3.6.5-8                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 MODES 4 and 5, the reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. Thus, pressure relief, associated relief, and LLS instrumentation are not required.
ACTIONS    -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------
Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.
          --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BW R/6 STS                          B 3.3.6.5-9                                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
A.1 Because the failure of any reactor steam dome pressure instrument channels [providing relief S/RV opening and LLS opening and closing pressure setpoints] in one trip system will not prevent the associated S/RV from performing its relief and LLS function, 7 days is allowed to restore a trip system to OPERABLE status. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE trip system is adequate to perform the relief and LLS initiation function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE trip system could result in a loss of relief or LLS function.
The 7 day Completion Time is considered appropriate for the relief and LLS function because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the relief and LLS design. In addition, the probability of multiple relief or LLS instrumentation channel failures, which renders the remaining trip system inoperable, occurring together with an event requiring the relief or LLS function during the 7 day Completion Time is very low.
B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable trip system is not restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, per Condition A, or if two trip systems are inoperable, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE      -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------
REQUIREMENTS      Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.
                  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  -------------------------------- REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------
The Notes in SR 3.3.6.5.2 and SR 3.3.6.5.3 requiring reset of the channel to a predefined as-left tolerance and the verification of the as-found tolerance are only associated with SL-LSSS values.
                  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  -------------------------------- REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------
BW R/6 STS                                B 3.3.6.5-10                                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 Notes 1 and 2 are applied to the setpoint verification Surveillances for all SL-LSSS Functions unless one or more of the following exclusions apply:
: 1. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to SL-LSSS Functions which utilize mechanical components to sense the trip setpoint or to manual initiation circuits (the latter are not explicitly modeled in the accident analysis). Examples of mechanical components are limit switches, float switches, proximity detectors, manual actuation switches, and other such devices that are normally only checked on a "go/no go" basis. Note 1 requires a comparison of the periodic surveillance requirement results to provide an indication of channel (or individual device) performance. This comparison is not valid for most mechanical components. W hile it is possible to verify that a limit switch functions at a point of travel, a change in the surveillance result probably indicates that the switch has moved, not that the input/output relationship has changed. Therefore, a comparison of surveillance requirement results would not provide an indication of the channel or component performance.
: 2. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to Technical Specifications associated with mechanically operated safety relief valves. The performance of these components is already controlled (i.e., trended with as-left and as-found limits) under the ASME Section XI testing program.
: 3. Notes 1 and 2 are may not apply ied to SL-LSSS Functions and Surveillances which test only digital components. For purely digital components, such as actuation logic circuits and associated relays, there is no expected change in result between surveillance performances other than measurement and test errors (M&TE) and, therefore, justification is needed to confirm that comparison of Surveillance results does not provide an indication of channel or component performance.
An evaluation of the potential SL-LSSS Functions resulted in Notes 1 and 2 being applied to the Functions shown in the TS markups. Each licensee proposing to fully adopt this TSTF must review the the potential SL-LSSS Functions to identify which of the identified functions are SL-LSSS according to the definition of SL-LSSS and their plant specific safety analysis. The two TSTF Notes are not required to be applied to any of the listed Functions which meet any of the exclusion criteria or are not SL-LSSS based on the plant specific design and analysis.
          --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains relief or LLS initiation capability, as applicable. Upon completion of the BW R/6 STS                      B 3.3.6.5-11                                          Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the relief and LLS valves will initiate when necessary.
SR 3.3.6.5.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.
SR 3.3.6.5.2 The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints.
The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.6.5.3. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.
SR 3.3.6.5.2 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will BW R/6 STS                        B 3.3.6.5-12                              Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY.
The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP]. W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.
The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].
BW R/6 STS                    B 3.3.6.5-13                            Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6.5.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.6.5.3 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY.
The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP]. W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.
If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.
The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].
SR 3.3.6.5.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed for S/RVs in LCO 3.4.4 and LCO 3.6.1.6 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant BW R/6 STS                        B 3.3.6.5-14                            Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
 
Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [5.2.2].
: 2. FSAR, Appendix 5A.
: 3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
BW R/6 STS                B 3.3.6.5-15                            Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04}}

Revision as of 04:08, 23 November 2019

NRC Response to 4/16/2007 Submittal of TSTF-493, Revision 2, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions, Enclosure 4k - BWR6_3.03.6.05_B for TSTF-493R2eITSB
ML072120119
Person / Time
Site: Technical Specifications Task Force
Issue date: 07/25/2007
From: Kobetz T
NRC/NRR/ADRO/DIRS/ITSB
To:
Technical Specifications Task Force
Schulten C. S., NRR/DIRS, 415-1192
Shared Package
ML072070202 List:
References
TAC MD5249, TSTF-493, Rev 2
Download: ML072120119 (15)
v • d • e


Text

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.5 Relief and Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The safety/relief valves (S/RVs) prevent overpressurization of the nuclear steam system. Instrumentation is provided to support two modes of S/RV operation - the relief function (all valves) and the LLS function (selected valves). Refer to LCO 3.4.4, "Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," and LCO 3.6.1.6, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," for Applicability Bases for additional information of these modes of S/RV operation. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. The subset of LSSS that directly protect against violating the rReactor Ccore Safety Limits and or the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pPressure boundary Ssafety Llimits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are referred to as Safety Limit LSSS (SL-LSSS).

10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) requires that TSs include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. For variables on which a SL has been placed, the LSSS must be chosen to initiate automatic protective action to correct abnormal situations before the SL is exceeded.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices...so chosen that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that an SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.

However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

REVIEW ER'S NOTE ----------------------------------

The term "Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)" is generic terminology for the setpoint value calculated by means of the plant-specific setpoint methodology documented in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

The term Limiting Trip Setpoint indicates that no additional margin has been added between the Analytical Limit and the calculated trip setting.

W here margin is added between the Analytical Limit and trip setpoint, the term Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is preferred. The trip setpoint (field setting) may be more conservative than the Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint. W here the [LTSP] is not documented in SR 3.3.6.5.3 for the purpose of compliance with 10 CFR 50.36, the plant-specific term for the BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-1 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint must be cited in Note 2 of SR 3.3.6.5.3.

The brackets indicate plant-specific terms may apply, as reviewed and approved by the NRC. The as-found and as-left tolerances will apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance.

Licensees are to insert the name of the document(s) controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 that contain the [LTSP] and the methodology for calculating the as-left and as-found tolerances, for the phrase "[a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]" in the specifications.]

BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The [Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)] is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the

[LTSP] ensures that SLs are not exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 1).

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Use of the [LTSP] to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the [LTSP] due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the [LTSP] and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the [LTSP] to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-2 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. The Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.6.5.3 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during testing such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP] and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP]

by an amount equal to [or greater than] the as-found tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ensures that an SL is not BASES BACKGROUND (continued) exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.

If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.

This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.

If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the device channel would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The relief function of the S/RVs prevents overpressurization of the nuclear steam system. The LLS function of the S/RVs is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the S/RV discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the S/RV discharge line. It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the containment by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the S/RVs subsequent to their initial actuation.

Upon any S/RV actuation, the LLS logic assigns preset opening and reclosing setpoints to six preselected S/RVs. These setpoints are selected to override the normal relief setpoints such that the LLS S/RVs will stay open longer, thus releasing more steam (energy) to the BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-3 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 suppression pool; hence more energy (and time) is required for repressurization and subsequent S/RV openings. The LLS logic increases the time between (or prevents) subsequent actuations to allow the high water leg created from the initial S/RV opening to return to (or fall below) its normal water level, thus reducing thrust loads from subsequent actuations to within their design limits. In addition, the LLS is designed to limit S/RV subsequent actuations to one valve, so that containment loads will also be reduced.

The relief instrumentation consists of two trip systems, with each trip system actuating one solenoid for each S/RV. There are two solenoids per S/RV, and each solenoid can open its respective S/RV. The relief mode (S/RVs and associated trip systems) is divided into three setpoint groups (the low with one S/RV, the medium with 10 S/RVs, and the high with nine S/RVs). The S/RV relief function is actuated by transmitters that monitor reactor steam dome pressure. The reactor steam dome pressure transmitters send signals to trip units whose outputs are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic for each trip system in each of three separate BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-4 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) setpoint groups (e.g., the medium group of 10 S/RVs opens when at least one of the associated trip systems trips at its assigned setpoint). Once an S/RV has been opened, it will reclose when reactor steam dome pressure decreases below the opening pressure setpoint. This logic arrangement ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude the S/RV relief function.

The LLS logic consists of two trip systems similar to the S/RV relief function. Either trip system can actuate the LLS S/RVs by energizing the associated solenoids on the S/RV pilot valves. Each LLS trip system is enabled and sealed in upon initial S/RV actuation from the existing reactor steam dome pressure sensors of any of the normal relief setpoint groups. The reactor steam dome pressure channels used to arm LLS are arranged in a one-out-of-three taken twice logic. The reactor steam dome pressure channels that control the opening and closing of the LLS S/RVs are arranged in either a one-out-of-one or a two-out-of-two logic depending on which LLS S/RV group is being controlled. This logic arrangement ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude the LLS S/RV function. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. W hen the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LLS or relief initiation signal, as applicable, to the initiation logic.

APPLICABLE The relief and LLS instrumentation are designed to prevent SAFETY overpressurization of the nuclear steam system and to ensure that the ANALYSES containment loads remain within the primary containment design basis (Ref. 1).

Relief and LLS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Trip Setpoints that directly protect against violating the reactor core or Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary Safety Limits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are Safety Limit-Limiting Safety System Settings (SL-LSSS). Permissive and interlock setpoints allow bypass of trips when they are not required by the Safety Analysis.

These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventative or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy, (i.e. the value indicated is sufficiently close to the necessary value to ensure proper operation of the safety systems to turn the AOO). Therefore permissives and interlocks are not considered to be SL-LSSS.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-5 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 LCO The LCO requires OPERABILITY of sufficient relief and LLS instrumentation channels to provide adequate assurance of successfully accomplishing the relief and LLS function, assuming any single instrumentation channel failure within the LLS logic. Therefore, two trip systems are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of each trip system is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the reactor steam dome pressure channels associated with required relief and LLS S/RVs. Each required channel shall have its setpoint withinconservative with respect to the specified Allowable Value. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not withinconservative with respect to its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-6 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES LCO (continued)

Allowable Values are specified for each channel in SR 3.3.6.5.3. [Limiting Trip Setpoints] are specified [in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceedremain conservative with respect to the as-left tolerance band Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. . After each calibration the trip setpoint should be reset to within the as-left band around the [LTSP]

The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP] by an amount

[greater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ([LTSP]) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.

Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).

If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.

This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.

If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel would be considered inoperable. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-7 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5

[LTSPs] are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The [LTSPs] are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but withinconservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

Trip setpoint[Limiting Trip Setpoints]s are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analyticanalytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analyticanalytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints[LTSPs]

are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g.,

drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

For relief, the actuating Allowable Values are based on the transient event of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure with an indirect scram (i.e., neutron flux). This analysis is described in Reference 2. For LLS, the actuating and reclosing Allowable Values are based on the transient event of MSIV closure with a direct scram (i.e., MSIV position switches).

This analysis is described in Reference 1.

APPLICABILITY The relief and LLS instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since considerable energy exists in the nuclear steam system and the S/RVs may be needed to provide pressure relief.

If the S/RVs are needed, then the relief and LLS functions are required to ensure that the primary containment design basis is maintained. In BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-8 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 MODES 4 and 5, the reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. Thus, pressure relief, associated relief, and LLS instrumentation are not required.

ACTIONS -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-9 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

A.1 Because the failure of any reactor steam dome pressure instrument channels [providing relief S/RV opening and LLS opening and closing pressure setpoints] in one trip system will not prevent the associated S/RV from performing its relief and LLS function, 7 days is allowed to restore a trip system to OPERABLE status. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE trip system is adequate to perform the relief and LLS initiation function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE trip system could result in a loss of relief or LLS function.

The 7 day Completion Time is considered appropriate for the relief and LLS function because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the relief and LLS design. In addition, the probability of multiple relief or LLS instrumentation channel failures, which renders the remaining trip system inoperable, occurring together with an event requiring the relief or LLS function during the 7 day Completion Time is very low.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable trip system is not restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, per Condition A, or if two trip systems are inoperable, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------

REQUIREMENTS Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------

The Notes in SR 3.3.6.5.2 and SR 3.3.6.5.3 requiring reset of the channel to a predefined as-left tolerance and the verification of the as-found tolerance are only associated with SL-LSSS values.

REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-10 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 Notes 1 and 2 are applied to the setpoint verification Surveillances for all SL-LSSS Functions unless one or more of the following exclusions apply:

1. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to SL-LSSS Functions which utilize mechanical components to sense the trip setpoint or to manual initiation circuits (the latter are not explicitly modeled in the accident analysis). Examples of mechanical components are limit switches, float switches, proximity detectors, manual actuation switches, and other such devices that are normally only checked on a "go/no go" basis. Note 1 requires a comparison of the periodic surveillance requirement results to provide an indication of channel (or individual device) performance. This comparison is not valid for most mechanical components. W hile it is possible to verify that a limit switch functions at a point of travel, a change in the surveillance result probably indicates that the switch has moved, not that the input/output relationship has changed. Therefore, a comparison of surveillance requirement results would not provide an indication of the channel or component performance.
2. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to Technical Specifications associated with mechanically operated safety relief valves. The performance of these components is already controlled (i.e., trended with as-left and as-found limits) under the ASME Section XI testing program.
3. Notes 1 and 2 are may not apply ied to SL-LSSS Functions and Surveillances which test only digital components. For purely digital components, such as actuation logic circuits and associated relays, there is no expected change in result between surveillance performances other than measurement and test errors (M&TE) and, therefore, justification is needed to confirm that comparison of Surveillance results does not provide an indication of channel or component performance.

An evaluation of the potential SL-LSSS Functions resulted in Notes 1 and 2 being applied to the Functions shown in the TS markups. Each licensee proposing to fully adopt this TSTF must review the the potential SL-LSSS Functions to identify which of the identified functions are SL-LSSS according to the definition of SL-LSSS and their plant specific safety analysis. The two TSTF Notes are not required to be applied to any of the listed Functions which meet any of the exclusion criteria or are not SL-LSSS based on the plant specific design and analysis.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, provided the associated Function maintains relief or LLS initiation capability, as applicable. Upon completion of the BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-11 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the relief and LLS valves will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.5.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.

SR 3.3.6.5.2 The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints.

The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.6.5.3. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.

SR 3.3.6.5.2 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.

Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-12 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY.

The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP]. W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.

If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.

The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-13 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.6.5.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.6.5.3 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.

Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY.

The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP]. W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained.

If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.

The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].

SR 3.3.6.5.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed for S/RVs in LCO 3.4.4 and LCO 3.6.1.6 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-14 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

Relief and LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.5 outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [5.2.2].

2. FSAR, Appendix 5A.
3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

BW R/6 STS B 3.3.6.5-15 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04

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