05000397/FIN-2016001-01: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = Licensee
| identified by = Licensee
| Inspection procedure =  
| Inspection procedure =  
| Inspector = D Bradley, D Stearns, D You, G Kolcum, J Groom, J O,'Donnell N, Greene S, Hedge
| Inspector = D Bradley, D Stearns, D You, G Kolcum, J Groom, J O, 'Donnelln Greene, S Hedger
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, prior to November 17, 2015, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, in October 2012, the licensee identified in AR 271801 that the maintenance procedure for Square D QMB electrical disconnects, specified in procedure PPM 10.25.53, Inspection of Lighting Panels and Power Panels, Revision 10, did not include steps to clean and burnish contacts that are susceptible to corrosion that may yield a high-resistance connection. However, the licensee failed to identify that several installed QMB disconnects may be vulnerable to failure since the previous maintenance performed did not include the steps to clean and burnish the contacts. Consequently, on November 17, 2015, the 125 VDC circuit (E-DP-S1/2D circuit 6) associated with under voltage trips of the division 2 vital bus failed a monthly surveillance test due to degraded voltage from high-resistance connections on corroded contacts. The licensee implemented corrective action by declaring affected components inoperable per technical specifications, identified high-resistance contacts as the cause, burnished the contacts to restore the circuit, and re-performed the surveillance to establish operability. The licensee also performed relay testing to demonstrate 125 VDC circuit availability at the observed, degraded voltages. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function, did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification equipment for greater than 24 hours. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR 340134.
| description = Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, prior to November 17, 2015, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, in October 2012, the licensee identified in AR 271801 that the maintenance procedure for Square D QMB electrical disconnects, specified in procedure PPM 10.25.53, Inspection of Lighting Panels and Power Panels, Revision 10, did not include steps to clean and burnish contacts that are susceptible to corrosion that may yield a high-resistance connection. However, the licensee failed to identify that several installed QMB disconnects may be vulnerable to failure since the previous maintenance performed did not include the steps to clean and burnish the contacts. Consequently, on November 17, 2015, the 125 VDC circuit (E-DP-S1/2D circuit 6) associated with under voltage trips of the division 2 vital bus failed a monthly surveillance test due to degraded voltage from high-resistance connections on corroded contacts. The licensee implemented corrective action by declaring affected components inoperable per technical specifications, identified high-resistance contacts as the cause, burnished the contacts to restore the circuit, and re-performed the surveillance to establish operability. The licensee also performed relay testing to demonstrate 125 VDC circuit availability at the observed, degraded voltages. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function, did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification equipment for greater than 24 hours. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR 340134.
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Revision as of 19:54, 20 February 2018

01
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Report IR 05000397/2016001 Section 4OA7
Date counted Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: Licensee-identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate) D Bradley
D Stearns
D You
G Kolcum
J Groom
J O
'Donnelln Greene
S Hedger
Violation of: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI

Technical Specification - Procedures

Technical Specification
INPO aspect
'