ENS 43884: Difference between revisions

v t e ENS Event
16:00 Jan 6, 2008
Title	Hpci Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Surveillance Test
Event Description	During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds. The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * RETRACTION BY K. LONG TO R. ALEXANDER AT 1109 EST ON 03/04/2008 * * * The initial notification was made as a result of the failure of HPCI to meet its response time of 50 seconds as defined in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) due to a degraded component. Failure to meet the operability procedure requirements resulted in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system being considered inoperable. Since HPCl is a single train system, its inoperability was the event that warranted a notification to meet the following reporting requirement: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional review and evaluation of the licensing basis was performed and demonstrated that the procedural required response time was set conservatively. As expected, the licensing basis does not require or assume any specific start time and HPCl is not credited in the accident analyses. The acceptance criterion contained in the TRM is within licensee control via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Consequently, the TRM criterion was revised to 75 seconds to retain a value to assure continued monitoring and trending of HPCl performance in order to recognize and prevent continued performance degradation. Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that HPCl would have completed its mission time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> despite the degraded condition of the EGR [Electronic Governor Remote] that caused the initial slower response time. This is based on the fact that HPCl started and ran at rated flow and pressure for approximately 39 minutes prior to shutdown with no problems identified. This removes any questions regarding its ability to restart and run based on demand during its mission time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. An industry expert on this system and the engineer from the vendor that supports this system concurred with that conclusion. Since this subsequent review and evaluation determined that the slower response time did not render HPCl inoperable, no single train failure of HPCl occurred. The system was fully capable of performing its intended safety functions during the event timeline. Based on this information this notification serves to retract notification # 43884 made on 1/06/08. The licensee notified the Resident Inspector of this retraction. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

ENS 43884 +/- *RETRACTED*
Where
Hatch Georgia (NRC Region 2)
Reporting

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.63 h-0.0263 days <br />-0.00375 weeks <br />-8.62974e-4 months <br />)
Opened:	Tony Spring 15:22 Jan 6, 2008
NRC Officer:	Jeff Rotton
Last Updated:	Mar 4, 2008
43884 - NRC Website Loading map... {"minzoom":false,"maxzoom":false,"mappingservice":"leaflet","width":"350px","height":"250px","centre":false,"title":"","label":"","icon":"","lines":[],"polygons":[],"circles":[],"rectangles":[],"copycoords":false,"static":false,"zoom":6,"defzoom":14,"layers":["OpenStreetMap"],"image layers":[],"overlays":[],"resizable":false,"fullscreen":false,"scrollwheelzoom":true,"cluster":false,"clustermaxzoom":20,"clusterzoomonclick":true,"clustermaxradius":80,"clusterspiderfy":true,"geojson":"","clicktarget":"","imageLayers":[],"locations":[{"text":"\u003Cb\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\"mw-parser-output\"\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca class=\"mw-selflink selflink\"\u003EENS 43884\u003C/a\u003E - \u003Ca href=\"/Hatch\" title=\"Hatch\"\u003EHatch\u003C/a\u003E\n\u003C/p\u003E\u003C/div\u003E\u003C/b\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\"mw-parser-output\"\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHpci Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Surveillance Test\n\u003C/p\u003E\u003C/div\u003E","title":"ENS 43884 - Hatch\n","link":"","lat":31.93298888888889,"lon":-82.34381666666667,"icon":"/w/images/1/14/Southern_Nuclear_icon.png"}],"imageoverlays":null}
v • d • e

v t e Emergency Notification System
Hatch with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
WEEKMONTHYEAR2023-12-18T07:23:00 [Table view]
[ENS list for Hatch]

@@ Line 17: / Line 17: @@
 | event date = 01/06/2008 11:00 EST
 | last update date = 03/04/2008
-| title = Hpci Declared Inoperable Due To Failed Surveillance Test
+| title = Hpci Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Surveillance Test
 | event text = During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds.  The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented.
 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

v t e Unit 2
GE-4
Reactor critical	Critical
Scram	No
Before	Power Operation (100 %)
After	Power Operation (100 %)

ENS 43884: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 22:14, 1 March 2018

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ENS 43884: Difference between revisions

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