ML17209B117: Difference between revisions

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3.The following principles of law are applicable to this action: (a)The transmiss'on facilities known as the Pacific intertie cannot practicably be duplicat d by plaintiffs.
3.The following principles of law are applicable to this action: (a)The transmiss'on facilities known as the Pacific intertie cannot practicably be duplicat d by plaintiffs.
Consequently, the intertie is essential to the transmission of bulk power from the PNM area to plaintiffs.
Consequently, the intertie is essential to the transmission of bulk power from the PNM area to plaintiffs.
See Associated Press v.United States, 326 U.S.1, 13 8 n.10 (1945);United States v.Terminal Hsilrasa issaaistian, 22t U.S.383, t09 (1912);Bsai.t v.Pro-Football, 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C;Cir.1977).  
See Associated Press v.United States, 326 U.S.1, 13 8 n.10 (1945);United States v.Terminal Hsilrasa issaaistian, 22t U.S.383, t09 (1912);Bsai.t v.Pro-Football, 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C;Cir.1977).
(b)Per se rules oz antitrust lav are appropriate I only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.
(b)Per se rules oz antitrust lav are appropriate I only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.
See Northern Paciz ic R.Co.v.United States, 356 U.S.1, 5 (1958).(c)Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the defendant's restzictions on access to the intertie system warrants a nez'e rule.(d)Zn.Blonder-Ton ue Laboratories, Znc.v.Universit of Illinois, 402 U.S..313, 329 (1971), the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality of parties vhen applying the principle of'ollateral estopp and held that estoppel vill be applied unless the party, can demonstrate that, it did not have a full and fair oppoz tuni,ty, procedurally,, substantively, and evidential to litigate the issue.sought to be estopped in the prior case.Subsequently, in.Parklane Hosier Co.v.Shave, t39 U.S'.322 (197g), the Supreme court held that the trial court is granted broad discretion in determini whether or not to apply the doctrine of collatez'al estoppel.Nhen making such a.determination; the trial court should conside.>>(i)the incentive to tully lit'tati in the prior f'orum;(2)vhethez the orior judgment is inconsistent with other decision;and (3)the proceduz al limitations on other proceedings.
See Northern Paciz ic R.Co.v.United States, 356 U.S.1, 5 (1958).(c)Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the defendant's restzictions on access to the intertie system warrants a nez'e rule.(d)Zn.Blonder-Ton ue Laboratories, Znc.v.Universit of Illinois, 402 U.S..313, 329 (1971), the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality of parties vhen applying the principle of'ollateral estopp and held that estoppel vill be applied unless the party, can demonstrate that, it did not have a full and fair oppoz tuni,ty, procedurally,, substantively, and evidential to litigate the issue.sought to be estopped in the prior case.Subsequently, in.Parklane Hosier Co.v.Shave, t39 U.S'.322 (197g), the Supreme court held that the trial court is granted broad discretion in determini whether or not to apply the doctrine of collatez'al estoppel.Nhen making such a.determination; the trial court should conside.>>(i)the incentive to tully lit'tati in the prior f'orum;(2)vhethez the orior judgment is inconsistent with other decision;and (3)the proceduz al limitations on other proceedings.

Revision as of 16:35, 26 April 2019

Order That Listed Facts Are W/O Substantial Controversy & Are Deemed Established.Listed Principals of Law Applicable to Proceeding.Plaintiff Request for Order Limiting Discovery Denied W/O Prejudice.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML17209B117
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/18/1981
From: LUCAS M M
U.S. DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
To:
Shared Package
ML17209B115 List:
References
CV078-810-MML, CV78-810-MML, NUDOCS 8105290158
Download: ML17209B117 (10)


Text

ATTACHMENT 5)981.i@Ega, Il.$.0lSLRlCf CRRT cmL amacz v QLHeta N" UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 14 16 17 CZTZES OF ANAHELM', RIVERSIDE, BANNING, COLTON and AZUSA, CALIFORNIA, Plaintir fs, v~SOUTHERN.CALZFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,: Defendant.

)))))))))))).)NO.CV-78-8 10-PAL ORDER SPECIFYING CERTAZN FACTS TO BE WITHOUT, SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVEHSY, AND REQUIRING FURTHER BRIEFING ON OTHER ISSUES 20 26.27 On February 3, 1981, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Adjudicate Certain Facts, to Limit the Issues to be.Tried, and to Limit: the Scope of Discovery.

After careful consideration of this motion, the memoranda and evidence submitted in supoort and in opoos'ion to the motion, the arguments or counsel for all parties, and the entire record in this action, the Court hereby Orders as follows: 1.Although this motion is characterized by plaintiffs as a Rule 16 motion, the Court f'nds that plaintiffs'otion shall be treated as a motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules or Civil Procedure either for summary judgment or for 8 yosp S015~

I 2 3'0 12 I3 16 17 19 20 21 27 28 an order-specifying certain facts to be without substantial controversy.

The Court finds that the defendant is not prejudiced by this recharacterization.

The defendant has fully argued, all of the issues presented in this motion, both orally and in writing, and has submitted voluminous evidence and affidavits in support of its position.2.The following facts are without substantial contro-versy, and shall be deemed established for the purposes of'his action: I (a)BPA and other PQf entities have ha'd, and continue=to have, low-cost bulk powe.available for sale to purchasers outside the PNM area.See Moody testimony, at pp.IZ and 16;(b)The Cities, as public entities, have a federal statutory preference to BPA bulk power surplus energy and surplus peaking capacity marketed outside the PNM area.16 U.S.C.5832(c)(a);

16 U.S.C.5837a;(c)Transmission facilities controlled by Edison and others, known as the Pacific Intertie ("Intertie"), extend from the PNM bulk power market and connect to Edison's electric system.See Hoody testimony, at pp.2~3 y (d)Access to the intertie is necessary in order for the cities to engage in bulk power transactions with the BPA or other PNU entities.See Plaintiffs'xhibit

~P6;(e)Certain contracts ente.d into by Edison and others gove.n access to the Zntertie and give Edison 10 12 15 16 17 19.20 26 and others the power to preclude the Cities from obtaining access to the intertie, subject to the ultimate authority of the FERC.See Plaintiffs'xhibits r'7-11;16 U.S.C.5824i;(f)The cities of Anaheim and Riverside have requested direct access to the Xnertie.The cities of Azusa, Banning, and Colton have not.See Plaintiffs'xhibits N13-16;(g)Qn August'8, 1973 and September ll, 1973, P.G.4 E.informed the cities of Anaheim and River side that it would not provide them, direct access to the Intertie.See Plaintiffs'xhibit iP6 and 20;(h)Edison has informed the citIes of Anaheim and River side that it will not provide them direct access to the Intertie.See Plaintiffs'xhibits ik21;24;and (i)The Cities are dependent upon Edison for t , transmission of bulk power supplies.See p.48 of Edison's memorandum in opposit'on.

3.The following principles of law are applicable to this action: (a)The transmiss'on facilities known as the Pacific intertie cannot practicably be duplicat d by plaintiffs.

Consequently, the intertie is essential to the transmission of bulk power from the PNM area to plaintiffs.

See Associated Press v.United States, 326 U.S.1, 13 8 n.10 (1945);United States v.Terminal Hsilrasa issaaistian, 22t U.S.383, t09 (1912);Bsai.t v.Pro-Football, 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C;Cir.1977).

(b)Per se rules oz antitrust lav are appropriate I only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.

See Northern Paciz ic R.Co.v.United States, 356 U.S.1, 5 (1958).(c)Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the defendant's restzictions on access to the intertie system warrants a nez'e rule.(d)Zn.Blonder-Ton ue Laboratories, Znc.v.Universit of Illinois, 402 U.S..313, 329 (1971), the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality of parties vhen applying the principle of'ollateral estopp and held that estoppel vill be applied unless the party, can demonstrate that, it did not have a full and fair oppoz tuni,ty, procedurally,, substantively, and evidential to litigate the issue.sought to be estopped in the prior case.Subsequently, in.Parklane Hosier Co.v.Shave, t39 U.S'.322 (197g), the Supreme court held that the trial court is granted broad discretion in determini whether or not to apply the doctrine of collatez'al estoppel.Nhen making such a.determination; the trial court should conside.>>(i)the incentive to tully lit'tati in the prior f'orum;(2)vhethez the orior judgment is inconsistent with other decision;and (3)the proceduz al limitations on other proceedings.

Also see United States v.TT Ra onier, 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.1980).(e)Collateral estoppel may be'nvoked to foreclos I'elitigation of'ssues already determined in an adminis-trative proceeding.

United States v.Utah Construction I 2 C., 3))U.).39),))'-22)!96));P Transport S stems v.Chauffeurs etc., t>6 p.2n 106t, 1066 (9th Cir.1971).10 13 16 17 19 20 21p7 (f)Edison is collaterally estopped from disputing the following factual issues determined in FERC proceedings: (i.)The Cities and Edison are in actual, and potential competition at the retail level.See Plaintiffs,'xhibits 027 at p.886, and lP28 at pp.-896-98.(ii)The aporopriate rates to'ompare to determine whether Edison subjected the Cities to unlawful monoooly pricing ("pr ice squeeze")between'February 1,.1976 and August.16, 1979 are the A-8 retail rates oaid.by Edison's large industrial customers and Edison's R-2 wholesale rate oaid by resale customers, such as 0he Cities.See Plaintif exhibits iP27 a.t p.874, and iP28 at o.898.(iii.)Edison's R-2 wholesale rat , paid by the Cities, exceeded the A-8 r tail rates.paid by I Edison's large industrial customers during the period between February 1,.1976 and August 16, 1979.See Plaintiffs'xhibits

~~27 at po.875, 882, and IP28 at p.898.As to these facts, Edison had every incentive to'ully litigate them before the Administr ative Law Judge and the FERC.Edison was reoresented by counsel, oermitted massive discovery, allowed to oresent documentary eviden 10 14 19 20.21 22 I 23'627 28 and testimony, permitted to cross examine witnesses, permitted to object to evidentiary mater ial, and in general.'iven a full, and fair opportunity to litigate these factual issues.Moreover, Edison was permitted to appeal the Administrative Law Judge's decision, to the FERC on two occasions, with.the opportunity to raise each of the objections presently ra'sed in this Court.The FERC,expressly found-that each of these findings~as necessary to the proceedings and rejected Edison's.contention that the findings were superfluous.

See Plaintiffs'xhibit

~P27 at pp.885-86.The FERC also indicated that the-findings as to these issues are final, regardless of the disposition of further hearings See Plaintif fs'xhibit fP28 at p.898.(g)At, this time, the.plaintiff has failed, to demonstrate that the FERC has reached a final decision on whether Edison's H-2 wholesale rate, paid by the Cities between February 1, 1976 and August 16, 1979, was cost-justified.

See Plaintiffs'xhibit

/r'28 at p.899.Collateral estoppel, therefore, shall not be applied at the present time to this factual issue.Plaintiffs'equest for an order lim'ting discover y*is denied at this time without prejudice.

The Court finds that in light of the findings above, the requested restrictio upon discovery ma'y be unnecessary.

The parties are reminded, however, of the requirements of Hule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit discovery to matters relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend'ng action, and to 10 12 information that appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.5..Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby directs the attorneys for both parties to appear on i4fonday, July 20, 1981, at 10:00 a.m.in Courtroom 12 for a conference to consider the simplification of the issues.in this case.Prior-to this conference, on or before June 15, 1981, plaintiffs shall submit a brief fully examining whether or not the following issues are properly issues for trial in this case: (a)The impact of government regulation of defen-dant's activities and rates upon plaintiffs'laims in this action;16 17 19 20 2127 (b)The'impact of Congressional or FERC encourage-ment of the.present intertie system on'laintiff's claim;.(c)The relevance of'onspiracy theory under the antitrust laws, in light of the contracts entered into by Edison-and other s with respect to the intertie;(d)The relevance oi prior settlements'r ZOAs entered into between plaint'iffs and defendant, on plaintiffs'resent claims;(e)The impact or relevance ox PURPA upon plaintif claims;(f)The consequences, particular ly with respect to standing, of Azusa, Banning, and Colton's failure to request direct access-to the.ntertie;and (g)The relevance or facts concerning future I 2 3 availability of bulk power sources outside the PNM to plaintiffs.

Plaint'fs'rief shall also address the question of a bifurcation in this action of the issues of liability and damages.Defendant may then submit a brief in response to plaintiffs'.

brief, on or before July 3, 1981.10 ZT ZS SO ORDERED.ZT iS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve, by United.States mail, copies of this Order on counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendant in this action.Dated: May 18, 1981 16 17 Ma o m.~ucas United tate District Judge 19 27 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of))Florida Power 6 Light Company))(St.Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit No.2))CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Docket No.50-389A I hereby certify that copies of the"Motion to Establish Procedures, For a Declaration That a Situation Inconsistent with the Antitrust Laws Presently Exists and For Related Relief" with Attachments 1-5, Appendices A and B, and'indices (without documents) of Appendices C through I, have been served on the following by hand delivery (*)or by deposit, in the U.S.Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 27th day of May, 1981.I hereby certify that copies of Appendices C through I (with documents) will be served on all parties, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, by hand delivery (*)or by deposit in the U.S.Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 28th day of May, 1981.*Chase Stephens, Chief Docketing S Service Section Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Ivan W-Smith, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety S Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Robert M.Lazo, Esquire Atomic Safety S Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Michael A.Duggan, Esquire College of Business Administration University of Texas Austin, Texas 78712 Elizabeth S.Bowers, Chairman Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington; D.C.20555'erome Saltzman, Chief Antitrust 6 Indemnity Group Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Richard S.Salzman, Esquire Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Board Panel Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 William D.Paton, Esquire A.P.Hodgdon, Esquire Counsel for NRC Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 J.A.Bouknight,'r.

Lowenstein, Newman,.Reis E Axelrad 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C.20036 Joseph Rutberg, Esquire Lee Scott Dewey, Esquire Fredric Chanania, Esquire Counsel for NRC Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Dr.Peter A.Morris Atomic Safety&Licensing Board Panel Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Dr.Oscar H.Paris Atomic Safety&Licensing Board Panel Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 William H.Chandler, Esquire Chandler, O'Neal, Avera, Gray&Stripling P.O.Drawer 0 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Janet Urban, Esquire Department of Justice P.0, Box 14141 Washington, D.C.20044 I Donald A.Kaplan, Esquire Robert Fabrikant, Esquire Antitrust Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C.20530 Herbert Dym, Esquire Covington&Burling 888 16th Street, N.W.Washington, D.C.20006 Thomas Gurney, Sr., Esquire 203 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32802 William C.Wise, Esquire 1200 18th Street Suite 500 Washington, D.C.20036 Charles R.P.Brown, Esquire Brown, Paxton&Williams 301,South 6th Street.P.O.Box 1418 Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Hutchinson Island Coalition c/o Helen Shea Wells 93 El Mar Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 33457 George R.Kucik, Esquire Mare Gary, Esquire Ellen E.Sward Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin&Kahn 1815 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C.20006 Robert, A.Jablon Alan J.Roth Daniel Guttman Attorneys for the Gainesville Regional Utilities, the Lake Worth Utilities Authority, the Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach, the Sebring Utilities Commission,'nd the Cities of Alachua, Bartow, Fort Meade, Key West, Lake Helen, Mount Dora, Newberry, St.Cloud, and Tallahassee, Florida and the Florida Municipal Utilities Association BY