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==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ApplicationforamendstoLicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,requestingTechSpecsTables4.7-1S3.7-4associatedw/TechSpecs3.7.1.1remainsteamsafetyvalvetolerance.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOZDCOPIESRECEIVEDILTRgENCL/SIZE:&#xc3;+ITITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:-/J.RECIPIENTCOPIESCOPIESIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCLLTTRENCLPD3-1LA1111STANGFJ22RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDACCELERATEDDISFRIBUTIONDEMONSTR<TION'YSTEMREGULATINFORMATIONDZSTRIBUTIOSTEM(RIDE)ACCESSIONNBR:9211170207DOC.DATE:92/ll/llNOTARIZED:YESiDOCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.EIndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)DINTERNAL:NRR/DET/ESGBNRR/DST/SELB7ENRR/DST/SRXB8EOC/LFMB-EGFI01NRR/DOEA/OTSB11NRR/DST/SICB8H7NUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIB1111111011.,11D1111S1011EXTERNAL:NRCPDR11NSIC11DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK.ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMiDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!rDDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR16ENCL14 indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Coiumbus,OH43216AEP:NRC:1169.DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSCHANGETOINCREASETHEALLOWABLETOLERANCEFORMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyNovemberll,1992
Application foramendstoLicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,requesting TechSpecsTables4.7-1S3.7-4associated w/TechSpecs3.7.1.1remainsteamsafetyvalvetolerance.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOZDCOPIESRECEIVEDILTR gENCL/SIZE:&#xc3;+ITITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:-/J.RECIPIENT COPIESCOPIESIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCLLTTRENCLPD3-1LA1111STANGFJ22RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDACCELERATED DISFRIBUTION DEMONSTR<TION'YSTEMREGULATINFORMATION DZSTRIBUTIO STEM(RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9211170207 DOC.DATE:
92/ll/llNOTARIZED:
YESiDOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.E IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.
DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)DINTERNAL:
NRR/DET/ESGB NRR/DST/SELB 7ENRR/DST/SRXB 8EOC/LFMB-EGFI01NRR/DOEA/OTSB11 NRR/DST/SICB8H7 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIB 1111111011.,11D1111S1011EXTERNAL:
NRCPDR11NSIC11DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK.ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)
TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMiDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!rDDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR16ENCL14 indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Coiumbus, OH43216AEP:NRC:1169.
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGETOINCREASETHEALLOWABLE TOLERANCE FORMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyNovemberll,1992


==DearDr.Murley:==
==DearDr.Murley:==
ThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforamendmenttotheTechnicalSpecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically,werequestthatT/SsTables4.7-1(Unit1)and3.7-4(Unit2)associatedwithT/S3.7.1.1beamendedtoreflectanincreasedmainsteamsafetyvalvetoleranceof+3%.Inaddition,werequestthatUnit2T/S3.5.2beamendedtoreflectathermalpowerlimitationresultingfromthesmallbreakLOCAanalysiswhenasafetyinjectioncross-tievalveisclosed.Theliftsetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesfrequentlydriftoutsideoftheoriginallyintended+1$allowanceoverafuelcycle.Inattemptingtominimizethesetpointdriftproblemanddeterminetherootcause,severalvalveshavebeeninspectedandrefurbished.Theseactionshavebeenunsuccessfulinkeepingthesetpointswithinspecificationoverthefuelcycle.Themanufacturerofthesevalveshasrecommendedanincreaseintheallowabletoleranceto+3S.ThistoleranceisconsistentwithrecentASMEcoderequirements.Consequently,wearemakingthissubmittaltoimplementthechangesintheT/Ssidentifiedabove.In1986,aNoticeofViolationwasissuedduetoconcernsnotedinInspectionReportNumbers50-315/86030and50-316/86030(referenceAEP:NRC:1013)regardingthedriftinthesetpointforthesubjectvalves.Althoughthiswasnotfoundtobeasignificantsafetyconcern,wecommittedtosubmitalicenseeeventreport(LER)whenanyofthevalveswerefoundoutsideofthe+1%range.InadditiontorequestingyourapprovalofthisproposedT/Sschange,itisalsorequestedthatthiscommitmentbecancelled.Thisrequestisbasedontheoperatingcharacteristicsofthesevalves,thatthevalvesoperateasabank,notindividually,andareanalyzedassuch.Inthefuture,therefore,itisconsideredmoreappropriatetosubmit92111-70207,921111PDR'ADGCK05000815PDR  
Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, werequestthatT/SsTables4.7-1(Unit1)and3.7-4(Unit2)associated withT/S3.7.1.1beamendedtoreflectanincreased mainsteamsafetyvalvetolerance of+3%.Inaddition, werequestthatUnit2T/S3.5.2beamendedtoreflectathermalpowerlimitation resulting fromthesmallbreakLOCAanalysiswhenasafetyinjection cross-tie valveisclosed.Theliftsetpoints ofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesfrequently driftoutsideoftheoriginally intended+1$allowance overafuelcycle.Inattempting tominimizethesetpointdriftproblemanddetermine therootcause,severalvalveshavebeeninspected andrefurbished.
~O Dr.T.E.Murley2AEP:NRC:1169anLERonlyifthe"as-found"conditionofthisbankofvalvesdoesnotsupporttheChapter14safetyanalysisofrecord.Althoughitispossible,basedonhistoricaltrends,thatsomevalvesmayexceedthe3%driftlimit,sufficientcapacityfromtheremainingvalvesinthebankwouldtypicallybeavailabletoensurethattheplantwouldhaverespondedwithintheanalyzedlimits.ThisT/SchangeisbeingrequestedforimplementationbeforethenextregularlyscheduledUnit2refuelingoutageandassociatedvalvetesting.Tosupporttheschedule,werequestthattheamendmentbeapprovedforbothunitsbytheendofthethirdquarterof1993.WewillkeepNRCprojectmanagementinformedofanyschedulechangethroughroutineprojectreviewmeetings.AdetaileddescriptionoftheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationsareincludedinAttachment1tothisletter.Attachment2containstheproposedrevisedT/Sspages.Attachment3containsmarked-upcopiesoftheexistingT/Ss.WestinghouseReportSECL-91-429,"DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointToleranceRelaxation,"isfoundinAttachment4.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtheNFEMSectionChief.Thisletterissubmittedpursuantto10CFR50.54(f)and,assuch,anoathstatementisenclosed.Sincerely,VicePresidenttjwAttachments Dr.T.E.Murley3AEP:NRC:1169cc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief Dr.T.E.Murley4AEP'NRC:1169bc:S.J.BrewerD.H.Malin/K.J.TothM.L.Horvath-BridgmanJ.B.KingseedD.F.PowellJ.B.ShinnockW.G.Smith,Jr.W.M.Dean,NRC-Washington,D.C.AEP:NRC:1169DC-N-6015.1 COUNTYOFFRANKLINE.E.Fitzpatrick,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresidentoflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforegoingTechnicalSpecificationsChangetoIncreasetheAllowableToleranceforMainSteamSafetyValves,andknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.Subscribedandsworntobeforemethisdayof19~mNOTARYPUBLICRITADHILLNOTAIIYPUBLIC.STAlEOFOHI)
Theseactionshavebeenunsuccessful inkeepingthesetpoints withinspecification overthefuelcycle.Themanufacturer ofthesevalveshasrecommended anincreaseintheallowable tolerance to+3S.Thistolerance isconsistent withrecentASMEcoderequirements.
ATTACHMENT1toAEP:NRC:1169NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONINSUPPORTOFTHEINCREASEDALLOWABLETOLERANCEONMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVES Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1169Page1I.INTRODUCTIONThereareatotaloftwentyDressermainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSV)installedonfourmainsteamheaders(fivevalvesperheader)ineachunitatCookNuclearPlant.ThesevalvesarerequiredtobesetpointtestedperSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,1974Edition.Thesetpoints(liftsettings)mustbewithinthe+1%tolerancespecifiedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Typically,one-thirdofthevalvesaretestedeachrefuelingoutage.Onefailuretomeetthe+1%T/Scriteriacausesadditionalvalvestobetested.AtCookNuclearPlant,wehavehadtotestalltwentyvalvesduringeveryrecentrefuelingoutage.Sincethe1987"TreviTest,"animprovedtestingdevicehasbeenemployedtotesttheMSSVs.Evenwiththeimprovedtestmethods,thetestresultsdonotshowadefinitivetrendofvalvedegradation.Themanufacturer(Dresser)believesthat,ifthevalveswerecycledmorefrequentlythanthe18-monthtest,the+1%tolerancecouldbeachieved.Cyclingthevalvesmoreoftenthanevery18months,,however,isnotfeasibleduetoplantoperationalconstraints.Dresserrecommendsanincreaseinthetolerancerangefrom+1%to+3%forMSSVsatCookNuclearPlant.HistoricaltestresultsofMSSVsatCookNuclearPlantrevealthat90%ofthesetpointdrifthasbeenwithinthe+3%band.The+3%bandisconsistentwithANSI/ASMEOM-1,1981Edition(StandardforReliefDevices),whichspecifiesa+38testingtoleranceforallISIsafetyandreliefvalves.Thetestingrequirementsofthi,sstandardareapplicablevia1986andlatereditionsofASMESectionXI.II.DESCRIPTIONOFPROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESA.Unit11.Table4.7-1Table4.7-1isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%toleranceratherthanthe+1%toleranceontheMSSVs.2~Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowabletoleranceandtherequirementtoresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.ThedescriptionofthevalvefunctioninthefirstparagraphwasclarifiedtobeconsistentwiththeequivalentdescriptionintheUnit2Bases.
Consequently, wearemakingthissubmittal toimplement thechangesintheT/Ssidentified above.In1986,aNoticeofViolation wasissuedduetoconcernsnotedinInspection ReportNumbers50-315/86030 and50-316/86030 (reference AEP:NRC:1013) regarding thedriftinthesetpointforthesubjectvalves.Althoughthiswasnotfoundtobeasignificant safetyconcern,wecommitted tosubmitalicenseeeventreport(LER)whenanyofthevalveswerefoundoutsideofthe+1%range.Inadditiontorequesting yourapprovalofthisproposedT/Sschange,itisalsorequested thatthiscommitment becancelled.
Thisrequestisbasedontheoperating characteristics ofthesevalves,thatthevalvesoperateasabank,notindividually, andareanalyzedassuch.Inthefuture,therefore, itisconsidered moreappropriate tosubmit92111-70207,921111PDR'ADGCK05000815PDR  
~O Dr.T.E.Murley2AEP:NRC:1169 anLERonlyifthe"as-found" condition ofthisbankofvalvesdoesnotsupporttheChapter14safetyanalysisofrecord.Althoughitispossible, basedonhistorical trends,thatsomevalvesmayexceedthe3%driftlimit,sufficient capacityfromtheremaining valvesinthebankwouldtypically beavailable toensurethattheplantwouldhaveresponded withintheanalyzedlimits.ThisT/Schangeisbeingrequested forimplementation beforethenextregularly scheduled Unit2refueling outageandassociated valvetesting.Tosupporttheschedule, werequestthattheamendment beapprovedforbothunitsbytheendofthethirdquarterof1993.WewillkeepNRCprojectmanagement informedofanyschedulechangethroughroutineprojectreviewmeetings.
Adetaileddescription oftheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations areincludedinAttachment 1tothisletter.Attachment 2containstheproposedrevisedT/Sspages.Attachment 3containsmarked-up copiesoftheexistingT/Ss.Westinghouse ReportSECL-91-429, "DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointTolerance Relaxation,"
isfoundinAttachment 4.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.
Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),
copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtheNFEMSectionChief.Thisletterissubmitted pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)and,assuch,anoathstatement isenclosed.
Sincerely, VicePresident tjwAttachments Dr.T.E.Murley3AEP:NRC:1169 cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector
-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief Dr.T.E.Murley4AEP'NRC:1169 bc:S.J.BrewerD.H.Malin/K.J.TothM.L.Horvath-BridgmanJ.B.KingseedD.F.PowellJ.B.ShinnockW.G.Smith,Jr.W.M.Dean,NRC-Washington, D.C.AEP:NRC:1169 DC-N-6015.1 COUNTYOFFRANKLINE.E.Fitzpatrick, beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresident oflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforegoing Technical Specifications ChangetoIncreasetheAllowable Tolerance forMainSteamSafetyValves,andknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledge andbelief.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethisdayof19~mNOTARYPUBLICRITADHILLNOTAIIYPUBLIC.STAlEOFOHI)
ATTACHMENT 1toAEP:NRC:1169 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION INSUPPORTOFTHEINCREASED ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE ONMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVES Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 Page1I.INTRODUCTION ThereareatotaloftwentyDressermainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSV)installed onfourmainsteamheaders(fivevalvesperheader)ineachunitatCookNuclearPlant.ThesevalvesarerequiredtobesetpointtestedperSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,1974Edition.Thesetpoints (liftsettings) mustbewithinthe+1%tolerance specified intheTechnical Specifications.
Typically, one-third ofthevalvesaretestedeachrefueling outage.Onefailuretomeetthe+1%T/Scriteriacausesadditional valvestobetested.AtCookNuclearPlant,wehavehadtotestalltwentyvalvesduringeveryrecentrefueling outage.Sincethe1987"TreviTest,"animprovedtestingdevicehasbeenemployedtotesttheMSSVs.Evenwiththeimprovedtestmethods,thetestresultsdonotshowadefinitive trendofvalvedegradation.
Themanufacturer (Dresser) believesthat,ifthevalveswerecycledmorefrequently thanthe18-monthtest,the+1%tolerance couldbeachieved.
Cyclingthevalvesmoreoftenthanevery18months,,however,isnotfeasibleduetoplantoperational constraints.
Dresserrecommends anincreaseinthetolerance rangefrom+1%to+3%forMSSVsatCookNuclearPlant.Historical testresultsofMSSVsatCookNuclearPlantrevealthat90%ofthesetpointdrifthasbeenwithinthe+3%band.The+3%bandisconsistent withANSI/ASME OM-1,1981Edition(Standard forReliefDevices),
whichspecifies a+38testingtolerance forallISIsafetyandreliefvalves.Thetestingrequirements ofthi,sstandardareapplicable via1986andlatereditionsofASMESectionXI.II.DESCRIPTION OFPROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESA.Unit11.Table4.7-1Table4.7-1isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%tolerance ratherthanthe+1%tolerance ontheMSSVs.2~Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowable tolerance andtherequirement toresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.Thedescription ofthevalvefunctioninthefirstparagraph wasclarified tobeconsistent withtheequivalent description intheUnit2Bases.
r>>~Pi'~
r>>~Pi'~
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1169B.Unit2Page21.T/S3.5.2TechnicalSpecification3.5.2isbeingchangedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERto3250MW~whenasafetyinjectioncross-tievalve(s)isclosed.InanalyzingasmallbreakLOCA,theMSSVtoleranceincreaseresultsinanincreaseinsteamgenerator,andconsequentlyprimarysystem,pressure.Thisresultsinalowersafetyinjectionflow.Theadditionalloweringofthesafetyinjectionflowforthecross-tievalveclosedconfigurationiscompensatedforbyalowerthermalpowertoobtainacceptablesmallbreakLOCAresults.2.Table3.7-4Table3.7-4isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%toleranceratherthanthe+1%toleranceontheMSSVs.3.Basespage5-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttherequirementtoreducepowerwhenasafetyinjectioncrosstievalveisclosed.4.Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowabletoleranceandtherequirementtoresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.III.JUSTIFICATIONFORCHANGEWestinghouseReportSECL-91-429,"DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointToleranceRelaxation,"foundinAttachment4,summarizestheaccidentanalysesaffectedbyarelaxationintheallowableMSSVtoleranceto+38.ThisWestinghousereportprovidesajustificationfortheT/Sschange.IV.NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSANALYSISWehaveevaluatedtheproposedT/Sschangesandhavedeterminedthattheydonotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsiderationbasedonthecriteriaestablishedin10CFR50.92(c).OperationofCookNuclearPlantinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwillnot:1)InvolveasinificantincreaseintherobabilitorconseuencesofanaccidentreviouslevaluatedBasedontheanalysespresentedinAttachment4,alloftheapplicableLOCAandnon-LOCAdesignbasisacceptancecriteriaaresatisfied.Althoughincreasingthevalvesetpointmay 0o Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1169Page3resultinanincreaseinthesteamreleasefromtherupturedsteamgeneratorintheeventofasteamgeneratortuberuptureabovethecurrentUFSARvaluefoundinChapter14.2.4forbothunitsbyapproximately0.2%,theanalysisindicatesthatthecalculateddosesarewithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelines.Theevaluationalsoconcludesthattheexistingmassreleasesusedintheoffsitedosecalculationsfortheremainingtransients(i.e.,steamlinebreak,rodejection)arestillapplicable.Therearenohardwaremodificationstothevalvesand,therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofaspuriousopeningofaMSSV.Sufficientmarginexistsbetweenthenormalsteamsystemoperatingpressureandthevalvesetpointswiththeincreasedtolerancetoprecludeanincreaseintheprobabilityofactuatingthevalves.Basedontheabove,thereisnosignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARorinthedoseconsequences.2)CreatetheossibilitofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanreviouslanalzedIncreasingtheliftsetpointtoleranceontheMSSVsdoesnotintroduceanewaccidentinitiatormechanism.Nonewfailuremodeshavebeendefinedforanysystemorcomponentimportanttosafetynorhasanynewlimitingsinglefailurebeenidentified.NoaccidentwillbecreatedthatwillincreasethechallengetotheMSSVsandresultinincreasedactuationofthevalves.Therefore,thepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentthananyalreadyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotcreated.3)InvolveasinificantreductioninamarinofsafetAsdiscussedinthesafetyevaluation(Attachment4),theproposedincreaseintheMSSVliftsetpointtolerancewillinvalidateneithertheLOCAnorthenon-LOCAconclusionspresentedintheUFSARaccidentanalysesofrecord.Thenewlossofload/turbinetripanalysisconcludedthatallapplicableacceptancecriteriaarestillsatisfied.ForalltheUFSARnon-LOCAtransients,theDNBdesignbasis,primaryandsecondarypressurelimits,anddoselimitscontinuetobemet.Peakcladdingtemperaturesremainbelowthelimitsspecifiedin10CFR50.46fornormaloperationandwhenthethermalpowerisreducedtocompensateforclosureofthesafetyinjectioncrosstievalvesasrequiredbytheproposedTechnicalSpecifications.Thecalculateddosesresultingfromasteamgeneratortuberuptureeventremainwithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100permissiblereleases.Thus,thereisnoreductioninthemargintosafety.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 B.Unit2Page21.T/S3.5.2Technical Specification 3.5.2isbeingchangedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERto3250MW~whenasafetyinjection cross-tie valve(s)isclosed.Inanalyzing asmallbreakLOCA,theMSSVtolerance increaseresultsinanincreaseinsteamgenerator, andconsequently primarysystem,pressure.
TABLE4-1STEAMLINESAFETYVALVESPERLOOPVALVENUMBERa.SV-1b.SV-1c.SV-2d.SV-2e.SV-3LIFTSETTING*3X*1065psig1065psig1075psig1075psig1085psigORIFICESIZE-16in.216in.216in.216in.216in.2*Theliftsettingpressureshallcorrespondtoambientconditionsofthevalveatnominaloperatingtemperatureandpressure.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT13/47-4AMENDMENTNO.}}
Thisresultsinalowersafetyinjection flow.Theadditional loweringofthesafetyinjection flowforthecross-tie valveclosedconfiguration iscompensated forbyalowerthermalpowertoobtainacceptable smallbreakLOCAresults.2.Table3.7-4Table3.7-4isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%tolerance ratherthanthe+1%tolerance ontheMSSVs.3.Basespage5-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttherequirement toreducepowerwhenasafetyinjection crosstievalveisclosed.4.Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowable tolerance andtherequirement toresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.III.JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGEWestinghouse ReportSECL-91-429, "DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointTolerance Relaxation,"
foundinAttachment 4,summarizes theaccidentanalysesaffectedbyarelaxation intheallowable MSSVtolerance to+38.ThisWestinghouse reportprovidesajustification fortheT/Sschange.IV.NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSANALYSISWehaveevaluated theproposedT/Sschangesandhavedetermined thattheydonotrepresent asignificant hazardsconsideration basedonthecriteriaestablished in10CFR50.92(c).
Operation ofCookNuclearPlantinaccordance withtheproposedamendment willnot:1)Involveasinificantincreaseintherobabilit orconseuencesofanaccidentreviouslevaluated Basedontheanalysespresented inAttachment 4,alloftheapplicable LOCAandnon-LOCAdesignbasisacceptance criteriaaresatisfied.
Althoughincreasing thevalvesetpointmay 0o Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 Page3resultinanincreaseinthesteamreleasefromtherupturedsteamgenerator intheeventofasteamgenerator tuberuptureabovethecurrentUFSARvaluefoundinChapter14.2.4forbothunitsbyapproximately 0.2%,theanalysisindicates thatthecalculated dosesarewithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelines.
Theevaluation alsoconcludes thattheexistingmassreleasesusedintheoffsitedosecalculations fortheremaining transients (i.e.,steamlinebreak,rodejection) arestillapplicable.
Therearenohardwaremodifications tothevalvesand,therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofaspuriousopeningofaMSSV.Sufficient marginexistsbetweenthenormalsteamsystemoperating pressureandthevalvesetpoints withtheincreased tolerance toprecludeanincreaseintheprobability ofactuating thevalves.Basedontheabove,thereisnosignificant increaseintheprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARorinthedoseconsequences.
2)Createtheossibilit ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanreviouslanalzedIncreasing theliftsetpointtolerance ontheMSSVsdoesnotintroduce anewaccidentinitiator mechanism.
Nonewfailuremodeshavebeendefinedforanysystemorcomponent important tosafetynorhasanynewlimitingsinglefailurebeenidentified.
Noaccidentwillbecreatedthatwillincreasethechallenge totheMSSVsandresultinincreased actuation ofthevalves.Therefore, thepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentthananyalreadyevaluated intheUFSARisnotcreated.3)Involveasinificantreduction inamarinofsafetAsdiscussed inthesafetyevaluation (Attachment 4),theproposedincreaseintheMSSVliftsetpointtolerance willinvalidate neithertheLOCAnorthenon-LOCAconclusions presented intheUFSARaccidentanalysesofrecord.Thenewlossofload/turbine tripanalysisconcluded thatallapplicable acceptance criteriaarestillsatisfied.
ForalltheUFSARnon-LOCAtransients, theDNBdesignbasis,primaryandsecondary pressurelimits,anddoselimitscontinuetobemet.Peakcladdingtemperatures remainbelowthelimitsspecified in10CFR50.46fornormaloperation andwhenthethermalpowerisreducedtocompensate forclosureofthesafetyinjection crosstievalvesasrequiredbytheproposedTechnical Specifications.
Thecalculated dosesresulting fromasteamgenerator tuberuptureeventremainwithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100permissible releases.
Thus,thereisnoreduction inthemargintosafety.
TABLE4-1STEAMLINESAFETYVALVESPERLOOPVALVENUMBERa.SV-1b.SV-1c.SV-2d.SV-2e.SV-3LIFTSETTING*3X*1065psig1065psig1075psig1075psig1085psigORIFICESIZE-16in.216in.216in.216in.216in.2*Theliftsettingpressureshallcorrespond toambientconditions ofthevalveatnominaloperating temperature andpressure.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT13/47-4AMENDMENT NO.}}

Revision as of 08:33, 29 June 2018

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Requesting Tech Specs Tables 4.7-1 & 3.7-4 Associated W/Tech Specs 3.7.1.1 Re Main Steam Safety Valve Tolerance
ML17329A670
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 11/11/1992
From: FITZPATRICK E E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: MURLEY T E
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17329A671 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1169, NUDOCS 9211170207
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Application foramendstoLicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,requesting TechSpecsTables4.7-1S3.7-4associated w/TechSpecs3.7.1.1remainsteamsafetyvalvetolerance.

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GeneralDistribution NOTES:-/J.RECIPIENT COPIESCOPIESIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCLLTTRENCLPD3-1LA1111STANGFJ22RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDACCELERATED DISFRIBUTION DEMONSTR<TION'YSTEMREGULATINFORMATION DZSTRIBUTIO STEM(RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9211170207 DOC.DATE:

92/ll/llNOTARIZED:

YESiDOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.E IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.

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LTTR16ENCL14 indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Coiumbus, OH43216AEP:NRC:1169.

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGETOINCREASETHEALLOWABLE TOLERANCE FORMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyNovemberll,1992

DearDr.Murley:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, werequestthatT/SsTables4.7-1(Unit1)and3.7-4(Unit2)associated withT/S3.7.1.1beamendedtoreflectanincreased mainsteamsafetyvalvetolerance of+3%.Inaddition, werequestthatUnit2T/S3.5.2beamendedtoreflectathermalpowerlimitation resulting fromthesmallbreakLOCAanalysiswhenasafetyinjection cross-tie valveisclosed.Theliftsetpoints ofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesfrequently driftoutsideoftheoriginally intended+1$allowance overafuelcycle.Inattempting tominimizethesetpointdriftproblemanddetermine therootcause,severalvalveshavebeeninspected andrefurbished.

Theseactionshavebeenunsuccessful inkeepingthesetpoints withinspecification overthefuelcycle.Themanufacturer ofthesevalveshasrecommended anincreaseintheallowable tolerance to+3S.Thistolerance isconsistent withrecentASMEcoderequirements.

Consequently, wearemakingthissubmittal toimplement thechangesintheT/Ssidentified above.In1986,aNoticeofViolation wasissuedduetoconcernsnotedinInspection ReportNumbers50-315/86030 and50-316/86030 (reference AEP:NRC:1013) regarding thedriftinthesetpointforthesubjectvalves.Althoughthiswasnotfoundtobeasignificant safetyconcern,wecommitted tosubmitalicenseeeventreport(LER)whenanyofthevalveswerefoundoutsideofthe+1%range.Inadditiontorequesting yourapprovalofthisproposedT/Sschange,itisalsorequested thatthiscommitment becancelled.

Thisrequestisbasedontheoperating characteristics ofthesevalves,thatthevalvesoperateasabank,notindividually, andareanalyzedassuch.Inthefuture,therefore, itisconsidered moreappropriate tosubmit92111-70207,921111PDR'ADGCK05000815PDR

~O Dr.T.E.Murley2AEP:NRC:1169 anLERonlyifthe"as-found" condition ofthisbankofvalvesdoesnotsupporttheChapter14safetyanalysisofrecord.Althoughitispossible, basedonhistorical trends,thatsomevalvesmayexceedthe3%driftlimit,sufficient capacityfromtheremaining valvesinthebankwouldtypically beavailable toensurethattheplantwouldhaveresponded withintheanalyzedlimits.ThisT/Schangeisbeingrequested forimplementation beforethenextregularly scheduled Unit2refueling outageandassociated valvetesting.Tosupporttheschedule, werequestthattheamendment beapprovedforbothunitsbytheendofthethirdquarterof1993.WewillkeepNRCprojectmanagement informedofanyschedulechangethroughroutineprojectreviewmeetings.

Adetaileddescription oftheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations areincludedinAttachment 1tothisletter.Attachment 2containstheproposedrevisedT/Sspages.Attachment 3containsmarked-up copiesoftheexistingT/Ss.Westinghouse ReportSECL-91-429, "DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointTolerance Relaxation,"

isfoundinAttachment 4.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.

Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtheNFEMSectionChief.Thisletterissubmitted pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)and,assuch,anoathstatement isenclosed.

Sincerely, VicePresident tjwAttachments Dr.T.E.Murley3AEP:NRC:1169 cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief Dr.T.E.Murley4AEP'NRC:1169 bc:S.J.BrewerD.H.Malin/K.J.TothM.L.Horvath-BridgmanJ.B.KingseedD.F.PowellJ.B.ShinnockW.G.Smith,Jr.W.M.Dean,NRC-Washington, D.C.AEP:NRC:1169 DC-N-6015.1 COUNTYOFFRANKLINE.E.Fitzpatrick, beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresident oflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforegoing Technical Specifications ChangetoIncreasetheAllowable Tolerance forMainSteamSafetyValves,andknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledge andbelief.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethisdayof19~mNOTARYPUBLICRITADHILLNOTAIIYPUBLIC.STAlEOFOHI)

ATTACHMENT 1toAEP:NRC:1169 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION INSUPPORTOFTHEINCREASED ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE ONMAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVES Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 Page1I.INTRODUCTION ThereareatotaloftwentyDressermainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSV)installed onfourmainsteamheaders(fivevalvesperheader)ineachunitatCookNuclearPlant.ThesevalvesarerequiredtobesetpointtestedperSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,1974Edition.Thesetpoints (liftsettings) mustbewithinthe+1%tolerance specified intheTechnical Specifications.

Typically, one-third ofthevalvesaretestedeachrefueling outage.Onefailuretomeetthe+1%T/Scriteriacausesadditional valvestobetested.AtCookNuclearPlant,wehavehadtotestalltwentyvalvesduringeveryrecentrefueling outage.Sincethe1987"TreviTest,"animprovedtestingdevicehasbeenemployedtotesttheMSSVs.Evenwiththeimprovedtestmethods,thetestresultsdonotshowadefinitive trendofvalvedegradation.

Themanufacturer (Dresser) believesthat,ifthevalveswerecycledmorefrequently thanthe18-monthtest,the+1%tolerance couldbeachieved.

Cyclingthevalvesmoreoftenthanevery18months,,however,isnotfeasibleduetoplantoperational constraints.

Dresserrecommends anincreaseinthetolerance rangefrom+1%to+3%forMSSVsatCookNuclearPlant.Historical testresultsofMSSVsatCookNuclearPlantrevealthat90%ofthesetpointdrifthasbeenwithinthe+3%band.The+3%bandisconsistent withANSI/ASME OM-1,1981Edition(Standard forReliefDevices),

whichspecifies a+38testingtolerance forallISIsafetyandreliefvalves.Thetestingrequirements ofthi,sstandardareapplicable via1986andlatereditionsofASMESectionXI.II.DESCRIPTION OFPROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESA.Unit11.Table4.7-1Table4.7-1isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%tolerance ratherthanthe+1%tolerance ontheMSSVs.2~Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowable tolerance andtherequirement toresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.Thedescription ofthevalvefunctioninthefirstparagraph wasclarified tobeconsistent withtheequivalent description intheUnit2Bases.

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Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 B.Unit2Page21.T/S3.5.2Technical Specification 3.5.2isbeingchangedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERto3250MW~whenasafetyinjection cross-tie valve(s)isclosed.Inanalyzing asmallbreakLOCA,theMSSVtolerance increaseresultsinanincreaseinsteamgenerator, andconsequently primarysystem,pressure.

Thisresultsinalowersafetyinjection flow.Theadditional loweringofthesafetyinjection flowforthecross-tie valveclosedconfiguration iscompensated forbyalowerthermalpowertoobtainacceptable smallbreakLOCAresults.2.Table3.7-4Table3.7-4isbeingchangedtoreflectthe+3%tolerance ratherthanthe+1%tolerance ontheMSSVs.3.Basespage5-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttherequirement toreducepowerwhenasafetyinjection crosstievalveisclosed.4.Basespage3/47-1TheBasesarebeingchangedtoreflecttheallowable tolerance andtherequirement toresetthevalvestotheirnominalsetting.III.JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGEWestinghouse ReportSECL-91-429, "DonaldC.CookUnits1and2,MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSetpointTolerance Relaxation,"

foundinAttachment 4,summarizes theaccidentanalysesaffectedbyarelaxation intheallowable MSSVtolerance to+38.ThisWestinghouse reportprovidesajustification fortheT/Sschange.IV.NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSANALYSISWehaveevaluated theproposedT/Sschangesandhavedetermined thattheydonotrepresent asignificant hazardsconsideration basedonthecriteriaestablished in10CFR50.92(c).

Operation ofCookNuclearPlantinaccordance withtheproposedamendment willnot:1)Involveasinificantincreaseintherobabilit orconseuencesofanaccidentreviouslevaluated Basedontheanalysespresented inAttachment 4,alloftheapplicable LOCAandnon-LOCAdesignbasisacceptance criteriaaresatisfied.

Althoughincreasing thevalvesetpointmay 0o Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 Page3resultinanincreaseinthesteamreleasefromtherupturedsteamgenerator intheeventofasteamgenerator tuberuptureabovethecurrentUFSARvaluefoundinChapter14.2.4forbothunitsbyapproximately 0.2%,theanalysisindicates thatthecalculated dosesarewithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelines.

Theevaluation alsoconcludes thattheexistingmassreleasesusedintheoffsitedosecalculations fortheremaining transients (i.e.,steamlinebreak,rodejection) arestillapplicable.

Therearenohardwaremodifications tothevalvesand,therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofaspuriousopeningofaMSSV.Sufficient marginexistsbetweenthenormalsteamsystemoperating pressureandthevalvesetpoints withtheincreased tolerance toprecludeanincreaseintheprobability ofactuating thevalves.Basedontheabove,thereisnosignificant increaseintheprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARorinthedoseconsequences.

2)Createtheossibilit ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanreviouslanalzedIncreasing theliftsetpointtolerance ontheMSSVsdoesnotintroduce anewaccidentinitiator mechanism.

Nonewfailuremodeshavebeendefinedforanysystemorcomponent important tosafetynorhasanynewlimitingsinglefailurebeenidentified.

Noaccidentwillbecreatedthatwillincreasethechallenge totheMSSVsandresultinincreased actuation ofthevalves.Therefore, thepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentthananyalreadyevaluated intheUFSARisnotcreated.3)Involveasinificantreduction inamarinofsafetAsdiscussed inthesafetyevaluation (Attachment 4),theproposedincreaseintheMSSVliftsetpointtolerance willinvalidate neithertheLOCAnorthenon-LOCAconclusions presented intheUFSARaccidentanalysesofrecord.Thenewlossofload/turbine tripanalysisconcluded thatallapplicable acceptance criteriaarestillsatisfied.

ForalltheUFSARnon-LOCAtransients, theDNBdesignbasis,primaryandsecondary pressurelimits,anddoselimitscontinuetobemet.Peakcladdingtemperatures remainbelowthelimitsspecified in10CFR50.46fornormaloperation andwhenthethermalpowerisreducedtocompensate forclosureofthesafetyinjection crosstievalvesasrequiredbytheproposedTechnical Specifications.

Thecalculated dosesresulting fromasteamgenerator tuberuptureeventremainwithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100permissible releases.

Thus,thereisnoreduction inthemargintosafety.

TABLE4-1STEAMLINESAFETYVALVESPERLOOPVALVENUMBERa.SV-1b.SV-1c.SV-2d.SV-2e.SV-3LIFTSETTING*3X*1065psig1065psig1075psig1075psig1085psigORIFICESIZE-16in.216in.216in.216in.216in.2*Theliftsettingpressureshallcorrespond toambientconditions ofthevalveatnominaloperating temperature andpressure.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT13/47-4AMENDMENT NO.

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