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{{#Wiki_filter:PR.IC)R.I"EV1ACCELERATEDRIDSPROCESSING)REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9504060190,DOC.DATE:95/03/31NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETgFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316,AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
{{#Wiki_filter:PR.IC)R.I"EV1ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE:
95/03/31NOTARIZED:
YESDOCKETgFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316, AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ApplicationforamendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74.AmendswouldmodifyTS3.9.4toprovideflexibilityinoperationofcontainmentpersonnel.airlocksduringcorealterations.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:.LTRtENCLJSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LAHICKMAN,JINTERNAL:LECENTE01NRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2'XTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111110RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDPNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELI!vIINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTS'YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR13ENCL12 R
Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74.Amends wouldmodifyTS3.9.4toprovideflexibility inoperation ofcontainment personnel.
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany'P.O.Box16631Columbus,OH43216FIMarch31,1995AEP:NRC'1220DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2PROPOSEDAMENDMENTTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSECTION3/4.9.4FORCONTAINMENTPERSONNELAIRLOCKREQUIREMENTSThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationfor,amendmenttothetechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically,weareproposingtomodifyT/Ss3.9.4entitledRefuelingOperations,.ContainmentBuildingPenetrations,toprovideflexibilityintheoperationofthecontainmentpersonnelairlocksduringCOREALTERATIONSbyexpandingtheexistinglimitingconditionforoperationtoincludetheestablishmentofcontainmentclosurecapabilityrequirements.ThisproposedamendmentisconsistentwithAmendments194(DPR-53)and171(DPR-69)approvedforuseattheCalvertCliffsNuclearPowerPlantintheNRC'stransmittalofAugust31,1994.TheCalvertCliffsamendmentallowsthepersonnelairlockdoorstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONSprovidedcertainadministrativecontrolsareinplace.Attachment1providesadetaileddescriptionoftheproposedchanges,thejustificationforthechanges,andourdeterminationofnosignificanthazardsconsiderationperformedpursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment3containstheproposedT/Spages.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.I.GC03>95040601'PO950331PDRADOCK05000315~,.P'PDR  
airlocksduringcorealterations.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:.LTR tENCLJSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNAL:
LECENTE01NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2'XTERNAL:
NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111110RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELI!vIINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS'YOU DON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR13ENCL12 R
IndianaMichiganPowerCompany'P.O.Box16631Columbus, OH43216FIMarch31,1995AEP:NRC'1220 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2PROPOSEDAMENDMENT TOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION3/4.9.4FORCONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCKREQUIREMENTS Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication for,amendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weareproposing tomodifyT/Ss3.9.4entitledRefueling Operations,.
Containment BuildingPenetrations, toprovideflexibility intheoperation ofthecontainment personnel airlocksduringCOREALTERATIONS byexpanding theexistinglimitingcondition foroperation toincludetheestablishment ofcontainment closurecapability requirements.
Thisproposedamendment isconsistent withAmendments 194(DPR-53)and171(DPR-69)approvedforuseattheCalvertCliffsNuclearPowerPlantintheNRC'stransmittal ofAugust31,1994.TheCalvertCliffsamendment allowsthepersonnel airlockdoorstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedcertainadministrative controlsareinplace.Attachment 1providesadetaileddescription oftheproposedchanges,thejustification forthechanges,andourdetermination ofnosignificant hazardsconsideration performed pursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment 2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment 3containstheproposedT/Spages.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
I.GC03>95040601'PO 950331PDRADOCK05000315~,.P'PDR  


U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC'1220TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(l),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.Sincerely,qg'E9r(~E.E.FitzpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHIS8/n/DAYOF~A1995No,aryPubiicMyCommissionExpires:-M-5'5'hAttachmentsCC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett  
U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC'1220 TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.
'I ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1220DESCRIPTIONANDJUSTIFICATIONOFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS
Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(l),
~~E, Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page1I.DESCRIPTIONOFCHANGESTheproposedamendmenttotechnicalspecification(T/S)3.9.4makesthefollowingspecificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2T/Ss:S394A.ExpandLimitingConditionForOperation3.9.4,item"b"(page3/49-4)toincludetheabilitytoleavebothpersonnelairlockdoorsinthe"open"positionduringCOREALTERATIONS.Asaresult,closurecapabilityofthecontainmentairlockdoorswillbeassuredinoneoftwoways;1)oneairlockdoorwillbemaintainedclosedduringCOREALTERATIONS,or2)bothairlocksmayremainopenprovidedcertainrestrictionsaresatisfiedincludingthepositioningofdedicatedpersonnelattheairlocktofacilitateclosure.,B.AfootnotehasalsobeenaddedtodefinewhatconstitutesanOPERABLEairlockdoorwhenimplementingthe"bothairlockdoorsopen"optionofthespecification.C.RevisetheBasesforspecification3/4.9.4(pageB3/49-1)toincludetherestrictionsassociatedwiththe"bothairlockdoorsopen"option.II.JUSTIFICATIONFORCHANGESTechnicalspecification3.9.4requiresthataminimumofonepersonnelairlockdoor,aswellasothercontainmentpenetrationsbeclosedduringCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelwithinthecontainment.Althoughthepresenttechnicalspecificationrequiresaminimumofoneairlockdoortobeclosedduringrefueling,theUFSARanalysisofaradioactivereleaseresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment,takesnocreditforcontainmentisolation.Duringarefuelingoutage,otherworkinthecontainmentdoesnotstopduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.Thisrequiresthatpersonneloperatetheairlockdoorstoenterandexitthecontainment.StudiesofairlockdooroperationandmaintenanceatCookNuclearPlanthaveidentifiedthefollowingtrends.Airlockusage,duringthe1994refuelingoutage,fortheperiodsboundingCOREALTERATIONS(Sept.16th-20thandOct.18th-25th)totalled10,200entriesandexits.Assumingfourtofiveindividualsenteredthecontainmentperairlockcycle,theaveragenumberofairlockcyclesduringCOREALTERATIONSisconservativelyestimatedtobegreaterthan200perday.Suchheavyuseoftheairlockdoorswasnotanticipatedduringitsdesign.Asaresultofthisunexpectedlyheavyuse,failuresofthedoorhavemanifestedthemselvesas Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page2problemsinthegearandinterlockalignmentsofthedoorslockingmechanismandhandwheelfailures.Inadditiontothewearandmaintenanceconcernsdescribedabove,theCalvertCliffssubmittalraisedconcernsregardingworkersafetyandthepracticalrealityoftheairlock'sabilitytopreventthereleaseofradioactivematerialfollowingafuelhandlingaccident.CalvertCliffsprovidedthefollowingargumentwhichwebelievetobeaccurate,realisticandapplicabletoCookNuclearPlant:"Therearealargenumberofpeopleinthecontainmentduringarefuelingoutage,evenduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.Shouldafuelhandlingaccidentoccur,itwouldtakeanumberofcyclesoftheairlocktoevacuatepersonnelfromcontainment.Witheachairlockcycle,morecontainmentairwouldbereleased.Whilewaitingfortheirturntoexit,the"workerswouldbeexposedtothereleasedactivity."Toaddressthepotentialforworkerexposureandtoincreasetheavailability/maintainabilityofthepersonnelairlockdooratCookNuclearPlant,weproposetoallowbothairlockstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONSprovidedthefollowingadministrativecontrolsareestablished.Theairlockdoorsshallbecontrolledinthefollowingmanner:1.aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,or2.bothairlockdoorsmaybeopenprovided:a.onedoorineachairlockisOPERABLE,b.refuelingcavitylevelisgreaterthan23feet,andc.adesignatedindividualisavailableatalltimestoclosetheairlockifrequired.Whenconsideringtheproposedamendment,thedoseconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentwerereviewed.TwocasesarediscussedintheUFSAR,oneforafuelhandlingaccidentintheauxiliarybuilding,theotherforasimilaraccidentinsidecontainment.Thedesignbasisaccidentisthecompleteruptureofthehighestratedspentfuelassembly.Whenconsideringthetwoaccidentanalysesthecontainmenteventwasconsideredtoprovidetheboundingconditions.Thiswasbasedonthefactthatnoreductioninthepotentialthyroiddoeswasassumedsincecharcoalfiltrationwasnotconsideredandnocreditwastakenforcontainmentisolation.Theaccidentinsidecontainment(assuming3588MWTpoweroperation)gave  
copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Sincerely, qg'E9r(~E.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS8/n/DAYOF~A1995No,aryPubiicMyCommission Expires:-M-5'5'hAttachments CC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector
-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett  
'I ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION ANDJUSTIFICATION OFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
~~E, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page1I.DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTheproposedamendment totechnical specification (T/S)3.9.4makesthefollowing specificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2T/Ss:S394A.ExpandLimitingCondition ForOperation 3.9.4,item"b"(page3/49-4)toincludetheabilitytoleavebothpersonnel airlockdoorsinthe"open"positionduringCOREALTERATIONS.
Asaresult,closurecapability ofthecontainment airlockdoorswillbeassuredinoneoftwoways;1)oneairlockdoorwillbemaintained closedduringCOREALTERATIONS, or2)bothairlocksmayremainopenprovidedcertainrestrictions aresatisfied including thepositioning ofdedicated personnel attheairlocktofacilitate closure.,
B.Afootnotehasalsobeenaddedtodefinewhatconstitutes anOPERABLEairlockdoorwhenimplementing the"bothairlockdoorsopen"optionofthespecification.
C.RevisetheBasesforspecification 3/4.9.4(pageB3/49-1)toincludetherestrictions associated withthe"bothairlockdoorsopen"option.II.JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGESTechnical specification 3.9.4requiresthataminimumofonepersonnel airlockdoor,aswellasothercontainment penetrations beclosedduringCOREALTERATIONS andmovementofirradiated fuelwithinthecontainment.
Althoughthepresenttechnical specification requiresaminimumofoneairlockdoortobeclosedduringrefueling, theUFSARanalysisofaradioactive releaseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment, takesnocreditforcontainment isolation.
Duringarefueling outage,otherworkinthecontainment doesnotstopduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.
Thisrequiresthatpersonnel operatetheairlockdoorstoenterandexitthecontainment.
Studiesofairlockdooroperation andmaintenance atCookNuclearPlanthaveidentified thefollowing trends.Airlockusage,duringthe1994refueling outage,fortheperiodsboundingCOREALTERATIONS (Sept.16th-20thandOct.18th-25th)totalled10,200entriesandexits.Assumingfourtofiveindividuals enteredthecontainment perairlockcycle,theaveragenumberofairlockcyclesduringCOREALTERATIONS isconservatively estimated tobegreaterthan200perday.Suchheavyuseoftheairlockdoorswasnotanticipated duringitsdesign.Asaresultofthisunexpectedly heavyuse,failuresofthedoorhavemanifested themselves as Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page2problemsinthegearandinterlock alignments ofthedoorslockingmechanism andhandwheel failures.
Inadditiontothewearandmaintenance concernsdescribed above,theCalvertCliffssubmittal raisedconcernsregarding workersafetyandthepractical realityoftheairlock's abilitytopreventthereleaseofradioactive materialfollowing afuelhandlingaccident.
CalvertCliffsprovidedthefollowing argumentwhichwebelievetobeaccurate, realistic andapplicable toCookNuclearPlant:"Therearealargenumberofpeopleinthecontainment duringarefueling outage,evenduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.
Shouldafuelhandlingaccidentoccur,itwouldtakeanumberofcyclesoftheairlocktoevacuatepersonnel fromcontainment.
Witheachairlockcycle,morecontainment airwouldbereleased.
Whilewaitingfortheirturntoexit,the"workerswouldbeexposedtothereleasedactivity."
Toaddressthepotential forworkerexposureandtoincreasetheavailability/maintainability ofthepersonnel airlockdooratCookNuclearPlant,weproposetoallowbothairlockstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedthefollowing administrative controlsareestablished.
Theairlockdoorsshallbecontrolled inthefollowing manner:1.aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,or2.bothairlockdoorsmaybeopenprovided:
a.onedoorineachairlockisOPERABLE, b.refueling cavitylevelisgreaterthan23feet,andc.adesignated individual isavailable atalltimestoclosetheairlockifrequired.
Whenconsidering theproposedamendment, thedoseconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentwerereviewed.
Twocasesarediscussed intheUFSAR,oneforafuelhandlingaccidentintheauxiliary
: building, theotherforasimilaraccidentinsidecontainment.
Thedesignbasisaccidentisthecompleteruptureofthehighestratedspentfuelassembly.
Whenconsidering thetwoaccidentanalysesthecontainment eventwasconsidered toprovidetheboundingconditions.
Thiswasbasedonthefactthatnoreduction inthepotential thyroiddoeswasassumedsincecharcoalfiltration wasnotconsidered andnocreditwastakenforcontainment isolation.
Theaccidentinsidecontainment (assuming 3588MWTpoweroperation) gave  


Attachment1to,AEP:NRC:1220Page3a0-2hoursiteboundarythyroiddoseofapproximately100rem,andawholebodydoseof1.4rem.Bothofthesevaluesremainsignificantlybelowthe300remthyroidand25remwholebodylimitsestablishedin10CFR100.Basedonthesefindings,itwasdeterminedthatallowingbothairlockdoorstoremainopenduringCOREALTERATIONSwouldnotincreasetheanalyzedsiteboundarydoseresultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Comparedtotheanalyzedcase,thedoseconsequencesofareleasethroughanopenairlockmayevenbereducedbecauseofretentiontimeintheauxiliarybuildingandthepossibilityoffiltrationthroughtheauxiliarybuildingventilationsystem.III.0CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thedesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentistheruptureofthehighestratedfuelassembly.Asdiscussedpreviously,theconsequencesofanaccidentinsidecontainment(i.e.,siteboundarydose),withbothairlockdoorsareboundedbytheexistingfuelhandlingaccidentcurrentlypresentedinourUFSAR.Sincethecontainmentairlockdoorsdonotaffectthefailuremechanismofafuelassemblyduringafuelhandlingaccident,webelievethatthisamendmentrequestdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Additionally,nocreditwastakenforcontainmentclosureintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,basedontheseconsiderations,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.  
Attachment 1to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page3a0-2hoursiteboundarythyroiddoseofapproximately 100rem,andawholebodydoseof1.4rem.Bothofthesevaluesremainsignificantly belowthe300remthyroidand25remwholebodylimitsestablished in10CFR100.Basedonthesefindings, itwasdetermined thatallowingbothairlockdoorstoremainopenduringCOREALTERATIONS wouldnotincreasetheanalyzedsiteboundarydoseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccident.
Comparedtotheanalyzedcase,thedoseconsequences ofareleasethroughanopenairlockmayevenbereducedbecauseofretention timeintheauxiliary buildingandthepossibility offiltration throughtheauxiliary buildingventilation system.III.0CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thedesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentistheruptureofthehighestratedfuelassembly.
Asdiscussed previously, theconsequences ofanaccidentinsidecontainment (i.e.,siteboundarydose),withbothairlockdoorsareboundedbytheexistingfuelhandlingaccidentcurrently presented inourUFSAR.Sincethecontainment airlockdoorsdonotaffectthefailuremechanism ofafuelassemblyduringafuelhandlingaccident, webelievethatthisamendment requestdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Additionally, nocreditwastakenforcontainment closureintheaccidentanalysis.
Therefore, basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.  


Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page4Criterion2Asstatedinresponsetocriterionone,thepositionofthecontainmentairlockdoorsinnowayaffectsthemechanismbywhichaspentfuelassemblyisdamagedduringafuelhandlingaccident.Thus,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Criterion3Themarginforsafetyasdefinedin10CFR100hasnotbeenreduced.Asdiscussedpreviously,theexistingfuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforaneventinsidecontainmenttakesnocreditfortheisolationofcontainment.Asaresult,thepositionoftheairlockdoorshasnoimpactontheanalyzedsiteboundarydosesresultingfromsuchanaccident.Basedontheseconsiderations,itisconcludedthatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page4Criterion 2Asstatedinresponsetocriterion one,thepositionofthecontainment airlockdoorsinnowayaffectsthemechanism bywhichaspentfuelassemblyisdamagedduringafuelhandlingaccident.
ATTACHMENT2TOAEP:NRC:1220EXISTINGTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONPAGESMA%MDTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES e1~~}}
Thus,itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Criterion 3Themarginforsafetyasdefinedin10CFR100hasnotbeenreduced.Asdiscussed previously, theexistingfuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforaneventinsidecontainment takesnocreditfortheisolation ofcontainment.
Asaresult,thepositionoftheairlockdoorshasnoimpactontheanalyzedsiteboundarydosesresulting fromsuchanaccident.
Basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.
ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1220 EXISTINGTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGESMA%MDTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES e1~~}}

Revision as of 08:03, 29 June 2018

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Modify TS 3.9.4 to Provide Flexibility in Operation of Containment Personnel Airlocks During Core Alterations
ML17332A717
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/1995
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17332A718 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1220, NUDOCS 9504060190
Download: ML17332A717 (16)
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Text

PR.IC)R.I"EV1ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE:

95/03/31NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKETgFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316, AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74.Amends wouldmodifyTS3.9.4toprovideflexibility inoperation ofcontainment personnel.

airlocksduringcorealterations.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:.LTR tENCLJSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNAL:

LECENTE01NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2'XTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111110RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELI!vIINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS'YOU DON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR13ENCL12 R

IndianaMichiganPowerCompany'P.O.Box16631Columbus, OH43216FIMarch31,1995AEP:NRC'1220 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2PROPOSEDAMENDMENT TOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION3/4.9.4FORCONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCKREQUIREMENTS Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication for,amendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weareproposing tomodifyT/Ss3.9.4entitledRefueling Operations,.

Containment BuildingPenetrations, toprovideflexibility intheoperation ofthecontainment personnel airlocksduringCOREALTERATIONS byexpanding theexistinglimitingcondition foroperation toincludetheestablishment ofcontainment closurecapability requirements.

Thisproposedamendment isconsistent withAmendments 194(DPR-53)and171(DPR-69)approvedforuseattheCalvertCliffsNuclearPowerPlantintheNRC'stransmittal ofAugust31,1994.TheCalvertCliffsamendment allowsthepersonnel airlockdoorstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedcertainadministrative controlsareinplace.Attachment 1providesadetaileddescription oftheproposedchanges,thejustification forthechanges,andourdetermination ofnosignificant hazardsconsideration performed pursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment 2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment 3containstheproposedT/Spages.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

I.GC03>95040601'PO 950331PDRADOCK05000315~,.P'PDR

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC'1220 TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.

Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(l),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.Sincerely, qg'E9r(~E.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS8/n/DAYOF~A1995No,aryPubiicMyCommission Expires:-M-5'5'hAttachments CC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett

'I ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION ANDJUSTIFICATION OFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

~~E, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page1I.DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTheproposedamendment totechnical specification (T/S)3.9.4makesthefollowing specificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2T/Ss:S394A.ExpandLimitingCondition ForOperation 3.9.4,item"b"(page3/49-4)toincludetheabilitytoleavebothpersonnel airlockdoorsinthe"open"positionduringCOREALTERATIONS.

Asaresult,closurecapability ofthecontainment airlockdoorswillbeassuredinoneoftwoways;1)oneairlockdoorwillbemaintained closedduringCOREALTERATIONS, or2)bothairlocksmayremainopenprovidedcertainrestrictions aresatisfied including thepositioning ofdedicated personnel attheairlocktofacilitate closure.,

B.Afootnotehasalsobeenaddedtodefinewhatconstitutes anOPERABLEairlockdoorwhenimplementing the"bothairlockdoorsopen"optionofthespecification.

C.RevisetheBasesforspecification 3/4.9.4(pageB3/49-1)toincludetherestrictions associated withthe"bothairlockdoorsopen"option.II.JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGESTechnical specification 3.9.4requiresthataminimumofonepersonnel airlockdoor,aswellasothercontainment penetrations beclosedduringCOREALTERATIONS andmovementofirradiated fuelwithinthecontainment.

Althoughthepresenttechnical specification requiresaminimumofoneairlockdoortobeclosedduringrefueling, theUFSARanalysisofaradioactive releaseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment, takesnocreditforcontainment isolation.

Duringarefueling outage,otherworkinthecontainment doesnotstopduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.

Thisrequiresthatpersonnel operatetheairlockdoorstoenterandexitthecontainment.

Studiesofairlockdooroperation andmaintenance atCookNuclearPlanthaveidentified thefollowing trends.Airlockusage,duringthe1994refueling outage,fortheperiodsboundingCOREALTERATIONS (Sept.16th-20thandOct.18th-25th)totalled10,200entriesandexits.Assumingfourtofiveindividuals enteredthecontainment perairlockcycle,theaveragenumberofairlockcyclesduringCOREALTERATIONS isconservatively estimated tobegreaterthan200perday.Suchheavyuseoftheairlockdoorswasnotanticipated duringitsdesign.Asaresultofthisunexpectedly heavyuse,failuresofthedoorhavemanifested themselves as Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page2problemsinthegearandinterlock alignments ofthedoorslockingmechanism andhandwheel failures.

Inadditiontothewearandmaintenance concernsdescribed above,theCalvertCliffssubmittal raisedconcernsregarding workersafetyandthepractical realityoftheairlock's abilitytopreventthereleaseofradioactive materialfollowing afuelhandlingaccident.

CalvertCliffsprovidedthefollowing argumentwhichwebelievetobeaccurate, realistic andapplicable toCookNuclearPlant:"Therearealargenumberofpeopleinthecontainment duringarefueling outage,evenduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.

Shouldafuelhandlingaccidentoccur,itwouldtakeanumberofcyclesoftheairlocktoevacuatepersonnel fromcontainment.

Witheachairlockcycle,morecontainment airwouldbereleased.

Whilewaitingfortheirturntoexit,the"workerswouldbeexposedtothereleasedactivity."

Toaddressthepotential forworkerexposureandtoincreasetheavailability/maintainability ofthepersonnel airlockdooratCookNuclearPlant,weproposetoallowbothairlockstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONS providedthefollowing administrative controlsareestablished.

Theairlockdoorsshallbecontrolled inthefollowing manner:1.aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,or2.bothairlockdoorsmaybeopenprovided:

a.onedoorineachairlockisOPERABLE, b.refueling cavitylevelisgreaterthan23feet,andc.adesignated individual isavailable atalltimestoclosetheairlockifrequired.

Whenconsidering theproposedamendment, thedoseconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentwerereviewed.

Twocasesarediscussed intheUFSAR,oneforafuelhandlingaccidentintheauxiliary

building, theotherforasimilaraccidentinsidecontainment.

Thedesignbasisaccidentisthecompleteruptureofthehighestratedspentfuelassembly.

Whenconsidering thetwoaccidentanalysesthecontainment eventwasconsidered toprovidetheboundingconditions.

Thiswasbasedonthefactthatnoreduction inthepotential thyroiddoeswasassumedsincecharcoalfiltration wasnotconsidered andnocreditwastakenforcontainment isolation.

Theaccidentinsidecontainment (assuming 3588MWTpoweroperation) gave

Attachment 1to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page3a0-2hoursiteboundarythyroiddoseofapproximately 100rem,andawholebodydoseof1.4rem.Bothofthesevaluesremainsignificantly belowthe300remthyroidand25remwholebodylimitsestablished in10CFR100.Basedonthesefindings, itwasdetermined thatallowingbothairlockdoorstoremainopenduringCOREALTERATIONS wouldnotincreasetheanalyzedsiteboundarydoseresulting fromafuelhandlingaccident.

Comparedtotheanalyzedcase,thedoseconsequences ofareleasethroughanopenairlockmayevenbereducedbecauseofretention timeintheauxiliary buildingandthepossibility offiltration throughtheauxiliary buildingventilation system.III.0CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thedesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentistheruptureofthehighestratedfuelassembly.

Asdiscussed previously, theconsequences ofanaccidentinsidecontainment (i.e.,siteboundarydose),withbothairlockdoorsareboundedbytheexistingfuelhandlingaccidentcurrently presented inourUFSAR.Sincethecontainment airlockdoorsdonotaffectthefailuremechanism ofafuelassemblyduringafuelhandlingaccident, webelievethatthisamendment requestdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Additionally, nocreditwastakenforcontainment closureintheaccidentanalysis.

Therefore, basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1220 Page4Criterion 2Asstatedinresponsetocriterion one,thepositionofthecontainment airlockdoorsinnowayaffectsthemechanism bywhichaspentfuelassemblyisdamagedduringafuelhandlingaccident.

Thus,itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Themarginforsafetyasdefinedin10CFR100hasnotbeenreduced.Asdiscussed previously, theexistingfuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforaneventinsidecontainment takesnocreditfortheisolation ofcontainment.

Asaresult,thepositionoftheairlockdoorshasnoimpactontheanalyzedsiteboundarydosesresulting fromsuchanaccident.

Basedontheseconsiderations, itisconcluded thatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1220 EXISTINGTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGESMA%MDTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES e1~~

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