Latest revision as of 17:13, 10 December 2024

Text

Proposed TS Converting to ITS Sections 4.0,3.4 & 3.6
	ML20196C536
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	11/20/1998
From:	; TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20196C534	List: ML20196C528; ML20196C536;
References
	NUDOCS 9812020066
	Download: ML20196C536 (73)
	v • d • e

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

E.M EEE DI DEFINITIONS ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESFT RESPONSE TIME M4 The ENGINEERED SAFE" IEAl'JRES (ESF-) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF jiActuation BSetpoint at g

,rm,, ;M1 "N

the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The:responsd: time:mayIbe

.rified measunilPbfmeansrof;anylseti.esTof'-+easarlappinglTor; total.

' Steps soithatethe entire resnnnw time ~1sGieasured Verificy.; In Iteu.of 1-08-A r

pea sur ement,;responseltime l may_be1Verj f,ied _for;sej ecieq.componentsiprovided_that 0 1.1-4 thelcomponents2 and imethodologylforleti fication_fiave_beeqipreviouslyJ reviewed;;and 8pptoVedlby(the:NRCJ FREOUENCY NOTATION 1.15 The TREOUENCY "0TATION specified for the performance of Surveillance

,,.,.,?d..

iN Requirc; cats ; hall coricspond to thc interval; defined in Table 1.1.

rmny --

.A ""*" 4.Jaq.se,se ta Ih0~:i P - 3 E s #:I O ti?cEy~;9^tcl'E^at] s;Ecs;2tet","L'Z:htll 3 01101of H e-A Pti=JTer$416siGir3ci.ghDcT3GG.Chc 01;0T;tidJ;iD_cBtili.-E.t 0 3.6.1 6 uten#.=22.+1 JHRRIFIED LEAKAGE IlNIf0M LEAKAGENshal]Itsi H 6La] Identifiejj IDENTIf!EO Leakage LEAKACE shall bc:

[e.

LENfAGEj Lc;kage (cxcept CONT!10LLEO LEAKACE) into cicscd systems, such as thatittbs pump seal,( or valve packing (erM$ti"r;eget5rRoolintIpGal!

XRCP)3L6)lya{eitli;Qect_ioDXr?lshkoffU 4eeks that is are captured and 1

conducteditoZedllection.J.tystems3 a sump or collecting tanki--ee 1

gb.

LENWili Lc;kogc into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of -]t-eakage 50etection RSystems or not to be preisurg houndafyyRESSURE SOUNDARY LEAKAGEh or

}e.

Reactor Coolant System [BCSJ LEAKAGE ic;kage through a steam generator l

LSQ to the Secondary Ceciant System [--

9812020066 981124 PDR ADOCK 05000445 PM p

/

CPSES Mark-up of CTS - 1.0 1-4 11/20/98

)

N MRYMSEMIORElKgjo!l M DEFINITIONS i

i RATED THERMAL POWER MIPT 1-28 E RATED EER"/L "0L'E" shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to NN the reactor coolant of 3411 Hwt.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM tRTSI RESPONSE TIME 1-29 The EES RCACT0" TRI" SYSmi RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its glEtTrip $5etpoint at the channel

.c sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage. Deltespomelt.melmay;be LNARG i

SFef4Hed meMhbfaean_s;oE&nfierfes'dfMwmtfhUrmerlmWno ofitotal.

[ eranasso snat r* antw romanseitime 4s7yes4f g seasured; injieu_oI-1 08 A 0-1.1-4 yucasurengtjiresponse; time may;ne2vetifidd;for23' elected ~~componerits'provjded;that j gemszand_ methodology,1for2vedficattor@pgbgtnipteviously reviewed "and Q1b5Cthe1NRpC 1

aEmTmE-evs 1.30 A RE"0RTA0LE E"Et" shall be any of thcsc conditicas spccificd in 10Cr"SO.73.

7-19-A o1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 1-31 SDj SliL"00L*1 "/."CIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition y.m N

=NM assuming all rod cluster corttr.ol assemblies OKE6s] (shutdcan and contro1+ are fully inserted except for the single itCC8 rod clustcr assc:bly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. Uttt!ggy'g;0ML35pable g2ldggglEirHetMidSliFridctiMtyTsorthreGthNeDst9eTitcoqrit.edlforIid IBMa m m ettorcofAnnsmal MRQ inWX6rientheI1ldersKilioUdtttememmedR3tstliggsittettfewt BBIEB9!!aGMapftag!!Lg]

ElHMEN

$Hi2tW 1.32 The S!T SOUi?OA"Y shs11 bc thst linc as shcan in Eigurc 5.1 3.

f SLAVE RELAY TEST 1-33 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall eqnsistMf be-the energiz] Met 4en of each PfqUil1Fd m,

slave relay and verifyingication of $!!eIOPERABILITY of each tguijfg.itJaB relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall includeZeEg3rriefeliiR a continuity check-as a mini;u:, of associated tbqdit@ testable actuation devices. EM SEAXE 1 3o.3 EDX5KJiLBisy;belperformedlbytmeansfwm.et%9redul!intisTDFretlapplnsl o.1.1 1 RS$!PMM#tepf8 CPSES Mark-up ofCTS - 1.0 1-8 11A0M8

i I

CHANGE NUMBER EC DESCRIPTION 1 06 LS-1 The current TS definition for Core Alterations would be modified consistent with NUREG 1431, to qualify a core l

alteration as movcment of fuel, sources, or other reactivity control components. This proposed change is less restrictive since the current TS definition defines 1

the movement of ADy component within the reactor vessel with fuel in the vessel as a Core Alteration g 0 1.1 3

,:. 3. 3 y. y..- ;

. 3;.

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fDME!Oe1EMacityttyzagutyggetonsime3lpid continut3tsaminta1[thCftsmadXetL20al@!t33h11e eLt!!agagrgenecegary2esttutsgjgnmigm.M 1temsWWeameresgetcTagleTgglp.oJanslangemoold continertea11 air:the3pplicattorrer:appropr.gtplisitsito theIstepdRIpf2=*=*tethstico#Wefgt[corg rea~cggggj llswcVer slince the proposed definitionguld limit core alterations to those manipulations that could affect core reactivity, the proposed change is acceptable from the standpoint of the health and safety of the public.

1-07 A

Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B).

1 08 A

The current TS definitions for Engineered Safety Features I

Response Time and Reactor Trip System Response a muld

_. _ _ ind tn he consistent with NU gRgdBR andfalBeiMBERERH.

- > - ~- e-would be repieced by " verified-t; bc ; asistent with th; 7;gir;r;-ts of irprev;d E 0:1 3.3.1.10 ;r.d 0" i %

- 3.3.2.10 te verify resp ast t h '- " " ', li;;;its, The

]

0-1.1 4 m ad itian nf the statement that response time may ha- #

arified N058tNDiy meam, vi eny series of sequential, ta+=1 cteos so that the entire response overlapp y ied g g g red.p s aaministrative in nature.

time is c if This is consistent witn tne methodology presently described in the current TS Bases for damnnstratina tntal A-9 r enanea tw ATIFeramh_=-e&1mMMt resas2 Mines"NoMiEl!mactRf1ERRRERRit!t"REBEltlanEffilidtV

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.? r. f i 3 s J ; ; L e - (4, _g. t ' i. ;

' M ;. ;7. gf ' y ~ q.g g y

~ w m ng g gg gg m J

l CPSESDescription ofChanges to CTS 1.0 11/20/98 i

- CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS L0 Page 1 cf 6 APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CAlthlAY NUPBER DESCRIPTION 1-01 These definitions would be reworded to be consistent with Yes Yes Yes Yes A

NUREG-1431. The proposed rewording included in this category does not involve any changes of a technical nature.

1-02 The CPSES definitions for Analog Channel Operational Test No - do not have Yes No - do not have No " Digital" is A

and Digita) Channel Operational Test would be combined into the Digital Channel the Digital Channel not included in a single definition of Channel Operational Test (00T).

Operational test Operational test current TS, definition.

definition.

i 1-03 The definition of channel calibration is reworded. The Yes Yes Yes Yes l

N revised wording provides additional detail concerning j

calibration of instrument channels with RTDs or thei-Occuples.

1-04 This definition would no longer be used and the Yes Yes Yes Yes: See also improved TS 5.5.6 i

Atf}

specifications in Section 3.6 would be revised accordingly.

and 5.5.16.

The current TS definition for Containment Integrity would be of deleted.,gglest I

lyptowed1TSQi6 Mitgefgggpineq@l%gglKERLlBLM Q-3.6.1 1 1-05 The current TS definition for Controlled Leakage would be Yes Yes No. See Change No. See Change Number 1-28 LG.

Number 1 28-LG.

A deleted.

1 06 The current TS definition for Core Alterations would be No - Already in Yes VespoRAmeneent Yes LS-1 modified to qualify a core alteration as movement of fuel.

CTS.

30pitapprag3 Leg

]>

HWuettitggl sources. or other reactivity control couponents.

1-07 The location of the thyroid dose conversion factors used for Yes No - Already in No Already in No - Already in CTS.

CTS.

A DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 heve been added.

1 08 The current TS definitions for Engineered Safety Features Yes Yes Yes Yes

_ E Q-1.1 4 l

A Response Time and Reactor Trin Wa= Dar-- T* would be

...-.. ?_ ?...?. m?..?. ?.". '.!D...~ S,.. -.._,

Y

?.s.

5.D j

.w._

m

( of i v. e.cd 5 m 3.~.1.15 =d 2 ~:.3.2.= to crifjy c--~.,_ tin i;.;it"- li;it;f 11/20M8 CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 1.0

1 INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 1.0 TRAVELER #

STATUS DIFFERENCE COMMENTS TSTF-19, Rev 1 Net Incorporated W

]

of travalcr cut-cff date.

L T 30. Rev 1 Incorporated 1.1-9 I

M E

]

^

TS" 54 Incorporated 1-14 r

t292.. J TSTI SS

-Incorporated 1-1--8 l0-1.19 l

15EEEE9:Re9Mi Incorpo~ratsd IT1 13 In ~~if4dh l o-3.6.1 6 l

ch w%

d!E.__me e.,.

...z.

TSTF-111,Revh Incorporated 1.1-5 0 1.1 4 l

N

'C-57, Rcv 1 Incorporated 1.1-6 EM3

>. :p 0 1.1-5 l

'C -74. Rev-1 Incorporated 1.1-3 t.

l Q 1.4-1

'C-00. Rev 1 Incorporated 1.1 11 g 7 ' ;j l

Q 1.4 1 l

l 1

i

1 Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

-AVERAGE shall be the average (weighted in proportion to DISINTEGRATION ENERGY the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for

-m isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives

> 15 3 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total noniodine activity in the coolant.

ENGINEERED SAFETY The ESF RESPONSE TIME shall be that time FEATURE (ESF) RESPONSE interval from when the monitored parameter TIME exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required i

positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, whare applicable.

The response time may be ;;;;ured dfiedlaeasur

[1Lif5]

means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or tota steps so enHra rasoonse tima k --+

' fl1K0f ningsgmspLtJEfgMie3 fee 1.1-5 i

0 1.1 4 meM. mlue%foMeJa@ed.*30egoDeR$gg63h&W.

c0EPWRntsig!Id3!!!tj!!gLt]ggMo_t] grit lC[gk[EllRIAF) ly7ev1WeltlE0gspeaA$rJDemCgy t

1, Th; ;;ximu; elle;;;bi; pri;;ry ;;ntain;;nt 1;;ieg; 1 1 13 r;te, L,. ; hall b; 0.10 % of pri;;ry ;;ntai. ant air 0 3.6.1 6

eight p;r day at th; ;;lculat;d p;;k ;;nteirant prc=re (P,-)-

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be.

a.

Identified LEAKAGE 1.

LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal water injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank:

l 2.

LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE: or l

3.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System; (continued)

!-7 CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431ITS-1.0 1.1-3 11D088

[y

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

PRESSURE AND The PTLR is the unit specific document that TEMPERATURE LIMITS provides the reactor vessel pressure and REPORT (PTLR) temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown

,,' E. 9 W g

rates...

c-L.

-..m M for the current reactor vessel fluence period. These pressure and temperature limits shall be determined for each fluence period in accordance with Specification 5.6.6.

Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in iggMesi ETT" 3 C0 3.4.3, ""CS Prc;;urs ard Taper;ture (P/T) Li;;its," and LC0 3.4.12. " Low M -6 Tu g ratur; O nipressurc Protection (LTOP) 0 1.1 5 sawTRE5EPgtss&ttOnCi.,=[iture n--

M:3134 6,32M_3lupethrt!

Lhfergr_ essure fiviEi1onML_TOPl15yst_eug QUADRANT POWER TILT QPTR shall be the ratio of the maximum upper RATIO (QPTR) excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater.

~

RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer ~

(RTP) rate to the reactor coolant of-2893 }411 HWt.

(BPSJQ REACTOR TRIP The RTS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (RTS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RTS TIME trip setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary grippe en[1 unitana The response time Dil?Si maybe=;sured(:~~~*

means of any

~

series of sequent 1a over ing, or m ai neps w

'1.1 5 so that the entire racnnnea H=a is =:sured 0 1.1 4 7_

j f -._. _ __ t

.w w

m s w %,s.

j p g;

.p.7. m

. c.,;.+%.

.ms,m; s y ; s u,[ T,

.. n.. g...

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDH)

SDH shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming:

i i

a.

All rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) are i

fully inserted except for the single RCCA of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With any RCCA not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of the RCCA must be accounted for in the determination of SDH: and I

b.

In H0 DES 1 and 2, the fuel and moderator temperatures are changed to the ra.inol Icro

[BQSJ p;W;r dcsign leni DRggg3M3Biggigyy CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1D1ITS-1.0 1,1-5 1120M8

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 Section 1.0 This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up technical change to NUREG 1431 Revision 1, to make them plant specific or to incorporate generic changes resulting from the Industry /NRC generic change process. The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG 1431 mark ups. For enclosures 3A 3B, j

4, 6A and 6B, text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and 1s not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location.

i i

CHANGE NUMER JUSTIFICATION 1.1-1 The NUREG-1431 Rev.1 definitiong of Channel CalibrhtionAChannel Opets)1dnalle,st3r4WActugimfpeVice10petationalRest gse i

0 1.1 2 langdagEtoldentjbelt?MPJgppe3fiteltingisimilarito? states, "The C".^f!!:L CALISRATIO" shall caspss "the entire channel, including the required sensor, alcra, interlock, display, and trip functions". Thj gor _d_Jeoui$1s23lMMligengsubjggtltOisinte_rpretationrasitg fphether2helist3fgj@l51F41Repttisentat1Ve2BThis change clarifies What.jeLapogetitslate3pc glgli)Lggfyjngla]l!LleVices11h:thelchat!nel, J

te901tediforIche_nngBERggyEEslallarJ_cladttcatignJEproVided forlthe Actuat1Dn1tDatsgstT11 cacapsx3 the entirc chenaci by rewording the definition t; stetc. "The C".'?!!:L CALIBRATIO" shell _

enc a pss thos; ca pacats. such ;s scascrs. elern, dispi;ys, end trip functions. rcquired to grfe r. the specified 3;faty function (s)." The Channel Oper;tional Test =d Trip Actu; ting OcVic; Opr; tion:1 Tcst definitions are simil;rly revised. This change is consistent with TSTF-20g64-t 1.1-2 Not used.

i 1.1-3 Adds new example to ITS 1.4 to clarify meaning of SR notes of the type "Only required to be performed in MODE..." This change is

0. u.1 consistent with traveler "00 74. R;; 1 DLF,i!M.

i 1.1 4 Not used.

1.1 5 The definitions for ESF Response Time and RTS Response Ti gevisedJ; substitute the wr; verified" in lieu of "x; sum

..sistant with thc requircants of 1"1EC 1431 SR 3.3.1.10 :nd SR 3.3.2.10. This cheng; w;uld ; n urc censiste ey betun n the definitions for Resp;nse Tin end the requir;xats to periodically verify Resp;m; Ti;;;; is within li;its. This ch a gc is consistent with w

TSTF-110t-Rev DeMticGGttl6 statementLt!LatiffspjgtgRhe3srj J

gleg!!GlosponentEqqy&MgCl$1gjdtNo.tt!6f;mentisieppfoted'intFM3

'LRhilg[ggitiVCIIChatjiT %,; v a f. Js]Egigjggy;WEg85ll$tlg'JtuirHIEj onigs1Nlrcapptcyant:53astIRIggamlantadNIL181statesmats uw,o+msww+somni+rmannanammemmeccenn anammame. mums mamanns runw I'

8DDtRBllR0pTC87 6 m M1RRggg i

Wm"m l,

CPSESDiferencesfrom NUREG-1D1 -ITS1.0 1

11/208 8

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 - SECTION 1.0 Page 1 of 2 i

DIFFERENCE FROM NUREG 1431 APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION j DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALIA RY b Yes 1.1-1 This change would clarify #at..~en a; the c : tin Yes Yes Yes ch

..~1 hy rc.~cdin;; the definitions p( t; ;tetc. "The CHANNEL CALIBRATIONigl{ggdgggg{ f;l' mm,,,an

$y t e ll replac l

E 0-1.1-2 3

devicesiinSAt$ennelltequired;fetchanne

{FERABI6T ~ ; ;;;;-~..t;. scch = -.. ~. ;.

le. ;;. di; play;. and trip far.ctions..iwirtd to g,-fe ; th; ;p,;ified afety 7..atientsP The i

$ct;ustienilegtenTestk "T ;nd T'"- definitions-ece $s C

similarly revised NA NA NA NA 1.1 2 Not used i

1.1-3 Adds new example to ITS 1.4 to clarify meaning of SR Yes Yes Yes Yes i

notes of the type Tnly required to be performed in MODE..".

1.1-4 Not used N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes The definitions for ESFpnw Time and RTS Response 1.1-5 Time would be revis @ ~ Lh:titut th; %

puunum r 0-1.1 Tr'fied" in licu sf see;u. ed" us..;istent with th;

. cw;, _.1; cf "".l:0 l'315" 3.0.1.15 :nd 5" Q:.10.

1.1-6 The definition of the Pressure and Temperature Limits Yes Yes Yes Yes Report would be revised to include the maximum allowable PORV lift settings and the arming temperature associated with the system, and to be consistent with the COLR definition.

1.1-7 The definition of Channel Functional Test in the Yes No - Not p Jt No - Not part No Not part current TS will be retained in the improved TS. This of current

.a.

of current TS.

of current T5.

definition is not in NUREG-1431 Rev 1.

11/20M8 CPSES Conversion Comparison Tame - ITS 1.0 e

e

~- - ---

-e

+

t

INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.3 TRAVELER #

SI41115 DIFFERENCE #

COMMENTS TSTF-19 Rev. 1 Netlncorporated NA Not NRC approved as cf TR-3.:-004 l

,, m s_,

.,__2 wh www v..

wo M SAWS CtRGBEK"dH1.

5 00, Rcv. 2 Incorporated 3-3-34 TSTF 37, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated NA ITS 5.6.8 still addresses PAM reports. Sections after ITS 5.6.7 were not renumbered.

TSTF-51 Not Incorporated NA Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay j

time dependence for fuel hr.1dling accident.

TSTr-01 Not Incorporated NA

[ ] Allowabic '!alues TR 3 3-005l fcr icss of volta;c and degraded voltagc will rc=in in the TS.

TSTF-111, Rev..

Incorporated NA 0 1. ]

4 l

TSTF-135 1 Rey D Partially 3.3-41 Travcicr is to; broad 7g.3.3 006 l Incorporated 33-(4 scopc in nature.

33f902 should havc bcca 313J911 sevcral separate travelcrs.

3.3-93, Portions of the travcicr that 3.3 95, significantly clarify 37312061 sperability requircants have 3.3-122.

bcca incorporated.

374RE TSTF161,B(jr5"I Incorporated 3.3 79 ggip~rReT593hOlRC 0-3. '-79 l

ApprjggL Ethe NRC TSTF-168 Incorporated 3.3 43 d

03.

43 l

TSTF-169 Incorporated 3.3 42 ApprMed _bKthe!NRC1 rg.3.3.co3 g WOC 105didit-242 Incoroorated 3.3 49 Q-3..

49 l

N Incorporated 3.3 107 WOC ".ir.i Croup Acticr.

0-3.: 107 l travelcr 14cc !145.

RTS Instrumentation j

B 3.3.1 BASES i

Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical. This test cannot be performed with the reactor at power and must therefore be performed prior to reactor startup.

SR 3.3.1.16 i

SR 3.3.1.16 verifies that the L'equjpg individual channel / train actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response ti=c tating testing 2.0,;O ^.;;hY -Wed"*

~~'*we criteria

- y are mciuaea in iecnnical Requirements Nanual, plRe61;3 Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the cquip. ant re xha th; receired funutional stetc 'i.c.

centrol =d,hutdc reds i

fully inscrted in the reactor coraM!t1130s.s3fi4Mtipary gr_1ppet3011DLDltlage.

o.1.1 4 g For channels that include dynam ransfer Functiers (e.g.".-

lag lead /laa. rata /laa, etc.) the response time ta t m y bc Nst may he JCC;^3t%;& rformed with the transfer Function time 3 cgs)antsisct to ex, with the roulting==ured rapeac tin capered to the approprict; = resp;me tix.

Alterstely, the ra p;n n ti n t o t c= bc pcrfern d with the i

tin comt=ts xt to their nominal values, provided th; c quired resp =x tin i =;1ytially alculatcd n ;;ing the tin cent =ts arc set at their nominal values. The re;penx tin m y bc =nured;by ; xric of ;=rlepping tats such thet th; catira ra p= = tin is ;easured.

--m._ mm.... _

_b i

,--- __ m.

~n._ - m.e ~~_a.a.

4.,,

a w.c.sa A cisamanum n.

as -s mammunumaann.um aa,emsnumammmmmune

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_ _ _ _ __.m us-_-_-----

--.gm e

f gm_....-

-__.______,----,.,i

,_,.__m,__._..,_._._m_,,__

__,w

,.,... =,.,,

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m'- -i.

r

1mm,~..~. -.,# kp -- ~ e.er- - -M su A m-n m

. 22-

-- N-se - " -'

'*A a wm sg

.m__,m K8pe#33!metWmfffet@nstautgommEmmmestor o.1.1 4 g E_stlerpfam1lntinsMtHyptmEmmenlahmIH a

respbnse"tiatifftts1tRP'the'TMll161DCetfM8 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.3 B 3.3-59 10f30/98

.. =..

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES l

4

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CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases - ITS 3.3 B 3.3-59a 10/30M8

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES As appropriate, each2gsmed channel's response 33elmust be verified every 3 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, lg;g IRiff D a14 M 20th tr44nsMN3K3er9di'90ptHr; _ Testing of the final actuation devices is included in t es_th

.csting l o.1.14 l (sJ.116K.3 Rnpunse times cannot be determin uring unit u m auon oecause equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.3.1.16 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors and116^poiwer2monitorsjare excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response. Response tLee3flthe]2utroniflgMNiEpsigna]IportiorEotithelchannel shaltbe7measuredmsa:Aetectormtmotiipputsolthelffrst electroniqgspornehtWtteTchang))

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Chapter [7].fSARlKhapMrW 2.

ISAR. Chapter [5].Mihapte_rJ5]

3.

ISAR, Chaptcr [15]. LEEE'279;19]7 4.

ISEE 2701071.10:CER150;492 SJ LICAPI10271 RIA',960pp]ge Ltjgnef31?3unr1990j 6.

RTS/ESIAS Sctpcint Mcthodology Study.InchhifaTRequjresents

!!ag]OJ 7.

TX 10271 P A. Suppic; cat 2. Rcv.1. June 1000.EotlUsedj l

S.

Tcchnical Rcquirc; cats Menucl. Section 15. "Rc;ponse hees *NRCTeldricVetterR5109.3deted3eg985]

BJ WCAPjl36MiPjMBelisjoq"2SElimi_qatioD'OfiPres~sure l o.1,14 l SenWMResponte3jarTest1DLRejgM.[rfLmen_tsXJandatL199.6j i

CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.3 B 3.3-60 10/3088

ESFAS Instrumentation i

B 3.3.2 BASES l

SR 3.3.2.10 I

7 N

This srb ver~ifia:; the gggg[] individual channel ESF j

0-1.1 4 RESPONSE TIME 5 are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the 1

I 1

E l

t l'

l l

CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases - ITS 3.3 B 3.3-120s 1030ng l

1 l

r

l ESFAS Instrumentation j

B 3.3.2 4

E BASES l

accident analysis. Response Time o.1,1 4

.. ; 4...

<" Y. acceptance criteria are included in the 4

Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 7), m y.

y., y p ;

?.-

., A L 0-3.3 55

.p y..L s. g.. -.. : - Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which j

the parameter exceeds the Trip Setpoint value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment in both trains reaches the required functional state (e.g.

pumps at rated discharge pressure, valves in full open or closed position).

For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.a.[.

4

[

lag, lead /laa. rate / lag, etc.) the response tims@ ting; (Dej verification 'q;y r,c performed with the transfer runctions set t; enc with the rc uitin; cz,Grcd icspenx tin ce.p; rcd to l

3

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calculated exa;;;in; th; ti;n cen;t- ^ ----

--t at their nr*w l

values. The response time may verifi-H by a series j

I *erlapp}ng testg that t entire response time is q

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(continued) 8l 81 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.3 B 3.3-121 10/3088

~

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 4

BASES I

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ESF RESPONSE TIMEE==tFare arifict'

' b rformed on an

$631 k

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,Hc Testing of the final actuation devices, which make up t!w bulk of the responsh i

time. is included in the - om _. m __--

- 13e of each 4

channel. The final actuation device in one : rain is tested with 4

each channel. Therefcre, staggered testing results in response i

time verification of these devices every E months. The g month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is j

based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious respons i

time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

This SR is modified by a Note that clarifies that the turbine driven AFW pump is tested within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after 0 3.3 G 1 reaching-1000 gg psig in the SGs.

i l

CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.3 B 3.3-121a 10/30M8

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES (continued) 5 10 CFR 50.49.

6.

WCAP-10271-P A, Supplement 2, Rev.1. June 1990.

7.

Technical Requirements Manual.

S.

'JCfJ' 13032. Rr; 1

\\

8.]

WCAPN632EPJK1ReXLs1ELi%Timiettonzof2 Pressure 0'l l'4 I

Msor,Res@nse? Time'Testjng:Requiremej)tsyanuary219_962

)

1 CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.3 B 3.3-123 10B0/98

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.4.9-3 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC REQUEST:

Difference 3.4.17 (Wolf Creek, Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak)

Comment: TSTF-93 Rev. 3 was approved with a reviewer's note which says that for non-dedicated safety-related heaters which normally operate the frequency is 18 months and for dedicated safety-related heaters which normally don't operate the frequency is 92 days. Each of the plants is asking for the 18 month frequency but it is unclear from the submittals if they meet the criterion. Please provide information demonstrating consistency with the TSTF.

FLOG RESPONSE (original):

DCPP and WCGS have two-groups of non-safety related pressurizer backup heaters. The pressurizer heaters, together with the pressurizer spray valves, are used to control RCS pressure.

For DCPP, the NRC recently approved (6/5/98) changing the CTS SR 4.4.3.2 from 92 day to

" Refueling Interval" in L:A 126/124.

For Comanche Peak, the pressurizer heaters used to satisfy the pressure control function are comprised of one proportional control group and three backup groups. The design and operation is consistent with the basis for an 18 month surveillance described in Section 6.Q of NUREG-1366 (which was the basis for TSTF-93). The heater groups are normally connected to the emergency power supplies (two to each Class 1E train of emergency power) and normally operate. CPSES will revise the 3.4.9 BASES to reflect the NUREG-1366 basis for the 18 month frequency.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): TSTF-93, Rev. 2, contains the following Reviewer's Note, "The frequency for performing Pressurizer heater capacity testing shall be either 18 months or 92 days, depending on whether or not the oplant has dedicated safety-related heaters. For dedicated safety-related heaters, which do not normally operate,92 days is applied. for non-dedicated safety-related heaters, which normally operate,18 months is applied." As used in this note, safety-related heaters means heaters which are powered from a class 1E electrical distribution bus. Normal operation includes operation during power operations, unit start-up and/or unit shutdown. Dedicated heaters are heaters whose only function is the mitigation of a design basis event. This is consistent with Generic Letter 93-05, "Line-item Technical Specifications improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation," which indicated that the capacity of pressurizer heaters should be tested once each refueling interval for those plants without dedicated safety-related heaters, in all cases where a FLOG plant has used the 18 month frequency in the ITS for performing pressurizer heater capacity testing, the requirements of the Reviewer's Note identified above have been met.

ATTACHED PAGES:

None

i

)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.1-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA i

REQUEST:

DOC 2-05 LG DOC 2-% A JFD 3.6-1 CTS 4.6.1.1.c (Wolf Creek)

CTS 4.6.1.1.d (Callaway)

CTS 3/4.6.1.2 (Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak)

STS SR 3.6.1.1 ITS SR 3.6.1.1 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.1.c/d and 3/4.6.1.2 require leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program which is based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B. STS SR 3.6.1.1 requires the visual examination and leakage rate testing be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J as modified by approved exemptions. ITS SR 3.6.1.1 modifies STS SR 3.6.1.1 to conform to CTS 4.6.1.1.c/d and 3/4.6.1.2 as modified in the CTS markup. The STS is based on Appendix J, Option A while the CTS and ITS are based on Appendix J, Option B.

Changes to the STS with regards to Option A versus Option B are covered by a letter from Mr. Christopher 1. Grimes to Mr. David J. Modeen, NEl, dated 11/2/95 and TSTF-

52. While the ITS SR 3.6.1.1 differences from STS SR 3.6.1.1 are in conformance with the letter and TSTF 52 as modified by staff comments, the changes to the ITS Bases as well as ITS 3.6.2 and ITS 3.6.3 and their associated Bases are not in conformance. See Comment Number 3.6.3-28 for additional concems with regards to CTS 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.d at Comanche Peak. Also see Comment Numbers 3.6.0-2,3.6.2-5, 3.6.3-27, 3.6.3.28 and 3.6.3-37.

Comment: Licensees should revise their submittals to conform to the 11/2/95 letter and TSTF-52 as modified by the staff. See Comment Numbers 3.6.0-2,3.6.2-5,3.6.3-27, 3.6.3.28, and 3.6.3-37.

FLOG RESPONSE: (original)The 11/2/95 letter from C. Grimes (NRC) to D. Modeen (NEI),

TSTF-52 proposed Revision 1 (which includes the changes proposed by the staff) were reviewed for incorporation into the ITS. Based on this review, the ITS Bases have been revised to incorporate proposed Revision 1 of TSTF-52. Revision 1 addresses the NRC comments on Revision 0 of this TSTF but has not been approved by the Tech Spec Task Force. The FLOG will continue to evaluate any NRC/ industry approved revisions to TSTF-52 and will incorporate applicable changes into the ITS submittal as appropriate.

FLOG RESPONSE: (Supplemental): As discussed at the meeting on October 13-14,1998 and in a conference call on November 19,1998, the NRC reviewer provided specific comments that have been incorporated into this supplemental response. The FLOG understands that with these changes the NRC staff approves incorporation of TSTF-52 into the iTS.

For CPSES, the incorporation of TSTF-52 negates changes made under licensee initiated change CP-3.6-005 and thus CP-3.6-005 is withdrawn.

ATTACHED PAGES:

', CTS 1.0 - ITS 1.0, Definitions l

Enci5A Traveler Status Sheet

-Enci6A 3

Enci6B 2

i Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Enci5A Traveler Status Sheet

~

Enci5B B 3.6-1, B 3.6-2, B 3.6-4, B 3.6-5 and B 3.6-7

?

l c

INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 1.0 TRAVELER #

STATUS DIFFERENCE COMMENTS TSTF 19, Rev 1 Net Incorporated 6

of traveler cut-l TR-1.0 00f l

eff-flate-TSTF-30. Rev 1 Incorporated 1.1-9 NIE220!i UFI Q 1.1 1 TGTF-64 Incorporated 1-1--4 j

0 1.1-2 i

TSTI SS Incorporated 1-1-8 Q 1.1 9 l>lt-n Q g I Inc6rpofrates 1 E 13 IPid7EW&tsF7

.a.3,3,1 3 l

1 J

^

L n.w

=2 w e,= w,x. g TSTF-111. Rev 14 Incorporated 1.1-5 Q 1.1-4

'J00 57. Rev 1 Incorporated 1.1-6 NRCNptiroved;3 g,

0 1.1 5

'400 74. Rev-4 Incorporated 1.1-3 gg lQ1.41

'400 00,Rcv 1 Incorporated 1.1-11 I

gg Q 1.4 1

CHANGE i

NLDEER JUSTIFICATION change the intent of the Specifications. SR 3.0.2 applies if a Surveillance is not performed within the "specified Frequency". Again, the example does not change the intent of the Specifications but only makes clear the application of SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to Surveillances with Frequencies tied to plant conditions. This change will eliminate confusion and misapplication of the ITS and will ensure consistent application of SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to these types of 0 1.4 1 Surveillance Frequencies.

This char.ge is consistent with traveler '00 ~J.1E7J8]

)

i EH Iheldefin111orCW3HAlllRMiBLil!B5H M Ns::cetiseditor.nove getar s3fRBlii!MBhEEllBMEllLLbsttentty:MJEsn m 1.0 006 l

Base.slassocjatedMEtMmempftlantrennsistentJ!1tJh SIE19]

132M ItayelerJSTE52# r==r:4 Jete ctheldefinitioniof ~

3 6

'6 t,TZsinceXtis detinedronnoCFasotAppendiggafand.IITs Sectjon sisI1ganteineentrieal!!peInatetTestj!yfrogramililits tedundatFinclude%'4sinietmitiortrAs describerin;NLINARC19,3^O3]

Nrgers;_suidelfonsheglagtuetmed;TechnicaJlSpecificationsu Specification 111122Custlef3:efined:termsIandicor_re.sponding deDinitiopsysed ithroughggt;$he2Lechnicallspecifications75lttj s"not i

used;thmghou_ tith 67Technicanspe'cificationsrandrisaiefinedJn;section sisI1gst J

r 4

4 i

CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 -ITS 1.0 3

11/2088 l

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR NUREG-14Il DIFFERENCES SECTION 1 Page 2 of 2 NUMER DESCRIFTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCH PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 1.1-8 M1G,41]antygg86DigghangeRNote b is revised to VesNo VesNo VesNg Yes refer to the Pequired reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned" and note c is revised to read Sequired reactor vessel head closure bolts less than H0-1.1 9 I

fully tensioned."

1.1-9 The definitions of Channel Operational Test (C0T).

Yes Yes Yes Yes pastetRelay1Testris!avitRelay1 Test? [ ] and Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TADOT) are expanded to include the details of acceptable performance H 0-1.1 -1 I

methodology. Performance of these tests in a series of sequential, overlapping. or total d.

...J steps provides the necessary assurance of appropriate operation of the entire channe1 7f.elay yldevjce; tespectlyely.

1.1-1G This change is based on the current TS definition of No - Not part No - Not part No -

Yes CONTROLLED LEAKAGE. This change is a clarification of CTS.

of CTS.

Maintaining only and does not affect the way RCS water inventory ISTS wording.

balances are performed.

1.1-11 Adds new example to ITS Section 1.4 to clarify Yes Yes Yes Yes surveillance frequencies that are contingent on both specified frequency and plant conditions.

D1112 TMLdeDMtic0MfiCHAWlac413pRADON11*ltevisedLtg yes yes yes tog moMdeta11gongTp3nd;thermoccupJaicalthratiore_to l

TR-1.0 006 l

thefIsj3;31saseJ4aogDte4Dithitheicomponents qqg81stentattittgISI]EL9J 3 2.11 RaveltE!5IPARIC im.m= 241etesitM yes Yes Igg definjtjoRL9fcl42LA nw s.mm L1gebj N1QQFR503 Append 1Giand LTsMionX5n01 containment:t.eakage

]l,,0-3. 3.1-6 l

Rate 1TestiniLLTpgtasjtitusitedundagtoline_luduws o

Mettnit1tml CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS 1.0 1U2088

1 INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.6 TRAVELER #

STATUS DIFFERENCE #

COMMENTS TSTF 17 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6-2 NRC approved.

TSTF-30 Rev. 2 1-Incorporated 3.6-4 Not applicable to Wolf Creek and Callaway 1R 3.6 002 TSTF 45 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6-5 NRC approved.

TSTF 46 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6 7 NRC approved.

TSTF-51 Not incorporated NA Not NRC ap' proved as of traveler cut off date.

TSTF 52

.ZL Incorporated 3.6 1 IrG W@ l 03.6.1.i B FTemeLW-

/ NRG LoisJ! etff#titti NZsG TSTF-145 Not incorporated NA Not NRC approved'as of traveler cut off date.

h"X: 01 ISTE(269 Incorporated 3.6 11 EQ 3-6-40 gpFWeid 0 3.6.3-11 l

~

Containment (At;;sphcric)

B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment (At;;;phcric)

BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building, its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor __ core following adliEERb i

Neice Besh-testsitardifsCcMaJntccidentammutt-f0BW h3y' ~i)6 Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

1 The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat tirLtEa'reactoricavity; pit pgjection, and a shallow Msphetical dome roof. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a carbon steel liner to r

ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.

for centein; cats with ungreuted tcadens, the cylindcr wellls picsticssed with a post tcasioning systc; in the vcrtical and horizontal directicas, and the desc reef is prcstresscd utilizing c thrcc wsy post tensioning systc=.

The concrete reactor building is required for structural integrity of the containment undervfsafgh']las79]Q:1de@

_ cp n =

QDBA conanlons. The steel liner and its penetra<;1ons 0 3.6.1 06 establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment.

Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply 0 3.6.1-06 with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 0ptienZB (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a.

All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1.

capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or (continued)

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6 B 3.6-1 11n088 l

Containment (Atrcsphcric)

B 3.6.1 BASES BACKliiROUND 2.

closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3,

" Containment Isolation Valves" b.

Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.2,

" Containment Air Locks":

c.

All equipment hatches are closediargEsealed: and o.3.6.1 02 d.

The pressurized sealing mechanism associated with a penetration (eig NWeldsZbe))ows7;or_0Jrjngs), is OPERABLE.

crept c3 provided ir. LCO 3.5.[ ].

l APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break and a rod ejection CP 3.6 06 accident (REA) (Ref. 2~hnd 23,).

In addition, release of significant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA or REA. In the DBA analyses. it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for these DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of l03.6.0-02 OlM of containment air weight per day (Ref. Sg IndJ).

This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting ll CP 3.6 06 from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J2 Opj;1og ll 0 3.6.106 gj(Ref.1), as L : the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak contain= ant internal pressure j (P ) resulting from the limitinghjg@gG0GM-989 The allowable leakage rate represented by t, Torms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing.

L, is assumed to be OIlt BfNetMMieftt?81eWefght per day in the safety analysis at P, = 44-1 {8J psig. Die ll 0 3.6.0 2 g1_c. o18tWpealgpressinEfcit;t0CAs30Tnts Itjgin~48Ep;sig (Ref. 3).

ll cP 3.6 08 Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the "",C Policy (continued)

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6 B 3.6-2 1U2M8

4 Containment (At;;;#iric)

B 3.6.1 BASES B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and i

without challenging plant systems.

4 4

4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 i

REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements ofitM Containment"1 eakagej,jletelestinfPtogrg 10 C m 50. Apgrdix J L

(Rcf.1) ;s ;;dified by ;ppr;;;d cxeeptions. Failure to 2

g meet air lock g[ Mate 5RehtyMfe$1Mentiseal leakage.

limits specified in LC0 3.6.2 8til1~LCOM3 does not 0 3.6.0 02 2

invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage i

determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A.

B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As icft icek;;c I

prior to the first stortup after grfer;ing a rcquired 10 0 0 50, Appendfx J.10:k:ge tett t required t0 be ' O.S L,h;; tired d

Type B :nd C 10:k:ge, :nd ' O.75 L, for ;;;rall Typ A ick:gc.

At :11 Other tirs bctwcen rcquircd ic;k;;c rate tests, the excptax criteri; is b;xd on = cverall Tpe A ic;k;;c limit Of ; 1.0 L,.

At ; 1.0 L, the offsitc den conxquccess are bounded by th u su;ptions of the = fety =:1ysis. 3slTJ,ft

]

MBRageWJDP 6 2 6 0 3.6.106 ll EtllM 2.; ;..

9e:

.hyggy REEDep1MGBKN1 SR Frequencies are as required by Appadix J, n ; edified by eppreicd cxceptions thg M 61nNntK6a N it yf_rM EM. Thus. SR 3.0.2 (which allows Ticqucray extcr.sions' deu not epply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.

.- m.. -,-

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CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6

_B 3.6-4 11/20M8

l l

Containment fAL_--

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1 1

,\\

l REFERENCES 1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix., Op. tion ~B__t 0 3.6.1 06

. n 2.

FSAR, Chapter 15.

3.

FSAR, Section 6.2.

n_

s__..e.2;_

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r,,

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u l

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6 B 3.6-5 1U20/98

4 Containment Air Locks (At aparic Rbot;;.c;p.cric, Icc Cer.dcr.;cr r.d Ox1)

B 3.6.2 i

BASES fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of Mt of containment air weight per day

~

(Ref. 23). mc leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50.

CP 3'6 09 i

=. :. ;, = L, - M ' ;.

- "' "'" " ' """ ~"

(~igila'teggptipit ~

maximum a owa e d

i containeen ea age a the calculated peak _co internal ressureC14.4 p:;ig. 7 WMggle.3following a his allowaDie leakage rate forms the sis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.

The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of of the NP,0 Policy StatG~nt 10CFR5013_6ic)J2M19 LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of the containment prejsgrelboundary, the air j

lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's -

structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into end g exit from containment.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements fct the containment air locks during MODE 6 are addressedinLC03.9.33,"ContainmentPenetrations."

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6

. B 3.6-7 11aM8

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO:Q 3.6.2-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST:

JFD 3.6-2 STS SR 3.6.2.2 ITS SR 3.6.2.2 and Associated Bases STS SR 3.6.2.2 requires verifying only one door in the airlock will open at a time at six month intervals. The interval is modified in ITS SR 3.6.2.2 from 6 months to 24 months.

This modification is in accordance with TSTF-17; however, the Bases changes are not in accordance with TSTF-17.

Comment:

Revise the ITS Bases to be in accordance with TSTF-17 or justify the deviations.

FLOG RESPONSE (original): The ITS Bases for SR 3.6.2.2 has been modified to conform to TSTF-17, Revision 1, and reads, "..used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door opening), this test is only required to be performed every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for loss of containment OPERABILITY when the Surveillance is performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency for the interlock is justified based on generic operating experience. The Frequency is based on enginee5ng judgement and is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during the use of the airlock."

FLOG RESPONSE (revised): The ITS 3.6.2 Bases have been revised for the associated surveillance requirements consistent with TSTF-17, Rev.1.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6 Enci5B B 3.6-12 I

i I

r l

Containment Air Locks U,ts;p.cric, Sub;ta;p.cric, Icc Cericascr :nd Ousl)

B 3.6.2 BASES (continued) providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA.

Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of glggEh3pflig:at>1e j

g SR 3.6.1.1.

This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the ovcrcli jgggMdm2qq(C 9

containment leakage rate.

i SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will 4

support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the ptrely

cchanical Igliab}g nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only gl@normally challenged when the containment air lock door is opened esed!foriegtryIandiexit-

.(p g eduresleguirelstrictt'a eerence M )1gglfdoorJopening), this i

test is only required to be performed uga catcring er cxiting a i

contain;;nt air isck but is n;t rcquircd ;;;;re frcqucatly then cycry i

104 d;y: gV$tHQuonttGEf2EBIRMre@elfcyMbeted 60 te!!MeinsitDGeditthmM.a@Gndet"$he3ondftfons ME4pM L

W k 690tient18TWerMoti ofRontaf - - _ZMW _ Mwarve11W Wl 0 3.6.2 6 l g

g Frequency for the terlock s justifia @.ased on generic operating experience. T_he equency is based on engineering judgement and is consi ed adequate in vic.; cf othcr indication; cf door end intcrieck

echanis;;;

tetu; ;voilabic t; egrations grsenaci MVen7thet2the

}nterlociGEgo11B:hR1NIBRIBrilKGlH3fithtTgrig M

~

REFERENCES 1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix JJJWpt1 F B.

l 0-3.6.1 06 ll 3 2. FSAR, SectionM0s.N.c4~M.

3 m w fSART35ectigg y CP-3.6 09 l n

mawame CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6 B 3.6-12 11/2W98

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET

' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-1 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC REQUEST:

DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0)

DOC 1-01 LG CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon)

CTS 3/4.6.1.1 CTS 4.6.1.1.b ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2, SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4, SR 3.6.3.8 and Associated Bases CTS 1.7 (1.8 in Diablo Canyon) defines CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. A markup of CTS 1.7/1.8 is provided in the CTS markup of CTS 1.0. DOC 1-04 A (CTS 1.0) states that the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is deleted from the CTS /ITS. DOC 1-01 LG in CTS 3.6 states that the definition requirements have been relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.6.1. Both of these justifications are incorrect. CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a in Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either capabl.e of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. This requirement has been relocated to the Bases of ITS 3.6.1, but it is also the basis for ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2, SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and SR 3.6.3.8. No justification is provided for this Administrative change in CTS 1.0.

Comment: Revise the CTS markup and provide a discussion and justification for this j

Administrative change.

]

FLOG RESPONSE (original):

DOC 1-35 A (CTS 1.0) has been added to read;" CTS 1.7.a (1.8.a for Diablo Canyon) specifies that all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either capable of being closed by an OPERABl.E containment automatic isolation valve system or closed by manual valves, blind flanges or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions. Consistent with NUREG-1431, this requirement from the definition of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY would be included in the Bases of ITS 3.6.1 and would be addressed by the combination of surveillance requirements ITS SR 3.6.3.1, SR 3.6.3.2 (not applicable to CPSES), SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3 4 and SR 3.6.3.8. This change would be classified as Administrative (A) because the requirements of CTS 1.7.a/1.8.a would be retained in the combined surveillance requirements of ITS 3.6.3," Containment isolation Valves."

Also, see the FLOG response to Comment 3.6.1-1 regarding the relocation of the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition requirements.

FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed at the meeting on October 13-14,1998, WCGS is providing a revised CTS mark-up to reflect the correct DOC numbers. For CPSES, this Comment will be resolved with the resolution of Comment Number O 3.6.3-14.

ATTACHED PAGES:

None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-4 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST:

DOC 743A CTS 4.6.1.7.1 ITS SR 3.6.3.1 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.7.1 requires the purge valves to be verified locked closed or blank flanged at least once per 31 days.- The CTS has been modified to provide an allowance for one purge valve in the flow path to be open to repair excessive leakage while in the ITS Action for an inoperable purge valve due to excessive leakage. This change designated DOC 7-03 A is characterized as an Administrative change. This is incorrect. The CTS

_ does not currently have this allowance and the change cannot be characterized as Administrative because of consistency with another Less Restrictive change. The change is a Less Restrictive change. See Comment Number 3.6.3-5.

Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change.

FLOG RESPONSE: (original) DOC 7-03 A has been revised to be DOC 7-03 LS-26 and the discussion and justification for this Less Restrictive change has been provided.

This Comment is no longer applicable to DCPP based on response to Comment Number _

Q 3.6.3-5.

FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed at the meeting on October 1314,1998, the CTS mark-up has been revised to reflect the revision of DOC 7-03-A to DOC 7-03-LS-26.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6 Encl. 2 3/4 6-9

l 1

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITED CONDITION FOR OPERATION (continued)

IENMIM 19$

lappenett (W3El j

Derstr4 t t n?f k Y M 2 8 3 2 M-m1030t3dd fl83MM41]lKilhRisel RiservisewemmelsenEamsoortsmeenammasand tassrmuum t]thln thennejg!30;jlogeg i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(

4.6.1.7.1 Each 48-inch and 12 inch containment and hydrogen purge supply and I

7 03 ALS exhaust isolation valve shall be verified

to be locked closed at least once p 0 3.6.3 4 31 daysriexcept for;one:purgelvalve31nIa;penetratjon;flgpath,;tdLile;1rGctjon 2

3_;6HJc;as1resultioLmeasured 1eakagelrate;in; excess'of;11mits.

v 3

fj7-1HJiM 4.6.1.7.2

At least once per 184 days ind_WfthiL 92Ldgysiofiop_ening3.he y_alyef,.,, _._.

. -, the inboard and outboard isolation valves with 7-es-s i

resilient material seals in each locked closed 48 inch and 12 inch containment 7 14 M and hydrogen purge supply and exhaust penetration shall be demonstrated 7 15 A 4

OPERABLE by verifying thet-the measured leakage rate. 4: 100: than 0.05 L,-when 0 3.6.3 19 prc: uri cd t P,-

INWMl i

i i

l 4.6.1.7.3

( At least once per384JilggkicRlt;hir) 92 days 3ffBMfDh193bd

[06LS A

galve~l each 18-inch containment pressure relief discharge isolation valve with 0 3 6'3 19 resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the 0 3 6.3-20 measured leakage rate 1: 1000 th:n 0.06 L, when prc urized t P,.

L'-$$$

I;eakagelrateitestingli_sMt3eghjjid;forrcontainniptlpoir3jeJ1 sol.atjog]

yMM$d ValyeDjthires11ienti]sealsiWhe!11tWrationJDer:pathT3?Isolatedj bJ adeak_ttgediblankiQarige]

E7-8N5N J

Lsolatfo g dey1ce rin'high.Itadfat1 r are w mar bel ecified:b radministrative e,w3g u.-

y i

CPSESMark-up of CTS 3M.6 3M 6-9 1U20/98

j d

i L

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.6.3-11 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA i

1 REQUEST:

DOC 11-14 A

)

[

DOC 1-06 LS-19

]

DOC 11-07 LG I

JFD 3.6-11 JFD 3.6-12 I

l CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS CTS 4.6.3.3 t

ITS 3.6.3 RA A.2 Note 2, RA C.2 Note 2, RA D.2 Note 2, SR 3.6.3.5 and.

3, Associated Bases j

i; i

CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS, CTS 3.6.3 ACTIONS, ITS 3.6.3 RA A.2, ITS 3.6.3 RA C.2 and ITS 3.6.3 RA D.2 have been modified by a Note that states the following: " Isolation devices that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative maans". CTS 4.6.3.3 and ITS SR 3.6.3.5 have been modified by the phrase "that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position" to clarify which valves require isolation time testing. These changes are characterized in JFD 3.6-11 and JFD 3.6-12 as a

.' generic change designated WOG-91 The staff has not received this change through i

i.

the STS generic change process (TSTF) and therefore considers this change to bq beyond the scope of review for this conversion. See Comment Number 3.6.3-12.

- Comment: ' Delete this generic change. See Comment Number 3.6.3-12.

(

FLOG RESPONSE (original):

WOG-91 has recently been designated TSTF-269. While

. we recognize that this is a generic change to the STS, the change was approved by the i

Westinghouse Owners Group over 18 months ago and was expected to have been approved i.

by this time. We expect the TSTF committee to forward TSTF-269 to the NRC in the very near.

future.' We believe the technical merits of the change, which supports NRC approved TSTF-45, Rev 1 by providing additional clarification, should justify rapid approval by the NRC. This TSTF is of sufficient value in precluding confusion, LERs, and inspection findings that should 1

[

we be required to remove it from our submittal, an LAR would be submitted upon NRC approval of the TSTF. We believe that it would be cost effective for all concemed to retain this change within the submittal pending NRC review of TSTF-269.

i'

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): TSTF-269 has been approved by the NRC. The approved version does not contain all the changes proposed by the original WOG-91. The following

,j-changes have been made to make the FLOG submittals consistent with the approved traveler:

l The exclusion which stated that response time testing does not apply to automatic valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position has been removed from the CTS and ITS markups. As a result DOC 11-14-A and JFD 3.6-12 are no longer used (note that for Callaway, DCPP and WCGS, changes made to SR 4.6.3.2 under DOC 11-14-A have been reassigned DOC 9-04-A). The traveler list in Enciosure 5A has also been updated.

' Additionally, this item is related to Comment Number Q 3.6.3-56 for Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak. No additional response is required for Comment Number Q 3.6.3-56.

)

.._. _ - _._....._.._. ~ - _.. _.. __.

i l

- ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Enci 2 3/4.6-13 Enci3A 13 Enci38 7 and 10 EnciSA Traveler page and 3.6-16 Enci 5B B 3.6-20, B 3.6-22, B 3.6-24 and B 3.6-27 Enci 6A

' 3 and 4 Encl 6B 2

l i

w

a f

1 i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS a

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o i.u n 43lLitJgg shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18

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w i v.aus v vs yusvw s.

VAvv VI I u s a sudw tt aaviu I vs i bLdb d I y1 su s % i a u 5ia rt, vs a a b 64 A.

_.J.

J_

.#f 1

&L.

-1 AJ _

.X LL.

..._J X.. 1 J _

...A...

Lp, by a winu a s s sia waiV a besw hvevey B w w a vi s vs w s sw dww nsu s s a uv s a e ry vubuyw 2._

t t_ J L n s vu vi a a b

s..

CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.6 3M 6-13 11M0/98

CHANGE NUMBER RSE DESCRIPTION 11-10 A

Deletes [a note] providing a one time test interval extension that is no longer applicable.

11 11 A

Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 38).

i 11-12 A

The phrase " flow path" is added for clarification and consistency with NUREG 1431. This specification is based on GDCs 55, 56, and 57 which addresa the proper isolation for each "line" that penetrates containment. It is recognized that multiple lines can share the same penetration.

Licensees have always been required to assure that proper protection is provided for each line or flow path that passes through containment even if multiple flow paths share the same penetration. In this specification, the term

" penetration" has always meant each flow path that penetrates containment. Adding the words " flow path" to the specification clarifies this meaning.

11-13 LS-22 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 3B).

11-14 A

Consistat with 1"CG, Jm motisrl;N rm m 0 3*6'311 ll locked. n led. cr other isc secured in position

is added for clarification in rcgerd to which volves require isolation ti= testing.

'! lves that cr; secured in placc. ;rc sccured in the p;sition rcquircd t;

= ct their safety function. The iscistion ti n testtng casurcs that volves an rapend to thc position that = cats their afety fuxtion in the ti;c nund in the =fcty

= lysis. If th; valves are ncured in the position that acts their nfct3 function. n testing is acccanry. N_ot t

11 15 A

Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 3B).

11-16 A

Even though it is not specified in ITS 3.6.3 Required Actions.- the Action to restore the inoperable valve stated in CTS 3.6.3.a is understood as always the primary objective and a continuous option to be performed during any Completion Time.

11 17 Not used.

11 18 AEG Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison l g.3.6 007 ll table (enclosure 38).

i l

CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.6 13 1U2088

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.6 Page 7 cf 12 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 8-10 ITS Condition [qQ specifies two containment spray trains Yes

"; Cl'500 h a only Yes Yes l03*6*6 1 l A

[cr any Minction of t%; ;r -.e troim] inoperable to two Contai. w.t enter 3.0.3.

Even though this condition is not specified

g ay trains in the CTS, 3.0.3 would be entered.

covered by this

,ccific; tion l_;n of both of thosc trai n i; cutsid

tb-CTS :nd 3.0.3 2_

_ m __ _ m _ _ m.

iT;;k;d. ygg 8-11 A "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO* provision Ms Yes No - CPSES current Yes Yes LS 2 been added to the completion time for one train of TS does not have a containment spray / cooling systems inoperable. This change containment cooler is considered Less Restrictive in that the 10 days allowed specification.

in the ITS not to meet the LCO is greater than the CTS would allow.

8-12 R 0-3.6.3-L3 l 09 01 The DCPP units for the spray additive tank volume limits Yes No No No A

are changed from gallons to percent.

09 02 The operability of the spray additives eductors is Yes Yes Yes Yes LG contained within the definition of operability for the spray additive system as described in the Bases.

09-03 This change revises the action statement by replacing the Yes Yes Yes Yes A

reference to restoring the Spray Additive System to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , with the requirement to be in cold shutdown within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

g f ~---'"- '

)/

r 3

r-09-04 This change adds the phrase 'that is not locked, sealed, or Yes CL,, m.,

h A

otherwise secured in position

with regard to which valves is circady in CTS.

Facticc Garrent 0-3.6.3-L1 r,

m.

require actuation testing.

Yes 4.0.2.0.Yes peset4e k

.5.2.2. yes v

CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.6 linosys

( -.

CONVERSION COMPARISON TAELE - CURRENT TS 3/416 Page 10 cf 12 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 11 11 A note is added to the containment isolation specification Yes No - already part Yes Yes A

that the LCO is not applicable MSSVs. MSIVs. FIVs.

of current 15.

[ associated bypass valves] and steam generator relief valves.

11 12 The phrase " flow path" is added for clarification and Yes Yes Yes Yes A

consistency with NUREG-1431.

11-13 This change revices the DCPP containment Ventilation Yes

-No No No LS-22 Isolation valve surveillance frequency from 30 months to every 184 days and from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to 92 days.

/

T M

M E

$.b, _N,~!N..!.,_!!.5.!..

U... I.I.b...I.U.I.!.$.5. Ym..

1 l 0-3.6.3-1 1 l

C m

to c.ich v;1vc; revira isci; tion ti:: t;; tin;;. R j 11 15 A Callaway specific note to 3.6.3 regarding testing is No No No Yes A

deleted based on ITS LCO 3.0.5.

11-16 Even though it is not specified in ITS 3.6.3 Required Yes Yes Yes Yes A

Actions. the Action to restore the inoperable valve stated in CTS 3.6.3.a is understood as always the primary objective and a continuous option to be performed during any Completion Time.

11-17 Not used.

NA NA NA NA 11-18 The sords during the COLD SHUTDOWN

or REFUELING MODE" are No - Not in CTS.

No - Not in CTS.

Yes Yes WC-3.6-0C9 LG)

vcd to the ",oscs deleted.

12-01 Consistent with NUREG-1431. the hydrogen monitoring Yes Yes No - CTS Hydrogen No CTS Hydrogen A

specification is moved to ITS section 3.3.3 concerning monitoring monitoring Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAM).

requirements are requirements are not in this not in this section

section, 12-02 The MODE of applicability for the hydrogen monitors is Yes Yes No - CTS Hydrogen No - CTS Hydrogen H

extended to MODE 3.

monitoring monitoring requirements are requirements are not in this section not in this section CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.6 JH20M

INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.6 TRAVELER #

STATUS DIFFERENCE #

COMMENTS TSTF-17 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6 2 NRC approved.

TSTF-30 Rev. 2 4-Incorporated 3.6 4 Not applicable tc, Wolf Creek and Callaway j

TR 3.6 002l TSTF 45 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6 5 NRC approved.

TSTF 46 Rev. 1 Incorporated 3.6 7 NRC approved.

TSTF 51 Not incorporated NA Not NRC ap~ proved as of traveler cut off date.

TSTF-52 sq l Incorporated 3.6 1 I_ mad Ro3.6.1-6 I chaf!gesJpeg d

ILRQ cognatesreafts IMWi515 TSTF-145 Not incorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cut off date.

6 Incorporated 3.6 11 EQ

(

v 0 3.6.3-11 l

f a

. _ ~

Containment Isolation Valves 'At;r.;;pteric, Subst;r,;;;phcric, I;; Cctj;n;;r, and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

)

SR 3.6.3.4

-- ------- - NOTE -- -- ---- -- ---

IgValves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2ETt!elblistGe!aem4uel;transfe_r2 canaDiesd;gog3OgtRNKEf_998LLt2 Cept]

g3;sAq aftelr eaWAremeODhis2am11 j

Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 containment !stt~got71cekeglMealed;Iej from H0DE 5 if

$herwiselaecjpd and required to be closed not performed

[3.sg.

2 during accident conditions is closed, except within the for containment isolation valves that are open previous 92 days under administrative controls.

~

F3?6-Jj]

SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of ;;;h pc.;;r.

Iritnw dG3 sp;reted and each automatic posergoperated argordance223 containment isolatirn vage;I.sau;;;;;;;,) iji $ll'3tg! M s+4a C;;;I;d.

J.-.~

.;.. hM I;iMs0 1s

[ggf M 0 3.6.3-11 within limits.

.Testind M ~~

1 Eggg g er

_g 02 d;ys i

ER' ELM NO$1t.l884 02 d;7; Cyci; ;;;h weight er spring 1;;d:d d; d

$0753 velv; tc;t;ble durin; sp;rstion through en; ;W ct; cyci; cf full tr;;;1, ;nd i

verify ;;d did velv; r;.;in; ci;;;d den the differenti:1 pr;;sur; in~ tre dir;; tion of '1;w is s [1.2] p;id ;r.d ep;ns den th; differenti:1 pr;;;;ur; in th; dir;; tion of flow i; 2 [1.2] psid end : [5.0] p:id.

(continued)

CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 -ITS3.6 3.6 16 11/2M8

Containment Isolation Valves (At ;speric.

Subst;;;;;;paric. Ice C;r.ir.:;cr. er.d Ouel)

B 3.6.3 BASES (continued) devices inside containment, the time period specified as

" prior to entering MODE 4 from H0DE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely j-possibility.

Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves muFeheWe Q.3.6.3 53

__m

_,_, _ _.. -,_,. m __... m m._.._,.._ m _

mar =amm s m m=ss-sm=v

_f.z-# = === mwt mw =t

.;.f.W.: ^",;.,3ECZ.

For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. Condition C provides the appropriate actions.

l Required Action A.2 is modified by othJiotej-thet applies to isolation devices locat in high raumuun i

areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use l 0 3.6.311 l 4

of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable. since access to these areas is typically restricted./gggggERDes,.gg.

^

~

i

. J atjg b 3d M L M o @ ef fj g h $ 3 fm h j

securedMal]gWs'3[gseMMletifjed closedhttss~anessastattyeagangaggIlminor.yetifjcatLon.

byJdmipisj;gstEgmig3:onsideregggggtbleZs, tpcelthy 4

functignMagel@malgsmerJEC!!EBREIBW!stsjasao i

l k-ansureWh'Gefume]Etylnotl^ ~ ^.Z -lyh

-n.w.mQ,,/

Therefore, the probabi 11;y or m1sailgnment o" these devices

)

once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is /

4 4

small.

]

4_ _ _ _ _.

_m_,

n5z=___ _,m, _ _

-.._m. c

-- m,s,_.

- u m - ~ _ _ - ~ ~ a...

i m

/

IL1 Witi1 two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration j

flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve ItMGncl#RCEEWhsperaMd3lgilNgarithlpMr3 (continued)

CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6 B 3.6-20 112088

_~

Containment Isolation Valves (Ata;;pteric.

Sub;t;;;pheric, L; C;nden:;;r, ;nd Ouel)

B 3.6.3 BASES (continued) verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Hote indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a O'3 6 3'53 closed system. Bg3@JgeOgfGesMWnestact WC35TyeggMBl3LJfMgt3gmetpigggts!R4efstencel3] Rg i

closed;systegeputsidegtontatmentJaragL%1stta!PJ56 penetrationsra:Etn;accoquJc_e3rtth1tefegsgte 2_g1This Note is necessary since this Condition is written to specifically J

address those penetration flow paths in a closed system.

ed (in nigh radi m uu ot MJ Required Action C.2 is modified by applies to valves and blind flanges areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of l

administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable. since access to these areas is typically restricted.RMmanMes@

43#3* I

. M1aMmmemawsussidgefjgckedAMealed.M secgedjAg3tgiggjetEtnd3MWthese3!$gicesB03Gfec#16d closeorgsympe!mistrativelsesM22!6DemnGBtifica_t1_

byada181sttmismatms;tsg!ntAen!glac3dgetinstarei2he f

function 10BAWRREmeMa#EoseCRadeIAaB0Bilasmsac slu entiatF-_-

~ ;-wgwwettesempretmentonedd i

T ercivre, Ine probabi ity or misanwn.e m or tne:,e vaives, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

=.

. 'r,3 L

p v. - es *. *

p - at Y ' ' ' 4p * % N.p s " 7 *. i r T'

.f*'.

19

RJ.. *

.?

( h9 -h,6 p

' h ; i.. k, - j t(t

y.m '

w- '*

&#11

~ - [ r.

g g er. 7 e. [.m eh -;-[

[N,,

...,.-7..,.r'.'.

I -. e ' -, f e 3

",-] ;

g-

_ - m

_7

_ ;- 7

- -m

_)

n-- e

-..m ymn,-_

g-1 m

J "ith th; ;hi;1d building byp;n l=k;;; ret; n0t within limit, th; nu;pti;n; Of th; nf;ty erelys;s :r; not =t.

Ther;ferc, th; ick:g; ;;;ust b; rWor d t; within li;it within 4 hour:. 'interation an t~ ace +1i;ted by isolating th; p;ritr;tien( ) th t =und th; li;;;it to b; =G;d:d by un of en; clexd end d;-s;tivated out;;;; etic velve. closed

cnual v;1v;. er blind fieng;. L'h;n a peretration i

isolat;d th; 1 skag; rat; for th: isoleted p;nctratica is enu;;d t; b; the ;;tual p;thw;y l=kog; through the (continued)

)

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6 B 3.6-22 11/2M8 J

Containment Isolation Valves (At;;;;;phcric, Sub;t;;;c;pheric. Icc Cor, der.;cr. crd Duci)

B 3.6.3

. BASES (continued) that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge 0 3 6.3 56 i

valve does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.3.7. 184 days, 0 3.6.o 02 is based on an NRC initiative, Occ,cric I;;cc S 20 MBH g]M4gglMWG B 20 (Ref. 3 g). Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per M days was chosen and has been sh acce t ing experienc

. redMction 0 3.6.3 11 ll%M;W i L218pp11es3tdiolatL -

2

_2 devicesjigataktitmalinatiggarnaszandfanoe.ls tgese i

deuceszeititiegmipsumuse:otiadm31spaire:eeans a i

ADowiny1lsttf2!Inttegget3denistrattm3seansxcens_1dered i

acepptelemageReplapi#_eseRLaasJgMicaU.y J

rastdc3188EMalR01gs!so11golatgdeytces3 hat,'.are i

los!!adJumaledaREMangengsgrpsmoosingcagnucles these:demenasserrtattelageoy nEoffsettnistrative meansBWM)gBMggt$$$gELjgKby;administratjvelseans31s cottsidetEDMB8M81451BCEthelunctMgnocking 2 l

$eMing7Et20tgilMRMElR$1to']BG$tfre~ that!theg

)

m ygpos_ti;1copdj

-... - m., _ m -~. w. ~ - - --a.. ~...-.

eM

.. m.u-

- ~.

.mu.-,

. ; e,-

e

-w 1

-2m wm2-as.memeww eraJ A- ~*ft-ww d: -.?ta >, n.

.g gg RE D _E Ar

.Em l

ye wv vunwm m -- -- ---

aw=.

arw w avieneg., m e...asa

,. - = - -

~,. _ _,m EF.1andEE2 d

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met. the plant must be brcught to a H0DE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be 1

brought to at lecst MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6 B 3.6-24 11/20/98

Containment Isolation Valves (Atzspheric.

Subst u spheric. Icc 0;nda scr. ad Ducl' B 3.6.3 BASES ggg 7

.8 _f e.+.J,.,3.;.L.s y h m y.7 }g v-

: i k. a - m W.n %+ & ' Mc su.

sul's SR 3.6.3.5 Verifying that the isolation time of each p;;;r eperstad =d its$s s

in required to ucunmu ace vruve1 Lily. EM NttWitl 1 thNtopM*AsppM1EctesMgg31palML1, sipcWer.pd by',otherj than;safgLatggtiggeqEggDfgaj!2WZaotorM1a_totM The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time l

period less than or equal to that assumed in the (SR]Ref 121 2 afety = 1ysa. The3jgg4t1cn]$1meIerxQrgupncEof2ptis"St a.re l

1rEaccatDesMtp 3tm5s;hEttRMleMitemen_ts7Manua13ndjJthe Inservice'Testiftq_Prggr,_a_m2 er 02 d;ys.

i i

SR 3.6.3.6 (NotIUsed),

In sub;tzspheric ;;nteir. cats, the chc;k v;lva that servc.;

anteir.nnt isci;tien function er; w;ight er spring 1;;ded to l

provide p=itiv; ;l;=r; in th; dirati= cf flou. Thi; = =r;;

that that check valves will r;nin cles;d wha the inside centair.ni,t ;t;;;pher; r; turn; t; = bot;=ph;ri; anditi=;

i following ; DBA.

5" 3.5.3.0 r; quires verific; tion of the sp;r; tion ;f th; check V;lva th;t ;r; to;t;bl; during =it sper; tion. The Trcquacy ;f 02 days is ;;nsistent with the 4

Inservice Testing "regr = r;quir;n at for volv; testing en ;

02 d;y fr;quercy.

SR 3.6.3.7 s

l For Containment [urgeM2,grSo_hj;gl@!gg Ere'_s_uret1Mi valves with resilient seals, additional s

leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 0 3.6.1 06 10 CFR 50, Appendix JM is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC 0 3.6.0 02 resolution of 0;reric Is= B 20 th)1113Plarit? Action 1No] B.

20 " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 3 4).

(continued)

CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6 B 3.6-27 1120M8

!o CHANGE Nl#BER JUSTIFICATION 3.6 7 This change is in accordance with TSTF 46 and revises SR 3.6.3.5

~

to delete the reference to verifying the isolation time of "each power operated" containment isolation valve and only 0 3.6.3 8 require verification of each " automatic M L

M isolation valve." Valves credited as containment isolation valves which are power operated (i.e. can be remotely operated) that do not receive a containment isolation signal do not have an isolation time as assumed in the accident analyses since they require operator action. Therefore. deleting

.j reference to power operated isolation valve time testing reduces 1

i-the potential for misinterpreting the requirements of this SR i

j while maintaining the assumptions of the accident analysis.

i 3.6 8 Revises the completion time for the restoration of containment i

pressure from I hour to [8] hours. The [8] hour completion time i

{

is consistent with the current TS. The [8] hours [is consistent with the completion time to correct temperature problems (ITS j

3.6.5. Condition A) and] allows the operation time to take all i

required actions in a controlled manner.

l-

~

3.6 9 These portions of the specification do not apply since a i

containment cooling system is not part of the plant design.

{

3.6-10 Replaces the Chemical Additive Tank volume limits in gallons with a tank level limits in percent [ consistent with the current TS].

j' 3.6 11 A new Note is added to ITS 3.6.3 Condition A.2 [and C.2]

l in accordance with traveler W9G-91 g g g. The o.3.s.3 11 I

additional note applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be closed by use of administrative means. -

i It is sufficient to assume that initial establishment of component status (e.g.

1 solation valves closed) was performed correctly. Subsequently. verification is intended to ensure the component has not been inadvertently repositioned. Given that the function of locking, sealing or securing components is to

[

ensure the same avoidance of inadvertent repositioning. the periodic reverification should only be a verification of the 4

{

administrative control that ensures that the component remains in the required state. It would be appropriate to remove the lock, seal, or other seens of securing the component solely to perform an active verification of the required state.

I l

I)"N I

m..........,.

.0. y..I b..I.

I.!_ h. ~I ~.

,0;hd. or ;ther.Juc CPSES Diferencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3.6 3

11n0/98

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION fcired in thcir rcquired p;;ition ur.ir ;iinistrative 0-3.6.3 11 centrol, thi; che.ng; would provii th:t isci: tion ti;;;;

testing i; not rcquired fer auto:: tic conteir.xat isciation valves that er; loc'cd ;;; led. Or othcr.;isc secured i..

a their rcquired p;sition unir ;iinistrative ;;ntrol.;; aim 3.6-13 A clarifying note is added to SR 3.6.3.7 that would allow that leakage rate testing for containment purge valves with resilient seals is not required when the penetration flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The blank flange provides the required isolation and additional testing of the valves is unnecessary.

3.6 14 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 15 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 68).

3.6 16 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 68).

3.6 17 Not applicable. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6-18 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 19 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 20 Not used.

3.6-21 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 68).

4 3.6 22 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6-23 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

6I M 3,,1622.(

Bgj!gijWFCTSfneitsurveillancerSR13.6:3:12Ignd13;;6;3?13 Kbedridded]

CPSES DifJerencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3.6 4

11/2088

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431, SECTION 3,6 ~

Page 2 cf 4 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUteER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALUWAY 3.6 7 This change would revise SR 3.6.3.5 to delete the reference Yes Yes Yes Yes 0-3.6.3-8 to verifying the isolation time of "each power operated" containment isolation valve and only require verification of each " automatic yy uh.%um4. human isolation valve."

This change is in accordance with TSTF-46.

3.6 8 This change would revises the completion time for the Yes Yes No - CTS has I hour No - CTS has 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restoration of containment pressure from I hour to [8]

completion time.

hours. The [8] hour completion time is consistent with the current TS.

3.6-9 These portions of the specification do not apply since a No Yes No No containment cooling system is not part of the CPSES plant design.

3.6-10 This change would replace the Chemical Additive Tank volume Yes Yes No - CTS in gallons No - Callaway does limits in gallons with tank level limits in percent.

not have this system.

3.6-11 This change would provide that the Required Action to Yes Yes Yes Yes periodically verify the affected penetration i.'ow path is isolated does not apply to manual valves and blind flanges that are locked. sealed, or otherwise secured since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to lock *ng, sealing. or securing.

7

~

\\

3.6-12 Cc ;i;t;nt with 5". 0.5.0.0. thi;.L., usuid v.o.-id; that VesN4 VesNA VesW)

Vesg4 i;;htien ti;c tc; tin;; i; not.wircd Sr auto ; tic

..tci._..t i n htian va h;; tut arc tck d. x akd Or stk..;i x x...;d '- t hir. mircd p;iti;n u.a.

Kw V_...._._.. _...

CPSES Conversion Comparison Table -1TS 3.6 11DS98

i b

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET t

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q3.6.3-14 APPLICABILITY: CP i

REQUEST:

DOC 7-08 M CTS 1.7.a CTS 3.6.1.7.b CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION b CTS 4.6.1.7.3 STS SR 3.6.3.2 and Associated Bases CPSES CTS 3.6.1.7.b requires the 18 inch containment pressure relief discharge isolation valves be OPERABLE. The CTS does not have a surveillance other than a leakage test (CTS 4.6.1.7.3) that verifies OPERABILITY of these valves. However, the wording of CTS 3.6.1.7 i

ACTION b and CTS 4.6.1.7.3 implies that these valves are normally closed, but can be opened during operation for specific reasons. Thus, OPERABILITY would verify that the valves are closed. STS SR 3.6.3.2 is not used in the CPSES ITS. Based on CTS 1.7.a. CTS 3.6.1.7.b, CTS 3.6.1.7 ACTION b, and CTS 4.6.1.7.3, the Staff believes that STS SR 3.6.3.2 is applicable j

to CPSES ITS and that DOC 7-08 M should apply.

Comment: Revise the CTS /ITS markup to include STS SR 3.6.3.2 and associated Bases. Provide the appropriate discussion and justification for this More Restrictive change.

FLOG response (original): The surveillance requirement STS SR 3.6.3.2 would require verification that the containment pressure relief valve is closed except when open for pressure l

I control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry or for surveillance that requires the valves to be open. This requirement is not contained in the CPSES CTS based on the following justification currently included in CPSES CTS Bases for 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM:

l "The use of the Containment Ventilat'on System during operations is restricted to the 18-inch pressure relief discharge isolation valves (with an effective diameter of 3 inches) since, these venting valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break j

accident. Therefore, the Exclusion Area dose guideline of 10CFR100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment venting operation."

The valves are designed and qualified to be open during MODES 1 through 4 in accordance with SRP 6.2.4 (Rev. 2, July 1981)" Containment Isolation System" and BTP CSB 6-4 (Rev. 2, July 1981)" Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation." A debris screen covered by an orifice plate which restricts the effective opening to s 3 inches is provided to ensure the

. valves can close in the event of a LOCA and the valves are designed to close within 5 seconds of a containment isolation signal. Hence, the current Licensing basis and the CTS do not require a containment pressure relief valve to be considered inoperable if open for any reason.

Therefore, STS SR 3.6.3.2 should not be considered applicable to CPSES and is not a condition for the containment isolation valves to be OPERABLE.

r i

i

~.,-.,

~_

i FLOG response (supplement): The 18-inch pressure relief valve was discussed at the meeting on October 13-14,1998, at which time the NRC Containment Systems technical reviewers noted that several plants had been licensed with unrestricted usage of this valve. For CPSES, the NRC Staff concluded in Supplement No. 23 to NUREG-0797 (CPSES SER) that the design of the 18-inch pressure relief valve met the guidelines of BTP CSB 6-4 and that l

unrestricted usage of the valve was acceptable.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Nee 5

1 e

4 I

e I

L b

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-28 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST:

DOC 1-01 LG

)

CTS 3.6.1.1 ACTIONS CTS 4.6.1.1.a ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS ITS SR 3.6.3.3, SR 3.6.3.4 and Associated Bases CTS 4.6.1.1.a verifies that all penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind fianges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions. The corresponding ITS SRs for this CTS surveillance are ITS SR 3.6.3.3 for valves outside i

containment and ITS SR 3.6.3.4 for valves inside containment. IF CTS 4.6.1.1.a cannot be met, the ACTIONS of CTS 3.6.1.1 are entered which require restoration of valve OPERABILITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or shutdown within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . If ITS SR 3.6.3.3 or ITS SR 3.6.3.4 cannot be met, the ACTIONS of ITS 3.6.3 are entered which allows for one valve inoperable between 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months depending on the type of penetration to restore valve OPERABILITY before shutdown commences. This Less Restrictive change to the CTS ic not justified.

Comment: Revise the CTS markup to show this Less Restrictive change and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications.

FLOG RESPONSE (original):

Diablo Canyon, Commanche Peak, Wolf Creek, and Callaway have evaluated this issue and have concluded that no change in requirements occurred, the content of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a was moved to ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and ITS SR 3.6.3.4 with the required action time being moved to ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION B (see DOC 01-02-A).

Additionally, some implicit valve OPERABILITY aspects of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.s were combined with CTS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION and are now shown as ITS LCO 3.6.3 ACTION A, B and C for DCPP. CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a was written to provide assurance that"all penetrations not capable of being closed.. are secured." Containment OPERABILITY is associated with penetration flow paths per the CTS Bases 3/4.6.1.1 which states " CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that releases... will be restricted to those leakage paths... assumed in the safety analysis." The flow path (penetration) must be unsecured for the condition of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a to not be met.

Under CTS LCO 3.6.3 - ACTION, one inoperable containment isolation valve (a valve unsecured /out of position for a penetration "not capable of b ing closed during an accident")

would provide 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to restore the valve or secure the fu path. This was not changed under ITS 3.6.3 ACTION A. One " penetration" not meeting the cc >$ dons of CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a (two valves unsecured /out of position in the same flow path) wou.d provide one hour to secure one valve closed in order to restore containment OPERABILITY. This was also retained under ITS 3.6.3 ACTIONS B.

DOC 01-02-A will be revised to read " Conditions A, B, and C and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4."

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): The original response provided for this comment continues to reflect the position of the FLOG members and is the understanding being used in the implementation of these specifications. The changes are still considered to be administrative.

e After discussion with the NRC staff and to facilitate the conversion review, an LS DOC and its associated NSHC are being provided.

j ATTACHED PAGES:

s s

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 5

End 2 3/4.6-1

- End 3A 1 and 1a End 3B 1

End 4 1, 31a, 31b and 31c i

i I

j 2

~.

s i

i

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1-07 A 3/4.6.1

""J"""Y CONTAINMENT 0 3.6.0 1 CONTAI MENT INTEGRITY LIMITED CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 "ri=ry C0fAI!;tiEf IEEC"JTY G. nth 3Nept3shall be maintained 10PERABLE.

o 1.g1,3 0 3.6.1-1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.

ACTION:

"ithout pri=ry C0fAI""Ef ICEC"!TY, With.TgqtainmentMnopetable3 restore

....-.. Contai_6toiOPERjBJDwithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT

-,,,m.

.m.,

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

o

' cue"orisorelpenettatiof!ificW: pat _hsnappJicableito flow patns with_two cont 31nhenttisolationlyal ves)JJ11thlonelcont81nnent Msolation;VaTveli.noperable 1 02-ALS igLrept5foricontainment ventilation;isolatioCValves,,withTesilientisealslthat 1

2 0 3.6.3 28

fG!IqlBrdbleIdueltolleakageXWithJfj1Wtt3Fisolateltheiaffected i

peGSditWrFflgpath'With_1GLhggr,s;)y3selgffet2]eestione31o_sedlnd dedlR1Mantomat1Qalve7tclot8dinandaTSV1thleFb]jadifl.angeloricheckivalve with f glthroughlthelvalve'secur,,ed;roribe11njatMeast:HOTiSTANDBYWithinjtheLnext;6 hou Xraj!dliniCOLIESHUIDOWNJithigtheJolloitLoE3030utM SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS n

4.6.1.1

. riinary C0 fait?liEf ICEC"ITY Con _ ainment3shall be demonstrated OP,ERABLE:

t a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations * # not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation M_._,jj.

ts valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges,-or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, QCc!gek]ValVeWith'floEthroughitJ1eWalVe' secured l hMAi%

except as provided in Table 2.1.1 of the Technical Requirements Manualt end.; Isolation detR.eEin1hipNdiatBnladeaslaaylbRefflediby3se - @dir:p]

Rfia @jnistrati p J b.

By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the p- "g' requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment cr.d ;r; locked, ;caled or other.;isc secured ir; the closed positicr.. These penetrations ( shall be verified closed during E98383 each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days. The blind flange on the fuel transfer canal need not be verified closed except after each drainage of the canal.

(

QLceptithenIclistd:by.", nag [alIV61VesVindSJind.jfl angesithatiarelock_ed d DNM RERMBtGt1LeWisneutt@iEfa@BFfsenjed rorroterwiselsestedlmanos1 BlWr&ttl1M2119esMM3Igact1Vateggomaticialyysza.teicloted toltatisfy i

ECEEDGCJfMB3162Rhe3051t16GTstIM3etiffed;botDayibe3e~rjfi_ediby I

E b m B m 2Lt1 9 ]! 1 a g ]

CPSESMark-up ofCTS 3N.6

.3M.6-1 11/2M8

I DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS SECTION 3/4.6 l

This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked-up change to the current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change numbers contained in enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications).

In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in enclosure 4.

Only technical changes are discussed: administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For enclosures 3A, 38, 4, 6A and 6B, text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location.

CHANGE NUMBER lgit[C DESCRIPTION

" ^ ' " ^ " ' " " ' " " " " " " ' ' ~ ' - - ' - - - - -

'l 1 01 EGA NUREC 1431. The requireccats for contain;cnt 0-3.6.1 1 l

)

opcrability, including the rcquir;ccats picviously found in the C0!HAI!;liE!;T !!HCC"I"I definition, arc discussed in the expanded bascs of the contain;;nt LCO.

This chengc is consistcat,4ith i U"EC-1431.

Con'istent s

utith'NUREG 143 Mig [toyedE5^3^6TWouldTetag teAuiresimts"cuttgig3y.Isptcit9d MICTSWA!63n7

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1 02 ALSjlg ConsistentwithNUREG1431,thissurveillancerequireme4 to verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated is now addressed by ITS 3 A 2 cantainment Isolation

/

Valves, Conditions AM C end [0pnd w

70-3.6.3 28 E Surveillance Reauirements a s.o.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4.

heTISY4CtiorQl5MtRAtedEl+"=ispnacifica BayEt_ hat.J_it ole CONTAINMENGINTEGRHEWith1EEhWrarlshutdom.WThBT 1,

CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3M.6 1

11/2088

-.. ~ -. -... -

CHANGE NUMBER EliC DESCRIPTION E

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-f-1 03 A

The action statements are revised to incorporate the NUREG 1431 equal alternative isolation method of a " check valve with the flow through the valve secured." This isolation method is provided in NUREG 1431 and is cor.sidered an acceptable variation of a de-activated automatic valve.

1 04 LS-1 A note is added to valve and blind flange survcillance requirements consistent with NUREG 1431. The note allows verification of valves, flanges and isolation devices located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative means. This change is less restrictive in that the current TS SR 4.6.1.1 has an exception to valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These valves shall be verified closed during each' COLD SHUTDOWN.

However, under the current TS, if an area outside of containment became a high radiation area, entry into the area would still be required to verify the closed positions. The ITS would allow verification of all areas

1 that are high radiation areas or become high radiation i

e areas by administrative means once they had been verified CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.6 la 1U2M8

b CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.6 Page I cf 12 t

TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUlBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON CONANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 01-01 T.'l=

50!"l i; = ',,,,.. ; d;fi ;d ta;.1. "50 Yes Yes Yes Yes i

i. _..^ ; f= _.^;i. -..^.,,,,. Lility.

0-3.6.1 -1

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4 10:. ".;..

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. u vb 3 upgs u. 73 b u v4 I hig.d. u u w.=w....y gr. b w.vis T g. vesy as 5.t b 4.h C"'l= !=O!"' ' 7 '-iti=

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0-This requirement to verify the penetration flow path is Yes Yes-Yes Yes-isolated is addressed by ITS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation l

(~

g Valves 01-03 An equal alternative isolation method of a " check valve Yes Yes Yes Yes A

with the flow through the valve secured" is added to the action statements.

{

I 01-04 A note is added allowing valves, flanges and isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes LS-1 devices located in high radiation areas to be verified by r

use of administrative means.

01-05 This requirement is addressed by ITS 3.6.2 Containment Air Yes Yes Yes Yes A

Locks Required Actions.

01-06 Only containment isolation valves that are not locked.

Yes Yes Yes Yes i

LS-19 sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be verified l

closed.

8

-- u,,_m.. --.---,u. d...m. m.

Leg les les M

M

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L Q 3.6.( -1 i

6 i

f 02-01 The Containment Leakage LCO is now addressed by ITS 3.6.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes A-Containment LCO.

i l

CPSES Conversion Comperison TnNe - CTS 3N.6 11n038

- ~

=.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC)

CONTENTS I.

Organization........................................ 2 II.

Description of NSHC Evaluations...................... 3 III.

Generic No Significant Hazards Considerattons i

"A" - Admini strative Changes......................... 5 "R" - Relocated Technical Specifications............. 7 I

"LG" - Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Technical Specifications)................. 10 I

"M" - More Restrictive Requirements................. 12 IV.

Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" i

LS-1................................................

15 LS 2........................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS 3................................................

17 LS 4................................................

19 i

LS5................................................21 i

LS6................................................23 LS7................................................25 LS 8................................................ 27 4

m LS 9.........................................

LS 10...........................

....... @ t u d 3 LS 11............................................

~

Q 3.6.3 28 LS 12............................................... 34 LS 13............................................... 3 6 LS-14............................................... 38 LS 15............................................... 41 LS 16............................................... 43 LS-17............................................... 45 LS 18............................................... 48 LS-19...............................................

50 LS - 2 0.......................................... Not U sed LS 21..........................................Not Used LS - 22.......................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS 23.......................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS-24..........................................Not Used LS 25.......................................... Not Appl i cabl e 0 3.6.3 4

[.SM M ;. 736 % h. A,J % > M p g V.

Recurring No Significant Hazards Considerations "TR" TR 1................................................ 525g TR - 2................................................ 54gg TR 3................................................ 56ll I

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CPSESNoSignificantHazards Considerations -3N.6 1

11/20/98 a

4 i

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CPSESNo Significant Ha:ards Considerations - 3N.6 31c 11/20/98

i 4

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q3.6.3 APPLICABILITY:

CP REQUEST:

DOC 2-05 LG i

JFD 3.6-1 CTS 4.6.1.2.c CTS 4.6.1.2.d STS SR 3.6.1.3.11 and Associated Bases (NUREG 1434) l STS SR 3.6.1.3.14 and Associated Bases (NUREG 1433)

E ITS B3.6.1 Bases - SR 3.6.1.1 i

f CPSES CTS 4.6.1.2.c requires a leak test with gas at not less than P, or a hydrostatic test at not less than 1.1P, for certain Safety injection valves. CPSES CTS 4.6.1.2.d requires a hydrostatic test at not less than 1.1P, for certain containment spray valves.

Amendment 51 for Unit 1 and Amendment 37 for Unit 2 converts the CTS from 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option A to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option B. CTS 4.6.1.2.c and l

4.6.1.2.d were retained during that conversion. The CTS markup shows these j

surveillances,as being relocated to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program and

' the Bases for ITS SR 3.6.1.1. DOC 2-05 LG justifies the relocation based on the level of detail in the TS not being consistent with NUREG-1431. Consistency with NUREG-1431 is not an acceptable justification for relocating material from the CTS to a licensee controlled document. In the development of NUREG-1431 a specific SR with regards to j

hydrostatically testing containment isolation valves for leakage was not included I

because the WOG stated that most units did not have any valves that were hydrostatically tested. This was not the case for the BWRs (NUREGs 1433 and 1434) which had hydrostatically tested valves. In that case, STS SR 3.6.1.3.11 (NUREG-1434) and STS SR 3.6.1.3.14 (NUREG-1433) were included in the NUREGs. Changes to the STS with regards to Option A versus Option B are covered by a letter from Mr.

Christopher I. Grimes to Mr. David J. Modeen, NEl dated 11/2/95 and TSTF-52 as modified by the staff. Neither document deleted or relocated those BWR SRs, but retained the SRs in a modified form. In addition, the SE associated with Amendments 51 and 31 states that the changes are in accordance with the 11/2/95 staff letter. Thus, the Staff requires that CTS 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.d be retained.

Comment: Revise the CTS /ITS markups to show CTS 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.d as being

- retained as SRs in ITS 3.6.3. Provide additional discussions and justifications as necessary for this change.

FLOG response: (original) Current CPSES surveillance requirements CTS 4.6.1.2.c and 4.6.1.2.d are retained and have been added to the markup of ITS 3.6.3," Containment isolation

' Valve," as new surveillance requirements SR 3.6.3.12 and SR 3.6.3.13, respechvely. CTS Bases information supporting these surveillances has similarly been retained by adding it to the ITS Bases for SR 3.6.3.12 and SR 3.6.3.13.

Further, DOC 2-05 A has been revised to read; "CPSES surveillance requirement CTS 4.6.1.2.c for leak testing of specified safety inje: tion valves is renumbered and retained as new ITS SR 3.6.3.12. This change would not change the existing requirement but simply renumbers and

"CPSES surveillance requirement CTS 4.6.1.2.c for leak testing of specified safety injection valves is renumbered and retained as new ITS SR 3.6.3.12. This change would not change the existing requirement but simply renumbers and modifies the format to be consistent with the ITS. This change would be classified as Administrative (A)."

Also, DOC 2-07 A has been added to read; "CPSES surveillance requirement CTS 4.6.1.2.d for leak testing of specified containment spray valves is renumbered and retained as new ITS SR 3.6.3.13.

This change would not change the existing requirement but simply renumbers and modifies the format to be consistent with the ITS. This change would be classified as Administrative (A)."

Also, see the FLOG responses to Comments 3.6.1-1 and 3.6.3-2 regarding the relocation of the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definition requirements.

FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) SR 3.6.3-12 and SR 3.6.3-13 have been revised to add the words "to be within limits" in reference to the surveillance leakage limits which are specified in the Bases. The revision makes the surveillance wording consistent with standard STS surveillance terminology.

Also, JFD 3.6-24 has been revised to be JFD 3.6-25 since JFD 3.6-24 had previously been used by another FLOG member for a separate change.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6 EnciSA 3.6-17 and 3.6-18 Encl 6A 4

i i

l i

Containment Isolation Valves (Atricsp',aric, Substr.caphCric, Ice Condensar, orid SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY EtBESN QE.U_

B B,j kt[ W M a rggs ga e n g e w a r m a i t'ast;tL%-wmm*2n 2%--55Y;fzC;gy;nES Perform leakage rate testing for 184 days containment purge Zhid p g purge"and kB PS3

$00teifment,'prfssuteReli,ej valves with MD resilient seals.

Within 92 days after opening the valve SR 3.6.3.8 Verify each automatic containment isolation valve that is not lockeds sealed or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the isolation 18 months (81")

position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

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CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 -ITS3.6 3.6-18 11n088

1 CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION securcd in their rcquircd position unir eiinistrative 0-3.6.3 11 control, this ch;n;c would previi that isolation ti;r.c testin;; is not required for outc;;;; tic cor.tain;;. cat isolation velves th:t arc locked.,celed, or othcr.;isc securcd in 4

their required position unir etinistrativc control.LLMsg 3.6 13 A clarify #ng note is added to SR 3.6.3.7 that would allow that leakage rate testing for containment purge valves with resilient seals is not required when the penetration flow path is isolated by a leak tested blank flange. The blank flange provides the required isolation and additional testing of the valves is unnecessary.

3.6-14 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 15 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6-16 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

u 3.6 17 Not applicable. See conversion comparison table (enciesure 6B).

3.6 18 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 19 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6-20 Not used.

3.6 21 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 22 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

3.6 23 Not applicable to CPSES. See conversion comparison table (enclosure 6B).

E63 Not? applicable 36~CPSESESeeLeortter$1ctEcomparfsorftablg a.3.6.6 9 l 180C.10WC8.3.6.B1l 3;ggf Bised ron:CTsrmR3 tit 941BanceWKST3n21ar$3E3:13 o.3.6.3 30 l M beenT W CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 -ITS 3.6 4

11n0R8

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-56 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP l

REQUEST:

B3.6.3 Bases - E.1, E.2, and E.3 l

iTS B3.6.3 Bases - D.1, D.2, and D.3 STS B3.6.3 Bases - E.1, E.2 and E.3 does not provide a description of the Note 4

I associated with RA E.2. ITS B3.6.3 Bases - D.1, D.2, and D.3 also does not provide a description of the Note associated with RA D.2. The Callaway and WCGS ITS markups provide this description.

Comment: Revise the ITS markup to provide this description.

FLOG RESPONSE (original): A dese:ription of Notes 1 and 2 for Required Action D.2 has been added to the appropriate Bases section.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): See FLOG RESPONSE supplement to Comment item 4

Q 3.6.3-11.

ATTACHED PAGES:

None.

l V

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q3.6.7-12 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST:

STS B3.6.7 Bases - BACKGROUND j

4 ITS B3.6.7 Bases - BACKGROUND The last paragraph in STS B3.6.7 Bases - BACKGROUND has been deleted from i

CPSES ITS B3.6.7 Bases - BACKGROUND. Since ITS changes to the STS Bases were made based on changes to the STS on plant specific system design, or on current licencing basis as specified in the CTS, the deletion does not seem to fall into any of these categories. The paragraph provides a description of how the Spray Additive System operates when activated, and is applicable to CPSES.

Comment: Revise the ITS markup to include this paragraph modified to specify plant specific parameters or provide a discussion and justification for its deletion based on system design, operational constraints or current licensing basis.

FLOG response:

(original) The change to the B3.6.7 Bases - BACKGROUND is based on plant specific system design and licensing basis. However, a plant specific description of the eductor design is provided in place of the deleted sentence to provide comparable details for CPSES.The spray additive system, including the eductors, is designed to ensure the contents of the Chemical Additive Tank is injected into containment given any single active failure.

Consequently, in the short term, the pH of a train of spray can vary from acidic to strong basic.

The low spray pH can only occur during injection prior to switchover to recirculation. The equilibrium sump solution pH is alsove 7 and adequate spray pH for long term iodine retention is achieved with the onset of the spray recirculation mode. The high spray pH can only occur after switchover to recirculation from the sump when spray additive is added to recirculated sump water. The high pH condiNo transient is bounded by the hydrogen generation analysis.

FLOG RESPONSE:(revised) The Background discussion of the Spray Additive System has been revised to restore the deleted paragraph as modified to be specific to CPSES.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Enci5B B 3.6-50 l

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r APPLICABLE The Spray Additive System is essential to the removal of SAFETY ANALYSES airborne iodine within containment following a DBA.

Following the assumed release of radioactive materials into containmenta the containment is assumed to leak at its design value volume following the accident. The analysis assumes that H04 56'i3[ of gg containment. - w C is covered by the spray (Ref. 1).

(continued)

CMESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3 6 B 3.6-50 W1248

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q3.6.7-16 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST:

ITS B3.6.7 Bases-SR 3.6.7.5 CPSES ITS B3.6.7 Bases SR 3.6.7.5 adds the following sentences: " Flow of between 50 and 100 gpm through the eductor test loops (supplied from the RWST) simulates flow from the Chemical Additive Tank. The flow rate through the eductors is not critical because the entire Chemical Additive Tank contents is injected prior to isolation." The latter sentence is confusing. In one sense it implies that the SR is not needed tiow rate...not critical." In another sense it implies that even if the flow rate is substantially less than 50 gpm, the contents of the tank will be injected before the system isoiates.

See Comment Number 3.6.7-17 for a related concem.

Comment: Provide a discussion and justification for this change based on system design, operation constraints or current licensing basis. See Comment Number 3.6.7-17.

FLOG response:

(original) The CTS require that RWST test water flow rates of between 50 gpm and 100 gpm through the eductor test loop of each train of the spray additive system be varified at least once per 5 years. The CTS BASES only describe the long term pH requirements for the spray additive system. The specified flow rates of 50 and 100 gpm are arbitrary and were not used in any safety analysis. The long term sump pH is not affected by the specific eductor flow rates since the design ensures the entire contents of the Chemical Additive Tank (CAT) are injected prior to isolation. Only short term spray pH is affected by the eductor flow rates. As described in the response to 3.6.7-12, above, the short term pH range is not significant. In fact, lower eductor flow rates are better for the short term since that would minimize the maximum spray pH. High eductor flow rates from the CAT were established by pre-operational testing and used for the bounding pH transient analyses. Flow testing through the RWST test loop is neither precise nor required to verify critical parameters. This surveillance is only required to ensure the eductors are not blocked and are capable of educting. The ITS BASES do not require additional changes.

FLOG response: (revised) The CTS require that RWST test water flow rates of between 50 gpm and 100 gpm through the eductor test loop of each train of the spray additive system be verified at least once per 5 years. The CTS BASES only describe the long term pH requirements for the spray additive system. The specified flow rates of 50 and 100 gpm are r:ot used in any safety analysis. The long term sump pH is not affected by the specific eductor flow rates since the design ensures the entire contents of the Chemical Additive Tank (CAT) are injected prior to isolation. Only short term spray pH is affected by the eductor flow rates. As described in the response to 3.6.7-12, above, the short term pH range is not significant. In fact, lower eductor flow rates are better for the short term since that would minimize the maximum spray pH. This surveillance ;s only required to ensure the eductors are not blocked and are capable of educting.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Enci5B B 3.6-54

Spray Additive System (At c:;phcric, Subt.c';phcric, Ice Ocaden:cr. :nd Dual)

B 3.6.7 BASES

' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.7.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

To ensure th t th; correct pggtjgggggMM*9ishi M] pll ic.21 i: c:tchli;hcd in the Mr;ted w;ter

g.., _ _ _ _ _.. 'u _ ; t..

i l

m.

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flowI55c ih. M t$ hphay'kdditivh byskNMs is verified once every 5 years. Eggy6 j

gigI 6 -X s

'. 218 w.

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--J ier- : +c __

E ' De l

0-3.6.7 16 N

......m

r.... m..

......~m

.....m

....m e.; cunt of ;;c0ll will M ::tcr:d into the now path upon i

Contain cat Spray Systc; initiatica. Due to the passive nature of the spray additive flow controls, the 5 year Frequency is sufficient to identify component degradation that may affect flow rete.

1 d

i i

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Chapter 6_.5.

t

t 1

l CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.6 B 3.6-54 S/]SB7 L

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET 4

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP-3.6-006 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: (original ) Corrected two references in the 3.6.1 Applicable Safety Analyses l

section.

REQUEST: (revised) Based on NRC reviewer comments, the applicable references have been revised to include both references in both affected locations.

ATTACHED PAGES:

f Attachment No.12 - CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6

't Enci5B B 3.6-2 4

9 4

i

Containment 'At;;;c;phcric)

B 3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND 2.

closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3,

" Containment Isolation Valves" b.

Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.2,

" Containment Air Locks";

c.

All equipment hatches are closed;am)3es}ed; and 0-3.6.1-02 d.

The pr;;;uriz;d sealing mechanism associated with a penetration leIgIWlds7Ebe]TgesZogitittgs) is OPERABLE.

i a cept ;; provided ir LCO 3.5.[ ].

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the.

limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBAs that rewit in a challenge to containment OPEPABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break and a rod ejection m3.646 accident (REA) (Ref la 23). In addition, releax J significant fission uct radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA or REA. In the DBA analyses, it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for these DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leaka of 3.6.0-02

@JM of containment air weight per day (Ref. 32 This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting CP 3.6 06 from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J2 Optjojr 0 3.6.1 06 R](Ref.1),asL,: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P ) resulting from the limiting DBA. The allowable leakage rate represented by L, forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing.

L, is assumed to be EI) pf.2@D1:.8.,insertt3Jg;gtigtg per day in the safety anal, lis at P, = 44-138)) psig. Ih6'J;:Blf.01sted 0 3.6.0 2 p1gkjuJjLEDfthMICA$'!$$36587than"18J3Ip!10 (Ref. 3).

Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the 50 Policy St;t; ;.t 10CFR5036(cKQni).

(continued)

CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.6 B 3.6-2 11/20R8

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