ML20147D189: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML20147D189 | | number = ML20147D189 | ||
| issue date = 12/15/1978 | | issue date = 12/15/1978 | ||
| title = Forwards Amend | | title = Forwards Amend 8 to Gibbssar Balance of Plant Standard Safety Analysis Rept Referencing RESAR-414.Requested Main Steam Line Break Analyses Have Been Incl in Section 6.2.1.1. Amend Incl Responses to Various Branch Questions | ||
| author name = Prietto R | | author name = Prietto R | ||
| author affiliation = GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.) | | author affiliation = GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.) | ||
Latest revision as of 04:50, 8 August 2022
| ML20147D189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000584 |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1978 |
| From: | Prietto R GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.) |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812190103 | |
| Download: ML20147D189 (200) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:b \ Gibbs B Hill,Inc. .,DilS DOCUMENT CONTAINS M P00R QUALITY PAGES , E N GINE E RS DE SIGN E RS CONSTRUCTORS 1 l l DIRECT DIAL E XT E N S7 9N mm Teo- 516 7 December 15, 1978 LGH-NRC-54 File: 5.1.4 i Director's Office of Nuclear Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docket Room j
Subject:
GIBBSSAR Docket No. STN-50-584 Gentlemen: Enclosed are sixty (60) copies of Amendment 8 to GIBBSSAR, the Gibbs & Hill, Inc. Balance of Plant Standard Safety Analysis Report referencing RESAR-414. . Amendment 8 includes completed responses to Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch Questions 010.13A, 010.16 and 010.64; Containment Systems Branch Question 022.2 and 022.9; Mechanical Engineering Branch Question 111.43; Structural Engineering Branch Questions 131.52 and 131.56 through 131.76; Reactor Systems Branch Question 212.35; System Analysis Section, Analysis Branch Questions 222.1 through 222.6 (except 222.4); Section A, Accident Analysis Branch Questions 311.20 and 311.21; Effluent Treatment Systems Branch Questions 321.16 through 321.25; and Emergency Planning Branch Question 432.0. Jr ~Tm,6,
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I' 781219 oto3 '% _ 3
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393 SEVENTH AVE N U E NEW YORK. N. Y 10001 CABLE. GIB BSHIL L, NE W YORK k
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f In addition the requested main steam line break analyses have been included in modified Section 6.2.1.1. Further, it is our understanding per discussions at our 11/7/78 meeting that Question 005.5 is to be withdrawn. If you have any questions or' comments concerning this submittal or letter, we will be pleased to meet with you at your convenience. Very truly yours, GIBBS & HILL, Inc. f RP:racu Robert Prieto
Attachment:
Affidavit GIBBSSAR Assistant Copies: 3 Originals + 60 cc Project Manager cc: J. Conran U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standardization Branch Washington, D.C. 20555
. .- . . . . . .. ~ . . - . .-. - , . . , . . . . .
STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS Robert Prieto, being duly sworn, states:
- 1. That he is GIBBSSAR Assistant Project Manager.
- 2. That he is duly authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this application and exhibit (60 copies of GIBBSSAR Amendment 8) attached hereto.
- 3. That all statements-made and all matters set forth herein are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge, infor-mation and belief.
y > Robert Prieto Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for State and County above named, this /f b day of d'um/% , 1978
/
EJCS J. Do:GRTINO j) , " NOTARY PUI:UC, Ctate of New Yotk it d c / N o. M 4M TJM Quotiflod in Em75 County k [ (( CommMn Exp.ru Mm:5 1 1990 1 l l
r , Gibbs 8 Hill. Inc. E N GIN E E R S D E SIO N E R S CONSTRUCTORS DIRECT DIAL E X T E N SIO N imi veo. 5167 December 15, 1978 LGH-NRC-54 File: 5.1.4 Director's Office of Nuclear Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docket Room
Subject:
GIBBSSAR Docket No. STN-50-584 Gentlemen: Enclosed are sixty (60) copies of Amendment 8 to GIBBSSAR, the Gibbs & Hill, Inc. Balance of Plant Standard Safety (q) Analysis Report referencing RESAR-414. Amendment 8 includes completed responses to Auxiliary and i Power Conversion Systems Branch Questions 010.13A, 010.16 and 010.64; Containment Systems Branch Question 022.2 and 022.9; Mechanical Engineering Branch Question 111.43; Structural Engineering Branch Questions 131.52 and 131.56 through 131.76; Reactor Systems Branch Question 212.35; System Analysis Section, Analysis Branch Questions 222.1 through 222.6 (except 222.4); Section A, Accident Analysis Branch Questions 311.20 and 311.21; Effluent Treatment Systems Branch Questions 321.16 through 321.25; and Emergency Planning Branch Question 432.0. O 393 SEVENTH AVENUE NEW YORM, N Y.10001 CAOLE OlB B EHILL. N EW YORK
- m. . - _ _ . . .._ _ _ ._. -. -. . . _ ._ _ _ . _ . ._
s 4
+
.o " ' In addition the. requested main steam line break analynes have been included in modified Section'6.2.1.1. Further, it is our understanding per discussions'at our 11/7/78 meeting that' Question 005.5 is.to be withdrawn. , If you have-any: questions or' comments concerning this submittal or letter, we will be pleased to meet with you at your convenience. Very truly yours, , GIBBS & HILL, Inc. di.d RP:racu Robert Prieto i
Attachment:
Affidavit GIBBSSAR Assistant Copies: 3 Originals + 60 cc Project Manager-cc: J. Conran U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standardization Branch. O I Washington,'D.C. 1 b O f _ - . . _ . . ~ - . - . , . - . _ . - - . . . _ . . - . . - . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . - . . . - .
STATE OF NEW YORK l i O . COUNTY OF KINGS l
.i i Robert Prieto, being duly sworn, states:
i
- 1. That he is GIBBSSAR Assistant Project Manager, c
- 2. That he is duly authorized on the part of said Corporation to assign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this application and exhibit (60 copies of GIBBSSAR Amendment 8) attached hereto. :
- 3. That all statements made and all matters set forth herein are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge, infor-
! mation and belief. O , A/ ad Robert Prieto subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for State and County above named, this /[ t_ day of l Olbr//h , 1978. 1 ~i , ALICE J. DeMARTINo NOTARY PULUC. State of New York No. 24 451934
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- 4 u N jf// 3 Quclified in Kings Courty k /(
Commission Expire. t.!mcc 301980 3 O
GIBBSSAR AMENDMENT 8 () INSTRUCTION SHEET The following instructional information and checklist is being pro-vided to insert Amendment 8 to GIBBSSAR, the Gibbs & Hill Standard Safety Analysis Report. Since in most cases the original contains information printed on both sides of paper, a new sheet is being furnished to replace sheets containing superseded material. As a result, the front or back of a sheet may contain information that is merely reprinted rather than changed. Discard the old sheets and insert the new sheets as listed below: Note, pages to be inserted that are marked with an asterisk (*) are being transmitted under separate cover and are not contained in this package. O O
1 ( ; Remove Insert
.(Front /Back) (Front /Back) l.8-2/- 1.8-2/1.8-2a .
T1.8-2 Sh. 1/T1.8-2 Sh. 2 T1.8-2 Sh. 1/T1.8-2 Sh. la l T1.8-2 Sh. 2/- T1.8-2 Sh. 5/T1.8-2 Sh. 6 T1.8-2 Sh. 5/T1.8-2 Sh. 6 T1.8-2 Sh. 6a/- T1.8-2 Sh. 7/T1.8-2 Sh. 8 T1.8-2 Sh. 7/T1.8-2 Sh. 8 : T1.8-2 Sh. 9/T1.8-2 Sh. 10 T1.8-2 Sh. 9/T1.8-2 Sh. 10 T1.8-2 Sh. 10a/- T1.8-2 Sh. 13/- T1.8-2 Sh. 1/T1.8-3 Sh. 2- T1.8-3 Sh. 1/- T1.8-3 Sh. 2/T1.8-3 Sh. 2a T1.8-3 Sh. 3/T1.8-4 Sh. 3a T1.8-3 Sh. 3/T1.8-3 Sh. 3a 3.5-8/- 3.5-8/3.5-8a 3.5-8a/3.5-9 3.5-9/- ,! 3.7-1/3.7-la 3.7-1/3.7-la 3.7-8/3.7-9 3.7-8/3.7-9 ; 3.7-15/- 3.7-15/- l 3.7-16/- 3.7-16/- l 3.7-17/3.7-18 3.7-17/3.7-18 i 3.7-20/3.7-20a 3.7-20/3.7-20a O 3.7-23/3.7-24 3.7-23/3.7-24 3.7-30/3.7-30a 3.7-30/3.7-30a 3.7-49/3.7-50 3.7-49/3.7-50 3.8-16/3.8-16a 3.8-16/3.8-16a 3.8-27/3.8-28 3.8-27/3.7-27a . 3.8-28/- , T3.ll-3 Sh. 1/T3.11-3 Sh. 2 T3.11-3 Sh. 1/ * ' T3.ll-4/- T3.11-4 Sh. 1/T3.ll-4 Sh. 2* 6.2-1/6.2-la 6.2-1/6.2-la 6.2-3/6.2-4 6.2-3/6.2-4 6.2-5/6.2-6 6.2-5/6.2-6 6.2-9a/6.2-10a 6.2-9a/6.2-10 i 6.2-11/6.2-12 6.2-10a/6.2-ll 6.2-12/- i 6.2-15/6.2-16 6.2-15/- 6.2-16/6.2-16a 6.2-17/6.2-18 6.2-17/- , 6.2-18/- , T6.2-1/- T6.2-1/- l T6.2-5/- T6.2-5/- T6.2-6 Sh. 1/T6.2-6 Sh. 2 T6.2-6 Sh. 1/T6.2-6 Sh. 2 T6.2-6 Sh. 3/- T6.2-6 Sh. 3/- T6.2-8/- (Note - The in-struction sheet to Amend-ment 7 incorrectly called for this table to be removed , and a new one inserted. A copy is provided herein to
I i I Insert I Remove (Front /Back) (Front /Back) be used if you destroyed the old copy in Amendment < 7) T6.2-11/- T6.2-ll/- T6.2-12/T6.2-13 T6.2-12/T6.2-13 T6.2-14a Sh. 1/T6.2-14a Sh. 2 T6.2-14 Sh. 1/T6.2-14 Sh. 2 T6.2-14a Sh. 3/T6.2-14a Sh. 4 T6. 2-14a Sh. 5/T6. 2-14a Sh. 6 T6.2-14a Sh. 7/T6.2-14a Sh. 8 T6.2-14a Sh. 9/T6.2-14a Sh. 10 T6.2-14a Sh. 11/T6.2-14a Sh. 12 T6.2-14a Sh. 13/- T6.2-14b Sh. 1/T6.2-14b Sh. 2 ' T6.2-14b Sh. 3/T6.2-14b Sh. 4 ' T6.2-14b Sh. 5/T6.2-14b Sh. 6 - T6.2-14b Sh. 7/T6.2-14b Sh. 8 T6.2-14c Sh. 1/T6.2-14c Sh. 2 T6.2-14c Sh. 3/T6.2-14c Sh. 4 T6.2-14c Sh. 5/- 3 T6.2-14d Sh. 1/T6.2-14d Sh. 2 W T6.2-14d Sh. 3/T6.2-14d Sh. 4 T6.2-14d Sh. 5/T6.2-14d Sh. 6 T6.2-14d Sh. 7/T6.2-14d Sh. 8 T6.2-14d Sh. 9/- T6.2-14e Sh. 1/T6.2-14e Sh. 2 T6.2-14e Sh. 3/T6.2-13e Sh. 4 T6.2-14e Sh. 5/- T6.2-19 Sh6/T6.2-19 Sh. 6A T6.2-19 Sh. 6/T6.2-19 Sh. 6A 6.5-1/6.5-2 6.5-1/6.5-2* 6.5-2a/-
- T6.5-1 Sh. 1/T6.5-1 Sh. 2 T6.5-1 Sh. 1/T6.5-1 Sh. la T6.5-1 Sh. 3/T6.5-1 Sh. 4 T6.5-1 Sh. 2/T6.5-1 Sh. 3 T6.5-1 Sh. 3a/T6.5-1 Sh. 4
- T6.5-1 Sh. 5/T6.5-1 Sh. 6 T6.5-1 Sh. 5/T6.5-1 Sh. Sa T6.5-1 Sh. 6/T6.5-1 Sh. 6a T6.5-1 Sh. 7/T6.5-1 Sh. 8 T6.5-1 Sh. 7/T6.5-1 Sh. 8 T6.5-1 Sh. 9/T6.5-1 Sh. 10 T6.5-1 Sh. 9/T6.5-1 Sh. 10 T7.1-1 Sh. 1/T7.1-1 Sh. 2 i T7.1-1 Sh. 3/T7.1-1 Sh. 4 T7.1-1 Sh. 5/T7.1-1 Sh. 6 T7.1-1 Sh. 7/T7.1-1 Sh. 8 T7.1-1 Sh. 9/T7.1-1 Sh. 10 9.4-1/9.4-la 9.4-1/9.4-2*
9.4-2/9.4-3 9.4-3/9.4-3a* 9.4-4/- 9.4-4/9.4-5* 9.4-6/9.4-6a* lll 9.4-5/9.4-6 9.4-6b/9.4-7* 9.4-6a/9.4-7 9.4-7a/9.4-8* 9.4-7a/9.4-8 ,
- r,w-m om,- . ,
l (2) Remove Insert (Front /Back) (Front /Back) 9.5-1/9.5-2 9.5-1/9.5-2* 9.5-3/9.5-4 9.5-3/9/5-4* 9.5-5/9.5-6 9.5-5/9.5-6* 9.5-7/9.5-8 9.5-7/9.5-8* 9.5-9/9.5-10 9.5-9/9.5-10* 9.5-11/9.5-12 9.5-11/9.5-12*
- 9.5-13/9.5-14 9.5-13/9.5-14*
9.5-15/9.5-16 9.5-15/9.5-16* 9.5-17/9.5-18 9.5-17/9.5-18* 9.5-19/9.5-20 9.5-19/9.5-20* 9.5-21/9.5-22 9.5-21/9.5-22* 9.5-23/9.5-24 9.5-23/9.5-23a* 9.5-23b/9.5-23c* 9.5-23d/9.5-23e* 9.5-23f/9.5-23g* 9.5-23h/9.5-24* Tll.2-1 Sh. 1/Tll.2-1 Sh. 2 Tll.2-1 Sh. 1/Tll.2-1 Sh. 2 ' T11.2-4 Sh. 5/Tll.2-4 Sh. 6 T11.2-4 Sh. 5/Tll.2-4 Sh. 6 T11.5-1/- Tll.5-1 Sh. 1/Tll.5-1 Sh. 2 T12.3-3 Sh. 1/T12.3-3 Sh. 2 T12.3-3/- ({) T12.3-4 Sh. 1/T12.3-4 Sh. 2 T12.3-4 sh. 3/- 13.3-1/- 13.3-1/13.3-2 13.3-3/13.3-4 13.3-5/13.3-6 ' 13.3-7/13.3-8 0 010-14/0 010-15 0 010-14/0 010-15 0 010-18/0 010-19 0 010-18/Q 010-19 0 010-68/O 010-69 0 010-68/0 010-69 0 022-3/O 022-4 0 022-3/Q 022-4 0 022-15/0 022-16 0 022-15/Q 022-16 l Q 111-49/O 111-50 0 111-49/0 111-50 0 131-59/- Q 131-59/- l O 131-63/0 131-64 0 131-65/0 131-66 , Q 131-67/0 131-68 1 Q 131-69/0 131-70 0 131-71/0 131-72 0 131-73/Q 131-74 0 131-75/0 131-76 0 131-77/0 131-78 0 131-79/0 131-80 Q 131-81/0 131-82 i 0 131-83/- Q 212-37/0 212-38 0 212-37/0 212-38 Q 212-38a/- O Q 222-1/Q 222-2 1
Remove Insert (Front /Back) (Front /Back)- O'222-3/Q 222-4 0 222-5/0 222-6 - 0 311-23/ * ' O 311-24/Q 211-25 O 321-17/0 321-18 Q-321-19/O 321-20 0 321 21/0 321-22 1
-.Q 321-23/Q 321-24
-Q 321-25/0 321-26 0 321-27/O 321-28 ,
0 321-29/0 321-30 0 321-31/0 321-32 0 331-23/- Q 432-1/- , P I FIGURES 3.7-2 3.7-2 , 3.8-2 3.8-2 4 3.11-l* ' 3.11-2* 4 6.2-13 6.2-13 through 6.2-16 , 6.2-14 6.2-15 6.2-16 6.2-17 6.2-17A 6.2-17B l 6.2-18 6.2-18 through 6.2-20 : 6.2-19 6.2-20 9.4-1 9.4-1 9.4-16 9.4-16 13.3-1 13.3-2 ! 13.3-3 13.3-4 ' 13.3-5 t i A i 1
- . .m- . . _ , . - - __..m_ , _ _ _ . - _ , , - , - - - . - - , - _ . - . . -. - .. . . , _ , . _ , . . - -
i n V GIBBSSAP 1 1.8.3 Utility-Applicant SAR Inputs Table 1.8-3 lists the information which must be supplied in the Utility-Applicant's SAP. Format references are keyed to Fevision 2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. l 1.8.4 Structural and Seismic Design Interfaces The following criteria are provided to ensure structural and seismic design compatibility between BOP structures and NSSS components:
- 1. The seisnde re sponse spectra and the differential displacements at the support points, as specified by the NSSS applicant will not be exceeded.
I
- 2. The envelopes of the loads that will be transmitted from Category I or non-Category I systems that will connect to the NSSS components, as provided by the NSSS applicant, will not be exceeded.
- 3. The seismic analysis of the BOP structures includes mass and
() stiffness properties of the NSSS as provided by the NSSS applicant.
- 4. The maximum number of earthquake cycles as specified for the NSSS components by the NSSS applicant will not be exceeded.
- 5. The elevation to which the constraint should be flooded after a LOCA, if required and as specified by the NSSS applicant, will be considered in the design of the containment as appropriate.
- 6. The maximum differential displacements at points of the NSSS that will interf ace with BOP structures, as specified by the NSSS applicant, will not be exceeded.
- 7. The structural properties of the BOP structures that support the NSSS components, as specified by the NSSS applicant, will be satisfied.
- 8. All the loads that will be transmitted to the BOP structures from the NSSS components as specified by the NSSS applicant, will be used in the design of the BOP structures.
O 1.8-2 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAF ,
- 9. The' allowable deflections of the BOP structures supporting the NSSS components, as specified by the NSSS applicant, will 8 not be exceeded.
4 O O 1.8-2a Amendment 8
1, t O O i
- GIDBSSAP l 'I ABLE 1.8-2 (Sheet 1 of 13)
FLUID SYSTEM INTEEFACES j (Westinghouse-414) GIBBSSAP GIBBSSAP Interface Interface GIBBSS AR RESAR-414 1(e y Figure Key Figure Interf ace Interface
} Criteria
- Number Number Number Numler Ee scriptioD Crit eria _
f ] Containment Sprav SP-01 6.2-25 NA RESAR-414 Containment Subsection Subsection $ sump 81 6.2.2.2e 6.2.4.2 j 6.3-1/1 recire. to i i FliR/SI pump . SP-02 6.2-25 NA RESAR-414 Containment Subs ection Subsection 6.3-1/1 sump 82 6.2.2.2e 6.2.4.2 f recirc. to FilR/SI pump 1 i Subsection Subsection
- SP-03 6.2-25 NA RESAR-414 FWST Line to-6.3-1/1 !!HSI f. LilSI/ 6.2.2.2a 6.3.2.2 '
3 FliR pumps
- 4
! SP-04 6.2-25 NA FES AR-414 FWST Line to Subsection Subsection 6.3-1/1 IIIISI & LIISI/ 6.2.2.2a 6.3.2.2 FHR pumps NA 6.2-25 RESAP-414 RESAR-414 FWST supply to subsection Section , FLIP-SIS-1 6.3-1/1 CS pump 31 6.5.2.2 6.2.2 NA 6.2-25 RESAB-414 RESAR-414 FWST supply to Subsection Section
] ^ P11R-SIS-18 6.3-1/1 CS pump 82 6.5.2.2 6.2.2 SFP Coolinq and Cleaninq SP-01 9.1-3 PESAF-414 FES AP-414 Purification Subsection Appendix A RIIR-SIS-7 6.3-1/1 to RWST 9.1.3.2 9A.2 i j SF-02 9.1-3 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 Purification Subsection Appendix PIIR-SIS-8 6. 3- 1/1 from FWST 9.1.3.2 9A.2 i SF-03 9.1-3 RESAF-414 FESAR-414 EPS evaporator Subsection Appendix PRS-1 9.3-3/1 feed pump 9.1.3.2 9A.2 return to l refuel canal l ' Amendment 4 l r i h i L__- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ - - _ _ _
'N '% d %Y GIBBSSAR i TABL E 1. 8- 2 (Sheet la of 13) '
4
!LUID SYSTEM INTEPFACES (Westingtouse-414)
Interface interface GIBPSSAR FESAR-41/4 GIBBSSAR GIBBSSAR Figure Key Figure Interface Interface Fey Criteria Hunter tiumter Mter Descrirtion [I tel gia E_ umber NA RESAR-414 Peturn from SFP Subsect ion Appendix SP-04 9.1-3 9A.2 8 9.3-3/1 demineralizers to 9.1.3.2 Fecycle 11oldup Tanks i Ane nd aent 8
O O GIPfiSSAF TABLE 1.8-2 (Sheet 2 of 13) FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACES (Wes t inghouse-414) GIBBSSAF Gil5BSSAP Interface Interface GIPBSSAF B ESAR-414 , Eey Figure Key Figure Interf ace Int e r f ace Niamber Number Number twscription Crit eria Numter_ Crit er ia_ Service Water SW-01 9. 2- 1 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 Service water Subsection Tables CVCS-21 9.3-1/4 to and from 9.2.1 9.2-1, 9. 3- 2 chiller unit SW-02 9.2-1 Utility Utility Service water Subsection NA Applicant Appli- supply to 9.2.1.1 UA-01 cant's service water SAR pumps SW- 0 3 9.2-1 Utility Utility Water from - NA Applicant Appli- strainer 4 UA-02 cant's SAR package SW-04 9. 2- 1 Utility Utility Water from tube Sute NA Applicant Appli- side of CCW h/x 9.' i UA-03 cant's SAR C_ogeneDt coolina Water CC-01 9.2-4 FESAF-414 PESAR-414 CCW to FCP Sus.,45 .on Appendix SA RCS-14 5.5-1 thermal 9.2.2.4 < barrier CC-02 9.2-4 PESAR-414 PES AR-414 CCW from Subsection Appendix SA FCS-15 5.5-1 FCP therinal 9.2.2.2 barrier CC-03 9.2-4 PESAF-414 PESAR-414 CCW to PCP Subsection Appendix SA RCS-16 5.5-1 motor lower 9.2.2.2 tearing h/x 4 CC-04 9.2-4 FESAP-414 FES AR-414 CCW f rom FCP Subsection Appendix SA FCS-17 5.5-1 motor lower 9.2.2.2 bearing h/x Ame ndment 4
. . 1 m i
o GIBl>SSAR i TABLE 1. ti-2 (Sheet 5 of 13) FLUID SYSTEM INTEftFACES (Westinghouse-414) l GIDIiSSAR GIBBSSAP Interface Interface GIBBSSAR hi?*F-418 l Fey Figure Key Fig ure Inte rf ace Interance Humle r Humber Numter Number Desc d p_ tion Cdt eElL Criteria __ Dgminerahtelp_Dd Peactor Makeup Water Systeg { DW-02 9.2 5 Utility utility Gen. primary subsection HA l Applicant Appli- cooling demin. 10.2.4 < UA-04 cant's supply i SAR 2 j DW-0 3 9.2-5 Utility' Utility Turb. plant - NA j Applicant Appli- cooling wtr UA-05 cant's head tank SAR demin. supply { DW-04 9.2-5 Utility Utility Deaerated water Suksection NA } Applicant Appli- to oxygen 9.3.2.2 UA-06 cant's analyzer 4 i SAR i DW-05 9.2-5 Utility utility Polisher back- Subsection HA 1 Applicant Appli- wash pump 9.2.7 UA-07 cant's demin. supply l SAR i MW-01 9.2-5 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 FMST BRS - Subsect ion l t BRS-19 9.3-3/2 recycle evap. 9.2.3 a condensate DW-01 9.2-6 RESAF-414 RESAR-414 Demin. to Subs ect ion Table 1 CVCS-20a' 9.3-1/4 chiller surge 9.2.3.2 9.2-2
- tank MW-02 9.2-6 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Recycle evap. - Table j
- BRS- 12 9.3-3/2 cond. demin. 9.2.3 supply
{ 1 l MW-03 9.2-6 F ESAR-414 RESAR-414 Recycle evap. -- Table j BR S- 13 9.3-3/2 package makeup 9.2-3 supply i t Amendment 4 1 k
i O O
~
o , GIBBSSAE TABLE 1.8-2 , (Sheet 6 of 13) ; l FLUID SYSTEM IN"IERFACES j (Westinghouse-414) 4 j j . I GIBDSSAF GIBBSSAR Interface Interface GIPSSSAR RESAF-414 f
~ Fey Figure Key Figure Inte rf ace Interface {
Numt>e r Numteg _ Nu:nbe r Numt e r Iescription Crit ela i Crit eria IM-06 9.2-5 Utilit.y utility Supply from Subsection NA g Applicant Appli- demineralized 9.2.7 UA-27 cant's water treatment i SAR system MW-04 9.2-6 FERSAR-414 FESAR-414 Fecycle evap. - Table [ BRS-16 9.3-3/2 reagent tank 9.2.3 ; 6akeup supply 4 i MW 9.2-6 PESAF-414 RESAR-414 CVCS BA Subsection Table l CVCS-25 9. 3- 1/ 5 batching tank 9.2.3.2 9.2-3 l makeup supply - l HW-06 (Deleted) RESAF-414 (Deleted) CVCS DI flush 8 CVCS-26 tank makeup - - supply MW-07 9.2-6 RESAF-414 RESAR-414 CVCS chem. Subsection Table i 4 CVCS-12 9.3-1/3 mixing tank 9.2.3.2 9.2-3 ! makeup supply
, NH-08 9.2-6 RESAP-414 RESAF-414 CVCS FC pump Subsection Table i CVCS-3a 9.3-1/1 standpipe 9.2.3.2 9.2-3 }
- makeup supply GIBBSSAR Subsection 4 f NW-09 9.2-6 RESAF-414 FESAR-414 FCS pres-FCS-9 5.1 - 1/ 2 surizer relief 9.2.3.2 9.3.2 tank makeup Main Steam Feheat and Dump MS-03 10.3-1 Utility -. Utility Main Steam Subsection hA i Applicant Applica nt's lines second 11.5.2.5 l UA-08 SAR sampling }
MS-04 10.3-1 Utility Utility Moist. sepa- - NA ! Applicant Appli- rator/ reheater j UA-09 cant's 81 to reheate } SAF crain tank i i
- i Amendment 6
- t i
O O O GIBBSSAF TABLE 1.8-2 (sheet 6a of 13) FLUID SYSTE*4 INTEPFACES (Westinglouse-414) 4 GIBBGSAE GIBBSSAR Interface Interface GIPBSSAP FESAF-414 Fey Figure Fey Figure Interface Interface DesgIl d on Cr iteria Criteria Numier _ Numte r }]umitr ?_tumi er_ _ MS-05 10. 3- 1 Utility utility Moist, sepa- - 14A Applicant Applicant's rator/releater UA-10 SAR #2 to reheater drain tank Amendment 8
i O ( O GIBBSSAE i TAbtE 1.0-2 (Shret 7 of 13) ! FLUID SYSTEM INTEI4 FACES (Westinghouse-414) GIBBSSAR GIBBSSAF Interface Interface GIDB SSAR I ESAF-414 Fey Figure Key Figure Interface Interface Pumber tiumbe r . Jiumber Number Description Criteria Crit eria . 4
- MS-01 10.3-1 FESAF-414 RESAR-414 Steam to recycle - -
- PRS-15 9.3-3/2 evaporator package
! MS-02 10.3-1 PESAF-41's PESAF-414 Steam cond. - - ! LRS-18 9.3-3/2 PE package j S.G. Feedwater System FM-01 10. 3-2 Utility Utility Chemical feed Subsection Table j through Applicant Appli- to S.G. I through 10.4.7.2 10.1-1 FM-08 UA-11 cant's 4 feedwater t hrough SAR UA-18 IN-09 10.3-2 Utility UtLitty Fan heaters Suteection tIA l q Applicant Applii.: ant 's sampling 10.4.7.5 UA-19 SAR
- Condensate System 4
? Co-01 10.4-1 Utility Utility / Secondary Subsection NA through Applicant Applicant's sampling to 11.5.2.5 ! C0-09 UA-20 SAF and from condenser d CO-09 10.4-1 Utility Utility / Chemical feed Sabsection Table j Applicant Applicant's supply line 10.3.5 10.1-1 8 j UA-25 SAR _! 4 CO-10 10.4-1 Utility Utility / Chemical feed Subsection ?!A Applicant Applica nt's discharge 10.3.5 4 UA-21 SAR I S.G. Blowdowp_Processino Systejg i ED-01 10.4-2/1 Utility Utility SG.1 thru 4 Section NA j through Applicant Applicant's blowdown sampling 11.5
. DD-05 UA-22 SAE 4
i Ane ndaent 8 i i i
- I
- .. ~. .
O O GIBBSSAP TABLE 1.8-2 ; (Sheet 8 of 13)- FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACES (Westinghouse-414) - 4 GIBRSSAR GiRBEh!O. Interface Interface GIBBSSAR E ESAP-414 Fey vispate Fey Figure Interf ace Interface , No.fyg_ p;ier Number Numler re scription Cr it eria _ Crit eria i Auxiliary.Feedwater System AF- 01 10.4-3 Utility Utility Chemical subsec tion. NA Applicant Applicant's injection to 10.3.5 ; UA-23 SAP AFW storage tank AF-02 10.4-3 Utility Utility AFW storage Subs ection NA l Applicant Applicant's tank drainage 9. 3. 3.1 . UA-24 SAR conn. ! Iiquid Waste Processing i WD-01 11.2-32 RESAF-414 RESAR-414 SIS Accumulator Table Subsection through PHR-SIS-25 6.3-1/3 No. 1 thru 4 11.2-2 6.3.2.2 WD-04 thru drains to FCDCT RUR-SIS-28 i
?
Section 4 WD-05 11.2-32 PESAP-414 RESAR-414 BCS loop Table [ t hrough ECS-3 5.1-1/1 No. I thru 4 11.2-2 11A i WD-08 thru FCS-6 drains to PCDCT , 4 pump i WD-09 11.2-32 RESAP-414 RESAR-414 ECS PRT to - Table RCS-11 5.1-1/2 FCDCT pumps 11.A-1 WD-10 11.2-32 RESAR-414 RES AP-414 CVCS excess - Section CVCS-2 9. 3- 1/1 letdown H/X waste IIA WD-11 11.2-32 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 FCP seal leakof fs - Table CVCS-3 9.3-1/1 to RCDCT 11.A-I WD-12 11.2-32 PESAP-414 RESAR-414 FCDCT line to - Table ER S- 3 9.3-3/1 recycle evaporator 11. A- 1 feed demin. WD-13 11.2-32 FESAP-414 FESAR-414 FCS FF7 return - Table FCS-10 5.1-1/2 from PCDCT H/X 11. A- 1 i Amendment 8
O O O GIBBSSAR TAELE 1.8-2 (Sheet 9 of 13) FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACES (Westinghouse-414) GIEBSSAR GIPBSSAR Interface Interface GIBBSSAF FESAF-414 Key Figure Key Figure Interf ace Interface iTumber Number Nu:tle r Number pescription Criteria Criteria WI)- 14 11.2-33 RESAR- 414 RESAR-414 Waste repro to - Table BRS-2 9.3-3/1 recyc. evap. I1.A-1 feed demin. 4. WD-15 11.2-33 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 ERS recycle - Table BES-22 9.3-3/2 evap conc 11.A-1 filter supply & return WD-16 11.2-33 RESAF-414 RESAR-414 IRS rec - Table BRS-21 9.3-3/2 evap 11.A-1 g package supply C return WD-17 11.2-33 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 ERS rec. evap. - Table BRS-20 9.3-3/2 cond. to recycle 11. A- 1 tank l8 WD-18 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line - Table CVCS-8 9.3-1/2 from SRS 11.A-1 pump to cation i demin. WD-19 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RES AR-414 Sluice line - Table 4 CVCS-10 9.1-3/2 from cation 11.A-1 teds to SRT WD-20 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line - Table CvCS-7 9.3-1/2 from SES 11.A-1 pump mired led demin. WD-21 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line - Table CVCS-9 9.3-1/2 from mixed beds 11.A-1 to SRT WD-22 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Resin sluice line - Table BR S- 4 9.3-3/1 Fee to Evap 11. A- 1 Fd demineralizer 81 Ane ndment 8
O o o : GIEBSSAR , TABLE 1.0-2 r (Sheet 10 of 13) ! FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACES , (Westinghouse-414) [ l 4 + GIEBSSAR GIBBSSAR Interface Interface GIBESSAR RESAR-414 f Fey Figure Fey Figure Interf ace Interface j Number Numier Number Numte r Deseription Crit eria Gheria j i WD-23 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line to - Table } BRS-6 9.3-3/1 SRT 11.A-1 ! WD-24 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Resin sluice - Table i BRS-5 9.3-3/1 line to RC Evap 11.A-1 ; Fd demineralizer 92 outlet ! l WD-25 11.0-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line to - Section }8 ; BRS-7 9.3-3/1 SRT 11A i 1 WD-26 11.4-1'2 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 Feturn to CVCS - Table ! CVCS-23 9.3-1/4 TR Demineralizer 11.A-1 i WD-27 11.4-1/2 R ESAR- 414 RESAR-414 Fesin sluice - Table [ CVCS-24 9.3-1/4 line from 11.A-1 4 thermal regeneration f demineralizer t WD-29 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line to - Section f ER S 9.3-3/2 Fec, evap. 11A . cond, demin. ! outlet i I
+
WD-29 11.4-1/2 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Sluice line - Section BRS-24 9.3-3/2 from rec. evap. 11A ; cond. domin. ; I WD-J0 11.2-34 Utility Utility Discharge to Subscction NA g i Applicant Applicant's Liquid waste 11.2.3 )' UA-26 SAR discharge pipeline l I
& I 4
I I Amerdnent 8 : t
O ' O GIBBSSAF TABLE 1.8-2 (Sheet 10a of 13) FLUID SYSTEM ItRERFACES (Westinghouse-414) GIEBSSAF GIBBSSAR Interf ace Interface GIDBSSAR LESAP-414 4 rey Figure Key Fig ure Interf ace Interface Number Numbe r_. Numt+r Numle r fescriptiog Criteria _ Criteria Gaseous Waste Processino System WG-01 11.3-24/1 EESAP-414 PESAR-414 ifs rec. - Section BRS- 25 9.3-3/2 evaporator 11A vent to WGC WG-02 11.3-24/1 FESAF-414 PESAP-414 IPS ejector - Section BRS-9 9.3-3/1 supply 11A e f i AnendFent 8
4 4 s- n GIPESSAF TABLE 1.8-2 j (Sheet 13 of 13) ~ j FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACES' 4 (Westinghouse-414) 4 I l GIBBSSAR GIBBSSAR Interface Interface GIBB SSAP FESAP-414 j Key Figure Key Figure . Interface Interface
; Numi er ILumt er Number Numter Descrintion Crite J R Criteria Plant Gas Supply System
,' GS-01 9.5-6 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 Nitrogen Subsect. 'RESAR-414 . j RIIR-SIS-23 6.3-1/3 supply to SIS 9.5.9 Appendix 6A
> accumulators 4 I
(header 81) i ~ GS-02 9.5-6 RESAR-414 PESAR-414 Nitrogen supply Subsect. RESAR-414 , RilR-SIS-24 6.3-1/3 to SIS 9.5.9 Appendix 6A j accumulators
- (header. 82) t
- GS-0 3 9.5-6 RESAR-414 RES AR-414 Nitrogen -
Section 11A CVCS-17 9.3-1/3 supply to volume j control tank i GS-04 9.5-6 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 Nitrogen supply - Section 11A t RCS-13 5.1-1/2 to pressurizer j relief tank i i GS-05 9.5-7 RESAR-414 RESAR-414 H2 Supply Section 11 A Section 11A 8 I CVCS-16 9.3-1/3 to VC'r l 4 i f i i l t i Amendment 8 il i f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ~ _______ _ _ -_ ___ _ __ -.
GIBBSSAR
.O TABLE 1. 8- 3 UTILITI-APPLICANT SAR INPUTS (Sheet 1 of 5)
Utility-Applicant Title Input Pequirement
- 1. INTPODUCTION AND GENEPAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT Introduction (1.1) yes General Plant Description (1. 2) yes General ( 1. 2.1) yes site Characteristics ( 1. 2. 2) yes Nuclear Steam Supply System ( 1. 2. 3) identify NSSS vendor Power Conversion and Electrical pd Systems (1.2.7) offsite power supply Cooling Water Systems ( 1. 2. 9) ultimate heat sink Comparison Tables (1.3) comparison of ultimate heat sink and offsite power supply Identification of Agents and Contractors ( 1. 4) yes Material Incorporated by Reference (1.6) site-related reports l
l l
(} GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-3 UTILITY-APPLICANT-SAR IN?UTS
-(Sheet 2 of 5)
Utility-Applicant Title Input Recuirement
- 2. SITE: CHARACTERISTICS yes, in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Pevision 2.
Geography and Demography (2.1) .yes Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities (2.2) yes Meteorology (2.3)- - yes Hydrologic Engineering (2.4) yes. n U Geology, Seismic, and Geotechnical Engineering (2. 5) yes
- 3. DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONEhTJL EQUIPMENT, ANp_ SYSTEMS Criterion 1 - Quality Standards and Records (3 1.1) yes Criterion 2 - Design-Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena (3.1.2) site characteristics, ,
recorded natural phenomena - Criterion 17 - Electric Power Systems (3.1.17) offsite power Criterion 44 - Cooling Water (3.1. 4 4) service water system source O Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR g TABLE 1. 8-3 UTILITY-APPLICANT SAR INPUTS (Sheet 2a of 5) Utility-Applicant Title IDout Pecuirement supporting Media for seismic Category Structures (3. 7. t. 4) description of site support media including 8 consolidation or fill ' if required O O Amendment 8 _~.- , _ , , - . . . _ , _ , - - ~ . _ . _ . . . . _ , . . . . . _ . _ . . - . . - - , .. .___.. . - . . . - _ .__
GIBBSSAR
)
TABLE 1.8-3 UTILITY-APPLICANT SAR INPUTS (Sheet 3 of 5) Utility-Applicant Title IDggt Pecuirement soil / Structure Interaction (3.7.2.4) description of embedment and soil strata Waterproofing description of 8 subgrade waterproofing membrane Qualification Tests and Analyses ( 3.11. 2) yes
- 4. REACTOR 7
Loose Parts Monitoring yes
- 6. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Inservice Inspection of Class 2 and 3 Components ( 6. 6) yes Components Subject to Examination (6. 6.1) yes Examination Techniques and Procedures
( 6. 6.3) yes Inspection Intervals (6.6.4) yes Examination Categories and Require-ments ( 6. 6. 5) yes i Evaluation of Examination Fesults (6.6.6) yes System Pressure Tests ( 6. 6. 7) yes O Amendment 8
l GIBBSSAR g TABLE 1. 8- 3 I UTILITY-APPLICANT SAR INPUTS l (Sheet 3a of 5) Utility-Applicant l Iitle Inout PecuiremeDt 80 ELECTPIC POWEP Utility Grid Description (8.1.1) yes Of fsite Power (8.2) yes
- 9. WATER SYSTEMS Potable and Sanitary Water Systeras ( 9. 2. 4) yes Ultimate Heat Sink (9.2.5) yes O
l O Amendment 8 ; I l
GIBBSSAR O
- 3. 5. 3 Barrier Design Procedures only one missile is considered at any one time.
The missiles have two effects on structures, walls, or any other barrier: local effects and overall response. The local effects include penetration, perforation, and spalling or scabbing. The overall response includes the flexural and shear effects. 3.5.3.1 Local Effects The estimate of missile penetration in concrete barriers is based on the use of the Modified Petry equation, Pef. 4. Sufficient thickness of concrete is provided to prevent perforation, and when required, to prevent backface spalling or scabbing. To prevent perforation, a concrete thickness of at least twice the penetration thickness determined for an infinitely thick slab is provided. The thickness (T) of the concrete barrier to prevent backface spalling or secondary missiles, which are injurious to safety-related equipment, is determined by the following equation: T= 2D [ 1 + exp (-4 (T/D -2)) ] where D is the maximum penetration in an infinitely thick slab. Determination of penetration by missiles into steel plates is in accordance with OF NL-NSIC-5, Ref. 5. 3.5.3.2 overall Barrier Fesponse The overall response of structural barriers to missile impact depends upon the available ductility. This ductility is a I function of the controlling nature of the structural behavior. Thus, for concrete beams, walls, and slabs, where flexure controls design, the permissible ductility ratio is taken as 0.05/ (p - p') , p being the ratio of tension reinforcement and p', 5 the ratio of compression reinforcement. However, the ductility ratio does not exceed 10.0 for beams, walls, and slabs. For beams, walls, and slabs where shear may control design, the ductility ratio is 1.0 when shear is carried by concrete alone, 8 1.3 when shear is carried by concrete and stirrups or bent bars, and 3.0 when shear is carried completely by stirrups. Flexural strength is determined based on ultimate strength theory with the 5 l limitations on ductility as follows: () 3. 5- 8 Amendment 8
I GIBESSAE O
- 1. For beam-column members where the compressive load 2 is equal to or less than one-third of that which would produce balanced conditions (i.e. , P ), or 0.1 xf[ xAg , l 8 whichever is smaller; the allowable ductility ratio ist 2 18 6.051 (P-P') 510 beam-column members where the design is
- 2. For controlled by compression, the allowable ductility is 1.3.
2
- 3. For members which are between these two values, ,
ductility shall be taken as decreasing linearly from 10 to 1.3. , To ensure that the response of a barrier will be governed by the less ductile shear mode, the load capacity of the barrier in shear will be the smaller of the load capacity in flexure, and 1.2 times the equivalent static effect of the dynamically applied load. For steel barriers, the ductility ratio does not exceed 10.0 forl a flexure, compression or shear. For steel columns with slenderness ratio ( /r) equal to or less than 20 the ductility ratio is 1.3. For steel columns with a slenderness ratio greater g than 20 the ductility ratio is 1.0. For steel tension members the ductility ratio is taken as 0.5 xEu/Ey, where Eu is the ultimate strain and Ey is the yield strain. b b 3.5-8a Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR [} The design load, caused by the missile, is governed by the absorption of the kinetic energy of the missile by the target at its maximum deflection. The procedure for such an analysis is contained in a paper by Williamson and Alvy (7) . The design 5 loads are also limited by the yielding, buckling, crushing or local failure of the missile. 3.5.4 References (1) Standard Review Plan, Section 3.5.1.4, Generated by Natural Phenomena," November 1975. " Missiles l 2 (2) Regulatory Guide 1.76, " Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants." (3) Regulatory Guide 1.91, " Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Poutes Near Power Plant Sites." l5 (4) Amirikian, A., " Design of Protective Structures," NAVDOCKS, P-51, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Department of the Navy, August 1950. O (5) Cottrell, W. B., and Savolainen, A. W., "U.S. Reactor Containment Tec hnology," ORNL-NSIC-5, Vol. 1, Chapter 6, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (6) American Nuclear Society, " Plant Design Against Missiles," N 177, April 1974, draft. (7) Williamson, R.A., and Alvy, R.R., " Impact Effect of Fragments Striking Structural Elements," Holmes and 5 Narver, Inc., Anaheim, California, Fevised, November 1973. ( 8) Nuclear Turbine Missile Information, Westinghouse Electric Corp., Steam Turbine Division Engineering, May, 1976. l ( 9) Methods of Determining The Probability of a Turbine Missile Hitting A Particular Plant Region, WCAP - 7861, Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems, Feb. , 1972. (10) Bush, S.H., " Probability of Damage to Nuclear Components Due to Turbine Failure", presented at Topical Meeting on Water Peactor Safety, 1973, CONF-730304, USAEC. O Amendment 5
- 3. 5- 9
- . _ _ __ _ .._ ._ . . _ . _ . _ ~ , ~ - . _ -. . __
GIBBSSAR O
- 3. 7 Seismic Desian 3.7.1 P'ismic Input 3.7.1.1 Design Response Spectra The SSE horizontal and vertical ground design response spectra for 2, 5, 7, 10 and 15 percent of critical damping are provided and shown in Figure 3.7-1 and Figure 3.7-2, respective y. The spectra for the standard balance of plant (BOP) are consistent 8 with the provisions of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 (29) - and are normalized to the' peak' ground acceleration of 0.30g for which the GIBBSSAR plant is designed.
The OBE design ground response spectra in both horizontal and 2 vertical motions are equal to half of their corresponding SSE values for all frequencies. 4 A confirmatory site-oriented analysis using the actual soil and structural properties will be performed to demonstrate that the 5 design peak ground acceleration of 0.3g used in this standand plant is adequate for the Utility-Applicant's site. O 3.7.1.2 Design Time History Artificial time history records for the horizontal and vertical SSE are generated to envelop the design response spectra presented in Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2, respectively.
- Figures 3.7-3 through 3.7-7 show the match between the horizontal time history response spectra and the design response spectra and Figures 3.7-8 through 3.7-12 show the match- for the vertical
+
spectra. The OBE motions are obtained by scaling the respective SSE time histories by 0.5. , - The time history records are generated from actual earthquake acceleration motions by selective amplification of their Fourier . l components. The time histories are discretized at a time step of I t 0.01 second and have a duration of 20 seconds. The time l l l l l () 3.7-1 Amendment 8
- n. ,-e- .n r w,~ - , , ew- +, , , - - vw ..mu ,.~,,,--e. _--g, - ~ . , , , . - - -- -, - , - - - -
GIBBSSAR g histories are shown in Figures 3.7-13 and 3.7-14 for the horizontal and vertical SSE, respectively. O 3.7-1a Amendment 2
I l GIBBSSAR of stif fness or flexibility and masc matrices developed from the mathematical model. These free vibration characteristics are calculated by using any one of the suitable algorithms which are l coded into the computer programs, such as the diagonalization method originated by Jacobi, Householder's tridiagonalization . combined with the Sturm sequence method, among others, such as I the ones used in computer programs presented in Appendix 3.7A. ] After establishing the free-vibration characteristics, such as natural frequencies and associated mode shapes, the next step consists of response computations obtained by using the response spectrum approach or time history analysis, or both. The response spectrum analysis is perfomed utilizing various computer programs consisting of different subroutines developed by GCH, IBM, and others as described in Appendix 3.7A. The analysis of the structures utilizes spectral values from the free-field ground response spectra as described in subsection 3. 7.1.1. Spectral values associated with modal damping and the natural frequency are obtained for each mode. Then the maximum absolute accelerations, inertia forces, shears, moments, and relative displacements are obtained in each mode. () These maximum modal responses are combined by the square root of the sum of the squares, by absolute sum and by combinations thereof, as discussed in subsection 3.7.2.7. In the seismic response analysis, either by the modal time history integration or by the spectrum approach, a sufficient number of modes, if not all modes, are considered to assure the participation of all significant modes. The criterion for sufficiency is that the inclusion of additional modes does not result in more than a 10-percent increase in response. A separate analysis is made on the model representing the structure for each of the three orthogonal principal directions of input ground excitations. Vertical and two horizontal ground excitations are assumed to act simultaneously. Hence, the effects of earthquakes on structures, components, or elements are computed by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the particular maximum effects or responses at a particular point, caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion (two horizontal motions at right angles to one another, and one vertical motion) . The total overturning moment at the base of a structure is obtained. The maximum dynamic soil pressure is evalua ted to 3.7-8
l l I I GIBBSSAR g insure that it is within permissible limits. This is done for a wide range of soil properties. l The analysis is performed for both the SSE and the OBE unless it becomes apparent that. one of these is controlling the design. After the mathematical models of structures are analyzed for their free-vibration characteristics, the tine history response at selected mass points is obtained using the artificial time history ground motion. Derivation of the appropriate time history ground motion is discussed in subsection 3.7.1.2. Once the time history response of a selected mass point is generated, the next step is to subject a single-degree-of-freedom system, with the natural frequency range of interest and various damping ratios, to this time history motion. A spectrum response curve is obtained by plotting the maximum acceleration response obtained as ordinate s and the corresponding natural periods of the single-degree-of-freedom system on abscissa. This curve represents the SRSS result of the effects of three spatial ground accelerations. The enveloping technique used for the construction of smoothed instructure response spectra consists of enveloping the maximum peaks. Since the frequencies of the structure can only be approximately computed because of the gg) linear and nonlinear deformability, the energy dissipation, variation in elastic properties of the structure, and the idealization of structure with lumped masses and elastic properties in discrete parts, parametric studies are performed to take into account these ef fects for construction of instructure response spectra. These effects result in the shifting of the resonance peaks of the instructure response spectra. The envelopes are widened at the resonance frequencies in accordancel with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.122 to account for these effects. ' 4 The peak broadening includes the effects of variations in soil stiffnesses. Thus a typical instructure response spectrum curve for a mass point for a given degree of freedom and a specified damping ratio has its peaks broadened after an envelope of the response spectra corresponding to different soil stiffnesses has 8 been obtained. The instructure response spectra are generated on the basis of an artificial time history ground motion with maximum ground accelerations normalized to 30 and 15 percent of gravity for SSE and OBE, respectively. The preceding analyses can be accomplished by using suitable computer programs presented in Appendix 3.7A. , O 3.7-9 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR {) If proof of performance is obtained by analytical means, the equipment supplier presents documentation in a step-by-step form which is readily auditable by persons skilled in such analysis. If proof of performance is obtained by testing, the test data includes detailed information on the following:
- 1) Equipment identification
- 2) Test facility (including location)
- 3) Test equipment
- 4) Test method
- 5) Test data (including unsuccesful test of components and subsequent remedial measures)
- 6) Results and conclusions
- 7) Attestation The equipment supplier provides the Utility-Applicent with
({) sufficient advance notice as to the date of tests. The Utility-Applicant will reserve the right to be present during the performance of tests.
- d. Stress and Deformation Criteria Primary steady-state stresses, including the effects of the normal operating loads plus the OBE loads are maintained well within the elastic limit of the material affected, and are in accordance with the appropriate codes, and standards as listed in 8 Section 3.8.
For systems and equipment, self-limiting secondary stresses may exceed allowable primary stress to the extent permitted by the appropriate codes. For the OBE, the equipment f unction is performed without permanent deformation. O 3.7-15 Amendment 0
GIBBSSAR Primary' steady-state stresses, including the effects of the normal operating loads plus the SSE loads, are limited to prevent loss of function of the equipment. For. the purpose of calculation, the no-loss-of-function stresses are limited to i 90 percent of the yield strength of the material except for 1 impactive and impulsive loads for which local yellding is 8 allowed. Deformations resulting from the combined influence of normal operating loads and the loads from the SSE are investigated to verify that they don't impair functional performance required for a safe and orderly shutdown of the plant. The number of expected , earthquakes, the duration of strong motion vibration, and the number of cycles the equipment or system is exposed to for OBE are evaluated and specified for fatigue analysis which is required by some codes. For fatigue analysis of the seismic Category I mechanical systems and components, Westinghouse specifies in RESAR-414 twenty events of the OBE during thel 1 40-year plant life with 20 cycles of strong shaking for each i e vent. Fatigue analysis, where required by the codes, is performed by the equipment supplier. 1 Descriptions of Mathematical Models (]) e. j The mathematical models to be used for the dynamic analysis of
- the major structures are described as follows
- 1) Model for Containment, Internal structure, and
- Auxiliary Building, with Common Mat The mathematical model for these structures are shown in Figure 3.7-18 and consists of lumped masses, elastic properties, and viscous dashpots in discrete parts. The number of masses and associated degrees of f reedom are kept to a minimum. to reduce unnecessary complexity. The dome of the containment is simulated by one mass while the cylindrical portion is represented by four masses. The remainder of the structures, which consists of 5 concrete walls, slabs, and columns, are represented by masses lumped at the floor levels. The common mat is represented by a single mass. The floors of the auxiliary building, fuel building, control room, safety features area, diesel generator buidling and the internal structure are simulated by masses interconnected with massless springs. Each mass is assumed to have all six dynamic degrees of freedom.
O 3.7- 16 Amendment 8 W-414 i
, . . ~ . , , . - . . _ . . . ~ _ , - . . _ . , _ _ , . , , - - - . _ _ _ . _ . , _ _ , _ _ , _ . , , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _
GIBBSSAR 5 Foundation-structure interaction, such as the soil-spring constants, damping ratios associated with each soil spring, are based on the theory of a rigid base resting on elastic half-space as described in subsection 3.7.2.4. (1) (2) (19) (24) (27) These values are determined for all six degrees of freedom of the 5 global orthogonal system. The effects of the embedment are discussed in Subsection 3.7.2.4. The stiffness or the flexibility matrix of the containment structure is developed using an appropriate computer program, such as Stardyne or Nastran or by hand calculations based on the beam theory. The stiffness matrices of the internal structure and the auxiliary building are- generated using suitable computer programs (Stardyne or Nastran) based on finite elements techniques; the interior structure walls, columns, and floors are 8 modeled with finite elements. The stiffness matrix which corresponds to the large finite element model simulating structural walls columns and floors is first reduced to match the dynamic degrees of freedom selected for the lumped mass structural model; thi reduced stiffness matrix consistent with the lumped mass model is then combined with the associated mass matrix to form the mathematical model for the structural dynamic (_,) analysis. (3) (19) (22) (23) 5
- 2) Models for All Other Category I Structures The mathematical models for all other Category I structures are comprised of lumped masses, discrete elastic members, and dashpots.
The locations of the mass points are chosen at floor levels and points considered of critical interest, such as equipment support levels. Where the structure cannot be considered symmetrical and the torsional modes of vibration can be excited by ground motions, each lumped mass node is assumed to have all six dynamic degrees of freedom, including three rotational or torsional j degrees of freedom corresponding to three rotational or torsional 8 l mass moments of inertia. However, if the structure can be reasonably regarded as a symmetrical structure, the torsional effects are neglected. l 1 I l I
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3.7-17 Amendment 8 l l
GIBBSSAR g l5 Soil-spring constants associated with three orthogonal principal translations and two rocking springs about the two horizontal orthogonal axes are determined on the basis of a rectangular base resting on an elastic half-space. (1) (2) (19) (24) Torsional soil-spring constants and damping ratios for soil below the vibrating mat associated with the soil-springs are determined on the basis of the equivalent radius for the rectangular base of 5 dimensions 2c by 2d using the theory of the elastic half-space for a circular footing in accordance with subsection 3.7.2.4. (1) (2) (19) (24) (27) The effects of the embedment of the structures are discussed in Subsection 3.7.2.4. The stiffness matrices of the building are generated using suitable computer programs such as Stardyne or Nastran using finite element techniques or by hand calculations based on the beam theory which includes bending and shearing effects. For unsymmetric structures the stiffness matrices include the effects of torsional rigidities of shear wall assemblies between floors. 8 The stiffness matrices obtained from finite element models are reduced to conform to the number of degrees of freedom of the dynamic models which are used in the dynamic analysis. (3)
- f. Criteria for Decoupling of Systems and Subsystems lll Criteria for determining whether a subsystem is to be decoupled from or coupled to the structural model of the supporting structure are in accordance with the following. Defining the ratio of the total mass of the supported subsystem to the mass of the supporting system as R , and the ratio of the fundamental frequency of the supported subsystem to the dominant frequency of the supporting structure as r, the following criteria are used:
- 1) If R <0.01, decoupling can be done for any r
- 2) If 0.01 $ R $ 0.1, decoupling can be done if 0.8 2 r 2 1. 25
- 3) If F > 0.1, an approximate model of the subsystem is included in the primary system model.
5 9 3.7-18 Amendment 8 ) l
I t GIBBSSAR O symmetric structures and equipment, such as axisymmetric shells of revolution in the vertical. direction, is uncoupled from lateral motion. Inertia forces due to vertical motion, in this case, can be neglected in computing lateral- motion, and- vice versa. If structures and equipment are symmetric with respect to two orthogonal horizontal axes, lateral motion in the direction of the two axes can also be uncoupled since it is not accompanied by rotation about the vertical axis. Since neither the mass nor the stiffness of most structures is completely symmetric with respect to these axes, whether the two directions can be considered uncoupled depends on the degree of unsymmetry of the mass as well as the ratio of lateral stiffness to torsional ' stiffness about the vertical axis. However, vertical and horizontal ground excitation are assumed to act simultaneously, as stated in subsection 3.7. 2.1,b. 8 The idealization of the mass proceeds on the basis of relative displacements. If for example, the horizontal cross section of the structural components, does not deform significantly, and the contents undergo essentially the same displacement as the structure, all mass in a given place can be represented by a ([) point mass placed at the centroid. The structural response analysis and the instructure response spectrum generation are based on the same mathematical model which consist of the lumped masses computed from tributary structure dead loads, a portion of live loads, and fixed 8 equipment loads. An estimated value of one-eighth of floor design live loads is used to cover the weight of piping systems, conduits, cable trays, HVAC ducts, and other possible live loads which might exist at the time of seismic events. These weights are generally small compared to the weight of structure and usually difficult to precisely calculate and distribute. For floor-supporting heavy piping not considered as equipment systems, additional masses are evaluated accordingly and included O Amendment 8 3.7-20 _ .. _ ,,._ ,- _ .-..- _- _ ... _ .. _ . _ .. . ~ . _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ _ . _ _ _. _- _.
I l GIBBSSAP in the model. In some cases, the uncoupled mathematical models with lumped masses representing the equipment include the effective masses and flexibility of the supporting structure. (22) (23) l
- l l
1 O O 3.7-20a Amendment 8
GIBBSSAP O where m is the mass of rigid block, r is the radius of bearing area, and is the mass density of the foundation medium. 'All of the results in this figure are for vertical motions, and all are for rigid blocks resting on the surface of the foundation medium. The solid curves on Figure 3.7-16 are based on the theory and correspond to two values of Poisson's ratio. The dashed curve on the figure has ordinates equal to 1/2 those of the theoretical . curve for Poisson's ratio equal to 1/4. This curve, for damping . ratio D associated with the equivalent foundation spring in I vertical translation, which has the equation: D = 2,19 (2B) 5 envelops on the lower side all but a few of the plotted points, and is a conservative relation for practical use. Internal damping due to energy loss during stress reversals are evaluated on the empirical basis. Combined effects of radiation and internal damping are taken into () account by direct addition of the two values of damping. that for rotational motions, the radiation damping is low, and Note the internal damping could be a significant part of the total damping. However, for translational motions, radiation damping is much greater than internal damping. The undefined nomenclature, used in Tables 3.7-4, 3.7-5 and 3.7-6, is as follows: , E and G. are the modulus of elasticity and the shear modulus of the soil, respectively: is Poisson's ratio of the soil. Shear modulus is obtained from the field-measured shear wave velocity C and mass density of the soil from the following equation G = C2
- s f (2)
If the soil stiffness is too high then fixed base assumption is used. O 3.7-23
GIBBSSAR g 307.2.5 Development of Floor Response Spectra The methods of seismic analysis are covered in subsection 3.7.2.1. The response spectrum method for the development of instructure response spectra is not used. Instructure response spectra at selected locations of interest are developed on the basis of computed responses to an artificial time history input of ground motion. The time history of the simulated earthquake ground motion is developed to be compatible with the given ground response spectra. Having established time history of the ground motion, the lumped-mass mathematical models of Category I structures are analyzed, and tine histories at desired masses lumped at floor levels or any other location of interest are generated. Once the time history of the floor motion is obtained, the next step is to subject a single-degree-of-freedom system with the natural frequency range of interest and various damping ratios to the floor time history motion. The maximum acceleration responses obtained are then plotted as ordinates and the corresponding natural periods of the single oscillators are plotted on abscissa. This plot is based on the SRSS value of the responses of the S-D-O-F oscillator subjected to the floor time histories caused by the spatial ggg ground motions. The envelope of maximum peaks will be used for the construction of instructure response spectra. (26) l5 Normally, instructure response spectra are developed at the centers of gravity of lumped masses of mathen:atical models representing Category I structures. Supports and seismic restraints of uncoupled subsystems such as Category I structures and equipment are usually located away from the centers of gravity of lumped masses. The instructure response spectra at I any points away from centers of lumped masses can be calculated . through interpolation and rigid body transformation from the l translational, rocking and torsional values of the lumped mass 5 points to account for the effect of the distances between the lumped mass locations and the points where the floor response spectra are to be developed. In cons tructing instructure response spectra, broadening of the resonance peaks with respect to natural frequencies in accordance 7 : with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.122 are introduced to account for thel 8 uncertainties l7 j 3.7-24 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAF I distances from the lines of action of the resultant modal l earthquake forces to the point of rotation A. The overturning moments for each direction of ground excitation! 5 are obtained by combining all the significant modal overturningl 8 moments j ust discussed in the previous paragraph. The SRSS 5 method as required by Regulatory Guide 1.92 are used in combining 8 these significant modal overturning moments. Then the totall overturning moments combined from horizontal and vertical ground motions by SRSS method are used directly to account for the total 5 overturning moment Mo expressed in equation. (4) The lateral soil pressure resulting from the foundation moving against the surrounding soil medium under seismic condition is considered in calculating the overturning moment. The lateral soil pressure can be calculated from the stiffness of the lateral , soil spring due to embedment (34) and the associated deformation of the soil spring which is obtained from the seismic response 8 analysis as the horizontal relative displacement of the structure with respect to the ground at the embedment elevations. The water table is assumed to be at the same level all around the structures, the overturning moment due to lateral hydrostatic O pressure is therefore equal to zero. The bouyant force (vertical hydrostatic pressure) is considered and taken care of previously. It should be noted that for positive values of k, where k is the distance from the line of action of the resultant soil pressure to the point of rotation A, stability of the structure exists. For k equal to zero, the point of impending stability and infinite soil pressure is reached. When the value of k is less than zero, the structure is unstable. The criteria to be used to select an acceptable structural configuration are as follows:
- a. The stability coefficient C shall not be less than 1.10 for the SSE.
- b. Maximum static and dynamic soil pressures shall remain within the ultimate capacity.
To calculate dynamic soil pressures, the resultant reaction R and the eccentricity e shown in Figure 3.7-17 are first determined. The resultant reaction is a function of the weight of the entire structure and the total vertical seismic load. The total vertical seisnic load is determined by the combined effects of 3.7-30 Amerndment 8
l 1 l GIBBSSAR I all dominant structure modes induced by horizontal and vertical seismic excitations. That is, modal resultant vertical I earthquake loads for each direction of ground motion are combined as discussed in subsection 3.7.3.7. Then the combined resultant vertical earthquake loads resulting from horizontal and vertical ground disturbances are added directly. Soil pressures are determined with the resultant vertical earthquake load acting in both upward and downward directions. j The determination of the distribution of contact pressure over the base of the mat plays an important role in computing the maximum soil pressure. For example, if a perfectly uniform settlement is enforced by the absolute rigidity of a mat, the O O 3.7-30a Amendment 5
l l GIBBSSAR O ) l (20) Timoshenko, S., Strength of Materials, Part II, Advanced Theory and Problems, Second Edition, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Toronto, New York, London. (21) Stoykovich, M. , "Use of Time History Analysis," Proceedings of Symposium on Structural Design of Nuclear Power Plant Facilities, pp. 576-614, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, December 1972. (22) Stoykovich, M., " Criteria for seismic Analysis of Nuclear Plant Structures and Substructures," Nuclear Engineering and Design, North-Holland Publishing Company, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 106-120, March 1974. (23) Stoykovich, M., " Seismic Design and Analysis of Nuclear Plant Components," ASCE Proceedings of the Specialty Conference on Structural Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, Vol. I, pp. 1-28, Chicago, Illinois, December 17-18, 1973. (24) Stoykovich, M., " Variation of Input Parameters Considered in Determining Floor Pesponse Spectra," ({) Proceedings of Symposium on Structural Design of Nuclear Power Plant Facilities. Department of Civil Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, December, 1972. (25) Ho, P.K., and Stoykovich, M., " Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures," ASCE Proceedings of the Specialty Conference on Structural Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, Volume II, Decemeber 17-18, 1973, Chicago, Ill. (26) Stoykovich, M., " Development and Use of Seismic Instructure Response Spectra in Nuclear Plants," published in Nuclear Engineering and Design, International Journal of North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam; and published in the book of preprints of International Seminar on Extreme Load Conditions and Limit Analysis Procedures for Structural Reactor Safeguards and Containment Structure s, paper No. 01/5, held 8-11 September 1975 in Berlin, Germany; and (abridged version) the book of preprints of the 3rd International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, paper No. K5/4, held 1-5 September 1975, Imperial College, London, England. O 3.7-49
GIBBSSAR O (27) Stoykovich, M., " Damping Associated with Foundation-Structure Interaction," NORCO Nuclear Plant, Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, Gibbs & Hill Proje'ct No. 2474A. (28) Stoykovich, M., " Damping Associated with Foundation-Structure Interaction in Seisnic Analysis of Nuclear Power Plants," Proceedings of the 2nd ASCE Specialty Conference on Structural Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, 8-10 December, 1975, New Orleans, La. (29) "De sign Fesponse Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.60, USNRC, October 1973 (rev. December 1973) , (30) " Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.61, USNFC, October 1973. (31) " Combination of Modes and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis," Regulatory Guide 1.92, USNRC February 1976. (32) Kennedy, Short, Wesley and Lee, "Non-linear Soil-Structure Interaction due to Base Slab Uplift on lll The Seismic Fesponse of an HTGR Plant," 3rd ; International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology. 6 (33) Wolf, J.P., " Approximate Soil-Structure Interaction with Separation of Base Mat From Soil (Lif ting-of f) , " 3rd International Conference on Structural Mechanics in i Reactor Techology. I (34) Novak, M. " Vibration of Embedded Footings and Structures," ASCE National Meetin gs, Session No. 10, 8 Soil and Rock Dynande s, San Francisco, preprint No. 2029, p.25, April 1973. I 1 I O 3.7-50 Amendment 8 i
GIBBSSAR {) 1 l
- 5) Seisade loads representing two magnitudes of earthquake are considered, as follows:
a) Ess represents the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). b) Eo represents the operating basis earthquake (OBE) . Vertical and horizontal ground earthquake accelerations are assumed to act simultaneously if additive in ghe calculation of maximum stress. The earthquake forces acting on the containment structure are taken from the results of dynamic analysis, based on seismic input as described in Section 3.7.
- 6) W represents the design wind load (See section 3.3)
- 7) Wt represents the tornado load, including missiles (See Sections 3.3 and 3.5) .
- 8) Po represents the piping loads acting on the y containment during operating conditions. l
- 9) Pa represents the piping loads acting on the containme nt, due to increased temperature resulting from the design accident, including Ro.
- 10) Rr represents the local effects on the containment due to the DBA; the local e ffects include Prr (the reaction of a ruptured pipe), Rrj (jet impingement f rom a ruptured pipe) , and Rrm (impact effect from a ruptured pipe) , as defined in Appendix III of the ASME Code, Section III, Division 2.
- 11) PV represents the negative internal pressure during ope ration; maximum Pv is 5 psig.
5
- 12) Ha represents the load on the Containment resulting from post-LOCA internal flooding.
O \.s 3.8-16 Amendment 5
l I 1 i GIBBSSAR g i
- b. Loading Combinations Design of the reinforced concrete containment structure incorporates the service-load combination requirements and the factored-load combination requirements, as follows (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, as defined in 8
- 3. 8.1. 2a) :
O O 3.8-16a Amendment 8
.= ,
l GIBBSSAR O The liner and anchors are derigned to withstand the effects of all load combinations, as described in subsection 3.8.1.3,b, using load factors equal to 1.0. The stability of the liner is ensured by anchorage to the reinforced concrete. The anchorage system accommodates all design loads and deformations .without loss of structural or leaktight integrity. The liner plate anchorage system is designed to accommodate all in-plane (shear) loads or deformations exerted by the liner plate and also to resist all loads applied normal to the liner surface. The anchors nrt designed either to elastically carry the forces resulting from one various loading combinations, or to have sufficient ductility to relieve the forces or to bring necessary additional anchors into action without rupture of the liner or anchor. The anchorage is such that if any one anchor is missing or fails, successive failure of adjacent anchors does not occur in the manner of a chain reaction. The maximum load affecting the design of the liner and anchors, in general, is that caused by the maximum temperature rise caused () by an accident. This temperature increase causes the liner, which is restrained by the reinforced concrete wall, to be stressed in compression. The compressive stress is calculated by equating the strains between the liner and the reinforced wall. The resulting stresses and strains in the liner are less than allovable as stated in subsection 3.8.1.5,c. The maximum load in an anchor stud is an in-plane (shear) load which can occur if the plate on one side of an anchor bows inward in a flexural mode, causing a reduction of membrane compression on one side of the anchor. This inward bowing of the plate can be caused by initial construction deformity, variation of liner plate curvature, loss of an anchor, and similar occurrences. Design of the liner is based on the assumption that an infinitely long strip of liner plate buckles and provides no support to the adjacent plate. The resulting unbalanced plate stress imparts a shear load and corresponding displacement on the adjacent anchor, and, to a lesser degree, on each successive anchor further away 8 from the bowed-in plate. The shear load versus displacement of the anchor stud is based on test data developed by the Nelson Co., and is expected to be typical of anchors used in this plant. The analysis to determine the load and displacement on each stud is performed by making a series of successive approximations using the test enrves for anchor shear load versus displacement. , The analysis is based on maintaining equilibrium of loads in the O 3.8-27 Amendment 8
- - , , , - . , -%v, --,~,,,,..w ,..r.-.-, ,.,v-, . . - - . - ---..-m m r m -,- - - - , . - - - - - - - .
GIBBSSAR g W , plate and anchors' for any free-body cut through a section of plate and compatibility between the strain in the plate and the 8 O I
- J 1
l l
)
)
1 l l l Amendment 8 h 3.8-27a
GIBBSSAR displacement of the studs. The resulting maximum loads and displacements in the studs are less than the allowables as stated in subsection 3.8.1.5,c. The design is such that failure of a liner anchor, which may impose additional loads on adjacent anchors, will not cause anchor loads and displacements greater 5 than the allowables stated in subsection 3. 8.1. 5 (c) . Thus a
" zipper effect" is prevented, multi-directional loading is considered.
The anchor design and analysis take into consideration the effects of the following (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, Article CC-3800) .
- 1) Variation of liner-plate curvature: the anchors are designed for a possible inward bowing of the plate, as described previously.
- 2) Variation in liner-plate thickness due to rolling tolerances: the range of maximum- and minimum-plate thickness is assumed in the design of the liner plate and anchors.
(} 3) Variation of liner-plate yield strength: the anchors are analyzed assuming the liner remains elastic under all con 5itions, i.e., the liner strains are converted to stresses using Hooke's law with the modulus of elasticity and Poisson's ratio below yield (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, Article CC-36 30)
- 4) Liner plate seam offset: stresses due to maximum allowable seam offset, as stated in the construction specification, are considered in design.
- 5) Variation in anchor spacing: maximum range of anchor spacing, as allowed in the construction specification, are considered in design.
- 6) Variation in anchor stiffness due to a variation of the concrete modulus: this variation is considered by modifying the load-versus-displacement test data for the stud anchors and considering in the analysis a range of minimum and maximum possible values of concrete moduli. l 1
- 7) Local concrete crushing in the anchor zone: such crushing is reflected in the anchor-stud test data.
O
.8-28 Amendment 5
i
-s GIBBSSAR U
6.2 Cgntainment Systemg The functional design of the containment system and those additional ESF systems upon which the containment function depends are described herein. This section demonstrates that the containment spray, containment isolation, and combustible gas control systems are capable of meeting all design and performance criteria under accident conditions. 6.2.1 Containment Functional Design 6.2.1.1 Containment Structure
- a. Design Basis The reactor containment is designed to prevent leakage of radioactive materials to the environment during normal operation, and to minimize such leakage in the event of an accident, up to and including the design basis ThCA. The containment design is such that for all pipe breaks, up to and including the double-ended severance of a reactor coolant pipe, the containment peak pressure is below the design pressure of 50 psig with adequate margin. This capability is maintained by the
(]} containment spray systerc. with only one of the two redundant 100-percent containment spray trains in operation. Earthquake effects, including loss of offsite power, are considered to occur simultaneously with the accident effects. See subsection 3.8.1 for specific load combinations used in the containment design. 7 The LOCA which results in the highest calculated containment pressure is the DBA for the containment structure. The percent margin is defined as:
% margin = 100 x desiqD pressure _ fpsic) _ peak DBA_oressure (Esigt peak DBA pressure (psig)
The calculated accident pressure margins inside the containment 7 are given in Table 6.2-1. The maximum peak pressure occurs with the DEPSG break with maximum ECCS. This break, therefore' 8 results in the minimum margin. Tne value calculated is 9.05 percent. Exception is taken to SRP section 6.2.1.1. A, part II.1 which 7 required a 10 percent margin for plants at the CP stage of review. Since GIBBSSAR is a standard plant it is felt that there is less uncertainty in the numbers used in the analy sis than would exist in a custom plant. Conservatism was added to the O 6.2-1 Amendment 8
i l l G1BBSSAE g t numbers used in this analysis so that any changes made between the preliminary design and the final design would more likely lead to lower rather than higher pressures. The containment free volume used is 2 percent lower than that actually calculated; , l (had the actual free volume been used, a margin greater than 10 percent would result) . A 2 percent margin was applied to all I concrete heat sinks inside the containment as well as the steel liner. All other steel heat sink values were based on the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station FSAR which has a containment of Gibbs & Hill design. The quantity of steel used in GIBBSSAR will, of necessity, be greater than what was used in the CPSES 7 design. The time to containment spray initiation was calculated assuming a greater length of pipe (and thus a later initiation GIBBSSAR design. time) than can physically fit into thea temperature of 120 F Containment initial conditions assumed (the technical specification limit) and 0 percent relative humidity, both of which are conservative. A RWST temperature of 120 F was assumed which is highly unrealistic. For these reasons, we feel that a margin of 9.05 percent is more than adequate at the current design stage. The Containment 's designed for an external differential pressure gg) of 5 psi (see Section 3. 8.1.3) which is well above the maximum differential pressure resulting from inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray System, 5 The differential pressure resulting from inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation is calculated using the following assumptions: O
- 6. 2- 1a Amendment 7
,, ,_ - _ . . , - , .~ _
1 GIBBSSAP O Following the completion of blowdown, other sources of energy and additional sinks assume greater prominence. The primary energy sources are decay heat, thick and thin metal water reaction heat releases, and energy stored in the secondary side of the steam 7 generators. The additional heat sinks are the ECCS and the containment spray system. The effectiveness of these safety features in limiting the consequences of a LOCA are addressed in subsection 6.2.2 and in section 6.3 of the NSSS SSAR. Results are provided for a double-ended pump suction (DEPS) break (DBA) assuming both maximum and minimum ECCS performance and one 7 100-percent containment spray following a postulated single failure. The transfer of energy from the containment to the outside environment during the period following a LOCA takes place in the following ways:
- 1) Heat rejection via the RER heat exchanger to the ultimate heat sink
- 2) Heat transfer from the containment building surf ace l 7 to the outside air
[} The containn'ent spray recirculation phase is discussed in subsection 6. 2. 2. The RHR systea is described in detail in subsection 5.5.7 of the NSSS SSAP. The core flooding rate is dependent on the containment pressure. Therefore, an analysis of the minimum containment pressure is performed to study the performance of the 7 ECCS. The analysis is detailed in subsection 6.2.1.5. In the analysis of the offsite radiological consequences following a postulated LOCA or steam line break, the containment is assumed to leak at a rate of 0.1 percent per day for the first 24 hours and at- 0. 05 percent thereafter. Twenty-four hours following the DBA (refer to Table 6.2-1) the containment internal pressure ic calculated to be less than 25 psig. Thus, asl 7 recommended by NBC Regulatory Guide 1.4, the containment pressure is reduced i () 6.2-3 Amendment 7 1
.y- -
-.,-.7--,--- , ..w..,. vy,,--w., --------r-,, -c.-y,+r ,. ,,y,-my .,c.,~v. .,-r- e.--,. .ww---- ,---+,,-,-.-,,,,mm,. e,e,,-.. . - - - - . - . - _m - - -
GIBBSSAR g to less than 50 percent of the containment design pressure within 24 hours after the postulated accident.
- b. Design Features 7he general arrangement drawings of the reactor building are presented in Sections 3.8 and 1.2.
Design methods used to maintain the integrity of the containment internal structures and subcompartments, as a result of containment pressure, temperature , and dynamic effects that can l 7 occur following a LOCA are described in Section 3.8. Design methods used to ensure integrity of the containment and itsl 1 subcompartments from the effects of blowdown jet reactive forces and pipe whip (resulting from postulated rupture of piping located either inside or outside of containment) are described in Section 3.6. Design methods used to insure integrity of the containment and its subcompartments from internal and external missiles are described in Section 3.5. Materials used in the containment vessel and components are selected to ensure f unctional capability under both normal andl 1 accident conditions for the life of the station. Environmental ggg design requirements for equipment installed within the containment are discussed'in Section 3.11. Protective coatings used in the containment are subject to criteria as stated in Section 6.1. Postaccident hydrogen production and accumulation, as a result of materials corrosion and other potential sources, are discussed in Section 15.4 of the NSSS SSAR and in subsection 6.2.5 of this report. Containment isolation valves form part of the containment barrier in the event of an accident. Provisions for redundancy and independence meet the requirements set forth in 10 CFP 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 54 through 57; refer to subsection 6. 2. 4 for details. The codes, standards, and guides used in the design of the containment structure and internal structures are identified in Chapter 3. 8 O 6.2-4 Amendment 8
- GIBBSSAR 8
Containment spray drainage is also discussed in subsection 6.2.2. The containment design ensures maximum drainage to thel 1 containment recirculation sumps. This is accomplished by the following:
- 1) Providing openings between all containment floors down to ground level
- 2) Providing drains from the refueling canal to the recirculation sumpe
- 3) Providing direct access for accumulated water between the subcompartments and the recirculation sumps.
In addition, all floor drains in the containment subcompartments and the refueling canal drains are equipped with dome strainers to prevent debris from entering and clogging the drain lines. The NPSH for the containment spray pumps are not adversely affected. The NPSH calculations are based on a containment water level at elevation 90'-6". This is the ground floor elevation in the containment, as well as the elevation of the top of the sump. ({} No consideration is given to water above this elevation. Of the approximately 500,000 gallons released to the containment, approximately 300,000 gallons are confined in the ECCS, the 7 containment spray system, the refueling canal, the in-core instrumentation tunnel and room, the containment sumps, the valve room and valve operating room, at elevation 80 8 -6", the reactor coolant drain heat exchanger rocm, and the reactor coolant drain tank and pumps rooms. The remaining 200,000 gallons are on thel 7 ground floor of the containme nt, with its surface above El. 92'-6". Thus, there is more than a 2 foot margin in the NPSH cal culations . This assumes that train "A" and train "B" systems ' are both in operation. The functional capability and frequency of operation of the ! ventilation system maintains the containment and subcompartment l atmospheres within the prescribed pressure, temperature, and humidity limits during normal oeration. This is discussed in detail in section 9.4. O 6.2-5 Amendment 8
I GIBBSSAR O
- c. Design Evaluation The containment pre s sure-temperature transient analysis is performed for a spectrum of large areas ruptures of the RCS at i three distinct locations:
- 1) Hot leg (between vessel and steam generator)
- 2) Pump suction (between steam generator and pump)
- 3) Cold leg (between pump and vessel)
During the reflood phase, these breaks have different >:haracteristics as follows: For a cold leg pipe break, all of the fluid which leaves the core vents through a steam generator and becomes superheated. However, relative to breaks at the other locations, the core flooding rate (and therefore the rate of fluid leaving the core) is low because all the core vent paths include the resistance of the reactor coolant pump. For a hot-leg pipe break, the vent path resistance is relatively low, which results in a high core flooding rate, but the majority of the fluid which exits the core bypasses the steam generators in venting to the containnent. The pump suction break combines the g ef fects of the relatively high core-flooding rate, as in the hot-leg break, and steam generator heat addition as in the cold-leg break. As a result, the pump suction breaks yield the highest energy flow rates during the postblowdown period. The spectrum of. breaks analyzed includes the largest cold-leg and hot-leg breaks, reactor inlet and outlet respectively, and a range of pump suction breaks from the largest to a 3.0-ftr pump suction split. Because of the phenomena of reflood as discussed previously, the pump suction break location is the worst case. This conclusion is supported by studies of smaller hot-leg breaks 7 which have shown on similar plants to be less severe than the double-ended hot leg. Cold-leg breaks, however, are lower both in the blowdown peak and in the reflood pressure rise. Thus, an analysis of smaller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes. O 6.2-6 Amendment 7
GIBBSSAR The failure mode analysis is described in subsection 6.2.2. The failure of a containment spray, with maximum safety injection assumed, yields the highest pressure in the containment after a' postulated accident analysis. The secondary side pipe breaks for a spectrum of power levels are analyzed using the same CONTEMPT-LT Mod 26 computer c ode. Mass 8 and O t P O 6.2-9a Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR h energy release data are presented in subsection 6.2.1.4. For all breaks, failure of the main steam isolation valve on the broken loop, the feedwater isolation valve on the broken loop, and one containment spray train are assumed. Feedwater is isolated on closure of the feedwater control valve. Auxiliary feedwater is conservatively assumed to enter the broken steam generator at a rate of 250 lb/sec until manually isolated by the operator 8 20 minutes after the accident. The assumptions used for each break are detailed in Table 6.2-11. The results for each case are tabulated in Table 6.2-5. heat removal during the initial time periods The significant following a LOCA or steam line break is caused by absorption of heat in the structures. A summary of the passive heat sinks is given in Table 6.2-6. The condensing heat transfer coefficients, assumed in the analysis are based on the work of Uchida. The value of the heat 7 transfer coefficient varies, depending on the mass ratio of air to steam from 2 to 280 Btu /hr-F-fte, The containment foundation (heat sink 3, Table 6. 2-6) is assumed to be in contact with, or submerged in, the water. In this 8 & the heat transfer coefficient is assumed to be W instance 0.4 Btu /hr F-ft2 All steel and concrete is assumed to be painted. The paint thickness is taken to be .0084 inch. A 1/8 inch air gap is assumed between steel and concrete in the conductivity containment dome of steel,and in the containment walls. The thermal 7 concrete, paint and air are presented in Table 6. 2-8. sinks was chosen so as to provide Mesh spacing for the heat minimum spacing for the outermost four inches. In this region Table 6. 2-7 presents the the maximum spacing used is 0.1 ft. l mesh spacing used for each heat sink. ) an accident, the structural heat g As time progresses following , sinks become less important. Most of the heat removal and the consequent pressure and temperature reduction is effected by the i containment spray system. The heat removal by the containment i j spray and the equations describing the heat transfer to the spray
- droplets are discussed in subsection 6.2.2.
l l O 6.2-10 Amendment 8
GISBSSAR Some energy dissipation to tne environment through the containment wall and dome takes place during the accident, however, this is neglected in the analysis. 7 I 1 0 , I h
; O 6. 2-10 a Amendment 8
GIBBSSAP 7 g For the most severe LOCA's and most severe secondary coolant system pipe break the accident chronologies are given in Table 6.2-9. Energy inventories for the most severe LOCA's and most severe secondary coolant system pipe breaks, are presented in Tables 6. 2-10 and 6.2-11, respectively. l8 The results of the containment pressure analysis for all reactor coolant and secondary system pipe breaks are shown in 7 O 6.2-11 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR O Figures 6.2-1 through 6.2-20. For the DEPSG breaks figures are l8 also provided for the following parameters as a f unction of time
- 1) Containment vapor and sump temperature 7
- 2) Energy inventory in the containment
- 3) Structural heat transfer coefficient After the peak pressure is reached, the ESF' reduce the containment pressure, at the end of the first day following the accident the pressure has a low value of about 23 psig. I7 The functional capability of the normal containment ventilation system to maintain assumed containment initial conditions are described in detail in Section 9.4. Limiting conditions for normal plant operation as they pertain to the containment environment are specified in Chapter 16.0, subsection 3/4.6.1 of the technical specifications.
, The instrumentaticn used to monitor the accident is discussed in 7 Chapter 7. O 1 0 6.2-12 Amendment 8
1 GIBBSSAR O
%s l (1) Hot Leg, Volume 1 (2) Cold Leg, Volume 1 c) Pressurizer Spray Line Compartment (1) Volume 4 d) Pressurizer Surge Line Compartment (1) Volume 1 The break sizes are: 144 in2 area in the case of the limited displacement cold-leg break (although data provided in the NSSS SSAR are consevatively calculated using 150 int area, it is used y unreduced) ; one f ull pipe area for the reactor coolant line breaks in the steam generator (I = 29 inches hot-leg, 27.5 inches cold leg) , and double-ended guillotine for the pressurizer surge (I = 11.188 inches) and spray (0 = 6 inches) lines. No flow l y restriction beyond those specified in the NSSS SSAP is used.
The subcompartmental nodalization information is supplied in Table 6.2-15 (a through d) , Table 6.2-16 (a through d) , and Figure 6.2-21 (a through d) . Previous experience has shown that O representation of all major features is sufficient to provide accurate pressure modeling. Graphs of pressure versus time for all nodes in the steam generator compartment and pressurizer compartments are presented in the figures 6.2-23 (b through e). The great number of volume nodes (33) used in the analysis of the nozzle girth weld safe-end limited displacement rupture in the weld inspection areas render reproduction of each pressure impractical. On each level, nodes experiencing peak pressure for that level are graphed (See Figures 6. 2-23a) . The mass and energy release rate data, as provided in the NSSS SSAR are presented in Tables 6.2-14 (a through e) . The data forl 1 the hot-leg and cold-leg splits in the steam generator compartment, the pressurizer spray line, and the pressurizer surge line contain a 10-percent margin which is deducted before using the data in the RELAP-3 code. The original data are used in constructing a mass release rate curve from which the best fit to PELAP-3 capabilities (no more than 19 data points) is made. O W-414 6.2-15 Amendment 1
GIBBSSAR O The flow conditions for all vent paths are presented in Tables 6.2-17 (a through e) . The vent loss coefficient for each junction (vent path) is designated in the RELAP-3 code as KJUN and calculated from the equation: KJUN = ____ ._K (1bf - sec2 / lbm- fts - in2) 144 x 2g x A2 where: K = resistance coefficient used in standard works, varying 0<K 51. 0 for sudden expansion, 0<K $0.5 for sudden contraction, and equal to fxL/D for flow in passages of length L and hydraulic diameter D. f = friction factor (Moody tables) g = gravitational constant (ft / sec a) A = minimum junction area (in a) The loss coefficients for each junction (vent path) are indicated on the flow diagrams (Figures 6.2-21a-d) as is the function inertia (L/A) . The cold leg limited displacement break will produce asymmetric g(q
/ horizontal forces on the reactor vessel, and nonzero moments around the reactor supports, all of which are tabulated in 2 Table 6.2-28, with coordinate axes as in Figure 6.2-35.
The effects of a pipe rupture within the steam generator compartment were investigated 'for possible asymmetric loading effects. The maximum side load on the steam generator would be 268405 pounds, with an associated moment about the base elevation (99' 0") of 6860 kip-feet. The maximum side load on the reactor coolant pump would be 1318000 pounds, with an associated moment of 33600 kip-feet. Sensitivity studies were performed to demonstrate that the approach taken yielded results substantially independent of any increase in the number of nodes. A doubling in the number of nodes surrounding the steam generator at the base level yielded a 17.5 percent reduction in the load applied 8 to this component. The reactor coolant pipes may split, in the nodalization scheme adopted, into either volumes 1 or 12, for the cold leg; or into volumes 11 or 12, for the hot leg (See Figure 6.2-22c, sheet 2) . Asymmetric loads on the steam generator compartment components are highest when the cold leg breaks into volume 1 and the hot leg breaks into volume 11. Asyneetric S.G. loads for the alternate break location (Volume 12) were reduced by 28 percent O W-414 6.2-16 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAE h in the case of the hot leg break and by 45 percent in the case of the cold leg break. Loads given include 40 percent margin. Available free area used in these analyses is that available af ter displaced insulation and other materials has clogged the vent paths through all fixed gratings. The reactor cavity analysis as presented is used both for prediction of maximum structural loads and for the design of the component supports. All . structural features causing constriction of the vent flow paths have been modeled. For this reason no additional 8 nodalization sensitivity studies beyond those employed in trial designs are planned. Since pre ssure reduction depends upon certain vent paths with a hydraulic diameter of 1.0 feet or less, consideration was given to vent clogging due to insulation dislodged in the course of a transient. A study of the pressure resisting properties of the reflective insulation used on the reactor coolant pipe showed that a pressure dif ferential of less than 3 psi would suffice to clear any possible clogging. As available pressure dif ferentials exceed 100 psi, no vent clogging due to displaced ins ulation is possible within the inspection cavity. O l
- 6. 2- 16a Amendment 8 1
GIBBSSAR 6.2.1.3 Mass and Energy Felease Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents A detailed description of both the computer codes used in the present analysis and of the models implemented for the transient analysis is given in Section 6.2 of the NSSS SSAR. The spectrum of mass and energy release data for the pipe breaks analyzed presented in Tables 6.2-2 through 6.2-16 of RESAR-414 fhave been; 8 modified as detailed in section 6.2.1.1.2 of RESAR-414. 6.2.1.4 Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment (PWR) The mass and energy release rates for all postulated secondary coolant system breaks are within the scope of the NSSS Vendor. Mass and energy release data used for the standard plant are given in Tables 6.2-33 through 6.2-40. This data has been 8 modified as detailed in Appendix 6B of RESAR-414. 6.2.1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance capability Studies on Emergency Core Cooling Systems (PWR) ECCS cooling performance is conservatively modeled in PESAR-414 Section 15.4.1.1. Except for outside temperature, the balance of plant assumptions used (see Table 15.4-3 of RESAF-414) are either tr same as or more conservative than the parameters existing in tL IBBSSAR Design. Outside temperature has a negligable effect on the pressure response due to the low thermal conductivity of concrete. The conservatisms in fan cooler performance and spray flow rate are more than enough to offset this difference. See Table 6.2-14 for a comparison if these parameters. 8 O W-414 6.2-17 Amendment 8
, _ . _ . . .-._ __.. _.. . - - _ . - - ..._ _.. .- ~_..._.._..._-_...- _ _ __ -
i GIBBSSAR 8 j 6.2.1.6 Testing and Inspection 1
- a. Leakage Testing Preoperational tests and inservice surveillance programs are carried out to assure that the containment system is capable of l performing its intended functions throughout its service life.
The inservice surveillance and testing program consists of visual l examination of the containment system and periodic leakage rate tests and are described below. The structural integrity test and the inservice surveillance of the containment vessel are discussed in Section 3.8.
- 1) Initial Integrated Leakage Rate Test This test is performed in conjunction with the structural integrity test, after completion of the containment vessel , including installation of all systems penetrating the containment vessel pressure boundary. The purpose of the test is to demonstrate that the integrated leakage rate is less than or equal
- to the allowable leakage rate specified in the technical (_w) specification. This test is referred to as the initial Type A test, as defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, and is conducted in accordance with the reduced pressure test program of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, III, 3, a.
- 2) Periodic Integrated Leakage Rate Tests This test is required for the periodic verification of the leaktight integrity of the containment. The periodic Type A tests are performed in accordance with the reduced pressure test program in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
- b. Frequency of Testing Types A, B, and C containment system tests are performed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, III, D.
6.2-18 Amendment 8
O O O GT P PSSM o 1 TABLE 6.2-1 l cot! tat tIMFffT PFFSSUFF. M AFG T t!* j (14e stinghouse- 414) Time Margin Energy l After as a Pressure Peleased Preak Percent at 1 day to containment 7 Peak Peak to Peak of Peak a f t er up to t he Fnd Pressure Temperature Pressure Pressure accidert of Flow 3cwn EEffh Jesis]L j[L _ 1sgegndst irsercentt jpsigl__ 1106 ELut,__,, touble-ended 45.85 270.2 262.0 9.05 9.57 7.44 pump suction, ouillotine, maximum ECCS, Double-ended 45.82 270.2 339.0 9.12 22.41 7.4a l8 purnp suctiort , ouillotine, minimum ECCS, 0.6 double-ended 41.22 263.4 168.0 21.30 17.0 7.64 pump suction ouillotine, m ximum FCCS, 3.0 fta pump 40.50 262.3 101.0 23.a6 17.00 13.34 , suct f ort split, itwixi mum ECCS 7 3 ! Double-ended 35.83 154.8 264.5 39.55 19.25 6.30 cold-leg u uil lot i ne , nuim tm ECCS . Double-ended 37.19 257.0 18.5 34.44 16.56 9.57 hot-leg qu il lot i ne, maximum FCCS 4 4 Amen 3 ment 8 7 i
t O O O G1PPSSER 1 l TABIE 6.2-5 STEMt LINE IT EAT MAPGIM (Westinghouse - 414)
- Time Marqin Eneroy
. After as a Feleaset Preak Percent to Containment Peak Peak to Peak of Peak up to the Frd Pressure Tempe ra t ure Pressure Pressure of Plowlovn EIf5h IEE111L__ JLL 1secondst JeercentL 1106 Ptut_____ pouble-ended 40.0 350 1200 25.0 772 102T power noutle-ended 42.1 349 1200 18.8 796 701 power Doutle-entled 42.2 345 1260 18.5 792 33% power Double-ended 37.5 344 240 33.3 683 0% power 320 89 3 785 8 split 33.5 310 102% power , sp '. 32.7 307 400 52.9 805 70% iwer split 37.3 305 1640 34.0 836 j 305 towe; split 31.8 301 280 57.2 790 i OT power l
. m $$ 5(
l t
y w GTBESSAP TAI'LE 6. 2-6 (Sheet 1 of 3) PASSIVE !! EAT SItWS , (WESTINGHOUSE - 414) Dimggslges __ 7 Used in ECCS Used in IrrA Backpressure
!! eat Analysis AcMal Analysis Twa Sink %ickness Area Thickness Area Thickness Area Sides UU0bCE E*'ECEi l119H Mat erial Ft Ftr Ft Ft 2 Ft Ft2 Ex e gj 1 Cont ainment St eel .03125 32350 .03125 33026 See BTP CSB 6-1 No Dome Concret e 2.5 32350 2.5 33026 4
2 containment Steel .03125 87729 .03125 90963 See BTP CSP 6-1 No wall Concrete 5.0 87729 5.5 90963 1 3 Founiation Concrete 2.5 12150 2.5 12150 See BTP CSP 6-1 Na steet .0208 12150 .0208 12150 Concrete 12.0 12150 12.0 8650 Concrete ---- ----- 28.0 3500 P 4 Vent ilation Steet .0025 82004 .0025 84600 See BTP CSP 6-1 Tes Ducts 5 Misc. Steel Steel .0083 7350 .0083- 7600 See BTP CFP 6-1 Yes (platforms, .0125 ladders, stairway, et c.) .1 to
.15 in.
6 Misc. Steel Steel .02683 4998 .02683- 5200 See ETP CSB 6-1 Yes (piping, .0633 shielding, beams, etc. ) ,
.322 to .76 in.
4 7 Misc. Steel Steel .125 2742 .125- 2800 See BTP CSP 6-1 Yes (crane wheel .17 axle, teams, etc.) , 1.5 to . 2 in. 4 8 Misc. Steel Steel .667 1310 .6f7- 1500 See BTP CSP 6-1 Yes (wheels, 1.5 Amerd me n t P n _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
1 I i GIPBSSAF , f rAPI F 6. 2-6 isheet 2 of 3) , i PASSIVE HFAT SINFS (WFSTINGI!OUSF - 414) ; Dimensions used in FCCS used In loCA Backpressure i Peat Analysis Actual ADDlYSiS Two Sink Thickness Area Thickness Area Thickness Area Sides ' Pumber Pescription Material Ft Ft2 Ft Ftr Ft Ft2 ExEosp] qirders, et c.) , et c.) 8 to 18 in. 9 Misc. steel St eel .012 4309 .012 4400 See BTP CSP 6-1 No
.0208 !
10 Misc. Steel Steel .0083 8608 .0083 8700 See BTP CSP 6-1 No l (filters, ; coils, hangers etc.) 11 Misc. Steel St e el .0233 9208 .0233- 9300 See BTP CSP 6-1 No (piping sys- .0458 8 tem, rims, crane, etc.) ,
.28 to .55 ir.
12 Misc. Steel Steel .1667 1413 .1667- 1500 See PTP CSB 6-1 No 2 to 2.5 in. .2083 13 Main Girders Steel .5 6759 .5 6000 See BTP CSB 6-1 No 14 Girders Steel 1.5 1248 1.5 1300 See BTP CSP 6-1 No 1% Concrete Concrete 1. 0 5949 1.0- 6070 See BTP CSB 6-1 Yes Walls, 1.9 (elevator, l walls, floor, etc.) , 16 Concrete Concrete 14896 2.0- 15200 See PTP CSP 6-1 Yes i Walls. 2.0 (pressurizer
+
Ameedmrnt R t t
GTPBGSM i i TABT.F 6.2-6 (Sheet 3 of 3) . PASSIVE IIEAT SItTFS 7 (HESTIttilottsF - 414) Dimensions ______ Used in FCCF Used In IK A Packpressure liea t Analysis Actual _Bnalysis Two Sink Thickness Area Thicknee. Area %ickness Area Side =; tamt er Description Material Ft Ft 2 Ft Ft2 Ft Ft 2 Fxposed and reliaf tank room, regeneration and letdown heat exchanger . rooms, etc.) 8 17 Floor Slabs Concrete 2.5 67659 2.5 69040 See BTP CSD 6-1 Yes 18 Misc. Walls Concrete 3.0 22217 3.0- 22670 See BTP CSB 6-1 Yes 3.9 19 Shield Walls Concrete 4.0 67365 4.0 68740 See BTP CSB f:- 1 Yes 20 Misc. Walls Concrete 5.0 6664 5.0 and 6800 See BTP CSP 6-1 13 o and floors g reater tint e s:
- 1) All steel and concrete is assumed to be covered with a .0084 7 inch layer of paint
- 2) An air gap of .13 inches is assumed between t he steel and concrete in heat sinks 1 and 2 a
n.merdmen t B a t
i 4 O O O i' GTPBSPAF 1 TA: E 6. 2-8 MATFOI AL PPOPERTIFS 4 Thermal St ecific Volumetric Conductivit y lieat Density lleat Capacity idat o ri a l jf tg/hr-f t-Q j Bt u/It:m-[}, jlbrn/f th _ Jrt u/f t 3 _Q__ steel 26.0 0.12 490.0 58.8 concrete 0.854 0.21 154.0 32.3 , Paint 0.1 - - 0.1
.Tir 0.017 0.24 0.001 0.01 4
3 4 d t 4 A i e _ __ _____._m_____ . _ _ _ __ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _
O O GIFitSS AF TAPIE fi.2-11 BALAtrE OF PLAtiT ASSUMPTIOt13 USFD TO MODTPY MASS AND FtFFGY FELFASE DATE PPESFtTTED It? FESAF-414 (1) (W stinghouse - 414) Quantit y of Flow rate of Aux Feedwater Time of "ain Fteam in Unisolated Specific Mass of Mass of Addit ion Pate Steam and Steam Generator Steam not Volume of Uninolated Feedwater to Faulted Feedwater at Time of of Steam TTnisolated Steam in Added steam Generator Isolation Preak Line steam Steam rinre Fre n utL _ n b/ sect Iseci ntt 11b/sec/ftr3 3, e i n tq_ ntt_______ ^ Double Ended 22900 250 7.6 170000 2355 .3871 23477 102% Power Doi:ble Ended 25190 2',J 7.4 191000 2400 .3786 20034 70% Power Double Fnded 32530 250 7.2 211000 2 t! 66 .3670 24763 30% Power Double Ended 5094 250 7.1 212000 2640 .3556 25557 8 0% Power
- cplit 59962 250 26.5 176000 (2) .3871 23477 102% Power rolit 61318 250 28.0 191000 (2) .1786 24004 70% Power rplit 72011 250 27.5 211000 (2) . % 70 24703 10% Power Split 22756 250 26.5 212000 (2) .3556 25557 Ot Power
!btes:
- 1) See Appendix EB of FESAF - 414
- 2) Fot required f or split breaks A rre nd uent 8 e
O GYPPSSAF TABLE 6.2-12 MASS 7ND ENFPGY PEIEASE DA*A, IOCA (frJesting house-41 tt) F ES AP-414 Preak Peference _ Double-ended pump suction Tables f.2-2, 6.2-9, 6.2-10, 6.2-15, 6.2-16, and 6. 2- 17 0.6 ilouble-ended pump suction Tables 6.2-3 and 6.2-11 3.0 f t a pump suction split Tables 6.2-4 and 6.2-12 8 rouble-ended cold-leg Tables 6.2-6 and 6.2-14 pouble-ended hot-leg Tables 6.2-5 and 6.2-13
*Dat a for the DEPSG break has been modified as detailed in FES AP -414 Sect ion E . 2.1.1.
Amendiant 8
O O o GIBBSSAP TAELF 6.2-13 SUBCOMPARTMENT PPFSSURE StR1MAPY (Westinghouse-414) Maximum Maximum Design Pressure Calculated Differential (Includes 404 Yocation Pressure Pressure Margjpl t:ozzle cavit y 357.3 psia 342.6 psig 480 psig (el. 112. 25 to el . 118.9) (t = 0.16 sec) , reactor cavity 67.8 psia 53.1 psig 75 psig (el. 117.3 to el. 122.3) (t = 1.0 sec) Feactor cavity 73.5 psia 58.8 psig 83 psig (el. 110.3 to el. 117. 3) (t = 1.0 sec) I reactor cavity 51.6 psia 36.9 psig 52 psig (el. 9R. 3 to el. 110.3) (t = 1.0 sec) Peactor cavity 33.9 psia 19.2 psin 27 psia (el . 87.1 to el. 98.3) (t = 1.0 see) Feactor cavity 33.9 psia 19.2 psig 27 psig , (e l . 65.5 to el. 87.1) (t = 1.0 see) Steam aenerator 44 psia 29 psig 41 psig compa rtme nt (t = 0.9 see) (tselow el. 171.9 ft) Steam generator 29.5 psia 15 psig 21 psig co.npartment (t = 1.0 sec) (atove el. 171.9 ft) Pressurizer compartment 20 psia 5.3 psia 8 psig 3 (above el. 138.0 ft) (t = 0.3 sec) , Pressurizer compartment 50.5 psia 35.7 psig 50 psig l2 (t;elow el. 136.0 ft) (t = 1.2 sec) 1 Ame ndmer.t 2
GIBBSSAR [ TABLE 6.2.-14 (Sheet I of 2) COMPARISON OF THE CONThINMENT ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE RESAR-414 ECCS ANALYSIS WITH THE ACTUAL GIBBSSAR DATA (hTSTINGHOUSE - 414) PESAR-414 Actual GIBBSSAR Parameter Assumption Data Net Free Volume 3.6x10* ft3 3.6x106 ft3 (includes 2% for uncertainties) Initial Conditions Pressure 14.7 psia 14.7 psia Temperature 90 F 90 F RWST Temperature 40 F 40 F 8 O Outside Temperature 0F -40 F* Spray System Number of Pumps Operating 2 2 Runout Flow Pate 6000 gpm 5000 gpm Actuation Time 25 sec 46 sec ; Safeguards Fan Coolers Number Operating 6 0 Structural Heat Sinks See BTP See BTP CSB 6-1 CSB 6-1
- Alt hough' a temperature of 0F used in RES AP- 414 is less conservative than the -40 F minimum temperature at a GIBBSSAP O
Amendment 8 j py- --pr- <TW -f wwv f- g "yf-y
'yy -$ v -wy7- N y g q p p> pr q g - y 4 y }r 3r
- p gae
- Wi r 7't- -Wri- kr e r g3 g -+a-eamPyr ew' h,aweme
GIBBSSAR h TABLE 6.2 -14 (Sheet 2 of 2) COMPARISON OF THE CONTAINMENT ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE RESAR-414 ECCS ANALYSIS WITH THE ACTUAL GIBBSSAR DATA (WESTINGHOUSE - 414) 8 the low thermal conductivity of concrete, the site, due to overall impact on the pressure response is negligible. Further, the increased heat transfer through the containment is more than design. offset by the lack of fan coolers on the GIBBSSAR Assuming a thermal conductivity of .92 Btu /hr-f t-F outsideand infinite inside and the conservativewall heatthe transfer coeficients maximum increased heat transfer through the containment containment wall would be 1.60 x 10' Btu /hr. The heat removal rate by the 6 fan coolers is greater than 500 x 106 Btu /hr (see FESAR-414 Figure 15.4-17a) . O I l l l Amendment 8 L __
/
GIPPSGP TABLP 6. 2-19 ( St'ec t 6 of 8) cot!TAltIMENT ISOLATION VALVING APPLICATION (Westinghouse-414)
}
Preli-Numter min- Valve Isola- Type C Ma x irmam of Design ary ESF Arrange- tion Locat ion I-elvage Length 5 Pene- Basis Line (yes ment Valve of Valve Test of Pire tra- (GDC) Size or Fig- Nutrbe r (IC or (yes or(Fote *) Valve Item lieu Service tions System ( ir. . ) no) ure 6.2-28 (PCI D) OC) not (ft) Type Actuaf7r (note 4) ______ _______ _____ __ 41 Accumulator one 56 SS 3/8 no 30 (later) IC yes (lat er) glote air i 5 sampling OC 71obe air l1 42 Deleted 5 43 Peactor coolant one 55 SS 3/8 no 5 IC ye s nioLe air lg 1 hot legs sairple OC g lot:e air 44 Pressurizer one 55 SS 3/8 no 5 yes l5 sample IC alobe air a OC 11ote air 1 45 Plant ventil- one 56 VCWS 6 no 2 IC yes check - ation chilled OC globe air wat er system 8 supply 40 Plant ventil- one 56 VCWS 6 no 35 IC yes o lot e air ation chilled OC , l ot'e air water system return 1 47 Safety one 54 SIS 3/4 no 5 OC yes alote air l5 iniect ion IC niobe air 1
- test line j
i i I l Diendment R 1 1
O a o a GIBPSSAP TABLE 6.2-19 (Eheet 6A of 8) CONTAllMENT ISO 1ATION VALVIt'G APPLICATIOti (wes t ing house- 414) Primary Secondary Power Valve F4 ode of Mode of Normal Shutdown Postaccident Failure Cont air: ment Closure Valve valve valve Valve valve valve Isolation Tim Position Sional (Se0) Comm+m t s > Itn Actuation Actuation Position Posit ion Position FM open open closed closed Phase A < 13 1 1 41 A A EM open open closed closed Phase A <10 5 42 Deleted 33 A FM closed open closed closed Phase A <13 A F e'. open open closed closed Phase A <10 ti4 A FM open open closed closed Phase A <10 g A FM open open closed closed Phase A < 13
- - - I 45 PP - - - -
A PM open closed closed closed Ptase A <10 closed Phase A <10 l 8 46 A PM open closed closed 4 PM open closed closed closed Phase A <13 47 A FM closed closed closed closed Phase n. < t3 A PM closed closed closed closed Phase A <10 mmendment 8
I 4 i C O GIDBSSAR 6 TABLE 6.5-1 n..- (Sheet 1 of 10) ANALYSIS OF ENGINEEFED SAFETY FEATUPE ATMOSPffEPE CLFANtfP SYSTEMS WIT!! FESPFCT TO FACII POSITION OF NPC REGULATOFY GUIDE 1.52, REVISION 2 l8 i Control Room Emergency , Ventilation Units (N Primary Plant Emergency Pressuriration Ventilation tinits and Two Emergency Exhaust Units 6 i- Criterla Filtration UD its) (ESF1* Ftoulatory Position 11 { Enyironsida LpesiggJriteria l' a. Fach ESF atmosphere Filtration and System is designed cleanup system -is based pressurization units to contair radio-on conditions reruit- are designed to limit active particulates ing from DPA. dose resulting from and radioactive DBA within the limits iodine resulting of GnC19 f rom a fuel ac- ! cident or FSF i component leakage. 8 Pressure Difference Emergency filtration unit Variable vane ! variable vane inlet fans inlet fans in in accordance with ANSI accordance with i N-509-1976. Pressuri- ANSI N-509-1976 l-zation unit constant velocity fan and modulating damper in accordance with ANSI N-509-1976 Felative flumidity Fmergency filtration unit Feating coil and [ controlled by control demister upstream , room air handling system. of - the IIEPA Pressurization unit filters per ANSI beating coil and demister N-509-1976 upstream of ITEPA filters per AFSI N-509-1976 s I Amendment 8 i e
,t--.-- --
.O O O GIPP.SSAP TABLE 6.5-1 6 (Sheet la of 10)
AtjAMSIS OF ENGINEFFfD SAFE *fY..FEATUFF A'IMOSPHEFF CLEANUP SYSTEM WIT 11 PFSPECT TO_ EACH POSITION OF FRC PEGULATOFY GUIDE 1.52 4 REVISION 2 l8 Control Room Emerges.cy 6 Ventilation Units (Two Pricary' Plant Fmergency Pressurization Ventilation Units and ho Fmergency Exhaust Ucits i cr it eria . filtration Unitsi j_ESfL* _ t'a x . 6 Min. Faergency Filtration Unit 50<T<135F g Temperature 75Ft5F. Pressurization IIFTA filter inlet Unit 70-125F range HEPA filter inlet.
- t. . System design is based Yes; filters are Yes '
on 30-day integrated designed for a 30-day radiation dose. integrated dose.
- c. Adsorber design.is based Yes Yes on iodine concentration.
- d. ' compatibility of atme Yes Yes 6 sphere cleanup system !
with other ESFs
- e. Components of system Yes Yes designed for both the ,
lowest and highest j outdoor temperatures
- Featinres of the modular' supply and exhaust filtration system used are as ~
follows: .These units are connected in parallel. The two Fuel Puilding
- exhaust units are. the only two. units of the modular system considered as ESP units.'
I i f s k Amendment 8 i b t
r% (d3 i d GIFP.SSAR 6 TABLE 6.5-1 (Sheet 2 of 10) 8 ANALYSIS OF FHGINFFFFD SAFFTY FFATUFE ATMOSP11FF E CI.FANUP SYSTFMS ' WITil PESPECT TO FaCH POSITION OF NPC FFGULA10FY GUIPF 1.52,_EFVISION 2 l l Control Room Emerge ncy 1 Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant Fmergency Pressurization Ventilation Units and Two Fmergency Exhaust-Units friteria FiltratioD Units) J ES Fl
- ___
legulatory j Position 21 system Design Criteria icontinuedt i j a. Pedundancy of atmo- Four filter trains, Two filter trains,
- sphere cleanup system heater, mist elimina- heater mist elim-g if designed for mitiga- tors, particulate, inat or, UFPA and 6 i tion of accident HEPA filters, fan, carbon filters, doses and housing are the -fan, and housing components included are the components in the design of included in the each unit, with re- design of each dundancy in active unit , with re-and passive com- dundancy in active ponents. Heater and and passive com-
! mist eliminator are ponents. not included on ' emergency filtration units. l'. Physical separation of Yes Yes redundant atmosphere cleanup systems l c. Atmosphere cleanup Yes Yes system designated seismic Category I , t o' prevent release ! of fission products 1
- d. At mosphere cleanup NA NA system pressure surge protection 1
h Amendment 8 4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _< &v
- .. . . . , ~ - . - _ _ .
O O O GIBBSSAP
.. TABLE 6.5-1 6 (Sheet.3 of 10)
ANALYSIS OF FNGIEEEFFD SAFFTY FFATUPE ATMOSPITRE CLFANUP SYSTEPJ EITl! PESPECT TO EACH POSITION OF NPC FEGULATOFX_gUlpE 1.52, PEVISION 2 l8 - l Control Foom Emergency Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant ; Emergency Pressurization Ventilation , Units and Two Emergency Fxhaust Units Criteria Filtration.UD its) (ESFl*
- e. . Atmosphere cleanup Yes Yes system construction materials; effective 6 performance Jf ex- ,
i posed to radiation
- f. Maximum and (required) ' Filtration units: 16,000 ft3/ min volumetric airflow 4000 ft3/ min - (15,000 f t 3/ min) ;
rate per atmosphere (3400 ft3/ min) t cleanup system train, ' Pressurization units. ;
- res pect ively*
- 1000 ft3/ min ;
(900 ft3/ min) 9 Atmosphere cleanup Yes. Yes l system instrumentation j provided
- h. Electrical distribution Yes .Yes and power supply con-forming to %EEE standards ;
i
- 1. -Automatic' activation of Safety injection signal' Safety injection i ESF Atmosphere Cleanup' and/or high radiation signal and/or high l System .
radiation signal from ' signal f rom redundant red undant seismic ' seismic Category I Category I radiation g radiation monitors monitors automati-automactically initiate cally activates , ESF atmosphere cleanup ESF atmosphere 2 system cleanup system. . Manually activated prior to fuel i handling in order to mitioate ef f ects ; of f uel handling accidents, i Amendment 8 :. e 1
O O O GIPBSSAF 6 TARI.E 6. 5- 1 (Sher t 3a of 10) ANALYSIS OF ENGINFFFFD SAFETY FFATUF E AT'40SPl!FFF CLFAHf1P SYSTFMS EIT5i FU5PECE'56~EACH POSITION OF t:FC PEGUIATbFi Flii5:F ];s2, nFvisl5t_2 j ;8 Control Foom Emergency Ventilation Units (Two Pritnary Plant Fmergency Pressurization Ventilat ion 6 Units and Two Fmergency Exhaust Units Criteria Filtration _ Units) JEEL_
** Maximum and required flow rates may vary from site to site. The rates oiven here are based on the conditions outlined in Section 9 . 88 . The required flow rate is in parenthesis, where applicable.
Amendment 8
O O O GIEPSSAR-TABLE 6.5-1 6 (Sheet 4 of 10) ANALYSIS CF ENGINEEPFD SAFETY FFATUFE ATMOSPIIEPE CLEANUP SYSTFMS WITH PESPECT TO FACH POSITI6U~6F.NFC PE6UEATORY_ GUIDE 1.52 1 F5VISI6N 2 l0 Control Room Emergency 6 Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant Fmergency Pressurization Ventilation Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units Crit eria Filtration U Dits) JESFU___
- j. Padiation protection for Design is such that Design is such that workers in order to removal of individual removal of indi- t perform maintenance components is possible vidual components ensuring that exposure is possible en-
- to operational personnel suring that exposure .
is ALAPA. to operating personnel ! is ALAPA. Foughing and IIEPA Foughing and HEPA
- quick latch - quick latch absorber - in place absorber - in place refillable refillable
- canister testing - canister testing F. 'tinimization of meteor- Intakes are provided .N/A supply units 8 i
.ological effects on with a tornado protection do not operate outdoor air intakes louver and two ESF following DBA trains in series. Dust ?
protection is provided . by a demister and pref 11ter i upstream of the IIEPA filters. Smoke prevention is by isolation see section 9.4.1 and Table 9.4-3
- 1. Atmosphere cleanup In accordance with ANSI In accordance ;
system housing and H-509 and ANSI N-510 wit h ANSI N-509 ductwork maximum total ASNI-N-510 5 leak rate limitations i ** Maximum and required flow rates may vary from site to site. The rates 6 [ qiven here are based on the conditions outlined in section 9.4 The l required flow rate is in parenthesis, where applicable. r I Amendment 8 f
T-GIPBSSAP TABLE 6.5-1 6 - (Sheet 5 of 10)
%YgI5_OE_ENGINFEFFD SAFFTY FFETUPE ATNOSPUFFE_gLf?NUP SYgTES g ZEgLF[T 10 FAgil POSITION OF 1:FC FFGULATgFY_ GUIDE 1. 5], F FVISION_2 l Control Poom FJnergency
- Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant Famergency Pressuritation Ventilation 6
- Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units _ ;
3 F11tration Units) JEgFl*___ gry Position 3: nt_and Design Crit eria litiEation Testing 1!edL i "ister performance Demisters*** are A loss of fuel ***
. qualification provided for the pool cooling may "uirements pressurization result in relative i units, per ANSI N-509 humidity to 100 8
- - 1976 percent. remister is provided i per ANSI N-509
- 1976 6 ective operating Yes; pressurization Yes; units are hiition of adsorption units are equipped equipped with g ,ts with beaters. Fmergency heaters, per ANSI filtration unit relative N-509-1976 6 humidity controlled by control Foom air con-ditioning system, 8 per ANSI N-509-1976 l yuirements of pre- Materials used in Materials used in prefilters withstand prefilters with- 6 Iter materials sub-sted t o radiation the radiation levels stand the radia-and environmental tion levels and conditions prevalent environmental con-during the postulated ditions prevalert DBA, per ANSI N-509-1976 during the postu-lated DBA, per 8 ANSI N-509-1976 Amendment 8
O O O GIBPSSAP 6 TABLE 6.5-1 (Sheet 5a of 10) ANAMSIS OF ENjITIFFFFD SAFETY FFATUFE A'IMOSPf1EPE CI,EANTIP SYS1FMS 8 WIT 1? _ RESPECT TO EACH POSITION OF NRC FFGULATORY GUIDF 1.52 2 RFVISION 2 i Control Poom Emergency Primary Plant 6 Ventilation Units (Two Emergency Pressurization Ventilation Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units Criteria Filtra11o OTnits) (ESFl*
*** Demisters are designed in accordance with the recommendations of Mine safety Analysis Fesearch 11-45 and meet Underwriters
- Laloratories, Inc., Class I requirements.
Amendwnt 8
l , GIPBSSAF ' TABLE 6.5-1 6 { (Sheet 6 of 10) s ANAgSIS OF ENGINEFPFD SAFffY FEATUTE _ ATMOSPljFPF_CLFANITP SYSTFt1S 8 i WITt! PESPECT TO FACll POSITION _ OF_ NFC BFGULFTOPY GUIDF 1.52g RFVISION 2 l i i Control Poom Emergency 6 l Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant
- Emergency Pressurization Ventilation i Units and wo Emergency Fxhaust Units Crit erla Filtration Units) fES Q*
i i d. IIEPA filter require- Yes, in accordance with Yes, in accordance ' ments and standards ANSI N-509-1976 with ANSI N-509 performance -1976
- e. Filter and adsorber In accordance with In accordance mounting frames (design ANSI N-509-1976 with ANSI N-509
. and construction) - 1976
- f. Filter and adsorber In accordance with In accordance j bank arrangement Sec 4.4 of EPDA 76-21 with Sec 4.4 of
-recommendations FFDA 76-21 g
- q. System filter housings In accordance with In accordance
' design and construction ANSI N-509-1976 with ANSI N-509
- 1976 i h. Water drain recommenda- In accordance with In accordance tions Sec 4.5.8 of with Sec 4.5.8 of ERDA 76-21 of EPDA 76-21 l i. Ecmoval of gaseous Adsort'er ef ficiency Adsorber ef-
- iodine by adsorber in accordance with ficiency in (carbon) material Table 2, Test No. 5 accordance with of NFC Fequlatory Table 2, Test 5 Guide 1.52 as well as of NRC Fegulatory ANSI N-509-1976 Guide 1.52 as well as ANSI N-509-1976
- j. Absorber cell Yes, in accordance with Yes, in accordance design recommendations FNSI N-509-1976 with ANSI N-509-
- 1976 4
4 Amendment 8
- . . . . ~ . .- ---- . . .-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ _
O O O I GIPPSSAP
' TABLE 6.5-1 6
.' '(Sheet 6a of 10) ; t 3N3 LYSIS OF FNGINFEPFD SAFETY FEATUPE ATP10SP[t_FDLCPANUP SYSTFMS 8 IqTII FESPECT TO FACH POSITION OLNPC F%ULATOPY GUIDE 1.52,j FVISIOL] I
~
Control Poom Emergency , Ventilation Units (Two Primary. Plant. [ Faergency Pressurization Ventilation 6 Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units ! L criteria Filtration Units) (EST)*
- k. Fire prevention in Ignition <600 F; Ignition <600 F; adsorter desorption <300 F; -desorption <300 F; isolation of the isolation of the -
affected unit prior affected unit to desorption, water prior to desorp-spray to inhibit tion, water spray ; adsorber fires to inhibit adsorber : fires. 1 I i e i l
+
2- . s I i I i i 1 i Amer.dment 8 ;
?
4 i
i GIPPSSAR T4BLE 6.5-1 6 (Sheet 7 of 10) 8 ANALYSIS OF ENGINFFFED SAFETY FFATUPE ATMOSPf!FFE CLEANUP SYSTFMS
- ' WITl! PESPFCT__TO EACit POSITION,OF NRC REGULATOFY GUIDE 1.52. RFVISION 2 l Control Poom Emergency Ventilation Unit s (Two Primary Plant 4 Fmergency Pressurization Ventilation Units and Two Fmergency Exhaust Units 1 Criteria Filtration Unitgl (ESFL*
- 1. System f ans provided Yes, in accordance wit h Yes, in accordance with suf ficient capac- ANSI N-509-1976 with ANSI U-509 ity and pressure - 1976' i
1 I m. Atmosphere cleanup Yes Yes 6 i system f an or blower } operates under the environmental conditions postulated. $ n. Ductwork designed in Yes; meets Yes; meets accordance with OENL requirements of requirements of 8 } I i recommendations ANSI u-509-1976 ANSI N-509-1976
- o. System contains a Yes Yes- ,
minimum of ledges, 6 protrusions, crevices, and similar items which impede personnel or create a hazard. Dampers designed in Yes Yes 8 j { p. ' i in accord with ANSI ' N-509-1976 I i i Artndment 8 f I 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ _ - - _- v- ___ ___ _m = + ,, g -,e+ -%-, -,yr,,
- O o .
GIBPSSAP ' TABLE 6.5-1 6 (Sheet 8 of 10) AN3MgIS_OF ' Et91NEFFFD_ShTETY FFATUFE ATMOSPHEPE CI,FANUP SYSTFMS 8 I WITH PESPECT TO EbCLPOSITION_OF NFC PEGULATOPY GUIDE - 1.52 4 RFVISION 2 Control Room Ernergency , t Ventilation Units (Two Prirnary Plant Emergency Pressurization Ventilation 6 Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units criteria Eiltration UD its) (FS Q* Eegulatory Position 4: riaintenance -
- a. Personnel safety, Yes, in accordance with Yes, in accordance ready removal of the the provisions of EPDA with the provisions elements arvi easy 76-21 and ANSI N-509 of FFDA 76-21 and 8 access of components - 1976 ANSI N-509-1976 i
- b. Definite mounting Yes Yes frame separation .8 distances ,
- c. Permanent test probes Yes, in accordance Yes, in accordance. g with external connections with ANSI N-509-1976 with. ANSI N-509-1976 ,
- d. Periodic. Operation of Yes; cyclic use of Yes; cyclic use standby atmosphere components of components cleanup system 6
-e. Atmosphere cleanup Yes Yes 1 8 system components installed after active construction 6 ,
l r i f Anrndment 8
?
+
i
I I l GIPBSSAP 6 TAELE 6.5-1 (Cheet 9 of 10) j AN3 LYSIS OF FNGINEEPPD SAFETY FEPTUEE ATMOSPilERE OLFANUP SYSTEMS l WITY! PESPECT TO EAqH POSITION OF t@C PFGULATOPY GUIDE 1.52, PEVISION 2 l8 Control Foom Emergency i Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant [ Emergency Pressurization Ventilation
-Units and Two Fmergency Exhaust Units Criteria. Filtration Units) (ES[1*
EegulatgEy PositioD_51 j In-Place Teating_priteria
- a. In-place testing of Acceptance tests and Acceptance tests-
- atmosphere cleanup periodic tests during and periodic tests system plant operation in ac- during operation cordance with ANSI-N510, n accordance 1975 with ANSI-N510, 6
1975
- b. Testing the airflow Acceptance tests and Acceptance tests distribution to the periodic tests during and periodic tests filters (HTPA and plant operation in ac- during operation adsorbers) cordance with ANSI-N510, in accordance 1975 wit h ANSI-NSIO, 1975
- c. The in-place testing Acceptance test and Acceptance tests -
! of HEPA filters con- periodic test during and periodic tests forms to ANSI standards plant operation in ac- during operation or is replaced. cordance with ANSI-N510, operation in accordance 1975 with AffSI-N510, 1975
- d. The adsorbers are Acceptance tests and Acceptance tests leak-tested. periodic tests during and periodic tests plant operation in ac- during operation cordance with ANSI-N510, .in accordance 1975 with ANSI-N510, 1975 Amendment 8 i--
O O O GIBBSSAF TABLF 6.5-1 6 (Sheet 10 of 10) r ANALYSIS OF ENGINFEPFD SAFETY FFATUFE WIT 40SPHFPLCLEANUP SYSTFMS 8 l WITH FFSPECT *IV EACH POSITIOt1 OF 77PC PEGULfGORY GUIDE Id], FEVISEtM l t Control Poom Dnergency Ventilation Units (Two Primary Plant l Fmergency Pressurization Ventilation 6 ! Units and Two Emergency Exhaust Units Crit eria Filtration Unitsl (EST) *
.[1gulatory Position 6:
Laborato n Testing Criteria for Activated Carton , j.
- a. If the act ivated carbon Testing of samples Testing of adsorber meets the reg- to determine effi- samples to ulatory requirements, ciencias and property determine effi-
- the adsorber section is specifications per ciencies and 8 assigned the decontami- . ANSI H-509-1976 property specifica-nation efficiencies. If . tions per ANSI l not, the carbon is not N-509-1976 e used . in ESF adsorbers. 6
- b. The efficiency of the Yes; see Subsection Yes; see Sub- i activated carbon ad- 6.5.1.4 and 9.4.'t.4, section 6.5.1.4.
sorber section is 8 and in accordance with a nd 9. 4. 2. 4, and determined by labora- ANSI - N-509- 1976 in accordance with , tory testing of rep- ANSI N-509-1976 i resentative samples of the activated carton exposed simultaneously 6 to the same service con- ' ditions as the adsorter section. i 8
~
6 Amendment 8 i
O O O GIEESSAR l TAELE 7.1-1 < (Sheet 1 of 10) t APPLICABLE STANDAFDS AND CODES TO IEC SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY (SAR Section) 4 CRITERIA TITLE 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 FEMAFKS i 1. 10 CFR Part 50 i ! a. 10 CFR 50.34 Contents of Application:' Technical Information X X X X X
- b. 10 CFR 50.36 Technical Specifications X X X X
- c. 10 CFR 50.55a Codes and Standards X X X
- 2. General Design Criteria (GDC) , See Section 3.1 Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for discussion of each GDC 8
- a. GDC 1 Quality Standards and Records X X X X
- b. -GDC 2' Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena X X X X
- c. GDC 3 Fire Protection X X X X~
- d. GDC 4 Environmental and Missile Design Bases X X X X
- e. GDC 5 Sharing of Structures, Systems-
- and Components X X X X Not Applicable
- f. GDC 10 Reactor Design See NSSS SSAR
- g. GDC 12 Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations See NSSS SSAR l
- h. GDC 13 Instrumentation and Control X X X X X
- i. GDC 15 Peactor Coolant System Design See NSSS SSAR Amendment 8 i
e , . - - -
~. . - . ~ . -. . - ~ - . - - . .. . .
O GIBBSSAR TABLE 7.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 10) APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND CODES TO IOC SYSTEMS d APPLICABILITY (SAP Section) TITLE 7.3 7. 4 7.5 7.6 7.7 EEMARKS CPITERIA l Control Foom. X X X X X
- j. GDC 19
- k. GDC 20 Protection System Functions X X f
- 1. GDC 21 . Protection System Feliability 4 and Testability X X
- m.' GDC 22 Protection System Independence X X X X See NSSS SSAR
- n. 'GDC 23 Protection System Failure Modes-
- o. GDC 24 separation of Protection and' Control Systems X X See NSSS SSAR
, 8
- p. GDC 25 Protection System Requirements for Feactivity Control Malfunctions See NSSS SSAR
- q. GDC.26 Reactivity Control System Fedundancy and Capability- See NSSS SSAR i
- r. GDC 27 Combined Reactivity Control Systems capability
~
See NSSS SSAP i
- s. GDC 28: Reactivity Limits See NSSS SSAR I
- t. GDC 29 Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences X X X
- u. GDC 33 Reactor Coolant Makeup See NSSS SSAF l
- v. GDC Residual lleat Removal See NSSS SSAR
- w. GDC 35 Emergency Core Cooling See NSSS SSAR
- x. GDC 37 itsting of Emergency Core Cooling System See USSS SSAR -
Amendment 8 , a 4 m --
i t ' W i GIEBSSAR 1 1 J 4 TABLE 7.1-1
; (Sheet 3 of 10)
APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND CODES TO I6C SYSTEMS { ) > APPLICABILITY (SAR Section) } TITLE 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 PEMAFKS i CFITERIA , 1 i y. GDC 38 Containment Ileat Femoval X i I 2. GDC 40 Testing of containment Heat Removal System X
! aa. GDC 41 Containment Atmosphere Cleanup X t
bb. GDC 43 Testing of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems X l i cc. GDC 44 Cooling Water X X
' 8 ,
dd. GDC 46 Testing of Cooling uater System X X ee. GDC 50 containment Design Basis X i: f f. GDC 54 Piping Systems Penetrating , t Containment X ! gg. GDC 55 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Mnetrating Containment X ; i hh. GDC 56 Primary Containment Isolation . X . i 5 ' Li. GDC 57 Closed Systems Isolation valves X. t i i ! I l' ,. i f i Amendment 8 L 4 l l
l
- O o o GIBBSSAR TABLE 7.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 10)
APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND CODES TO IEC SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY (SAP Section) 7.3 7. 4 7.5 7.6 7.7 B EMAR FS j CRITERIA TITLE See section
- 3. Institute of Electrical and listed below Electronics Engineers (IEEE) for discussion Standards: of each standard IEEE Std 279-1971 Criteria for Protection System a.-
for Nuclear Power Generating * (ANSI N#2.7-1972) Stations X X X X X
- b. IEEE Std 308-1974 Criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power X X X X 7.1 & 8.3.1.2.9 Generating Stations
- c. IEEE Std 317-1972 Electric Penetration Assemblies 8 4 in Containment Structures for X X X 8.3.1 .
Nuclear Power Generating Stations r
- d. IEEE Std 323-1974 Trial Use Standard Guide 1 for Qualifying Class IE Electrical f Equipment for Nuclear Power X X X X 7.1 t Generating Stations !
i Installation, Inspection and Test- ;
- e. 'IEEE Std 336-1971 ing Fequirements f or Instrumen- j
. (ANSI N45. 2. 4-1972) tation and Electric Equipment During the Construction of Nuclear X X See Utility X X X Power Generating Stations Applicant's S AP j I Criteria for the-Periodic Testing
- f. IEEE Std 338-1971 of Nuclear Power Generating Sta-
{ 7.1 i X X X X tion Protection Systems i I
. 4 Amendment 8 t
. O GIEBSSAR O ^ d ' $ TABLE 7.1-1~ . (Sheet 5 of 10)- APPLICABLE ST A!!DAFDS AND CODES
- TO IEC SYSTEMS l
i APPLICABILITY (SAF Section) CRITERIA TITLE 7.3 7.4 7. 5 7.6 7.7 FEMARKS
- g. IEEE Std 344-1975 Guide f or Seismic Qualification (ANSI 1441.7) of Class 1 Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating -
Stations X X X X 7.1 i
- h. IEEE Std 379-1972 Guide for Application of the (ANSI N41.2) Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems X X X X 7.1
- i. IEEE Std 384-1974 Criteria for Separation of Class IE 4
(ANSI N41.14) Equipment and Circuits X X 7.1 ti . Fegulatory Guides (PG) See Section Listed for 8 discussion of each PG
- a. FG 1.0 Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution
-Systems X X X 8.1. 4 4
- b. PG 1.7 Control of Combustible Gas Concen-trations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident X X 6.2.5
- c. FG 1.11 Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Feactor Containment X X 7.1
- d. FG 1.22 Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions X X X 7.1 e.' RG 1.29 Seismic Design Classification X X X X 7.1 ,
Amendment 8
- - ' ' _ _ _ _ - _ e - _ _ _ _ _ _ - + --J
.._.~ _ _ _ . _ _ _m _ .._. _.__ _ ._ . . . . .. _. ... _ -._ . _ . .. _ ,_. . ._ ._. . - . . _ . . __ _
O o - l GIBBSSAR , TAPLE 7.1-1 (Sheet 6 of 10) i APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND CODES TO IEC SYSTEMS - [ APPLICA3ILITY (SAR Sect ion) CRITEBIA TITLE 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 FEMAFES [
- f. FG 1.30 Quality Assurance Pequirements for the . Installation, Inspection, ,
and Testing of Instrumentaticn and l Electric Equipment X X X X X 7.I t [
- g. RG.1.32 Use of IEEE Std 308-1971, " criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for ,
Nuclear Power Generating Stations" X X X X 7.1 & 8.3.1.2.9 ;
- h. PG 1.45 seactor Coolant Pressure foundarY 8 -
f Leakage Detection System X ; l' i. . RG 1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant S&fety Systems X X X X 7.1
- j. HG 1.53 Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant i
Protection Systems X X X X 7.1 r
- k. EG 1.62 Manual Initiation of Protection Actions X X X 7.1 t
- 1. EG 1.63 Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants X X X 7.1 +
- m. PG 1.64 Quality Assurance Fequirements ,
For Design of Nuclear Power Plants X X X X
- n. FG 1.68 Preoperational and Initial Startup 7.1 Utilit y T Test Programs for W.nter-cooled Applicants ,
Power Reactors X X FSAF Ames.duent. 8 ,
- p. o . - - , , ,,- , . - - w t w
. O O ' f GIPESSAR 1 ! TAELE 7.1- 1 (Sheet 7 of 10) APPLICALLE STANDAFDS AND CODES ! TO ISC SYSTEMS l APPLICABILITY' (SAF Section) CF ITEPIA TITLE 7.3 7.e 7.5 7.6 7.7 FEMAF FS i
- o. FG 1.70 Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Peports for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2 X X X X X
- p. F G 1. 7 3 Qualification Tests of Electric valve operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants X 7.1
- q. FG 1.75 Physical Independence of Electric Systems X X 7.1 & 8.3.1 .
- r. RG 1.78 Assumptions for Evaluating the Habit-ability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Poom During a Postulated g Hazardous Chemical Release X
- s. FG 1.80 Preoperational Testing of Instru-ment Air Systems X X X X X
- t. FG 1.89 Qualification of Class IE Equipment
, for Nuclear Power Plants X X X X 7.1 j
- u. PG 1.95 Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Poom Operators Against j
An Accidental Chlorine Release X 7.1, 6.4 6 9.41
- v. FG 1.97 Instrumentation for Lightwater -
Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to
- Assess Plant Conditions during 5 following an accident X Sce Section 7.5 I Amendme nt 8 i
j rn . -- w-
l O s i t GIBBSSAR TABLE 7.1 (Sheet 8 of 10) APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND CODES TO IEC SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY (SAR Section) CRITEPIA TITLE 7.3 7. 4 7.5 7.6 7.7 FEMAFFS
- w. -EG 1.100 Seismic Qualification of
- Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants X X X X
- x. PG 1.105 Instrument Set Points X X X X
- 5. Branch Technical Positions (BTP) EICSB
- a. BTP EICSB 1 Backfitting of the Protection and Emergency Power Systems of Nuclear Reactors Not Applicable
- b. BTP EICSB 3 Isolation of Low Fressure Systems g from the High Pressure Peactor Coolant System See NSSS SSAR
- c. BTP EICSB 4 Requirements on Motor-Operated Valves in the ECCS Accumulator Lines See MSSS SSAP
- d. BTP EICSB 5 Scram Breaker Test Pequirements -
Technical Specifications See NSSS SSAP e.- PTP EICSB 9 Definition and Use of " Channel-Calibration" - Technical Specifications See Utility Applicants SSAP
- f. BTP EICSB 10 Electrical and Mechanical Equip-ment Seismic Qualification Program X X A X 3.10
- g. BTP EICSB 12 Protection system Trip Point Changes ,
for Operation with Feactor Coolant 4, Pumps Out of Service See NSSS SSAR Am(ndment 8 l 4 i
y GIEESSAF TABLE 7.1-1 i (Sheet 9 of 10) APPLICABLE STANDAPDS AND CODES TO ISC SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY (SAP Section) CRITERIA TITLE 7.3 7. 4 7.5 7.6 7.7 FEMAEKS
- h. BTP EICSB 13 Design Criteria for Auxiliary Feedwater Systems X See Section 7.3 i
- i. BTP EICSB 14 Spurious Withdraw 11s of Single i
Control Fods in Pressurized Water Reactors See NSSS SSAP j
- j. BTP EICSB 15 Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Qualification See NSSS SSAP
- k. BTP EICSB 16 Control Element Assembly Interlocks in Combustion Engineering Reactors Not: Applicable
). BTP EICSB 18 Application of the Single Failure Criteria to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves X X X
- m. ETP EICSD 19 Acceptvaility of Design Criteria for Hydrogen Mixing and Drywell Vacuum Relief Systems Not Applicable
- n. BTP EICSB 20 Design of Instrumentation and ,
controls Provided to Accomplish . Changeover from Injection to Recir- See Section culation Mode X 7.3.1.1b i o. BTP EICSB 21 Guidance for Application of Reg. Guide 1.47 X X X X 7.16 7.8
- p. BTP EICSB 22 Guidance for Application of Peg. Guide 1.22 X X 7.1
- q. BTP E1CSB 23 Qualification of.. Safety-Pelated Display Instrumentation for Post-Accident Condition Monitoring and Safe Shutdown X see Section 7.5.2 Amendnent 8
,. _. -- . . . _m - ~ _ . . _ . . . _ . , ...
O o GIDDSSAR TABLE 7.1-1 (Sheet 10 of 10) APPLICABLE E..JiDARDS AND CODES TO IE: SYSTEMS APPLICABILITY (SAR Section) TITLE 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 F EMAF ES CRITEPI A
- r. BTP EICSB 24 Testing of Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Feature Actua-tion System Lensor Response ' Times See NSSS SSAR
- s. BTP EICSB 25 Guidance for the Interpretation of General Design Criterion 37 for Testing the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling System as a whole X X See NSSS SSAP 8
- t. BTP EICSD 26 Requirements for Peactor Protection System Anticipatory Trips See NSSS SSAR
- u. BTP EICSB 27 Design Criteria for Thermal Overload Protection for Motors of Motor-Operated Valves. X X X e
1 Y Parndwnt 8,
O r.1 D%3 AF O O 1ABLF 11.2-1 2 (Steet 1 of 2) PAD AMETEFS USED IM TiiE CALCULN1IO*4 OF ESTIMATED ACTIVITY Ifl
'IllE I.IOUID WAS*lE PFCsCESSING SYSTEM (UESTINGHGUSE-41 f4) r.ource Tergs Input Volumes Traction Peactor Coolant Peak Discharged Fraction 6 Drain Channel Source !!ormal A 1. Equipment Drains $7,000 gpy 1440 gpd 0.75 1.0 18 i 2. Excess Samples 3000 gpy -
0.75 1.0 6 B 1. Cont ainment Puilding sump 40 gpd 120 gpdt** 1.00 1.0
- 2. Auxiliary Building Floor 200 gpd 600 gpd(*3 1.00 0.1 Drains
- 3. Lab Drains and Waste Water 400 gpd 1200 gpd(** 1.00 0.002
- 4. taise. Sources 700 gpd 2400 gpdtt3 1.00 0.01
- 5. Laundry and Ilot Shower 432 gtd 2400 gpd(2) 1.00 0.00001 18
- 6. Chemical Drains 10 gpd - 0.00 1.0 l6
( 1) Peak assumed at 3 times normal input for 6 days per year ( 2) Peak assumed for refueling at 100,000 gpy, total normal at 100,000 gpy 2 Decoritaminat ion Factors Evaporators Iodine DF = 103 Other rauclides DF = 10* Filters All nuclides DF = 1 14everse Osmosis All nuclides DF = 30 And r.dment 6 3 4
4 O O O i GIBBSSAP 2 TABLE 11.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) PAFAMETERS USED IN TIIE CAIfULATICN OF ESTIMATED ACTIVITY It3 TIIE LIQUID WASTE PFOCESSING SYSTEM (WESTING 1100SE - 414) Demine ralizers( 3 ) Fadwaste (il'Ofl-) Anion DF = 102 (10) Os, Fb DF = 2 (10) l Cation DF = 102 (10) 2 i Evaporator Condensate Cs, Pb DF = 2 Polishing All other 1 nuclides DF = 10 l6 i ( 3) For demineralizers in series the DF for the second der.tineralizer is given in parentheses , t Foldup Times Volume Input Drain Cjjannel 132rm_a 1 Peak _ [ A. Equipment Drains 50 days - B.
- 1. Laundry and IIct Shower ,
subsystem 24 days 5 days
- 2. Low Activity Waste Subsystem 8 days 3 days Bluipmnt_hyall3bility Filters 100%
Demineralizers 1007 Evaporators 100% (Dine to backup provisions) Feverse Osmosis 751 (Down time assumed at peak inimt period) Amendment f
O GIPPSSAp O 2 TAPLE 11.2-4 (St.eet 5 of 8) LIQUID kASTE UPOCESSIt?G SYSTEM It!STPUMEtTEATION DESIGli PAFAMETFFS
- Cont rol Location of Design Design Alarm Primary Press. Temp. set set location of Asigt _JfL_ Pagge Point Point F e a tiotit Descri dion Sensor Pressure Instrumentation PI Inw activity waste l2 filter outlet 150 200 0-150 psig Local
! 2 PI High activity waste filter 2 inlet 150 200 0-150 psig Incal PI High activity waste l2 filter 2 outlet 150 200 0-150 psig Incal Anu r.dment 2
r O O O GIBBSSAR 2 TArLE 11.2-4 (Sheet 6 of 8) LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM INSTPUMEffIATION DFSIGN PAF AM ETEFS Location of Design Design Alarm Cont rol Prima ry Press. 'I e mp. Set Ec t Incation of OCESEiUli2D Sensor Jegigt _J F1 L4Dge Poi Dt Point Feadout tevel Inutrurnentation LICA !!!qh activity 2 waste collection fli-Hi , 90% Iocal and tank 1 150 200 0-100% 111, 755 Io, 10% KPs Panel Io, 10% LICA liigh activity 2 waste collection tank 2 150 200 0-100% Ili-Hi , 90% Io, 101 Incal and 11 1 , 75% WPS Panel Lo, 10% LICA Chemical drain 111 , 75% Iocal, Wl's lg collection tank 150 200 0-100% Io, 5% Lo, 10% and drumming lunels IICA Peactor coolant drain collection tank 150 200 0-1007 111 , 7 5 % WPS panel i2 lo, 12% Io, 20% LICA Spent resin storage 150 200 0-100% 11 1 , 75% tank lo, 60% Lo, 60% hPS and drumring lanels LICA Laundry and hot Hi, 90% Incal and shower waste collection tank 1 150 200 0-100% lo, 10% 1 o, 105 kPs p mel 12 LICA Laundry and hot shower waste local and WPS 2 collection tank 2 150 200 0-100% Ili , 901 Io, 10% 10, 10% panel LICA High act ivit y 2 waste recycle t ank 150 250 0-100% tii, 'f 0 t incal and WPS 10, 10% panels Amendment 8
. s -
1 i 4 4 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.5-1 SHEET 1 OF 2 D PROCESS AND EFFIlfENT RADI ATION MrMITORING SYSTEM
- : a : Minimum Specified:Extected : : Principle: Safety Alarm Set Point e
- : : : : Instrument Range : Concentration : Measurement:1sotopes :Qtaalif t- (uCi/ce) :High-High Radiation Signal Auto- a s h nitor Channet m s.: Detector Type :Mnnitor Service :Manitor tocatinnt(1) (uct/cc) : Sampled uCi/cc:Ma te :hnitored: cation High-High High :matic Chntrol Ftanctions Auxiliary Bukiding : a a = : a r : -
a e a : : : : : : - Aux. Steam 3 RE-ASC-001 Gaauma Scintillator Aux. St eam : Fig. 10.3-1 31.0E-6 to 1.0E-1
- Ambient Gross Gauuma:Co-60 None Later fater Closes valres on three aux. steam Condensate a :Cbndensate : : Background : : : slines to HAnf, IJW and BRS evapo-a stoff-linet : : : : : : trators and terminates cxmdensate a t : e
- a adrain tank := tem;) or,er at i on . :
7 Boron R E-B RS-016 :Ganuma Scintillator Boron Rerycle mRESSAR 414 31.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.2-7 : Gross Gaauna:Co-60 :None IAter IAter : Trips a diversion vatwe and a 3 Recycle : : System Fluid 3 Fig. 9.3.2 : : : : : : Jirects BRS discharge to a
- : (off-line) : Sheet 2 : : : : : rrecrete hold p tank. :
- : e : : : : : a t Component 3 RE-CCw-001 :Gamraa S?intillator Component Cool- 2 Fig. 9.2-1 31.0E-6 to 1.0E 1 Ambient Gross Ganana:Co-60 s hne stater Later Closes CCW surge tank vent
- Coolant 3REMXw-002 sing Water : Background : : : : :
Water :(off-line) a : : : : e
- s
, : a a e : : :
- Station 3RE-SSW-001 Gamma Scintillator : Station Service Fig. 9.2-1 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Ambient Gross Gestaa:Co-60 :Noe Later Later thne : -
- Service : Water (off-line): = Background a a 4 -
i Water
- a :
, : : : : : 4 :
- Steam Gener- RE-SGP-001 3 Gamma Scintillator : Steam Generator : Fig. 9.3-2 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.2-6 3 Gross Gamma:Co-60 None n!.ater Later : Closes the inlet valves to the a rator Blow- = Blowdown Pro- : : : : : : scleanup system and terminates a down Process: scess System a a * . aflow to the heater drain tank.
2 : : : Fluid (off-line): : : : 3 -
- Steam Gener-:RE-SGS-001 :Ganana Scintillator St eam Genera or Fig. 10.4-2 31.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.1-2 3 Gross Gauvaa:Co-60 :None Later later : Closes isolation valves in the :
retor B1 tw- : eBlowdown Sample a
- ablow&wns and sample lines. a r =down(Sample): : :Line Fluid : : : : : a a stoff-line) a : : : : : :
+
- Gross Failed: RE-CVC-001 = Neutron Detector : Volume Control RESSAR 414 !Ater 3RESSAR 414 : Delayed Later :None t!ater Later None
- Fuel : :with Moderator :Tsuk Imtdown : Fig. 9.3-5 : : Table 11.1-2 Neutron : : 2 :
- : : : Sample Fluid : : . : : : :
- stin-linel : : : : . : :
Liquid Waste:RE-LW. 31 Gamma Seintillator : Liquid waste Fig. 11.2-34 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.2-6 Gross Gasuna:Co-60 :None 314ter later Closes valve on talPS discharge a e : Processing e - - r : sheader. : 3 : System Fluids : : : : : : : :
- stoff-line) : e : -
- Spent Fuel RE-SF-Oo 1 ;Gauvaa Scietillator Spent tuel Pool Fig. 9.1-3 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 stater Gross Ganuma:Co-60 None stater Iater :None
! sCooling 3 RE-SF-002 : Coolisig water : : : : : e , : water : stoff-line) : : : : : r : : :
- : : : : : : 4 : : :
- Waste Gas 3RE-WGS-001 2 Beta Scint111ator : Waste Gas System: Fig. 11.3-24 31.0E-1 to 1.0E+4 : Table 11.3-5 3 Gross Beta Xe-133 None !Ater later None
- : Fluids (on-linel: Sheet 1 : : : : : : :
e , a : : : : : : : : i (1) Minismsm speelfied instrimment sensitivity is the lower of the two values
'N -^ -
%,/
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.5-1 SHEET 2 OF 2 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADI ATION Mdi1TORING STSTEM s
- a a a :Minianum Specified: Expected ePrinciple: Safety *R1 arm Set E% int Instrument flange : Concentration : Measurement: Isotopes Qualifi-z(uci/cc) :High-High Ra411ation Signal Auto- :
3 Monitor : Channel Nos. Detector Type Monitor Service 2 Monitor Location:(1) (uCL/cc) Sampled uC1/cc:Made :Mm.itored: cation zHigh-High High spatic Control P\anct ions s : .
- Turbine Build g a s
- : : : : : 2 : :
- 3 s1.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.2-6 Gross Ga..ma:Co-60 Notte Iater later Initiates cloeure of dischar ge c
- Turbine RE-FDS-G01 Gaassa Scintillator : Turbine Drains :later Fluids 3 : : : valve.
- Dr ains : : a a stoff-line) : a : + a 4 3 1 2 3
- I
- a : :
- s a Condenser 3 RE-CES-00 3 : Beta Scintillator : Condenser Air sFig. 10.4-5 31.0E-6 to 1.0E-1 : Table 11.3-2 3 Gross Beta :Xe-13) :None stater later :None a e a sAir Ejector Ejector Gas : :
a :
- a a sGas a :(off-linel a r 3 t 8 2 8 3
- : a e a :
- a a a 4 3 3 3 2 2 I 3 3 2 3 1 t t 2 1
- a t 3 E 2 5 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 8 3 8 B E 3 3 3 1 3 2 8 6 5 . I 3 3 2 :
2 5 e t & 2 8 8 : 3 E 3 3 3 3 3 I 3 3 8 4 1 4 1 3 3 3 t E 3 3 4 3 . 3 3 s 8 4 3
- 3 E 3 6 3 8 1 3 3 1 2 3 4 3 5 3 4 2 2 2 I 3 I 7 3 I 3 5 4 3 3 s a 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 : . t 3 3 g
- 3 3 T 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 3 *
- 3 3 3 t 3 1 e a 1 8
- 3 : s 2 1 4 2 3 2 6 3 E 2 3 3 3 2 3 I $
3 8 3 3 : 8 1 I 3 1 8 3 8 2 8 8 I 3 I f 8 3
- I 3 s 3
* # 2 3 3 3 I e 3 I #
- 3 3 3 1 3 4 : 8 3 : 2 3 3 1 3 3 5 8 3 3 3 3 3 8
2 t a
's e a a :
8 I s : a a 8
- : 3 5 a :
a
- a
- s s s 3 3 3 I t t a 3 3 3 3 I I 3 3 3 3 8
3 3 3 8 8 E : 1 3 2 : : a s s 2 : 8 e a : . 2 *
- s :
- 8 8
{1) Minimum specified instrtament sensitivity is the lower of the two numbers indicated
sw p /mi V (v) J & . e
- -- O GIBBSSAR TABLE 12.3-3 AIRBORNE RADIATION MnNITolt!NG SYSTEM s
- : : Minimum Specified: Expected . : Principle: Safety Alare Set Points a Instrument Range : Concentrations : Measurement:IsotopesQualifi- (uCi/ce) :High-High Radiation Signal Auto-Monitor SChannel M s. Detector ] ==>e 3 Monitor ServlCO: Monitor I4Watton (uCi 'ec)* :Saeled tsCi/cc :Made tMonitored cation High-High High =matic Functions e a a a a : : : :
- Containment Air:RE-CT-001 : Beta Scanillator Containment Air:Later 35.0E-11 to 5.0E-7 Table 12.2-17 Gross Beta :Cs-137 : Seismic Later ater: Initiates containment ventila-
- Particulate :(off-line) : a : : : : : : tion isolation a Containment Ai r : RE-CT-002 3Gavana Scintillator: Containment Air:Later 34E + 4 egefuCi : Table 12.2-17 Isotopic :1-131 Seismic Later Later: Initiates containment ventila- :
Iodine : :(off-line) a : : 31-131 + 2 stion isolation
- Containment FE<T-003 : Beta Scintillator Containment Air:Iater 21E-6 to 1E-2 : Table 12.2-17 : Gross Beta Er-85 : Seismic :Later later: Initiates containment ven t ila- :
3 Ra<11oactive Gas {off-line) a : stion isolation
- Plant Vent RE-Pvr-001 3 Beta Scintillator : Plant Vent Fig. 9.4-6 :5E-11 to SE-7 : Table 11.3-2 : Gross Bete :Co-137 Seismic IAter Iater: Initiates cont _sinment ventila- a
- Particulate a a 1 Effluent : : : : : : tion isolation. cont rol room stoff-line) : a : : : : emergency pressurization swwie
- : : : a e : talso signal closes gas rel ase
- : : : : : : : svalve in the GWPS e a : : : : : : : : : : :
- Plant Vent Air 3 RE-PVT-002 :Gaauna Scintillator: Plant Vent Fig. 9.4-6 34E + 4 cpm /uCi : Table 11.3-2 Isotopic 31-131 : Seismic Later Later: Initiates containment ventila-Iodine : Effluent : a
- 31-131 : stion isolation. control room
- (off-line) a : : : senergency pressurization mode
- : x : : : : : salso signal closes gas release :
- : : : : : Valve in the CWPS : ,
a a a : : : : : : : :
- Plant Vent :RE-PVT-003 : Beta Scintillator : Plant Vent :kly 9,4-6 !E-6 to 1E-2 : Table 11.3-2 Gross Beta Kr-85 : Seismic Later Later: Initiates containment ventila- a Radioactive Gass Effluent : : : : : : stion isolation, control room a
- : :(off-line) : a : = emergency pressurization mode
- : : : : : : salso signal closes gas release a e : : : : svalve in the GWPg
- Control Room :RE-CVT-DO S : Beta Scintillator : Control Roon Fig. 9.4-1 31E-5 to 1E-1 Ambient : Gross Beta :Kr-85 : Seismic stat er Iater: Initiates control room emergency:
- Vent Duct Moni-:RE-CVT-002 : Ventilation Air = Background : : : : pressurization smwie and recir-stor :(off-1tne) a : : : : : =culation throush filters :
- Minimum specified instrument sensitivity is the lower of the two numbers indicated
____m__ _ _ - - -
- g. -
b , J l GIBBSSAR TABLE 12.3-4 SHEET 1 CW 3 AREA RADI ATION Mt NITORING SYSTEM
- . : Safety : Minimum Specified : Radiation: Alarm Set Points : :
2 Monitor Nos.:Ibtector Type : Monitor Location :nualification: Instrument Ran ge (mR/hr)* Zone :Minh-High High : Control Ibnction
- ESF Area : : : :
- :
- 2 :
- ARM-02 : Ionization Chamber :Above the RHR Valve operating:None 21.0E+02 to 1.0E+07 11: B :Later Later :None
= area, El. 04'-6", : : : : . :
- Fig. 12.3-1, 3-D : :
- ARM-03 :G-M Tube : Hot shutdown panel, penetra- :None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :I :Later later :None
- tion area, El. 121'-6", -
- Fig. 12.3-3, 3sc : *
- ARM-04 :G-M Tube : Containment spray and None 1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III B Later later :None
- SI pump area, El. 72*-6", e :
+ +
- Fig. 12.3-1, 4-C +
+ + t a :
- Containment Building : + = . e ARM-01 : Ionization Chamber :In-core instrumentation room None 31.0E+02 to 1.OE+07 :III B Later Later :None .
* :El. 65'-6", Fig. 12.3-1, 1-B : +
. = : :
- a 4 : ARM-05 :G-M Tube : Detector well cooling unit :None 1.0E-02 to 1.0E+07 IV A Later Later :None .
- El. 90*-6", Fig. 12.3-2, 3*C - -
- ARM-24A :G-M Tube Operating Deck, El. 150 '- 11" , : Sei smic 1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :IV A :Later Later : Initiates containment +
- (criticality monitor): Fig. 12.3-4, 3sC + 2 : ventilation isolation -
+ . : . 7 :
s : ARM-24a nG-M Tube Operating Deck, El. 150'-11",: Seismic 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :IV A :Later Later : Initiates containment
- (criticality monitor): Fig. 12.3-4, 3-C + + ventilation isolation .
- + = : : :
- ARM-210 -G-M Tube Operating Deck, El. 150*-11", Seismic :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :IV A :Later Iater Initiates containment
- :(criticality monitor): Fig. 12.3-4, 3-C + = : ventilation isolation
. : + + a :
- ARM-28 G-M Tube : Containment air recircula- :None :1.0E-02 to 1.0E+07 IV A :Later later :None .
- tion and cooling unit, : : .
a
- El. 171*-11", Fig. 12.3-5, : *
- x -
- 4-B + r i : *
+ n . :
2 Auxiliary Buildinq + * - +
. . + 2 *
+
- ARM-06 :G-M Tube : Spent resin storage tank :None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III A :Later later None svalve operating area, : *
- El. 111'-0", Fig. 12.3-6, 6-B: a + : :
- +
- 3 .
- AFM-07 :G-M Tube : Gas analyzer cabinet area :None 21.0E-01 to 1.0E+S4 :11 :Later Later :None *
- El. 100'-6", Fig. 12.3-2, 3-82
- Mini: mum specified instrument sensitivity is the lower of the two values.
t ) V , GIBBSSAR TABLE 32. 3 - 4 SHEEP 2 OF 3 AREA RADI ATION MONITORING SYSTEM
- : : Safety aMintiaum Specified r Ra.11a t ion : Alarm Set Mints . :
Monitor Nos. Dat ector Type : Monitor Incat ion :G 311fication Instrument Panne (mR/hr)* : Zone :Hlqh-High Htqh : Control Ranction a a e : : +
- ARM-08 :G-M Tube H2 recombiner gas analyzer None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 . mII Later later :None :
- acontrol Panel-B, El. 100'-6",e : : : :
- . : Fig. 12.3-2, 3-B : 2 s
= APJ1-09 :G-M hbe : Drum filling control room, None 1.0E-01 to 1.0E*04 *II Later later :None
- El. 100*-6", Fig. 12.3-2, 4-A a +
?
- ARM-11 :G-M Tube Sample room. El. 100'-6", :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A Later later None r
a : Fig. 12.3-2, 4-C : : 4 : : ARM-14 3G-M Tube Ref ueling water storage tank, :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A :Later later :None : . El. 100'-6", Fiq. 12.3-2, 4-D: * : :
- : : * : 4 ARM-15 3G-M Tube : Personnel air lock, :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A : tater later :None a
. El. 100*-6", Fiq. 12.3-2, 4-B a t a : : : : : 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III A :Later Later None
- ARM-16 G-M Tube Charging pump valve operating:None sarea, El. 111'-0", a : :
- Fig. 12.3-6, 5-C + = * :
- ARM-17 :G-M Tube Gas decay tank valve operat- None 1.0E-01 to 1.0E*04 *III A :Iater later :None :
- . sing area, El. 112'-0", : : : : : :
- : Fig. 12.3-6, 5-A : : :
- ARM-19 G-M Tube Letdown Hx valve operating :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III A Later later :None
. sarea, El. 131*-6", .
- Fig. 12.3-6, 1-B : :
- ARM-20 3G-M Tube Volume control tank valve :None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A Later later :None 6 : operating area, El. 131'-6", : : . + 3
+ : Fig. 12.3-6, 2-D a : : . . : : .
- ARM-21 G-M Tube Filter /Demineralizer valve None 21.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III A :Later later :None
- : operating area, El. 137'-C", a : .
. : Fig. 12.3-6, 1-A r : : . a : 2
- s . :
= ARM-22 :G-M Tube Filter /riemineralizer valve :None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A s tater later :None 2
- : : operating area, El. 137'-0", a : . . : :
- : Fig. 12.3-6, 2-B :
+ + : + 3 4
cARM-25 :G-M Tube : Waste evaporator panel area, None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :II :Later Iater :None :
+ El. 146*-6", Fig. 12.3-4, 4-A + a
- Minimum specified instrume nt sensit ivity is the lower of the two values.
A
\
GI B B $ -( x TABr.E 12.3 - 4 SHEET 3 of 3 AREA RADI ATION MONITORING SYSTEM
- Safety Minimum Specified : Radiation: Alarm Set Points a
- : Zone :High-High High Control Fbnction :
- Monitor >bs.: Detector Type : Monitor Incation :Gralification: Instrument Pincie (mR/hr )* :
- a
+ :
Recycle evap. feed pump value:None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A :Iater Later :None ARM-26 :G-M Tube
- operating area, El. 157'-6", : e : - :
+ e
- Fig. 12.3-6, 4-E :
J t I -
- Waste Gas valve operating :None 1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 :III A Later Later :None
- ARM-27 :G-M Tube + .
- area, E1. 111*-0*, , a
+
- : : Fig. 12.3-6, 5-B +
+ :
IFuel Handling Building a
- a a
- II B later None s 2
- ARM-23A :G-M Tube : Operating peck, El. 150*-11",tseism Q 1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 : Tater
+ 2 : : : :
23B :G-M Tube : Fig. 12.3-4, 3-A 23C G-M Tube (Criticality: - a monitors) - :
- Decontamination area, None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 311 :Later Later 2None
- ARM-10 :G-M Tube
- :El. 100'-6", Fig. 12.3-2, 2-As + .
s
+ : : .
- a
- Electrical Buildinq =
=
- Hot Laboratory, El. 100*-6", :None =1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A *Iater Later :None AIN-12 G-M Tube +
Fig. 12.3-2, 1-D :
+ = x : : :
- +
- Hot Shop, El. 100'-6", :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 III A :Later later :None .
- ARM-13 :G-M Tube + +
- Fiq. 12.3-2, 2-D -
+ : : : : - *
. 4
- 3 : : Initiates Control Rnom .
Co rol Ibnm: *
* : Emergency Pressuriza- .
+ :
later : tion ende :
- ARM-18 G-M Tube Control Room. El. 130*-6", :None 31.0E-01 to 1.0E+04 31 : Tater
+
- a
- Fig, 12.3-3, 1 dC +
+ * *
- Turbine Buildinq =
21 :Iater later :None : 3 ARM-29 :G-M Tube : Condensate polisher area, :None :1.0E-01 to 1.0E+04
- :El. 100'-6", Fiq. 12.3-2, 4-D: *
- Minimum specified sensitivity is the lower of the two values.
GIBBSSAR 13.7 Emergency Planning (]} The emergency plan is, for the most part, the responsibility of the Utility-Applicant. In this section the inputs required of 5e Utility-Applicant are discussed as well as design f eatures incorporated in GIBBSSAR to permit conformance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and to section 13.3 of the SRP. 13.3.1 Scope and Applicability The Utility-Applicant shall define the area to which the plan is applicable and a summary of its inter-relationships with its implementing procedures, plant operating, radiological control, and industrial control proced ures, and any other emergency , controls of the company or government agencies. l 13.3.2 Summary of Emergency Plan The Utility-Applicant shall describe the key elements of the overall emergency planning logic. 13.3.3 Emergency Conditions 8 The final determination of emergency conditions is within the scope of the Utility-Applicant. The discussion presented herein {) presents possible emergency conditions which may be used. 13.3.3.1 Personnel Emergency Condition This is a condition whereby onsite personnel require emergency medical aid. There is no danger of this emergency escalating to more severe emergency conditions and no need to alter the operating status of the reactor. This condition does not cause mobilization of the entire emergency organization but only various teams such as first aid. Recognition of this class is a matter of judgement on the part of personnel to be designated by the Utility-Applicant. Classification criteria and discrete accident situations which would give rise to this condition are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. 13.3.3.2 Emergency Alert Condition This condition is characterized by a situation which creates a potential for an accident which was previously non-existent or latent. No damage has been done to the plant and no personnel have been harmed but the potential for damage or injury is increased. O 13.3-1 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR Specific criteria which would result in an emergency alert a condition are presented in the Utility-Applicant's S AP. Examples W of the types of situations are severe weather, earthquakes, toxic gas releases in the vicinity of the plant, and civil disturbances which may jeopardize the security of the plant. 13.3.3.3 Plant Emergency Condition This condition results from a physical occurrence within the plant requiring immediate response of the emergency organization in order to protect personnel or plant property. Information available E.t the tica of the occurrence indicates that there is no danger of an offsite hazard being created as a result of this occurrenca and there is no breach of any fuel cladding, the RCPE, or the Containment. Evacuation of the plant is not anticipated although it may be necessary to evacuate various locations within the plant. Specific emergency action levels for initiation of this condition and the means for declaring this condition are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. Examples of occurrences leading to a plant emergency are radioactive spills, radioactive or toxic gas leaks, and fires 8 within the plant. 13.3.3.4 Site Emergency Condition lll This condition consists of those emergencies for which initial information indicates that protective actions offsite may be required. Depending on the magnitude, uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials to the environment could fall under this class. Accidents analyzed in chapter 15 having small to moderate radioactive releases could fall into this class. Doses received by individuals offsite for various meteorological dilution factors are presented in chapter 15. Emergency action levels for this class are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAP. 13.3.3.5 General Emergency I This class of emergency consists of those occurrences where offsite protective action measures are required. Evacuation of the plant and the site (except the control room) may te required. The more severe accidents described in chapter 15 including the l DBA would fall under this class. Doses received by individuals l are presented in Chapter 15. Emergency action levels are described in the Utility-Applicant's SAP. O ! 13.3-2 Amendment 8 i
GIBBSSAR (} 13.3.4 Organizational Control of Emergencies The emergency organization including offsite support is site specific and is presented in the Utility-Applicant's .SAR. 13.3.5 Emergency Measures i specific emergency measures are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. In .this section the plant design features which permit the development of emergency measures in conformance with the SRP for section 13.3 are discussed. 13.3.5.1 Activation of Emergency Organization Personnel are alerted to an emergency situation either by personal observation or an instrumentation alarm in the control room. Instrumentation is discussed in Chapter 7 as well as Chapter 7 of the NSSS SSAR. 'The fire detection system is discussed in section 9.5.1. The means for declaring an emergency as well as the emergency action levels .are discussed in the 8 Utility-Applicant's SAR. For those emergencies which require mobilization of the emergency organization, a central location is provided which may be used as an emergency operations center (see section 13.3.6.1) . () The need to contact government Utility-Applicant's SAR. officials is discussed in the 13.3. 5. 2 Assessment Actions Assessment functions required for each emergency condition are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. The GIBBSSAR design includes a digital radiation monitoring system which can be used to provide prompt accident assessment and can be programmed to assess doses following an accident. 13.3.5.3 Corrective Actions Corrective actions such as fire control and repair and damage control are described in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. The design features of the fire protection system are described in section 9.5.1. 13.3.5.4 Protective Actions The protective actions, protective action levels, the area involved, and the means of notifications of the population-at-risk are presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. 13.3-3 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR The design features of the plant that affect various protective actions are described herein. lll
- a. Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Accountability For various emergency conditions it may become necessary to evacuate non-essential personnel from the site. The recommended evacuation routes for plant areas are presented in Figures 13.3-1 through 13.3-5. An arrow directing perconnel to the nearest exit is shown at doorways, stairways, elevators, and shield labrynths. The arrows provide the normal route for personnel to follow to get from higher floors to the ground level. If an emergency resulted in the blockage of the normal evacuation route, it is expected that personnel would be indoctrinated that the closest alternate should be employed; personnel training is discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
The features of the facility to assure the capability for facility reentry in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident or, if appropriate, to continue operations are as follows. The plant is provided with multiple entry points with dual entry provided into most of the larger inner areas. g Many of the outer doors are penetration and/or bullet resistant, and these offer substantial resistance to 2 gradation. The locking doors are of two types: key operated or electrically operated. The mechanical key operated doors are of a commercial quality grade with spare keys in the possession of the plant security force. The electrically operated doors are augmented by emergency backup power from the small non-safety-related diesel generator; if this is unavailable because of the emergency, the locks are capable of mechanical override so that operation of the door is assured. The place to which personnel are evacuated, the protective l cover provided, the methods of personnel accountability, and the evacuation times are site dependent as are the means used i for evacuation once personnel leave the plant buildings. This information is-presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
- b. Use of Protective Equipment and Supplies i
Any special supplies which may be distributed to personnel l are discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. The health physics area, which is located on the first floor of tne l l Electrical Building, could be used for storing such equipment. Ample room for storage is also provided in the Emergency Control Center. O 13.3-4 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR l
- c. Contamination Control Measures j This is addressed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. )
13.3. 5.5 Aid to Affected Personnel This section discusses the design features of the plant which l permit assistance to be given to persons - inj ured or radiologically exposed,
- a. Emergency Personnel Exposure Criteria This material is addressed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
- b. Decontamination and First Aid Facilities for decontamination and first aid are provided on the first floor of the Electrical Building. These facilities include a shower and locker area with clean clothing provided. Waste water from the showers is processed via the laundry and hot shower waste processing system as discussed in section 11.2. The physical layout of these facilities is 8 shown in Figure 1.2-4.
Procedures to be used are presented in the _ Utility-Applicant's SAP. U Medical Transportation c. This section is site specific and is discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
- d. Medical Treatment This section is site specific and is discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
I 13.3.6 Emergency Facilities 13.3.6.1 Emergency Control Centers The primary emergency control center (ECC) is located in the guard house. The prevailing winds will be considered in the location of the guard house. Ample room is provided for storage of emergency supplies such as survey meters, air sampling equipment, personnel dosimeters, copies of the utility, state and local emergency plans and implementing procedures, site specific area maps and demographic data, plant drawings, protective clothing, sample collection mate rials, and personnel rescue equipment. The layout of the guard house is presented in the security plan submitted with this application. Two way radios, 13.3-5 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR , i and public telephones are located in the guard house for use by 3 emergency personnel for offsite communications. An alternate w emergency c ontrol center will be located offsite. This is discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. 13.3.6.2 Communications Systems Plant-to-offsite communications are provided by public telephones with two-way radio available as a backup. Telephones are located in plant areas that are routinely occupied including the guard house /ECC and the control room. Telephones are also available in vital areas, such as the hot shutdown panel area, even though they may not be occupied on a routine basis. A two-way radio may be operated from the control room, either hot shutdown panel, or the guard house /ECC. Intraplant communication is provided by the intraplant telephone system, the public address system, the intraplant portable radio transmitter-receiver s ystem, and the intraplant sound-powered telephone system. The intraplant telephone system and the public 8 address system are available in the same areas as the public telephone described earlier. The intraplant sound-powered telephone system is available in vital plant areas only. The GIBBSSAR design also incorporates an emergency evacuation alarm system which is operable from the control room. This alarm a operates via the public address system. W These systems are described in detail in section 9.5.2. 13.3.6.3 Assessment Facilities In this section. the monitoring instruments available for use in assessing an emergency situation are discussed.
- a. Natural Phenomena Monitors ,
l Natural phenomena monitors include hydrologic, seismic and ; meteorological monitors. The type and quantity of such l monitors is site-specific and is discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
- b. Radiological monitors The GIBBSSAR design incorporates a digital radiation l monitoring system. This system is composed of an area j radiation monitoring subsystem ( ARMS) and a process and l effluent radiation monitoring subsystem (PERMS) which are l discussed in sections 12.3.4 and 11.5, respectively. j l
(Il i 13.3-6 Amendment 8 ; I l l 1
GIBBSSAR Monitors which are part of the PERMS are located on each Os- effluent path as well as in numerous process streams. Area monitors are dispersed at various locations throughout the , plant as shown in Figures 12.3-1 through 12.3-8. Any l emergency involving a release of radioactivity would be ! promptly indicated and alarmed in the control room pe rmiting rapid and accurate assessment of emergency situations. The need for portable radiation monitoring and sampling equipment is addressed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. Ample room for storage of this equipment is provided in the ECC.
- c. Non-Radiological Monitors Non-radiological monitors such as pressure, temperature, liquid level, flow rate, status indication, etc. are provided for all systems as required. The instrumentation for each system is provided in the GIBBSSAR section describing that system. Information on instrumentation and controls for each system is also provided in Chapter 7.
- d. Fire detection devices The fire derection devices employed in the GIBBSSAP design include ioniza ion detectors, thermal detectors, and flame 8
detectors. The type of detector employed in each fire area
- depends on the type of fire hazard and the activity which
( goes on in that fire area. A complete description of the fire protection system is contained in section 9.5.1.
- e. Environs Monitoring Facilities and Equipment This section is site-specific and is presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
13.3. 6. 4 Protective Facilities The GIBBSSAR design incorporates a control room which is habitable for a period of at least 30 days following any emergency condition with consequences up to and including those associated with a DBA. The habitability features of the control room are presented in section 6.4. The guard house /ECC will be located, if possible, in a location which, on the average, is upwind of.the plant. In the event this location is affected by the emergency, the alternate of fsite ECC can be used by the emergency personnel so that they may work in an area unaffected by the emergency. Protective facilities for evacuees are site-specific and are discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. 13.3.6.5 First Air and Medical Facilities 13.3-7 Amendment 8
I GIBBSSAR The first aid station is located on the first floor of the a electrical building in the area of the personnel decontamination W facilities. This office is equipped with standard first aid supplies. In addition, eye-wash stations are located in various other areas of the plant including the area of the battery rooms. 8 13.3.7 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness This section is presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. ) 13.3.8 Recovery This section is presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR. O O 13.3-8 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR 1 Ouestion 010.13 ' (General) For all your auxiliary and steam systems within the GIBBSSAR scope of design, you have provided simplified flow diagrams. In order for us to complete our review we need piping and instrumentation diagrams which show all your instrumentation including any functions they perform or alarms which they I provide. The PSID's should indicate whether or not a valve may be operated locally and/or remotely from the control room or other remote locations. This information is necessary to understand' the operation- for different modes of operations ~of your systems and to perform a f ailure modes and offects analysis. Provide these PSID's with the information described above for all your safety-related systems, and indicate system piping sizes and design pressures and temperatures. Fesponse 010.13 The information requested has been provided on the following figures: Figure Number Systeg 9.1-3 SFP Cooling 6 Cleanup 6
- 9. 2- 1 Service Water 9.2-2 Component Cooling Water 9.2-3 Component Cooling Water 9.2-4 Component Cooling Water 9.3-2 Primary Plant Sampling 10.3-1 Main Steam, Reheat & Steam Dump 10.3-2 S.G. Feedwater 10.4-3 Auxiliary Feedwater The last set of digits of the piping designation number shown on the flow diagrams indicates the design pressure / temperature rating of the piping system as follows:
Eiggre Numbgr ClassificatioD Design _Eggggure/Temperg3Ig 9.1-3 151 210 PSIG/300F 9.2-1 152 150 PSIG/500F
- 9. 2- 2, 36 4 152 150 PSIG/500F 10.3-1 1302 1200 PSIG/650F 1303 1200 PSIG/650 10.3-2 2002 2045 PSIG/650F 10.4-3 152 150 PSIG/500F 2002 2045 PSIG/650F O
Q 010-14 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR h Ouestion 010.13tc__(Generall GIBBSSAR does not indicate which General Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, or Branch Technical Positions are being applied to a particular system. The acceptance criteria in our Standard Feview Plans ( SRP's) gives specific criteria that a particular system should be designed to meet (e.g. General Design 6 Criteria, Regulatory Guides, and Branch Technical Positions) . For each of your systems identify that your design bases will be in accordance with these criteria and justify and exceptions. Response 010.13A Letter LGH-NRC-45 transmitted on July 17, 1978 to the NRC indicated that GIBBSSAR has no deviations from any Standard Review Plans. Since our transmittal of LGH-NRC-45 we have identified one deviation from the Standard Peview Plan. This deviation is discussed in Section 6.2.1.1. 9-O O 010-15 Amendment 8 Y ,w- y-w ,
i i GIBBSSAR guestion 010.16 (3.5) (F SP)_ In section 3.5.1,1 you state that each safety-related system outside that containment has redundancy and/or is protected against damage by internally generated missiles by a combination of barriers and physical arrangement. This indicates that some safety related systems or components do not have protection j against internally generated missiles outside containment. It is 6 our position that each train of safety related systems be protected from missiles from the other train or from any other system also, demonstrate that you meet the RESAP-414 interface requirements for protecting the NSSS equipment from internally generated missiles outside containment. Pesponse 010.16 The requirement for missile protection of each train of safety related systems inside and outside containment was complied with 8 in revised GIBBSSAR Sections 3.5.1 and 3. 5.2 in conjunction with the response to NRC Question 212.29. ( e l l O Amendment 8 Q 010-18 l
1 l l l GIBBSSAR hl l l 1 Ouestion 010.17 (3.51 In Section 3.5.2 you state that only one tornado missile is ; postulated at a time. We do not consider this an adequate i approach to protection against tornado missiles. Revise your l design for tornado missile protection to withstand more than one , tornado ndssile by providing protection for all structures, l systems, and components needed for safe cold shutdown by means other than separation. Include the following in your response. (a) A list of all structures, systems, and components located outside of tornado protected buildings that require protection; (b) A description of the protection provided for outdoor tanks and their vents, safety related ventilation system intakes 1 and exhausts, diesel engine intakes and exhausts, and safety i related pumps and valves located outdoors; and (c) Address the interace requirements of RESAR-414 for the l protection of the NSSS components needing tornado missile ; protection. l h Pesponse 010.17 6 : 1
- 1. No structures, systems or components requiring tornado i protection are located outside of tornado proof buildings or j enclosures. l l
- 2. No safety-related tank, pump, or valve is located outdoors. l The Station Service Water System pumps will be located in a ;
tornado proof structure. A . description of this structure ' will be provided in the Utility-Applicant's S.A.R. All safety related piping will be located in tornado proof , structures or buried below grade. All safety related cabling I will be located in tornado proof structures or enclosures. ( The tornado missile protection of the ventilation openings for the diesel generator area are shown on Figure 1.2-5, ;
- 1. 2- 6 and Section 7-7 of Figure 1.2-9. As shown, the ventilation intake 6 exhaust openings are located in the exterior walls and roof of the diesel generator area. These openings allow air to flow into and out of concrete plenum chambers. In the event that a tornado missile should enter through these openings, the missile will be stopped by a wall or floor slab of the concrete plenum chamber. No safety ,
related equipment will be located within the concrete plenum I chamber. 4h Q 010-19 Amendment 6 1
GIBBSSAP Ouestion 010.63 (9. 4. 9) The minimum height of the plant discharge stack is approximately 195 ft. above ground level. Provide the results of an analysis which demonstrate that the failure of this structure will not affect any safety related equipment. 6 ll Resognse 010.fj The plant discharge stack extends to the spring line of the Containment at Elevation 275.5 feet (175.5 feet above ground le vel) . It is designed to seismic Category I requirements and fastened along side the Containment. See revised Section 9.4.9.2 O l j l l
. l l
l l O Q 010-68 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 010.64 ( 9. 5.1) . In response to our request 010.9 regarding our Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, you. state that the evaluation of your fire 6 protection program would be submitted in August 1977. We have not yet received your evaluation. Submit this evaluation in order that we may begin our evaluation of your fire protection program. Pesponse 010.64 The fire protection program, in accordance with Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 to Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, will be g submitted by December.15, 1978. The format of the fire protection program evaluation will remain unchanged. O O Q 010-69 Amendment 8
l l GIBBSSAR [} 1 ( 9) The Fesults of the detailed analysis will be used to justify the design temperature of the containment structure liner and concrete and the design temperature of the internal concrete structures. The safety-related instrumentation in GIBBSSAR scope located 2 within the containment will be qualified to withstand the temperature conditions resulting.from the steam line breaks. If it is determined at the time of procurement that qualification is not feasible, insulated encasement or other suitable means of protection will be provided. O O O 022-3 Amendment 2
GIBBSSAP h Guestion 022.2(6.2)_ Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that an analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents be performed in accordance with the requirements of Section 50.46. Appendix K, "ECCS Evaluation Models," to 10 CFR Part 50 sets forth certain required and acceptable features of evaluation models. Appendix K states, in part, that the containment pressure used for evaluating cooling effectiveness during reflood and spray cooling shall not exceed a pres sure calculated conservatively for this purpose. It further requires that the calculations include the effects of operation of all installed pressure reducing systems and processes. Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1, " Minimum Containment Pressure Model for PWR ECCS Performance Evaluation," (Attachment 1 to NRC Standard Review Plan 6. 2.1. 5) provides additional guidance for the performance of a minimum containment pressure analysis and 2 The ref ore , should be used when the analysis is performed. provide analysis of containment pressure transients for the GIBBSSAR/RESAR-4 5'4 design combination. Justify the transients to be conservatively low by describing the consevatism in the assumptions of initial containment conditions, modeling of the containment heat sinks, heat transfer coefficients to the heat sinks, heat sink surface area and any other parameter assumed in the analysis. Provide figures showing the containment pressure, lll temperature, and sump temperature response for each break analyzed for the RESAR-414 ECCS performance evaluation and compare the calculated pressure transients to those assumed in the RESAR-414 ECCS evaluation. Fesconse 022.2(6.2)_ 8 See response to Q 022.9. l l 4 I Ill Q 0 22- 4 Amendment 8 l l l
Ouestion 022.8 ) With regard to the main steam line break analysis, provide the l information we have previously requested in 022.1. In addition, ! identify the equipment relied on to limit the mass and energy I release to the containment. Specify the design criteria for this l equipment. Justify relying on equipment for accident mitigation that are not engineered safety feature grade; i.e. , designed to Safety Class 2 and seismic Category I criteria. Fesconse 022.8 6 It is GCH's understanding that the NFC has requested Westinghouse to provide the necessary blowdown data for main steam line break analyses as part of the RESAF-414 submittal. Upon submittal of this data by Westinghouse to the NFC, GCH will perform the required analyses. At the time of this submittal equipment relied upon to limit the mass and energy release to the containment will be identified and the design criteria specified. Justification for reliance on non ESF grade equipment for accident mitigation will be provided, if so required. O O Amendment 6 Q 022-15
Ouestion 022.9 Provide the information we have previously requested in 022.2 ; 6 regarding the analyses and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance ; following postulated loss-of-coolant accident. Pesponse 022,9 The GIBBSSAR design is enveloped by the balance of plant 8 assumptions employed in the RESAR-414 ECCS cooling performance analysis. See revised section 6.2.1.5 and Table 6.2-14 O l O Q 022-16 Am ndment 8
GIBBSSAR {-)g m Question 131.52 (3.8.6) GIBBSSAR is intended to accommodate a large number of sites within the continental United States. Naturally, the site soil conditions affecting design of foundations will vary from site to site. In order to proceed with the comprehensive design of the plant the design parameters of soil conditions must be defined 5 that will cover all possible situations for which the plant will be designed. You are requested to specify such design parameters in the SS AR. These parameters should cover pertinent aspects of structural engineering and design of foundations, such as the allowable soil bearing pressure ground water level, cohesion, soil stratification, etc. Pesponse 131.52 See Subsections 3.7.1.4 and 3.8.5.4 as revised in Amendment 6 l 8 O Q 131-59 Amendment 8
Pesponse 111.43 l7 For the design of Class 2 E.nd safety related Class 3 tanks and vessels the stress limits for service limits C and D tabulation Section III of the ASME BSPV Code will be met. 8 For Class 2 piping systems, the stress levels will not exceed "C" level service limits. For bends and elbows Equation 9 of paragraph NC-3652 will be modified by replacing 0.7B2 by 0.BB2, where 0.8B2 is not less than 1. O I l i i i i l 1 l
'O Q111-49 Amendment 8 . _ _ - - - ~ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ - . _ . _ _ . - - _ . . . _ . _ . . _ . . . _ , _ _ - . __ _
Question _111:44 (3.9.3.21 g Section 3.9.3.2.b.1 (page 3.9-10) of the SSAR and the response to Question 111.16 (page Q 111-18) both require all valves to have a natural f requency ".. . greater than 33 Hz. " Whereas part two of the response to Question 111.20 (page Q 111-24) identifies the 7
" pre f erred method for qualifying valves when the natural frequency is below 33 Hz." Resolve the conflict between the two criteria.
Response __O 111.44 See revised response to 0 111.20 l l l O l l l O Q111-50 Amendment 7
GIBBSSAR
,GIBBS AND HILL STANDARD BALANCE OF PLANT GIBBSSAR Structural Engineerino _ Branch SSAR Second Pecuest for Information Question 131.56 (3.3.21 (RSPL Your response to Item.131.3 is not adequate, since you did not specify the non-Category I equipment which may become a missile.
In view of the fact that the Gibbssar plant will utilize blow-out panels for venting, you are requested to state your intentions to either of the two: 8
- 1. Ident ify the non-Category I equipment which may become a tornado generated missiles, if any, and assess its damage potential and show that the damage potential is less than the damage which would result from the tornado missiles contained in the Standard Review Plan Section 3. 5.1. 4 or,
- 2. Commit to secure all non-Category I equipment in the blow-out areas which may become tornado generated missiles to their supports so that there will be.no tornado generated missiles resulting from the venting due to the blow-out panels.
({} , Fesponse 131.56 The GIBBSSAR plant will not utilize blow-out panels for tornado venting. Thus there will be no venting to produce tornado generated missiles. Reference to venting was deleted in paragraph 3.3.2.2 by Amendment 5. 1 4 I I i h Q 131-63 Amendment 8 l , ._ _ ~ . . _
O GIBBSSAR O Ouestion 131.57 (3. 5 -(RSP)
.Your response to Item 131.6 is not adequate.. The allowable ductility ratios to be used in the SSAR do not reflect the regulatory staff position. The staff's position is provided in 8 the Enclosure. Indicate your compliance with this position.
Response 131.57 The' allowable ductility ratios will conform to the regulatory staff position. See revised- section 3. 5. 3. 2 O l i l l l I i l l l l l L Q 131-64 Amendment 8 e. I- - . . - . . . . . - , . - - . . _ . . - - . . . . . . - - , . . _ . , . . . - . . . . - . . . . . _ . . . . -
i GIBBSSAR Ouestion__131.58 (3.8.11 Yo ur response to Item 131.36 requires additional inf ormation. Describe in more detail the following:
- 1. Material, physical characteristics and thickness of the
" protection course" shown in Waterproofing Detail (Figure 3. 8-2) .
8
- 2. Describe in more detail the " reinforced concrete mat" (FCM) .
Provide details of the reinforcement and thickness. Indicate the difference between the " reinforced concrete mat" and the
" foundation mat".
- 3. Provide the pertinent information regarding the material-and physical characteristics of the membrane waterproofing.
Pesponse 131.58
- 1. The " protection course" shown in the waterproofing detail (Figure 3. 8-2) is provided to protect the waterproofing membrane from sharp objects that may be inclued in the backfill against the structure. It will be constructed of brick or concrete block
({} of about 2 inches thick, or of hardboard, or of other suitable material.
- 2. The " reinforced concrete mat" shown in Figrue 3.8-2 is a
" mud" mat that will provide a smooth-support for placing the waterproofing membrane and for support of the foundation mat reinforcing steel during construction of the foundation mat. It will be a maximum of 6 inches thick structural concrete. Minimum temperature and shrinkage reinforcing steel will be provided in accordance with AC1-318. See revised Figure 3.8-2 l Fill material L. der the foundation mat, including concrete fill ,
j if required, will be described by the utility-applicant as a part l of the site support media. 'See revised Table 1.8-3.
- 3. Waterproffing mateiral will be of the membrane type
- consisting of either tar and felt layer, butyl rubber sheet, or plastic sheet as appropriate for site ' soil or rock conditions and ground water levels. See revised Table 1.8-3.
l O Amendment 8 Q 131-65
'w,, p -
- , - - > v sr r ms- w www n e- , v n w w- e w sa ~ m r - wr,-frm,+u,e em-vw se,,+m- rw-eve w---,-so-- vnm e~-ow-,--e e -e-oe * -=va<-e ~w w w ~ * - - - =
1 GIBBSSAR Ouestion 131.59 (3.7.11 (RSP) Your response to Item 131.8 is not satisfactory in that it lacks a commitment that the plant will be designed for the peak ground SSE acceleration of 0.3g. It is the regulatory staff position 8 . that'the standard plants should be designed for one peak ground ) acceleration regardless of the site. Express your intentions regarding this commitment. 1 Response 131.59 See revised Section 3.7.1 O O Q 131-66 Anendment 8
r - GIBBSSAR < Ouestion 131.60 (3.7.11 (PSPL Your response to Item 131.7 did not address the issue, Examination of Fig. 3.7-2 shows that the high frequency end of the response spectre is not in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.60. Indicate your intent to comply with R.G. 1.60 or provide technical justification for the deviation. Pesponse 131.60 vertical design response spectra are revised to comply with Fegualtory Guide 1.60. The new vertical artificial time history 8 will be developed by -January 20, 1979. Figures 3.7-8, 3.7-9, 3.7-10, 3.7-11, 3.7-12 and 3.7-14 will be amended at that time. O O Q 131-67 Amendment 8 4
,-rvy.---mm, 9 + y e onw= . - , . - - , , - ,-r - e w r e- 3- ,.i.- , , . --w. ,. =-,:w-- -- --w..--
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 131.61 (3.7.2L Your response to question 130.21 is not clear. Indicate how much of the live loads is included in the mathematical model and clarify if the mathematical model used for structural response 8 analysis is different from that used for in-structure response spectrum generation. If so, provide the details. Pesponse 131.61 See revised Section 3.7.2.3 i O O Q 131-68 Amendment 8 l
I 1 l GIBBSSAR O
\-) 1 l
Ouestion 131.62 (3.7.21 i Your response to Question 131.29 is not satisfactory. Clarify l the following:
- 1. How are lateral earth pressure and hydrostatic pressure ;
considered in your analysis? 8 ; 1
- 2. LAn upward vertical acceleration will reduce the weight of a structure. Is this considered in the definition of W indicated in Equation (4) on Page 3.7-297 Fesponse 131.62 See revised Sectin 3.7.2.14 0
l O Q 131-69 Amendment 8 . - _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . . . . . . . -. . ~ _ . . . . _ _ . _. _ . _ . - . . _ _ - . _ . . . . _ . . _ . - _ - . . .
GIBBSSAP g Ouestion 131.63 (3.7A) Your response to Item 131.34 is not complete. Referencing benchmark calculations is not enough. You are requested- to submit sample problems comparing the computer code solution with a solution obtained by either hand ; calculations or other computer code solution, which is in public domain, so that the reviewer has opportunity to review the 8 results of the two solutions. In case that the computer code has been verified by means of tests, the test report should be submitted together with the computerized solution for review. t Pesconse 131.63 Information will be submitted by 3/30/79 ) l i l l l i l l l l l I Q 131-70 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR O Ouestion 131.64 (3.7.21_ 8 The reference to R.G. 1.22 on P. 3.7-24' appears to be erroneous. The correct Regulatory Guide should be R.G. 1.122. Fesponse 131.64 See revised Section 3.'7.2.5 O i l l O Amendment 8 Q 131-71 _ . _ _ . . . _ . ~ . . . . _ . _ _ . - . , , , _ . . _ . _ _ . , . . . _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ - . . _ _ - _ _ . ~ . . _ _ . _ - - - - . _ - .
i GIBBSSAR O Question 131.65 (3.7.21 Cn Page 3.7-15 a statement is made that the stresses are within the elastic limit and in accordance with " appropriate codes a. 8 Define the codes to which reference is being made. Pesponse 131.65 See revised Section 3.7.2.1 O l l l t i O Q 131-72 Amendment 8
~s GIBBSSAR
' _)
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Question 131.66 (3.7.2) (RSP) Your response to the Regulatory staff's position stated in Item 131.16 is contradictory to a statement made in Section 3.7.2.1. In the response, you stated that you intend to comply with the Regulatory Staff position, which allows local 8 yielding due to impactive and impulsive loads. Yet, in the Section 3.7.2.1, you stated that yield sti: esses may exceed the secondary stresses "to the extent set forth in the appropriate design stadards and codes". Remove the ambiguity by specifying the codes and standards. and indicate your compliance with the staff's position, which allows stresses in excess of yield only when the impactive or impulsive loads are present. Response 131.66 See revised Section 3. 7. 2.1. O 1 O O 131-73 Amendment 8 l l l l l 1
l l GIBBSSAR O l Ouestion 131.67 (3.7.21 l l Your response is not satisfactory in that instead of responding to the original question you eliminated the pertinent information ; from the PSSAR. In view of the above, provide information and a i satisfactory justification pertinent to the treatment of the mass moment of inertia of each structure. In addition, Figure 3.7-18 l 8 referred to in your response is not a complete mathematical mode. In Sectios 3.7.2.1, 3.7.2.11 and other places, mention was made of using finite element techniques in modeling the structures. Figure 3.'7-18 does not reflect such a representation. Provide the complete model used in your seismic analysis. Fe sponse 131.67 See revised sections 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.3 O 9 Q 131-74 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR-Ouestion 131.68 (3.7.2) Explain and justify the following statements on page 3.7-17 of the SSAR:
- 1. What are the " appropriate computer prgrams to be used to develop flexibility matrix for containment structure". 8
- 2. What do you mean by " bean history" (SIC) and how it relates to the containment structure.
- 3. Justify the use of the computer programs based on " bean history" as applicable to the containment structure and those based on the finite element method as applicable to the other Category I Structures such as the auxiliary building and the internal structure.
Fesponse 131.68 See revised Section 3.7.2.1 ('i V i l () Amendment 8 Q 131-75 l-
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GIBBSSAF g Ouestion 131.69 (3.7.21 In Section 3.7.2.4, you indicated that the methods of analysis of Category I structures for the soil-structure interaction to be used in future confirmatory analyses will be according to those specified in Table 2.7-3 of the SSAR. It is the regulatory staf f position that each utility applicant referencing GIBBSSAF perform confirmatory soil-structure interaction analysis to demonstrate 8 design adequacy of Category I st::uctures and the acceptability of such confirmatory analysis will be reveiwed on a case by case basis in the future site related applications. Therefore, the discussion pertaining to future confirmatory analysis methods together with the Table 3.7-3 referenced should be deleted and a commitment to comply with the above stated staff position be provided in its place by the applicant. Fesconse 131.69 Table 3.7-3 is the current NRC regulatory positon for which GIBBSSAR and each Utility Applicant's SAR are to comply. Deletion of Table 3.7-3 is therefore deemed unnecessary. O O Q 131-76 Amendment 8
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,O GIBBSSAR y
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Ouestion 131.70 ( 3. 8.11_ l Your response. to Item 131.17 is not satisfactoy in that you failed to describe:
- 1. The method of calculating the loads resulting from the 8
buckled liner plate.
- 2. The buckling criteria applied to the liner plate . analysis and design. Provide the above information.
Fesponse 131.70 See I' vised section 3.8.1.4 (f} O . l l c l () , O 131-77 Amendment 8 l- - - -
GIEBSSAF g Ouestion 131.71 (3.8.11 Your response to' Item 131. 39 is not satis f actory. Section 3.9.1.4 (f) refers to Section 3.8.1.5 (c) for information on the allowable anchor loads. Examination of Section 3. 8.1. 5 - (c) reveals that this information is missing. Discuss in detail the method of analysis to prevent the " zipper effect" stating the test data, and the allowable loads on the anchors and the liner plate. 8 Pesponse 131.71 Section 3. 8.1. 5 (c) refers to tables CC-3720-1 and CC-3730-1 of the ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, 1975 edition. These tables define the allowable stresses and strains for the liner plate and liner anchors. As noted in Section 3. 8.1. 4(f) these stresses and strains are nota exceeded under the postulated design bases, thus precluding
" zipper effect."
O 4 l l I P h Q 131-78 Amendment 8 I
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GIEBSSAR Ouestion 131.72 (3.8.1) Your response to Item 131.40 is not adequate. The quection did not state that you must combine the effects of peak temperature and pressure effects, but simply asked you how are you combining such effects. This you did not answer. Describe the method of analysis to account for temperature gradient in the containment. Also, juctify the increase in allowable strain of tensile 8 reinforcing to 1.5 times the yield srain. Fesconyp_131.72 The +,t> mal effects are considered by applying tne various combing 0 ions of tereprature conditior s specified in Section 3.8.1.3 to the insidt: and outside surf 6 of containnent analysis models. The method of analysis to account for the temperature gradient in the containment is described in section 3.8.1.4. The ACI-ASME Code, . Se ction III, Division 2, Paragraph CC-3 42 2.1 (c) permits the tensile strain in the reinforcing steel to exceed the yield strain when the effects of thermal gradients O> through the concrete section are considered. The Winter 1977 addendum to the 1977 edition of the code permits this strain to reach twice the yield minus the compression strain in the concrete. However, in any case, the average tensile stress in the steel across the concrete section may not exceed 0.9 times the yield strength of the reinforcing steel according to paragraph CC-3422.1(b) of the' code. The " Criteria for Reinforced Concrete Nuclear Power Containment Structares" developed by ACI committee 349 and published in the January 1972 ACI Journal (paragraph 2.2) limited the movimum strain when the above thermal gradients are considered to 1.5 times the yield st ain. Appendix "C" of this criteria described a method of calculating total strain including thermal effects plus pressure; this method is used in the GIBBSSAR design. 9 O Q 131-79 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR : Question 131.73 (3.8.1L The revised sections 3. 8.1. 3 (a) and (b) , which you provided in response to Item 13i.42, do not contain load combination equations in accordance with the Standard Feview Plan. The Extreme Environmental Category Equation should include Ro, as defined in Section 3.8.1.3 (a) (8) of the SSAR. Please correct the equation accordingly. Fesponse 131.73 The standard review plan references the April 1973 Proposed Standard Code for Concrete Peactor Vessels and Containments (AC1 -359) issued for trial use and comments. The loads and load combination equations in Sections 3.8.1.3 (C and (b) of GIBBSSAR are in accordance with the 1975 edition of that code as adopted 8 for use and provides for a level of conse rvation equal to- or greater than the local combinations in the proposed code version. The 1975 edition of the code J s the " basic code" governing the GIBBSSAR Containment as specified in Section 3.8.1.2. O O Q 131-80 Amendment 6 _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ , , _-_ . _ . - _ . . ._ _ _ _ _ - ~ , - _ _ - _ . -
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GIBBSSAR Ouestion 131.74 (3.8.11 Your response to Item 131.46 is not acceptable. The revised . Fig. 3.8-13 does not answer the original question. Please provide pertinent answer to.this question. Fesponse 131.74 , As shown in the penetration details e r . . 7 and 3. 8- 8 8 the containment penetrations are a"~ .he containment wall. This is accortplised Sir 2mbedment in the concrete or by welding to s]< nbedded in the concrete. There are no 4' nts between the pentrations and the contain O O Q 131-81 Amendment 8 l. l
i GIBBSSAR O Ouestion 131.75 Your response to the Interface requirements (General Comments of
- 91) is too general to be considered satisfactory. For example, by making a statement that the " check will be made to ensure 8 consistency at'the interface between the BO structures and the NSSS components", you did not address the specific requests of the staff. Indicate your compliance to the specific requirements of the NSSS/ BOP interface as requested by the staff.
Fesponse 131.75 4 See section 1.8.4 O II> Q 131-82 Amendment 8 . _ _ , _ . _ . - _ - . . _ . . . . . _ . _ . . . _ , - . . . - . . - . . . , . _ - . , . _ - . , ~ _ - - -
GIBBSSAP , Ouestion 131.76
- It is noted that you did not respond to Items.131.37 and 131.52.
For your convenience these items are repeated below. Please respond to the original questions. Oricinal Ouestie.; 131.37 (3.82 11 Describe the provisions to be taken to prevent corrosion of the liner plate in case of buckling towards the inside of the containment and the surveillance measures to be used to detect 8 such condition. Cricinal Ouestion 131.52 (3.8.6)
' GIBBSSAR is intended to accommodate a large number of sites within the continental United States. Naturally, the site soil conditions af fecting design of foundations will vary from st e to site. . In order to proceed with the comprehensive design of the plant, the design parameters of soil conditions must be defined that will cover all possible situations for whch the . plant will be designed. You are requested to specify such design parameters
'in the SSAR . These paraneters should cover pertinent aspects of O strucutral enigneering and design of foundations, such as the ground water-level, cohesion, allowabfe soil bearing pressure, soil stratification, etc.
Pesponse 131.76 Items 131.37 and 131.52 were answered in Amendments 7 and 8 respectively. I i l l O Q 131-83 Amendment 8 l 1 e e,-,,-.---sm,,-r-ev-ve.v,,,www w, e v ror yw w-w -.w-. ,.s.m . e.w..,-awwwwe,.--2,.r.,.e.- ,-----.,-...e.,y- -.m e- - - . . . - -= - - - . - - -r--e
Ouestion 212.35 (5.5L The Regulatory Pequirements Peview Committee, in a memorandum from E. Case, Committee Chairman, to L. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations (dated February 16, 1978), has approved a new staff position (BTP RSB 5-1) for the Residual Heat Femoval System (RHR) . The technical requirements for your design are described below. Please discuss how you will satisfy the following requirements: (1) Provide safety-grade steam generator dump valves, operators, t air and power supplies which meet the single failure
- criterion.
(2) Provide the capability to cooldown to cold shutdown in less than 36 hours assuming the most lindting single failure and loss of offsite power or show that manual actions inside or outside containment or return to hot standby until the manual actions or maintenance can be performed to correct the failure provides an acceptable alternative. (3) Provide the capability to depressurize the reactor coolant system with only safety-grade systems assuming a single failure and loss of offiste power or show that manual actions 7 inside or outside containment or remaining at hot standby until manual actions or repairs are complete provides an acceptable alternative. (]} (4) Provide the capability for borating with only safety-grade systems assuming a single failure and loss of offsite power or show that manual actions inside or outside containment or remaining at hot standby until manual actions or repairs are completed provides an acceptable alternative. (5) Provide the system and component design features necessary for the prototype testing of both the mixing of the added borated water and the cooldown under natural circulation conditions with and without a single failure of a steam generator atmospheric dump valve. These tests and analyses will be used to obtain information on cooldown times and the corresponding AFW requirements. (6) Commit to providing specific procedures for cooling down using natural circulation and submit a summary of these procedures. (7) Provide or require a seismic Category I AFW supply for a least 4 hours at Hot Shutdown plus cooldown to the DHR system cut-in based on the longest time (for only onsite or of fsite power and assumint the worst single f ailure) , or show that an O Q 212-37 Amendment 7 l l l
l l adequate alternat scismic Category I source will be 7 1 available. lll Pesponse 212.35 (5.5L: A) The design of the Residual Heat Removal System (RER) is ,
- within the NSSS vendors scope. A description of the safe l snutdown basis for RESAR-414 plants and interface requirements for the BOP designer are provided in the response to NRC Question 212.23 and 212.146, respectively.
The interf ace requirements are met as follows: i
- 1) Emergency electrical power-provisions for emergency ac power !
as specified by RESAR 414 Section 8.3.1. 2, are described in GIBBSSAR Section 8.3. i 1
- 2) Steam generator safety valves-RESAR-414 interfaces listed in ,
Table 10.1-1 for spring-loaded safety valves and ' power-operated relief valves are met in GIBBSSAP Section 10.3.3.1 and 10.3.3.2 respectively. ;
- 3) Auxiliary feedwater system-compliance with Section 6.6 of RESAR-414 is described in GIBBSSAR Section 10.4.9 and Table 10.4-4.
- 4) CCW System - Table 9.2-10 lists the appropriate portions of ,
GIBBSSAR where all the interfaces specified in Section 9.2.2 gi ' of RESAP 414 are addressed. 8 i
- 5) SSW System -
A complete discussion on Section 9.2.1 of RESAR-414 is in GIBBSSAR Section 9.2.1. B) Specific to your request:
- 1) A complete discussion of the steam generator dump or power l operated relief valves and associated power supplies is provided in response to NRC question 010.66. See also GIBBSSAR Section 10.3.3.2 l
- 2) ,3) ,4) Critical functions (including capacity for depressurization and boration) associated with cold shutdown of RESAP-414 plants following condition II, III or IV events (including lose of of f site power) and all .
l required operator actions are discussed in the response ! to NRC question 212.23 on the RESAR-414 application. 5),6) Preoperational testing and operational procedures are not in the GIBBSSAR scope end will be addressed by the Applicant at the FSAR submittal. O Q 212-38 Amendment 8 i l
l l I 1
- 7) A seismic Category I Auxiliary Feedwater System is provided O. with a primary supply from the AFW Storage Tank. This tank meets the interface requirements of RESAR-414 and provides for supply of four hours at hot standby followed by five a hours cool down at approximately 50 F/hr to 350 F RCS hot leg 8 i temperature whe the RHP System may start to operate. The l Station Service Water System serves as the backup source of j seismic Category I water.
C) Based on the class definitions of R. J. Mattson's 01-19-78 memorandum, GIBBSSAR is a class 2 plant and complies with all interface requirements established to RESAR-414 and all requirements for class 2 plants. In addition the GIBBSSAR/RESAR-414 combination complies with some requirements of class 1 plants. O 1 I O Amendment 8 Q 212-38a
222.0 ANALYSIS PRANCH (:) Question 222.1'(6.2.1.4) Provide the results of analyses for a spectrum of main steam line breaks within the containment. You should vary break cize and power level to identify.the break sizes producing the highest containment temperature and pressure. Provide mass and energy release data for these two break sizes.. Provide a complete description for the. method used to calculate flow from the steam 7. generator .into the containment. Include justification for all equations and assumptions. Provide a comparison of the method used in the above analyses with the method described in KCAP-8843 (MARVEL) . The analyses should include the results of postulated single failures in the. steam and feedwater system. Eesconse 222.1: See recised Section 6. 2.1.1 for the results of a spectrum of main steam line-breaks within Containment. Table 6.2-5 provides peak containment temperatures and pressures for the spectrum of breaks ' considered. See RESAR-414 for mass and energy release data and a 8 description of the methodology used to calculate flow from the steam generntor into the containment. F O Q 222-1 Amendment 8
Ouestion 222.2 (6.2.1.4) ggg Discuss the method - by which unisolated steam in the main steam line and turbine plant is added to containment. Provide a table of unisolated steam mass as a function of power level for when ' the steam line isolation valve closes and when it i,s assumed not 7 to Close. Fesponse 222.2: Unisolated steam is added to containment as described in Appendix 6B of RESAR-414. The volune of the steam lines (Vsl) is taken to be the volume of all four steam lines as well as any branch lines up to the next upstream valve (see response to 8 . question 212.25); it is assumed that the steam line isolation valve on the unbroken loop has failed. The mass of unisolated steam relased from the steam lines is presented in revised Table 6.2-11. O O Q 222-2 Amendment 8
gue_sj; es ion 222. 3 (6. 2.1. g Discuss the cethod by which unisolated feedwater in the main and auxilary feedwater systems is added to the affected steam Provide 7 generator following a postulated main steam line break. the mass of unisolated feedwater with and without a f ailure of a feedwater isolation valve. Pesconse 222u3 : Unisolated feedwater and auxiliary feedwater is edded to the steam generator as described in Appendix 6B of RESAR-414. In all cases it is assumed that the feedwater isolation valve has ,, failed. Credit is taken for isolation via the safety Class 3 feedwater control valve. See revised Table 6.2-11 for the
' quantity of feedwater added and auxiliary feedwater added for each break.
O O Q 222-3 Amendment 8
I l Ouestion 222,4 ( 6, 2.1. 4) g Justify by analysis the values assumed for feedwater " low into the ruptured steam generator following a main steam line brake. Flashing of the fluid in the feedwater lines should be 7 considered as well as the affect of reduced discharge pressure on the flow rate through the feedwater and condensate pumps. Fesconse 222,4: A response will be provided later. O l O Q 222-4 Amendment 7 l _
l I f~g GIBBSSAR D Ouestion 222.5 (6.2.1)
. For calculation of mass and energy releases for containment subcompartment analyses, WCAP-8312 is referenced. This report describes use of the SATAN-V code with the Modified Zaloudek correlation for subcooled critical flow and the Moody correlation for saturated critical flow. A 10 percent margin is added to the resulting mass and energy release data for conservation. On page 6. 2-14 you state that this conservative margin has been removed for your subcompartment analysts. Justify removal of this margin.
Pesconse 222._5 0 The GSH analyses uniformly apply the 40 percent margin required by SRP 6. 2.1. 2 (p. 6. 2.1. 2- 3, R ev. 1) to the final pressures calculated by use of the RELAP 3 or RELAP 4 computer code. This margin is applied to che results of analyses based upon mass and energy release- data coming to us from Westinghouse documents. (RESAF-414, Amendment 3, pp. 6. 2-9 to 6. 2-9 6) and from our own analytical work (in the case of sendary side pipe ruptures) . Some of this data comes with a 10 percent margin included. O PESAR -41'4 pp. 6.2-61 to 87, for Hot Leg Split, Cold Leg Split, Pressurizer Spray and Surge Lines and other data, e.g. 150 sq. in. Cold Leg Break, (RES AR- 414 6. 2- 88 to 9 6) is supplied without margin. Consistency requires that a common base be used. Use of a 40 percent margin upon data inicuding a 10 percent margin would imply a 54 percent margin, which is in excess of that required <by established NRC policy. () Q 222-5 Amendment 8 l
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l i GIBBSSAP Ouestion 122.6 ( 6. 2.1) Since pipe restraints are provided for large primary system lines that penetrate the subcompartment we.lls limited of f set type breaks were analyzed. For breaks of this type the break geometry may resemble an orifice in the broken pipe. Data by a number of investigators has demonstrated that for two phase flow the mass flow rate per' unit area for orifices is higher than for pipes. Justify that the SATAN-V methods are 8 conservative for prediction of flow through orifices. Orifice flow data is found in (1) NEDO-13418, " Critical Flow of Saturated and Subcooled Water at High Pressure," by Sozzi and Sutherland, July 1975 (2) Blowdown Flow Rates of Initially Saturated Water", by V. Simon, Topical Meeting on Water-Reactor Safety, Salt Lake City, Utah, March, 1973, ad (3) " Choked Expansion of Subcooled Water and the I.H.E. Flow Model", by P.L. Collins, Journal of Heat Transfer, May, 1978. E,esponse 222.6 S AT AN-V , is a proprietary Westinghouse code. For this reason the question should be addressed to Westinghouse. lll O Q 22 2- 6 Amendment 8 I l
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GIB3SSAR Question 311.20 (6.1.2L You have indicated that a quality assurance program will be developed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.54. We require that the protective coating' systems to be used inside the containment meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.54. In addition, the total amount of organic materials and paints on small equipment brought into .the a containment, which do not meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.54 and which are exposed directly to the containment atmosphere, must be very small (such that insignificant quanitites of flammable gases and paint flakes will be generated) . Indicate how these requirements will be met. Response 311.20 Limitations on small equipment brought into the containment during plant operations is not within GIBBSSAF's Scope. The selection, type, quantity and usage of such equipment is within the Utility Applicant's scope and will be addressed in the Utility Applicant 8s SAR. 1 1 I I l O Q 311-24 Amendment 8 l l l
GIBBSSAE Ouestion 311.21_f6.1.3, 6.2.2 and 6.5.2 Show how the containment sump is designed to promote complete mixing of the emergency core cooling system water and spray 8 solution. Also, in the determination of sump pH, indicate any allowance for dead volume, such as water collected on each floor of the four spray regions shown in Fin- "-4. Fesponse 311.21 See response to NRC Question 311.2. O IIP , Q 311-25 Amendment 8 g - , - + ,+gr 4- -
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I GIBBSSAR Ouestion 321.16 (6.5.1. Q l For each filter provide the design bases used for iszing the filters, fans, and associated ducting. Discuss by reference, if , necessary, the bases for fission product removal' capability of 8 l the filter system. 1 1 Response 321.16 i See revise section 6.5.1.1-O Amendment 8 Q 3 21- 17
i GIBBSSAR Ouestion_321.17 ( 6. 5.1. 2) Since the issuance of Q-1, Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 (March 1978) has been issued and distributed. To assure conformance with each regulatory position, Fevision 2 should be Table 6.5-1 we find that additional 8 used. After reviewing information is needed. The positions and our concerns are as follows. (a) Peculatory Position C.1a Provide additional design information. The applicant has l committed only to the dose criteria of GDC 19. Regulatory Position C.1.a specifies that the Design of ESF systms should be based on maximum pressure differentials, relative humidity, maximum and minimum temperature, and other conditions resulting from a postulated DBA. The applicant should commit to each of the above positions in C.1.a or justify each exception. (b) Regulatory Position C.1.1 Provide assurance that the system will conformance with the Regulatory Position C.1.1 be designed in in reference lll Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978. (c) Feculatory Position C.2.i , Table 6.5-1 1. Provide additional information to assure that ESF atmosphere cleanup systems are designed to control
- leakage and facilitate maintenance in accordance with the l guidelines of Regulatory Guide 8.8.
(d) Feculatory Position _ C. 2.k Table 6.5-1 j. Describe the design features of the ESF atmosphere cleanup system that will protect the system from environmental contaminants such. as dust and residues from smoke and other contaminants. (e) Regulatory Position C.2.1 Table 6.5-1k. The applicant should provide a justification fer not committing to performing the leak test on d ucts and housings in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of ANSI N510-1975. O Q 321-18 Amendment 8 l
sJ. D 2 - a a; ,
.a GIBBSSAR (f) Regulatory Positions C.3, C.4, C.S and C.6 There have been a number of changes between Revision 1 and Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1. 52. To assure conformance with all regulatory positions you should reference Regulatory 8 Guide 1.52, Fevision 2, March 1978 for these sections.
gesponse 321._17 See revised Table 6.5-1 O O Amendment 8 Q 321- 19
GIBBSSkR - Question 321.18;(10.4.2.2) Provide.PSID 10.4-5-referenced in this section. 8 Bermonse 321.18 Figure 10.4-5 referenced in Section 10.4.2.2 was submitted as part of Amendment 6. f 4 0 O Q 321-20 Amendment 8
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GIBBSSAR O Ouestion 321.19 (10.4.3.2) Provide PSID 10.4-6 referenced in this section. Fesponse_32_1.19 8 Figure 10.4-6 referenced in Section 10.4.3.2 was submitted as part of Amendment 6. O 1 O Amendment 8 Q 3 21-21 . - . _ . . - . - - . - . ~ . . . . . . . - ~ . . . . - . . . . - . . . . - _ . . . - . . - . . . . ~ . - - . - . . - . . - . . - . _ . . . - . . . - . . -
. m_ ,
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 321.20 (10.4.3.3) Provide coolant chemistry specifications to demonstrate compatibility with primary to secondary system pressure boundary 8 material. The bases for the selected chemistry limits should be included. Pespor se 321.20 The reactor coolant and secondary side chemistry specfications are interfaces with the NSSS supplier. See response to NRC question 010.67, item 3. The primary to secondary system pressure boundary is within the NSSS scope. Chemistry specifications to demonntrate compatibility with primary to secondary system pressure boundary material is within the NSSS scope. O ! Q 321-22 Amendment 8 i
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rT GIBBSSAR V Ouestion 321.21_(11.1.2.2) Table 11.1-3 Maximum Volume Control Tank Activities. This table does not identify all sources of releases of radioactive material that are not normally considered part of the radioactive waste management system. Provide an estimate of releases of radioactive materials (by radionuclida) for the following sources; the steam gnerator blowdown system, all building ventilation exhaust systems, containment purging and venting (number of purges per year) , and the turbine gland seal system 8 For each of the above sources provide the bases and identify the transport mechanism and the release pathway. Fesponse 321.2J The radioactive releases from the steam generator blowdown system are presented in Table 11.2-7 (under the column labled-
" SECONDARY") ; the radioactive releases from all building ventilation systems including the containment are presented in Table 11.3-1. The radioactive releases from the Turbine Gland Seal System are negligable and have not been tabulated; The bases for the values presented in Table 11.2-7 are discussed in Section 11.2.3.3. The transport mechanism and the release pathway for radionuclide releases from the Steam Generator Blowdown Processing System are presented in Sections 11.2.3.4 and 10.4.8.2 respectivey.
The bases for the vlaues presented in Table 11.3-1 are discussed in Section 11.3.3. The transport mechanism and release pathway are also discussed in Section 11.3.3. Since GIBBSSAR is equipped with an 8 inch diameter line for pressure relief during power operation, gaseous releases from the containment ascome 4 purges per year and a continuous 1000 cfm ventilation rate (see NUPEG-0017, Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR-GALE code, April, 1976) Q 321-23 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAF h Ouestion 321.22 (11.2.1[ (a) Describe how the requirements of General Design Criteria 60 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Fart 50 will be implemented. (b) Provide an evaluation of the surge capacity of the liquid waste treatment system associated with back-to-back refuelings and equipment downtire. (c) Additional information is needed for tank overflows for tanks both inside and outside containment; discuss the 8 effectiveness of both the physical and the monitoring precautions taken. Discuss automatic diversion of wastes frcm tanks exceeding a predetermined level, the potential for operator error or equipment malfunction. Describe all design provisions and controls to preclude inadvertent or uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environ. Fesponse 321.22 (a) Criteria 60 states:
"The nuclear power unit design shall include means to control suitably the release of radioactive materials in liquid lll effluents" The liquid waste processing system is designed to receive, segregate, process, recycle and discharge liquid wastes. The j system provides filtration, evaporation, demineralization and reverse osmosis as treatment methods to provide reduction of !
influent liquid waste radioactivity. GIBBSSAP TABLE 11.2-1 provides decontamination factors and equipment availability data. Table 11.2-5'provides equipment design parameters and Figures 11.2-32 thru 35 provide processing paths. Section 11.2. 3.4 discusses compliance with Appendix I to 10CFR50 as a result of this processing to control, by system design, the release of reaioactive materials in liquid effluents. Criteria 60 states:
" Sufficient holdup capacity shall be provide for retention of 4
... liquid effluents containing radioactive materials, l particularly where unfavorable site environmental condition can be expected to impose unusual operations limitations upon the release of such effluents to the envoriment."
l O Q 321-24 Amendment 8 l I
GIBBSSAR Table 11.2-1 indicates input volumes, normal and peak, for the liquid waste processing system drain channels, Table 11.2-5 indicates processing rates and tank capacities for liquid waste processing system equipment. The following summary indicates holdup capacities for the liquid waste processing system drain channels. Drain Channel A: Holdup Reg'd Collection Tank, No. of Capacity Processing Usable _qal. Tank days Time davs High Activity 8 Waste Collection 5,000 2 50 Normal 0.5 7 Peak High Activity Waste Recycle 1 24 Normal 3,5 Peak TOTAL 74 Normal 10.5 Peak Drain Channel B: Holdup Reg'd LSHS Waste No. of Capacity Processing Collection Tanks days Time, days 10,000 2 24 normal 1.3(filtration l 5 peak and reverse osmosis) . 0.4 (filtration only) LSHS Waste Monitor 5,000 2 12 normal _2 peak TOTAL 36 normal 7 peak Low Activity Waste Collection O Q 321-25 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR g 10,000 2 15 normal 1.0 5 peak Low Activity Waste Fevcle 5,000 2 7 normal _2ypeak TOTAL 22 normal 7 peak 8 A minimum (at peak continous conditions) of one week holdup capacity is available in the liquid waste processing system. Therefore, sufficient holdup capacity is available where unfavorable site environmental conditions can be expected to impose unusual operational limitations upon the release of such liquid efluents to the environment. Refer to GIBBSSAR Sections 3.1.64, 11.5, 12.3.4 and 12.5 for inplementation of General Design Criteria 64 of Appendix A to 10CFR50. lll (b) The summary presented in (a) above indicates the collection holdup times and required processing tires for the liquid waste processing system under peak input conditions. Table 11.2-1 indicates equipment availability. Under peak or surge 4 conditions, the low activity waste subsystem process I utilization time required is 26 percent with 100 percent availability of evaporators, the low activity waste l processing subsystem has a 74 percent reserve capacity. The laundry and hot shower waste subsystem processing utilization time required is 26 percent. If the reverse osmosis unit is ( not available, the processing utilization time required is 8 l percent due to the higher processing rate. The laundry and l hot shower subsystem has then a reserve processing capacity of 74 to 92 percent. Therefore, sufficient surge capacity l l L exists during any anticipated plant operating mode. l l O Q 321-26 Amendment 8
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(c) Table 9.3-4 provides, information on overflow detection of liquid waste processing system tanks. Table 11.2-4 provides information on level instrumentation including alarm set points for liquid waste processing systsm tanks. Table 11.2-1 provides input volumes peak and normal conditions. Figures 11.2-32 and 35 indicate tankage and valving arrangements. The following summarizes the time from high level alarm to overflow for the liquid waste processing system influent collection tanks from the equipment and floor drainage system: Time from High level 8 high alarm alarm fre- High level Automatic Tank to overflow gue ncy/ time alarm Diversions Reactor 7 hrs 1/7 hrs Yes Yes Coolant Drain
,_s Collection U High Activity 6 hrs 1/25 days Yes No ( *)
Waste Collec-tion Low Activity normal 18 hrs 1/7 days Yes No ( *) Waste Collec- peak 6 hrs 1/2 days tion > LSHS waste normal 55 hrs 1/24 days Yes No ( * *) Collection peak 10 hrs 1/2 days (*) Remote manual valve operation from liquid waste processing system panel and main control panel l (* *) Manual valve operation required l Automatic diversion has been provided when tank level frequency of occurence is expected to be one day or less. Pemote alarm and remote manual valve operation has been provided at the LWPS panel l and at the main control panel for tankage with normally expected l high level frequency of one week or less. The high level alarm i duration to overflow indicated combined with two independent alarm and response locations is considered to minimize the potential for operater error. Tanks with normally expected high d(s Q 321-27 Amendment 8
I GIBBSSAR h level frequency cf greater than one week is provided with locally operated manual valves. In the event of valve failure sufficient time is provided for operator manual diversion of influent prior to an overflow condition. Other tanks within the system accept low volume inputs or input as a result of batch processing. The chemical drain tank has a low volume input and a high level alarm to overflow duration of aproximately 6 days. The spent resin storage tank is a closed circuit system as described in Section 11.4. 2.1 (b) . The laundry and hot shower holdup and monitor tanks high level to overflow alarm duration is 1-1/2 hours. These tanks accept influent only during the processing mode and provide sufficient 8 time for operator action. High level alarm is also indicated in the main control room to provide two independent areas for operator acknowledgement. Diversion valves are manual. The high activity waste recycle tank provides a 1/2 hr alarm duration from high level alarm to overflow. The high level alarm will be interlocked to the high activity waste collection tank pump and high activity waste evaporator to stop feed to the evaporator and initiate evaporator recycle mode, ggg The low activity waste sample tanks provide a 1/2 hr alarm duration from high level alarm to overflow. The high level alarm will be interlocked to the low activity waste collection tank pump and low activity waste evaporator to stop feed to the evaporator and initiate evaporator recycle. Pemote manual valves are furnished to divert filling to the standby tank for operator convenience and radiation protection. The evaporator concentrates tanks will be interlocked with the low and high activity waste evaporator. Upon high level alarm the concentrates feed from the evaporator will be terminated and the evaporator placed in recycle mode. Pemote manual valves are funished to divert fill to the standby tank for opertor convenience and radiation protection. In order to preclude inadvertent or uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environ, a radiation moniotr is placed on the discharge pipeline to termiaate flow on high activity. See Section 11.5.2.5 and Figure 11.2-34. In addition, locked closed valves are provided at the discharge of the low activity waste sample and laundry and hot shower holdup and monitor tanks to provide adminstrative control for the release of radioactive fluids. O Q 321-28 Amendment 8
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Msu4 A. w GIBBSSAF O Ouestion 321.23 (11.3.1.21 Provide the referenced PSIDs 9.4-2 and 9.4-6. Modular Exhaust 8 Cleanup units. Pesponse 321.23 t Figures 9.4-2 and 9.4-6 were submitted. as part of Amendment 6 i 1 l 1 0 O Amendment 8 Q 321-29
GIBBSSAP l Question 321.24 Part 1 (11. 4. 2.1) I 1 The description provided for the solld waste treatment system lacks sufficient detail. In order for us ^o evaluate the solid waste treatment system, the following concerns must be addressed; (a) For each waste type solidifed in the solid waste processing ) system provide the system processing capacity. (b) Provide additional information about the "small-volume continuous mixer used to confine and limit the quantity of wet cement in the mixer" at any time. Discuss normal mixer operation. Particular attention should be given to flushing, self-cleaning, and decontamination of the mixer. (c) Provide a detailed description of how an empty waste container is positioned on the process aisle cart. 8 (d) Provide a detailed description of waste / cement feed into the waste container. Discuss feed rates, process control parameters used to assure proper mixing with each waste type, methods used to assure that the waste container is not over filled, filling interlock and alarms associated station, and the methods used with to the clean waste and lll decontaminate the splash guard. (2) Discuss the procedures to be used to decontaminate the fill station in the event there is a spill. Evaluate the results of a spill. (f) Provide additional details relating to system decontamination when maintenance to the solid waste system is necessary. Discuss what happened to the decontamination solutions. Provide a PSID that shows interconnections back to the liquid radwaste system for the decontamination solution and flushing water. (g) Provide additional details relating to the following safeguard used with the solidwaste treatment system; verification of cement and waste flow, verification of proper waste container position, and methods used to assure that L cement will not harden in the mixer. In addition, describe the level sensor used to prevent waste container over-filling. (h) Provide a description of waste container expected to be used with the solidification system. O Q 321-30 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR (i) Provide a discussion of the monitoring precautions taken and the potential for operator errors and single failures of , equipment. t Ouestion 321.24 Part 2 (11.4.2.31 (R SP) (a) 'In your response to our question 321.14 (11. 4.1) , you stated l that the program to asonre complete solidification will be addressed in the Utility Application. It is our position that you should provide, in accordance with Branc5 Technical 8 Position ETSB 11.3, Section III, the details fo either a process control program, or methods for detecting free liquids in a waste container prior to shipment. (b) Provide a discussion of additives used to condition waste. Describe methods used to eliminate oil from waste. (c) Provide an evaluation of the expected chemical makeup of the waste to be procersed in the solid waste treatment system. (d) Provide a complete description of the capping device. (e) Provide dddtional information on postioning the wa'te ({} container after capping in the decontamination ;_ea. Describe routine waste container monitoring. Describe the methods to be used for smear test to determine external contamination of the waste container. Provide PSID that shows drains and interconnection back to the liquid radwaste system. (f) Provide additional information on pos tioning of the waste container at the fill station after the insertion of a spent filter. 4 Response 321.24 Parts 1 6 2 Section 11.4 will be revised to delete details specific to a particular solidifica ion agenh or system type. The revised section 11.4 will '.ist criteria required of solid waste processing system vencers and make reference to the Utility Applicant's SAR for de tils. O Q 321-31 Amendment 8
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'i1 GIBBSSAP 1 Ouestion 321,25 (11.5.4)
For process control monitors with control functions state the fail-safe position of isolation valves if the monitors fail. 8 Response 321.25 Process radiation monitors will be designed such that a monitor failure or loss of power to the monitor will cause the controlled isolation valves to assume their f ailed position as shown on the respective flow diagrams. O O Q 321-32 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR Que_stion 331.13 (12.4) Your responses to items 331.7 and 331.12 are not acceptable. While use may he made of published average data on experience at operating plants in evaluating likely doses, the dose assessment 8 addressed in 12.4 should be plant-specific. Describe the calculational model or the engineering judgement from which your estimate of "less than 300 man-rems" is derived, taking into account actual projected dose rates at GIBBSSAR, design improvements specific to GIBBSSAR, and expected staffing levels and man-hour requirements for the various operations at GIBBSSAR. ' An acceptable dose assessment is described in Pegulatory Guide 8.19. Fesponse 331.13 A response will be provided later. O Q 331-23 Amendment 8 . _ . _ . - , . _ . - .- _ . _ . . . . _ . _ - . . _ . _ . ~ . . . . . . _ . . . . _ . _ . . _ . , _ . . _ _ - . _ _ . , _ . _ . _ . _
432.0 EMERGENCY PLANNING BR ANCH O Ouestion 432.0 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix 0 requires that your submittal "... include information pertaining to design features that affect plans for coping with emergencies in the operation of the reactor or major portion thereof." Pursuant to Appendix 0, you should verify that the following features (within your scope of supply) have been incorporated in the balance-the-plant design by providing a description of: :
- a. the proposed locations and physical layouts of the onsite 7 emergency first aid and personnel decontamination facilities,
- b. the proposed location and physical layout of an emergency operations senter,
- c. the features of the facility that assure the capability for plant evacuation,
- d. the features of the facility to assure the capability'for i facility reentry in order to mitigate the consequinces of an accident or if appropriate, to continue operatione., and l
- e. the communications systems used for f acility evacuation and reentry.
(]) You may wish to reference other sections of the Standard Safety Analysis Report if appropriate. Resuonse 4322 0
- a. See added Sections 13.3.5.5.b and 13.3.6.5
- b. See added Section 13.3.6.1 ,
8
- c. See added Section 13.3.5.4.a
- d. See added Section 13.3.5.4.a
- e. See added Section 13.3.6.2.
() Amendment 8 Q 432-1
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