ML20148F347

Forwards Request for Addl Info by 781215 Re Environ Qual of Safety Related Equip Including Elec Containment & Cables, Pressure & Level Transmitters,Containment Isolation Valves, Containment Mass & Energy Releases & ESF Components

ML20148F347
Person / Time
Site:	05000584
Issue date:	10/30/1978
From:	Heltemes C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Gogolick C GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.)
References
NUDOCS 7811070365
Download: ML20148F347 (12)

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• s o jMgn ulc ,%q UNITED STATES y .7 4, * 'g fJUCLE AR R:!GULATORY COMMISSION j WASHINGTON, D. C. 2rn,5b

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%,**... rg,7 1978 Docket STN 50-584 i

Mr. Charles Gogolick GlBBSSAR Project 14anager Gibbs & Hill, Inc.

393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 100,01

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - ROUND TWO QUESTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS

Dear Mr. Gogolick:

Enclosed are requests for additional information that is needed in order to continue our review. Also, you are requested to respond to the staff positions included which are designated by the notation "RSP". We need a completely adequate response in these areas by December 15, 1978. Please contact us if there are any questions.

Sincerely, k(0h5

. ettemeif s

lJr., Chief St' ardization Branch Division of Project Management

Enclosures:

Q-2's/ Position by CSB, AB, AAB, ETSB, and RAB Branches cc: Mr. Frederick W. Cetler, Vice President Power Engineering Gibbs & Hill, Irc.

393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 781107 0305

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j Containment Systems Branch

Gibbs & Hill Standard fluclear Plant (GIBBSAR)

Request for Additional Information (Q-2)

$ 022.23 It is our position that you provide the following information regarding the environmental qualification of safety related equipment.

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1. Provide a comprehensive list of equipment required to be operational in the event of a, main steam line break (MSLB) accident to mitigate the accident consequences and assure a safe shutdown of the plant.

The list should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following safety related equipment:

a. Electrical containment penetrations ,

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b. Pressure transmitters

c. Containment isolation valves >

, d. Electrical power cables i c. Electrical instrumentation cable 4

f. Level transmitters i

Describe the qualification testing that was done, including the test environment, namely, the temperature, pressure, moisture content, and chemical spray as a function of time.

2. It is our position that the thermal analysis of safety related equipment which may be exposed to the containment atmosphere following a main steam line break accident should be provided based on the following:

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, a. A condensing heat transfer coefficient based on the recommendations in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1,

, Minimum Containment Pressure Model for PWR ECCS Performance Evaluation should be used.

b. A convective heat transfer coefficient should be used when

, the condensing heat flux is calculated to be less than the convective heat flux. During the blowdown period it is  ;

appropriate to use a conservatively evaluated forced convection heat transfer correlation. For example:

Nu = C(Re)h where Nu = Nusselt No. <

Re = Reynolds No.  !

C,h = empirical constants dependent on geometry and Reynolds No.

i Since Reynolds number is dependent on velocity, it is necessary

, to evaluate the forced flow currents which will be aenerated by the steam generator blowdown. The CVTR experiments provide limited data in this regard. Convective currents of from l

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l  ; 10 ft/sec to 30 ft/sec were measured locally. We recommend l that the CVTR test results be extrapolated conservatively to obtain forced flow currents to determine the convective heat I

transfer coefficient during the blowdown period. After the blowdown has ceased or been reduced to a negligibly low value, a natural convection heat transfer correlation is .,

acceptable.

c. For each component where thermal analysis is done in f conjunction with an environmental test at a temperature lower i

than the peak calculated temperature following a main steam

! line break accident, compare the test thermal response of the component with the accident themal analysis of the component. Provide the basis by which the component themal response was developed from the environmental qualification l test program. For instance, graphically show the thermocouple data and discuss the thermocouple locations, method of attachment, and performance characteristics, or provide a detailed discussion of the analytical model used to evaluate the component thermal response during the test. This evaluation should be performed for the potential points'of failure such as thin cross-sections and temperature sensitive parts where thermal stres' sing, temperature-related degradation, steam or chemical interacticn at elevated temperatures, or other themal effects could result in the failure of the component mechanicclly or electrically. If the component themal response comparison results in the prediction of a more severe themal transient for s

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the accident conditions than 'for the qualification test, t

provide justification that the affected component will l

s perform its intended function during a MSLB accident, or

_j provide protection for the component which would i

! appropriately limit the thermal effects.

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222.0 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS SECTION, ANALYSIS BRANCH 222.5 For calculation of mass and energy releases for containment

' (6.2.1) subcompartment analyses, WCAP-8312 is referenced. This report describes use of the SATAN-V code with the Modified Zaloudek correlation for subcooled critical flow and the Moody correlation for saturated critical flow. A 10% margin e is added to the resulting mass and energy release data for conservatism. On page 6.2-14 you state that this conservative margin has been removed for your subcompartment analyses.

Justify removal of this margin.

222.6 Since pipe restraints are provided for large primary system (6.2.1) lines that pe'netrate the subcompartment walls, limited off-set type breaks were analyzed. For breaks of this type the break geometry may resemble an orifice in the broken pipe.

Data by a number of investigators has demonstrated that for l two-phase flow the mass flow rate per unit area for orifices is higher than for pipes. Justify that the SATAN-V methods are conservative for prediction of flow through orifices.

I Orifice flow data is found in (1) NED0-13418, " Critical Flow l of Saturated and Subcooled Water at High Pressure," by i Sozzi and Sutherla.nd, July 1975 (2) " Blowdown Flow Rates of Initially Saturated Water", by V. Simon, Topical Meeting on Water-Reactor Safety, Salt Lake City, Utah, March,1973, and (3) " Choked Expansion of Subcooled Water and the I.H.E.

Flow Model", by R. L. Collins, Journal of Heat Transfer, May, 1978.

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311-1 311.0 SECTION A, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH 311.19 The information in Tables 3.11-3 and 3.11-4 are lacking. We must (3.11) have the information on the environmental conditions for quali-fication tests for ESF components in order to complete our safety evaluation. When listing the qualification radiation doses, identify the beta and gamma contributions as well as the expected contri-butions from a DBA condition and from normal operating conditions, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2.

311.20 You have indicated that a quality assurance program will be developed (6.1.2) in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.54. We require that the ' protective coating systems to be used inside the containment meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.54. In addition, the total amount of organic materials and paints on small equipment brought into the containment, which do not meet the recommend-ations of Regulatory Guide 1.54 and which are exposed directly to the containment atmosphere, must be very small .(such that insignificant i quantities of flammable gases and paint flakes will be generated).

' Indicate how these requirements will be met.

311.21 Show how the containment sump is designed to promote complete. mixing (6.1.3, of the emergency core cooling system water and. spray solution. Also, 6.2.2.and in the determination of sump pH, indicate any allowance for dead -

6.5.2) volume, such as water collected on each floor of the four spray regions shown in Figure 6.5-4.

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ETfl '0VND TWO QUESTIONS AND POSITIONS FOR GIBBSSAR STANDARD PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

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321.16 For each filter provide the design bases used for sizing (6.5.1.1) the filters, fans, and associated ducting. Discuss by reference, if necessary,the bases for fission product removal capability of the filter systems.

321.17 Since the issuance of Q-1, Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 (6.5.1.2) (March 1978) has been issued and distributed. To assure conformance with each regulatory position, Revision.2 should be used. After reviewing Table 6.5-1 we find that addi-tional information is needed. The positions and our concerns are as follows.

(a) Regulatory Position C.l.a

. Provide additional design information. The applicant has committed only to the dose criteria of GDC 19.

Regulatory Position C.l.a specifies that the Design of ESF systems should be based on maximum pressure differen-tials, relative humidity, maximum and minimum temperature, and other conditions resulting from a postulated DBA.

The applicant should commit to each of the above positions

, in C.l.a or justify each exception.

(b) Regulatory Position C.1.i Provide assurance that the system will be designed.in.

i confonnance with the Regulatory Position C.l.i in '

reference Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

(c) Regulatory Position C.2.j Table 6.5-1 i. Provide. additional information to assure that ESF atmosphere cleanup systems are designed to

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control leakage and facilitate maintenance in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 8.8. ,

(d) Regulatory Position C.2.k -

Table 6.5-1 j. . Describe the design features of the ESF atmosphere cleanup system that will protect the system from environmental contaminants such as dust and residues from smoke and other contaminants. >

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l (e) Regulatory Position C.2.1 i

! . Table 6.5-1k. 'The applicant should provide a justifica-1 I tion for not connitting to performing the leak test on

! ducts and housings in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of Af1SI !!510-1975.

(f) Regulatory Positions C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6

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! There have been a: number of changes between Revision 1 and Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.52. To assure

conformance with all regulatory positions you should reference Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978 for these sections. .

'l 321.18 ProhideP&ID10.4-5referencedinthissection.

(10.4.2.2)

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l 321.19 Provide P&ID 10.4-6 referenced in this section.

! (10.4.3.2)

} 321.20 Provide coolant chemistry specifications to demonstrate l (10.4.8.3) compatibility with primary to secondary system pressure boundary material. The bases for the selected chemistry '

limits should be included.

I 321.21 Table 11.1-3 Maximum Volume Control Tank Activities. <

l (11.1.2.2) This table does not identify all sources of releases of radioactive caterial that are not normally considered part

{ Provide an j of the radioactive waste maragement system.

estimate of releases of radioactive materials (by radio- <

! nuclide) for the following sources; the steam generator blowdown system, all building ventilation exhaust systems, -

containment purging and venting (number of purges per year), and the turbine gland seal system. c j

. for each of the above sources provide the bases and identify the transport mechatiism and the release pathway. i 321.22 (a) Describe how the requirements of General Design i (11.2.1) Cr'iteria 60 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 will be implemented.

. (b) Prohideanehaluationofthesurgecapacityofthe 1

liquid waste treatment system associated with back-to-back refuelings and equipment downtime.

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(c) Additional information is needed for tank overflows ,

for tanks both inside and outside containment; discuss the effectiveness of both the physical and the '

i monitoring precautions taken. Discuss automatic diversion of wastes from tanks exceeding a predetermined level, the pot'ential for operator error or equipment

! malfunction. Describe all design provisions and con- ,

j trols to preclude inadvertent or uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environ.

e l 321.23 Provide the referenced P& ids 9.4-2 and 9.4-6. Modular j (11.3.1.2 Exhaust Cleanup units.

i 321.24 The description provided for the solid waste treatment system (11.4.2.1) lacks sufficient detail. In order for us to evaluate the i

solid waste treatment system, the following concerns must be addressed; .

(a) For each waste type solidified in the solid waste j processing system provide the system processing capacity.

! (b) Provide additional information about the "small- "

i volume continuous mixer used to confine and limit

! the quantity of wet cement in the mixer" at any time.

! Discuss normal mixer operation. Particular attention should be given to flushing, self-cleaning, and decontamination of the mixer.

(c) Provide a detailed description of how an empty waste container is positioned on the process aisle cart.

l (d) Provide a detailed description of waste / cement feed into .

! the waste container. Discuss feed rates, process control I parameters used to assure proper mixing with - ch waste type, methods used to assure that the waste ,antainer is not over filled, interlock and alarms associated with the waste filling station, and the nathods used to clean and decontaminate the splash guard.  ;

(e) Discuss the procedures to be used to decontaminate the fill station in.the event there is a spill. Evaluate the results of a spill.

(f) Provide additional details relating to system decontamina-tion when maintenance to the solid waste system.is necessary. Discuss what happened to the decontamination solutions. Provide a P&ID that shows interconnections back to the liquid radwaste system for the decontamination solution and flushing water.

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i (g) Provide additional details relating to the following safeguard used with the.solidwaste treatment system;

verification of cement and waste' flow, verification of proper waste container position, and methods used to assure that cement will not harden in the mixer.

In addition, describe the level sensor used to prevent t

waste container over-filling.

1 (h) Prohideadescriptionofwastecontainerexpectedto be used with the solidification system.

(i) Provide a discussion of the monitoring precaution 5taken and the potential for operator errors and single failures of equipment.___ , ,

321.24 (a) I n your response to our question 321.14 (11.4.1), you (11.4.2.3) stated that the program to assure complete solidification (RSP) will be addressed in the Utility Application. It is our position that you should provide, in accordance with Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-3,Section III, the i

details of either a process control program, or methods for detecting free liquids in a waste container prior-to shipment.

(b) Provide a discussion of additives used to condition waste, Describe methods used to eliminate oil from waste.

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of the waste to be processed in the solid waste treatment system. .

(d) Provide a complete description of the capping device.

(e) Provide additional information on positioning the waste

, container after capping in the decontamination area.

Describe routine waste container monitoring. Describe the methods to be used for smear test to determine external contamination of the waste container. Provide PLID that shows drains and interconnection back to the liquid radwaste system.

(f) Provide additional information on positioning of the waste container at the fill station after the insertion of a spent filter.

321.25 For process control monitors with control functions state the (11.5.4) fail-safe position of isolation valves if the monitors fail.

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331.0 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 331'.13 Your responses to items 331.7 and 331.12 are not acceptable.

(12.4)

While use may be made of published average data on experience at operating plants in evaluating likely doses, the dose assessment addressed in 12.4 should be-i

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plant-specific. Describe the calculational model or l the engineeriig judgment from which your estimate of "less than 300 man-rems" is derived, taking into account  :

actual projected dose rates at GIBBSSAR, design improve-

. ments specific to GIBBSSAR, and expected staffing levels l

l and man-hour requirements for the various operations at  :

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GIBBSSAR. An acceptable dose assessment is described in l Regulatory Guide 8.19. '

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• g?i)u..% M/ ' i OCT ' ' 1978 v...+

Docket STN 50-584 Mr. Charles Gogolick GIBBSSAP, Project Manager ,

Gibbs & Hill, Inc.

393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - ROUND TWO QUESTIONS AND ,

STAFF POSITIONS

Dear Mr. Gogolick:

Enclosed are requests for additional information that is needed in order to continue our review. Also, you are requested to respond to the staff positions included which are designated by the notation "RSP". We need a completely adequate response in these areas by December 15, 1978. Please contact us if there are any questions.

Sincerely, s

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e temes(Branch ardization Jr., Chief Division of Project Management

)

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Enclosures:

Q-2's/ Position by CSB, AB, AAB, ETSB, and RAB Branches cc: Mr. Frederick W. Getler, Vice President Power Engineering Gibbs & Hill, Inc.

393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 t

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