ML022680740

TS Pages for License Amendment 130 Relating to Containment Systems Technical Specification Revisions

ML022680740
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	09/23/2002
From:	NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:
References
TAC MB3706
Download: ML022680740 (14)

Text

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION -. I-

d. Whenever there is ii (licatior 1 of relief valve

d. During reactor isolation conditions the reactor operation with a sti p1rossion pool temperal ,k pressure vessel shall te cdepresstirized to of 1.-0160"F and tire prinmary coo-mtlf sys lenl

<-200 psig at normal cooldown rates if the pressure o200 psip, Oil exterl;(1 visual suppression pool temporaltire exceed 120"F. exarrnirlation of tIhe st ,.r.'-i rn( ;hll eor sht S lI be) conducted dheforo 0r UOS111tilil I)OWOr

e. The suppressionl )poo1water level shall be operation.

-4.0 and t3.0 inches. Willt suppression pool waler level not witlhii iilts, restore water e. 1-t lStippressiu l l[)( wIa( tt tv.

,.sIrI zll.i:

level to within limits witlhin the succeeding clockol(di or e:1 :i( ( hiw . I 2 hoturs.

I. If the requirements ol 3.3.A. 1 ;aninotht I) met, the reactor siall be iplaced in a Cold StI tldown condition within 24 hoturs, awlr stmipend all activities with tlhe potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Ii) I' 3.7/4.7 tl [J i~ll.:l "

hll~ "130

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3. Pressure Suppression Charitber - Reactor Brildirti;

3. Pressure Suppression] Chamber - Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers Vacuum Breakers

a. hTIe p)ressui re SUPlI)t)i 3s 11( (ll e.r-reactor btuildil g vacutti breaikers miii(associated

a. Except as specified in 3.7.A.3.h Ilelow, two pressure suppression chambner-re. ctoi building instrmneiitation inchi ding set I)poi1l shall he chiecked for prop(ipm I ir Ird OvOry tl ree vacLiUrn breakers shall be operableat all times when the primary containment integrity is monthis.

required. T-he set point of tile differential pressure instrumentation which actuates tihe pressure Sulppressiom chamher-reactor huil(ling vacluumb reakers sthall be 0.5 ptSi.

h. From and after tihe dale that one of tile pressure suppression cihanmber reactor building vacuum breakers is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only dturing tlhe suicceeding seven clays unless such vacuum breaker is sooner made operable, provided that the repair procedure does not violate primary containment integrity.

c. It requirements of 3.7.A.3 cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.7/4.7 Avvl~

i* I k'I

• ..iL,130

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

b. Whlen th lle position Of at mly3(Itywo)ll-Sillplpression

e. One position alan icircit ii ea be inoperable (har ihor vac;tillmil I)rýak( .r v tive is inidicated() I providing that the redundlal it position alarm he 1ot fMilly (WSWeW ia*t a16iM wiieii Sil(11 clkH; h is re(qiiild, ti cdrywull lt(io,<; rt ,,sion c ii/il circitii is ooperable. BoIl position alarm circi iks differeiitial i)rossI5 lir (IH , y si raI l th,.

may be inotperable tfo a tperi(odI not to exceed II

• thlat stiown oni SS th.

seven clays provi(led !that all vaOciiim breakers denionshaled to he Figtire( 3.7.1 inmimiu lialtly mii(d following (-my are operable. of the evidence of Stl)$l:S(ji mlllii (o)prl..llioil/

If requirements of 3.7.A. (:alca tnot *e met, [lie ilil )Opl-n ble w va elv1 1 1ill llo:pi( ,i ! e r - ~le v a lv o. ri';

I

f. il )liid li~ ll.

tr storerl t o(Jit l3imi (0 reactor sh all he placed ii a ColI ruldown St condlilion withtii 24 l01 irs.

. Wh noll boll lp .s;iti lil allilli liii (

1 its l(3l'kiO 5 3; fouin(d tohIiiIi IllI?.ti l ii III' l! (ItIm m"I( lt (Idle d;t (ctl igt( ;S iil !!*: v* :IIII i )h1 ;tik ,r f .- J;il i*,i

5. P riilm -tl"7C o fllU-iliim ;liit ,' , *:  ; i , : d~ l , ;

5. Primary Conlainimeilt Oxygen Comr ientratiot I W h o lle v e r i0 0,, t lla w k 1h uImi:

1r wl ruIi; l iilim yV The primary contaiinleidt atOsl)ltos re shall be

a. vji:(!Idy th wl;it;.

reduced to less than 4% oxygein by volume with I11(1Wý1ille( im idI i (ll*( m il; nitrogen gas whenever the reactor is in the ruini mode, except as specified in 3.7.A.5.b.

Power t). Within the 24-hour period after Thermal is > 15% Rated Thermal Power following startil), to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing Thermal prior to Power to <-:15% Rated Thermal Power the next schediuled reactor shutdown, the containment atmosphere oxygen concentration shall be reduced to less than 4%'by volume, and maintained in ti ts condition.

3.7/4.7 A H;i ".,Alv :ii I ,,0 :-- 1 30

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS OPERATION 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR c.Whenever primary containment oxygen by 411' concentration is equ~al to or exceeds volumre, except as permhittedl l)y 3.7.A.5.1b period above, within the S~d)sequenct 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to less than 4%

return the oxygen conicentrationl by voIlume.

ot be met,

d. If the requtiremients of 3. 1.A.5 canni 15-0 Hated reduceiiThermal PlIower to Thermal Poerwill un 8 1101 r.

[-. Standlby Gas 1Treatim.,mit Sys;lmiH standbly gas I.Two separate and independ( ent 1WG(Rs 1rmal)1ýitu B. standby iI y.h treatmenit system circu its sh all be 01 )erabh. at all containment. integrity is 1wtoid times when secondary lIuOfLY',:oltoi 3.7.13.1.(a)1.

requiredt, exceptl as specified in sections qas, treatuerIsykii t~ Iu ornh IUU1Ioo and (b). Willi the iln i0O.

treatment system

a. After one of the standby gas [or circuits is made Or foLund to he inoperable handling and fuel any reason, reactor Operation seven is permissible only during the succeeding in the clays, provided that all active components are other standby gas treatmfenut system the 7 days, operable. With~in 36 h1ours following for the reactor sh-all be placed in a condition is not systenm which the standby gas treatment required in accordance with Specification 3.7.0.2. (a) fthrough (d).

3.7/4.7 4-1, 130

-1.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION reactor core, operationhs wilhtEl potential for reducing the ShUtdlOwn margin below that specified in or specification 3.3.A, and hiandling of irradliatedt fu el thlefuel cast< in theu secondiary conutaliflienl are to be immediately suspended if secondary containment integrity is not imaintainedt.

I I r.Priimary C01 tailiiflentIoaioVav;(Pl)

1. Du ring reactor power operating]Cond6ilionS, all

0tati( l IIalvs ai1(10 Vliimjary Cotutaillni ui AltotlI~Cic at all primary systein iii sit [IMI iaitlii 10 flo)w 0c0Iiehvalves shall b~e operable except as st tc(i hi(( I m3.7/.D.2. Ii ;hii III 1(l 1 ;t Ii )] lkv i hiýt(. 'JIl\'(? IV, WV

1. Jo psim lyst c (it

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4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

,3. Wi e tl oeV -r (co:i ita i r mllic i 0 i tr~U H(! mI I v oi it vw jjv ( :.s it f,,

3. a. The inertinqg and deiner ulg opu ,ernlions isWh I to im Itn eet [ie re i-iFS ti*ini il:*d'(; 3.7.D.1 3.1, permilled by TS 3.7.A.5.1) shall he via tihe the posilion of tHie l(*elivatclb . ai l i:olated valv;.

18-inch pumrge and vetit vwlv's (eqitipped with o-l itAsi(e )rimary dcllItilmr i e t ,;I l(ill hihrre or(

40-degree limnit slops) aligned lo tihe Reactor i 11)1iflIty. "'

Building iplentm and vent. All otlher pirging and venting, when pirimary containment integrity is required, shall I)e via tihe 2-ic-t pit ige and vent valve bypass liiie t tt II i,1mtai(cliy O s Trealment System.

I. It tinte event omw() o111 11.!ir iw

• I

,lUt' I hit1)wI )allis with one 1or mote o:ii- t uitIn*u(- 1itr(( (1id( vet it valves riot within pturrge amit vent w valve leakage limits, reactor operatior in the ril mmode may continue providled that within the si jbsequenl 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, restore the valve(s) to within leakage limits, or at least onie valve in each line having a pturge and vent valve not within leakage limits is deactivated in the isolated position. This requirerment may be satisfied by use of one closed and deactivated ailtoniatic valve, closed clIi otrlv , 18 iltl( lI pi1tti ift Itl U I Vd lw :; ,';l1 1 I

,,jit ,

manual valve, or blind flange. (Deactivated means electrically or pneumatically disarm or Tho 1 ctý to II .11 1101 )hiIt UitS if lI

. l v : i i u ( * , i , : , j ml !ml ltil vt I ./ .A .:, I ,

otherwise sectiure the valve.) p~e elf l l l l1( ,* I(1 s e a t s ,,tu d rl e ~rt ,gi li o+l , IlI wI III(! tt '. t ( 4)f,* li

l-

+

4. If Specification 3.7.D.1, 3.7.1).2 and 3.7.D.3 cannot b)e met, initiate normal orderly sliuldowim and have m ul vv(I.'l t v z.dt  ; t;Iudl !*t.ýr l lp v ( ;:'-ý k :,( iO .

reactor in the Cold Shititdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

""-Is o la l e (Ilw d w ,!-,i l I i qllt r - Oli lt l o:ll 't Wl t :L ; IIhly i: w~lili ,( iI ,,';* ,

O:f *u' ll il i lrli ()~dill II l..

130 S 3.7/4.7

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(F)5j-K-lijUC50)

Bases 3.7 (Continued):

vacuum breaker selector switch, and a common test switch. The reactor building vacuum breaker panel contains one red light switches and one green light for each of the eight valves. There are four independent limit switches on each valve. The two of less than 1/8" at the bottom of the disc. These controlling the red lights are adjusted to provide an indication of disc opening to switches controlling the green lights are adjusted switches are also used to activate the valve position alarm circuits. The two provide indication of the disc very near the full open position.

alarming to the control The control room alarm circuits are redundant and fail safe. This assures that no simple failure will defeat to alert the operator room when a valve is open beyond allowable and when power to the switches fails. The alarm is needed status, or both. If the that action must be taken to correct a malfunction or to investigate possible changes in valve position additional testing is required.

alarm cannot be cleared due to the inability to establish indication of closure of one or more valves, a timely basis. The frequency of the testing of the alarms is the The alarm system allows the operator to make this evaluation on same as that required for the position indication system.

by cycling the valve.

Operability of a vacuum breaker valve and tha four associated indicating light circuits shall be established light circuits are inoperable, The sequence of the indicating lights will be observed to be that previously described. If both red of subsequent and upon indication the valve shall be considered inoperable and a pressure test is required immediately however, no pressure test is operation. If both green light circuits are inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable, required if positive closure indication is present.

following a loss of coolant Oxygen concentration is limited to 4% by volume to minimize the possibility of hydrogen combustion failed to sufficiently cool the core.

accident. Significant quantities of hydrogen could be generated if the core cooling systems shutdown is more probable The occurrence of primary system leakage following a major refueling outage or other scheduled specified oxygen concentration limit is based. Permitting than the occurrence of the loss of coolant accident upon which the prudent in terms of the added plant safety offered without access to the drywell for leak inspections during a startup is judged for extended of starting the reactor and operating significantly reducing the margin of safety. Thus, to preclude the possibility when the scheduled during startup periods, periods of time with significant leaks in the primary system, leak inspections are after Reactor The 24-hour period to provide for inerting primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and pressure. be sufficient to perform the leak inspection and establish Thermal Power is greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power, is judged to of -_24% by volume, then the required oxygen concentration. If the containment atmosphere exceeds the oxygen concentration hour period. The 24-hour period is the oxygen concentration must be restored to <4% by volume within the subsequent 24 4% by volume because of the low probability and long duration of an event that would allowed when oxygen concentration is _>

180 3.7 BASES Amendment No. 17, 35,*80,n ln9, 123a, !28a, 130

.B_3ase .lit t ily pressurizc il rnia poriod. Ti 10pril/lary conitainimlentt is uly of Ilydrogen ccGIrring during this 111t leak in to generate significan t amotniis hi itir (01 11(1 Nitrogen tised for inerting could leak oi., of Ole cotairnmenth f during periods of reactor op)eration. i

• .iio)iitoringo nlainmenI is filled witll nilrogern to the required conennioti(

ce the (.- i';(Ell.lit )(itl as added increase oxygen cooncenlration. On will bo is necessary. I-lowever, at least once a week Ihe oxygen coricenltration oxygen concentratioln assulrance.

and C. Secondary Containmen0t B3. Standby Gas Treatment Systetml Of rIl(oi0 ctiVe 11 ni r il., ",il ;lt 1 1h reotl thoi izii to 0 I Nininlize any (jrlu 1.(I lewVl releLISO The secondary containmenl is ld;siq(idi ol, vitlil 1l0; III ywe l is sealedI'111'i pirovides secondary coilaiii inu t lurit01 ro'actor operati serious accident. -lie reactol I iiiilding 'd/W li! , i; Ii;, -s hri 11 I)riiiary contai'meilt whel n }l reaCtor is si itdtO1wri 1.t (1 11id;Ili ie (,

ii ni11

()1l. ilW.

ill service; the reactor building proviOleOS It is an insegral partr of the colpleote cointiniinll yltl , i:;*, ( it cOlliiilml power Instil0.

refueling. Because the seconldary for inlilial hild leadili1 Ip icr !)ifl ill crnirninnfieit is required except, howevor, is required at all timies that p)riniary :11wit y l in ]

to filter and ext iauLte 1reactor building all1osp!.0r.;I (1* 1 (t.

system is designed .t<-;ivec rhl 1.,t i it I0 T he standby gas treatment a miniimum -ele-s- el adici Itllatnciiu;tls itit(;

isolation condliOlis, with I* i, I lt. Irto 11(  !:

secondary containment is designed to) i;tnittici;lly itall stm-1.tupo l

or uii()'IaIIIlii gas ti-eamllenlt system circuit leakagle sIcild 1(1 in)(ill t; .i 11il (iiit standIby so8)Mi enviroins.

maintain the Onereactor buildirngll ressire at ihe design negative pressiire i dly. I ii:t tI Ili .?Iwo gas treatment crcilit is desigi leo 1to stai t i.i o alteriate standby ipIll(; r.,'!tiltki ) t circuit fail to start, thie reduIL(dalit gas treatirei t systen circfllts is i*ie.

Ided I , dý;lli 1ct.or the two standby circuits has 100% capacity. Only one of be inoperahle, lltere is 11o iino unetl( ttiti rý 11(to1the (;rtoliti*ilil Wi If one system is found to atmosphere upon containment isolation. rtii i:to.11 i;. If it I or refueling operation ilnay conltinte while S ti Therefore, reactor operation ;y,. lt.,i system performance. not require a sU-t11tlby gas treat-lil1uillt placed in a Condition that does circuit is operable, the plant is o, 7 7 RASESI I-) . I i.)f I " ý- ý I

Bases 3.7_ConL1inuer-.: ,( i tolat accident, not as a resi ill (if IIit ls*i.* oarticulaes are released from the primary -ofliaini iictI

• Ie release to Ow While only a small amountl of charcoal filters are specified to tii liiliize poterl).tOtiil and after the high-efficiency parlictilale fillers before inst'llIo (toro*(uc boHie potenlial to prevenlt cloggi* igof thce charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorhers are .flI ti at 1%

environment and a sysleo leak ii'ic 31U  ; ()I toth le environ eie11. -TIhe in-place lest restilts shofld indlic le'a10( it l( (I toleh'aI t 0, X, roitvi release of radioiodine 0 ItS LiSil g I alogenaled hydrocari)ltn atnd a1 I-IE.PA filter .li-of, bypass leakage for thech larcoal dl5 ate rot*liI itlit :nfl y for expect(,;I indicatel a radioactivemeOthyl iodidle t

carlmin sample test results 11111 of DOP particLIlates. Laboratory 90% ad.-sorrer *oli(:M6it ( y t;'.- *r-1he allowable penelralio n for th e laboratory lost is based oin '.iI li, ll tully dliftorri t Irho 1ll- "

accident condilion*s. Operation i fthe standbl y os Itreatment cirmuiltS S la-O: Oef -2. ,rti t l 1il,(otllntllt"i at off-site (lose analysis an(I a safely filter'-;

earcoaland ci l adsor s II. 110 1PItil('

ters.

eflici.tcy of tl t et I EPA  ; its a .ly/ d.

dlesign flow will change the renioval 10 CII.- 10 fo()It N. l It*,tt itlt the call.ct1a (l rdoses woil,"1he less thall the gitl(lItliti*e'- 5s -e(1 in niet as specified, Prinlary Containmentl Isolatiol *Valves D.

(PCIVs), ili (.;(tl)itiitiorl willi olel1r lt;i I iitii1,iUikti .y.:el ts, ii; lo the Priniary Contaitllinent Isolation Valves It" Iit( (,.;) tl-t- lbtt T-he funtrictioni of litii il,, ti !

durit g and following postulated Desigtn IBasis Ac:i l letts 1( ,tithitn tllito 1 iO limit fission prodILict release n *ccidruwtit ,y irt'lkfl (I I t1 itli;I boundary is maintained during and alter all I1 an adequate primary corltainimoel t y l it, i :li ifiit'iSil;::;i *at t

Specifications requirerments provide nIssiit nracthe II nil riraryt, ilir tied environment. Therefore, Technical passive or a-tiwvo (at (includi itoiialicl. Mat lvlA l ,ýcttl will be maintained. Thlese valves are either ieir closed position 1(1 11 l  ; U

-. *I',d. t, itit l*,w ltlrot n 11 1,.

the safety analysis itial valves) secured in* t autlornalic valves (including remote mar  ;. (It.r(ill *i;tt tiiloll liO0V; lv'!;

systems are considered passive dlevices. Check vtitl\,]

and closed valve secured), blind flanges, cont-sidered aclive -levic's.

action following an accident, are dlesigned to close willtout operator At ii ,t 1; AIi(

to maintain 111to it tlc grity of tloP Pi-itaiy ( :it Ii tiimt itt line would be sufficient idtl* +t' Closure of one of the valves in each paths frorn the conlaiiimloentt inrlt-! evo; o**,aI I ii'. aI iii!* .

to tile potential leakage Ilitti'titll li-' ly initiation is required tuinirnize the USAR. A valves are discussed in Section 5.2 of Details of the Primary Containmenlt isolation tine is 0givet i iJSAF -lt,. 2 Containment automatic isolation valves including maximum operating etratiot llfow pral.(s) to he. tiii ;u!sc kl I it*t t.rI titll( illy llidt,it niodified by a footnote allowing pet The Technical Specifications are I tt'r at till controls. These c)ontrols consist of stiltion irq a li.'ti,;al' (.lilti, lh ;tt,1..

ly)!

Operations Cornmlmittee approved administrative lh llli!.s way,1* tO, II ir t1't,,i *iitd t trI corn inunication with the control rooimi, controls of the valve who is in constant isolation is indicated.

when a need for the primary conlainmeint

/.1! 0 1i ( 1; I. f i .tIý, - ---- ý - - - 1, (1i)- .  ; ! :, 1 1 3 3.7 BASES

Wilh one or more penetration flow palils with one PCIV inoperable, Ithe affected p)e el raliontMLSl f I C;5 r'Amm.idt It) opoerable slnlt is or isolated within 4 houirs ([8 hours for MSIVs and 72 hotIrs for EFCVs). the 1e 4 holir conpletion limo ii i,- rs; t)sil(l0 t:t)nsiderit tj of suLpportnq priniary t niltairl 1 . I- 8 tho(il .

the lime required to isolate the penelratioil and Ihe relative importance

.t utt MS IV i-losiurt- will completion lime for MSIVs allows a peiiod of lime to restore Ihe MSIVs It operal1oe Status givoll IIt; I result in a potential for plant shutdown.. T-ll( 72 Ilotir comlpletion lile for f EF-C1 Vs is reasonr Ile 10 5 <;i( l;ilt t( l it(sli! i tic sril atid ability ofe!le tpell.lratiolt Io a t as ;i1 idJItfti i m ti(llary. Willt the small diameter of thie peiietralion Iipirri combined with Ole be rot  !; m h  ; t.usiis or the one or more penetrations wilthlwo [FCIVs iriperable, eillter IIe inolperable PCIVs nit ho tutfu ( i*i affected penetralion flow pathl tiisl t*o isolated witlhin 1 hot01r.

itaridhy gasI l.<i t llI yll i i (IexC(elI Specification 3.7.D.3 requires the mCoaltitiliimlit to he purged and vionltd tltrotiqilig tlhe y

troti il t; ct ll* imt t  ; ;i tiopluleri:

during inerling and deinertirug olqiptratittis. IThis provides for iodine adlc jparticulate ren-loval treahillnill systelli in It*he w;\tlt () t I, ,,;, h  : ttit;0l cii(leil Use of the 2-inch flow path irewvtits dailia.te to the stanlll)y gas aid vent flow )atlh m Ir nortiiiq at i t ,ij  !( ii (i ,i):r aicl is lVt il.it diiringppurging or ventiing. Use oif the reacltor bulilding pleltmi Widh- H-aHng, the control room operators to noriilnr thi**.mtivily level of the resuilting effluenIt by us8e of tllh* I 3ltI*:*: . i(-

ili i Vtt(Wlt Gas Monitors.

E. CombLislible Gas Control Syslem

.tmocri:t1.itittl  :. U],Iti 'I,iti ;I

-rhefuinction of the Cornb)stibl 0Gas Control System (CGCS) is to tiaint ait ioxyIom l .il Oxyqen may he qonmerat ittll II t it Ill.  :.'n lt I(i, i , 1 containment atmrosplhere below comhustille concentrations.

i accidenl from radiolysis of reactor coolant.

-operalioltIo less IItharl otir I r(;wl*it hy VIi ,h1lii ithriil otporthtt, The Technical Specifications limit oxygen concentrations (luring it if tI At ,liem!to holt The maintenance of an inert atmosphere diring operation pIreclucdes the h.tiiltl-pl) (0ta coltli iii1 ttIIt r ire-; i. ratlii ,ly:ui  ; ,I i;, it(dit wI itch*It.

mnetal-water reaction. The other potenlial mechanism for generation of comtbtstible mixt been found to he small.

i .ti, ;t;tinuio I, A special report is required to he stubmittedt to the Commission to outline CGCS e(tliprtiei it h uh ir<,

t IIU1 :it*tli* V hy;, tIo l)1;1!

taken if inoperability of one train exceeds thirty clays. Inl addlitioi, if [b01h traitliS are ilol) irahI)kt Io[r '

required to shutdown unlil repairs carn he made.

1 3.7 BASES

Bases 4-7 (ConinLiedl:

D. Primary Containmenl Isolation Valves Those large pipes comnpiising a portion of the r, actor coolant Sysemn willose failure 0(1'lId reotslit ill tlli:*',!*ill1*1- r1actor coin are stpplied willt aulomnalic" isolation valves (except t lose lines needed for enlmerrele-cy core 0 1)0lill(J .;ySI- lt*.(ioIit iIt r1 0r containiient cooling). Thie clostilre ii 00s spocilied in USAR Table 5.2-31) are a(leqilale to p i t ) I;I;*f(-f (trev cto*:

1( lail [r1 ltll circumferential ruplture of any Olf Ilese tles o tliside the conlnirlltIlt 01 t sk1ar lii to rill )ttir(( ll .

n t ial hItolli r .I li"; isolation

, thii valve closure time is sti[ficielnt to provei-nt tiicovering tile core.

Thie primary containlneid isoliOn valve:;wll are llighl ly reliable, havwe low service reqttiniire-ittml. 81 (1 It ip, a*l f ;t,ljlt1dly (:)s()(. 1! ]:

iniialinin sensor and assotciated(; tichl itimuels are,also checked to delloristrateh htile lcnbility t of t latil h Iti: ih1 lior. I-oefe'i c1:

c'ycle-, for mjiolltji jit:Iltti;i(,l;

, 1 o;lltl; ill it aI llutt..

Section 5.2.2.5.3 and Table 5-21 3h USAR. The lest inlerval of once per operalin1g proh)abilily of 1.1 x 10 / that a lille will itot isolate. More [re-tellt lIslinrg for valveo )oporhnilityr ,lwtfl ill; h l 1,1 t ti-i: i ln ,;y,;Irr .

Normally closed PCIVs are consider;0(;operable when:

Mantial valves are clnsed, oi-penied ill accordance wilth1 atplrCopriate wlljirtish1diwt (i t(c l At itonlatic valves or remote nlktrltal valves are capable of pierlo[rnlilil thleir ir1oln r( I saifty t 11 ,+,1 Automatic valves or remote manual valves are de-activatod rtld sectired ill thoir close+ I po,-tila : ( i 1  :,hlit I li I.',

included in their design basis, or Blind flanges are in place, or Closed systems are intact.

With one or more penetration flow paths wilh one or more PCIVs inoperable, restore t e Walvw:s v1 to )Il( ti)I(.!

• 1 iI;,,* to ift

• t.!.,

penelration flow paths must be isolaled. The mettiod of isolation mrist inclt.ide Ihe it s(,of at I*to;tot it , I0 linir ilzit 1 huttl(

cannot be adversely affected by a single active failtire. Isolalioin barriers 11hat1 tleiNs clilteontzii n81 (!,Ii 00h 81111ito a(.vai automatic valve, a closed manuial valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow [hrot igl t Ift vlwv , :1:1 ttI, Oxi 1 lit check valve with flow through 1[he valve seciured, cannot be Lised to isolate a pi etnralion with nlyl(y (! I -'CIV r Pt t renelkraioi wilh two inoperable PCIVs. For anlthe isolaled penetratio device tised to isolaeht(e111 enr ltlo 1 :1 h*11tHe :IIsIsest tI Affected perletration flow pathss lt st be wi.rified I0hle (It(-:d 8 pIerit dic; I.,

available valve to the primary contailmer*l. tit.; (I This is necessary to ensure that primary conlainmenlt penetratliois rerIulired to h)o i-oolal( !odl wIt tW*t1 ,t l ll cr

ItO ji(d 01, capable of being automalically isolated, 4.7 r-ASES

, !{I,-

/',* :::!I *, !* *, 130

does rlot require an y1es0lim '.)or1 lvic.:e 53 imitulali( il.

will be in the isolalioni r)siliofn slh()iild an event occu r. This requiired aclion le of potentially I iJsIIi!p(

eiil .il1ion1ec are in ttle Rather, it involves verification Itlat t lose dovices outside containmellt andi capal *trO is appropriate IIO itt1, <: 11" cdevices correcl position. The complelion time of "riiontt'ty" for devices otItside containroelt low. For thle devil-,-(l-,,(; primlary of their nisalignment is operated under administrative controls and the probability SotIIItdow* ifron oCold Slit 11(d(w, illrililinty coi*ailiminlit containment, the time period specified "prior to entering Startup or I-ol jtlgeiOjoioi 3 ll ai 1(1is is basedo(Il en(jinE;tii was deinerted while in Cold SuhltdowI1, if not performed in [he previotus 92 days" 1 cun-tiol.; ili!at l.t levice considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of tihe devices and olher admlinistrative 0!w misalignment is an unlikely possihility.

isohl;ti ll:3*3 I t(;( l3I o oi., 2lal-: '

ThIle surveillance req iireinetits are 1(3li lield by a footnote allowiilnj both active aIId passive 11l0litId. ,thse. Irt,*,Ali,;tty<,l~lly wi! Vl,;i1i0tiollI i)y radliation areas can be verified by use of admlinistr[ative Iaw; 1,:3\ll, penelration, that are located inl highi* jc.t, i; typically * " 1. lili*y a(-lniinistrative means is considered acc-iIablo, since access to these areaspositioi1, is low.

of thlese devices, 1iet3--e they have been verified in thie proper misalignment lines. A/ Iram+I1h11133 1 f H, 33 :t i 3 ( (til Thle containment is penetrated by a large number of small diarneter irislrtwrlent  :...,n, I iji0 WIw op

( lovewo!xrl ilti it lp

• Specification 4.7.D) and examinatiorn of the valves in these lines I1has2 eei submitted to the AEC on JLlly 27, 1973.

oni a mnore r-eqle1ll iut 01vltrwt+)3 ýO1-,d1 ;t ii, . I 3

.11'"1 ,1i;1iiy 0

Ti e main steam line isolation valves are hinctionially tested E. Combustible Gas Control System III, it 1113 I i113; 133 The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) is functionally tested oncie every six tIlonttiý3 to1(m!; Ht.331t31 essenlill com.llipo(0li- ki; -)11 . ,1 ((*,,:i( 11 O*Cproll I will be available if required. In addition, calibration and mailtellailce of cycle.

3. 3 ,, (3 --- -, 130 4.7 BASI--ES