ML022680740

TS Pages for License Amendment 130 Relating to Containment Systems Technical Specification Revisions

ML022680740
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	09/23/2002
From:	NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:
References
TAC MB3706
Download: ML022680740 (14)

Text

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

d.

During reactor isolation conditions the reactor pressure vessel shall te cdepresstirized to

<-200 psig at normal cooldown rates if the suppression pool temporaltire exceed 120"F.

e.

The suppressionl

)poo1 water level shall be

-4.0 and t3.0 inches. Willt suppression pool waler level not witlhii iilts, restore water level to within limits witl hin the succeeding 2 hoturs.

I.

If the requirements ol 3.3.A. 1 ;aninotht I) met, the reactor siall be iplaced in a Cold StI tldown condition within 24 hoturs, awlr stmipend all activities with tlhe potential for draining the reactor vessel.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

d. Whenever there is ii (licatior 1 of relief valve operation with a sti p1rossion pool temperal

,k of 1.-0160"F and tire prinmary coo-mtlf sys lenl pressure o200 psip, Oil exterl;(1 visual exarrnirlation of tIhe st,.r.'-i rn( ;hll S

eor sht lI be) conducted dheforo 0r UOS111tilil I)OWOr operation.

e.

1-t lStippressiu l l[)(

w a(

I tt sIr tv.

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3.7/4.7

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[J "130

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.

Pressure Suppression] Chamber - Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers

a.

Except as specified in 3.7.A.3.h Ilelow, two pressure suppression chambner-re. ctoi building vacLiUrn breakers shall be operableat all times when the primary containment integrity is required. T-he set point of tile differential pressure instrumentation which actuates tihe pressure Sulppressiom chamher-reactor huil(ling vacluumb reakers sthall be 0.5 ptSi.

h.

From and after tihe dale that one of tile pressure suppression cihanmber reactor building vacuum breakers is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only dturing tlhe suicceeding seven clays unless such vacuum breaker is sooner made operable, provided that the repair procedure does not violate primary containment integrity.

c.

It requirements of 3.7.A.3 cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.

Pressure Suppression Charitber - Reactor Brildirti; Vacuum Breakers

a.

hTIe p)ressui re SUPlI)t)i (l

3s 11( l e.r-reactor btuildil g vacutti breaikers mii i(associated instrmneiitation inchi ding set I)poi1l shall he ch iecked for prop(ipm ir I

Ird OvOry tl ree monthis.

3.7/4.7 Avvl~

i*

I k'I

• ..iL,130

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

e.

One position alan icircit ii ea be inoperable providing that the redundlal it position alarm circitii is ooperable. BoIl position alarm circi iks may be inotperable tfo a tperi(odI not to exceed seven clays provi(led !that all vaOciiim breakers are operable.

f.

If requirements of 3.7.A. (:alca tnot

• e met, [lie reactor sh all he placed ii a ColI St ruldown condlilion withtii 24 l01 irs.

5.

Primary Conlainimeilt Oxygen Comr ientratiot

a.

The primary contaiinleidt atOsl)ltos re shall be reduced to less than 4% oxygein by volume with nitrogen gas whenever the reactor is in the ruini mode, except as specified in 3.7.A.5.b.

t). Within the 24-hour period after Thermal Power is > 15% Rated Thermal Power following startil), to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing Thermal Power to <-:15% Rated Thermal Power prior to the next schediuled reactor shutdown, the containment atmosphere oxygen concentration shall be reduced to less than 4% 'by volume, and maintained in ti ts condition.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

b.

Whlen th lle position f O at mly3(Itywo)ll-Sillplpression (har ihor vac;tillmil I)rýak(.r v tive is inidicated() I he 1ot fMilly (WSWeW ia*t a16iM wiieii Sil(11 clkH; h is re(qiiild, t i cdrywull lt(i o,<;

rt,,sion c ii/il differeiitial i)rossI5 lir

, (IH y si raI l th,.

denionshaled to he th.

SS II

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3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS c.Whenever primary containment oxygen concentration is equ~al to or exceeds 411' by volumre, except as permhittedl l)y 3.7.A.5.1b above, within the S~d)sequenct 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period return the oxygen conicentrationl to less than 4%

by voIlume.

d. If the requtiremients of 3. 1.A.5 canni ot be met, reduceiiThermal PlI ower to 15-0 Hated Thermal Poerwill un 8 1101 r.

[-.

Standlby Gas 1Treatim.,mit Sys;lmiH I.Two separate and in depend ( ent standbly gas treatmenit system circu its sh all be 01)erabh. at all B. standby 1WG(Rs 1 rmal)1ýitu iI y.h times when secondary containment. integrity is requiredt, exceptl as specified in sections 3.7.13.1.(a)1.

lIuOfLY',:oltoi 1wtoid and (b).

qas, treatuerIsykii t Iu ornh IUU1Ioo Willi the iln i0O. ~

a. After one of the standby gas treatment system circuits is made Or foLund to he inoperable [or any reason, reactor Operation and fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding seven clays, provided that all active components in the other standby gas treatmfenut system are operable. With~in 36 h1ours following the 7 days, the reactor sh-all be placed in a condition for which the standby gas treatment systenm is not required in accordance with Specification 3.7.0.2. (a) fthrough (d).

3.7/4.7

-1.

4-1, 130

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS reactor core, operationhs wilhtEl potential for reducing the ShUtdlOwn margin below that specified in specification 3.3.A, and hiandling of irradliatedt fu el or thlefuel cast< in theu secondiary conutaliflienl are to be immediately suspended if secondary containment integrity is not imaintainedt.

r.Priimary C 01 tailiiflentIoaioVav;(Pl) 1.

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3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.

a.

The inertinqg and deiner ulg opu,ernlions permilled by TS 3.7.A.5.1) shall he via tihe 18-inch pumrge and vetit vwlv's (eqitipped with 40-degree limnit slops) aligned lo tihe Reactor Building iplentm and vent. All otlher pirging and venting, when pi rimary containment integrity is required, shall I)e via tihe 2-ic-t pit ige and vent valve bypass liiie t tt II i,1mtai(cliy O s Trealment System.

I.

It tinte event om w() 1 11 11.!

o r i

,lUt' iw I

I hit1)wI )allis with one 1or mote ii-o:

t uitIn*u(- 1itr(( (1id( vet it valves riot within ptur rge amit w

vent valve leakage limits, reactor operatior in the ril mmode may continue providled that within the si jbsequenl 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, restore the valve(s) to within leakage limits, or at least onie valve in each line having a pturge and vent valve not within leakage limits is deactivated in the isolated position. This requirerment may be satisfied by use of one closed and deactivated ailtoniatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. (Deactivated means electrically or pneumatically disarm or otherwise sectiure the valve.)

4.

If Specification 3.7.D.1, 3.7.1).2 and 3.7.D.3 cannot b)e met, initiate normal orderly sliuldowim and have reactor in the Cold Shititdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

,3.

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. ai l i:olated valv;.

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Bases 3.7 (Continued):

vacuum breaker selector switch, and a common test switch. The reactor building vacuum breaker panel contains one red light and one green light for each of the eight valves. There are four independent limit switches on each valve. The two switches controlling the red lights are adjusted to provide an indication of disc opening of less than 1/8" at the bottom of the disc. These switches are also used to activate the valve position alarm circuits. The two switches controlling the green lights are adjusted to provide indication of the disc very near the full open position.

The control room alarm circuits are redundant and fail safe. This assures that no simple failure will defeat alarming to the control room when a valve is open beyond allowable and when power to the switches fails. The alarm is needed to alert the operator that action must be taken to correct a malfunction or to investigate possible changes in valve position status, or both. If the alarm cannot be cleared due to the inability to establish indication of closure of one or more valves, additional testing is required.

The alarm system allows the operator to make this evaluation on a timely basis. The frequency of the testing of the alarms is the same as that required for the position indication system.

Operability of a vacuum breaker valve and tha four associated indicating light circuits shall be established by cycling the valve.

The sequence of the indicating lights will be observed to be that previously described. If both red light circuits are inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable and a pressure test is required immediately and upon indication of subsequent operation. If both green light circuits are inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable, however, no pressure test is required if positive closure indication is present.

Oxygen concentration is limited to 4% by volume to minimize the possibility of hydrogen combustion following a loss of coolant accident. Significant quantities of hydrogen could be generated if the core cooling systems failed to sufficiently cool the core.

The occurrence of primary system leakage following a major refueling outage or other scheduled shutdown is more probable than the occurrence of the loss of coolant accident upon which the specified oxygen concentration limit is based. Permitting access to the drywell for leak inspections during a startup is judged prudent in terms of the added plant safety offered without significantly reducing the margin of safety. Thus, to preclude the possibility of starting the reactor and operating for extended periods of time with significant leaks in the primary system, leak inspections are scheduled during startup periods, when the primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and pressure. The 24-hour period to provide for inerting after Reactor Thermal Power is greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power, is judged to be sufficient to perform the leak inspection and establish the required oxygen concentration. If the containment atmosphere exceeds the oxygen concentration of -_24%

by volume, then the oxygen concentration must be restored to < 4% by volume within the subsequent 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The 24-hour period is allowed when oxygen concentration is _>

4% by volume because of the low probability and long duration of an event that would 3.7 BASES 180 Amendment No. 17, 35,*80,n

ln9, 123a, !28a, 130

.B_3ase generate significan t amotn iis of Ilydrogen ccGIrring during this poriod. Ti 10pril/lary conitainimlentt is il rnia uly

.lit t ily pressurizc during periods of reactor op)eration. Nitrogen tised for inerting could leak oi., of Ole cotairnmenth hi itir (01 11(1 111t leak in to increase oxygen cooncenlration. On ce the (.- nlainmenI is filled witll nilrogern to the required conennioti(

i

• .iio)iitoringo f oxygen concentratioln is necessary. I-lowever, at least once a week Ihe oxygen coricenltration will bo i';(Ell.lit )(itl as added assulrance.

B3.

Standby Gas Treatment Systetml and C. Secondary Containmen0t The secondary containmenl is ld;siq(idi 0

to I Nininlize any (jrlu 1.(I lewVl releLISO Of rI l(oi0 ctiVe ni 11 r il., ",il ;lt 1

zii 1h reotl thoi i serious accident. -lie reactol I iiiilding pirovides secondary coilaiii inu t lurit01 ro'actor operati ol, vitlil 1l0; III ywe l is sealedI'111'i ill service; the reactor building proviOleOS I)riiiary contai'meilt whel n

}l ie reaCtor is si itdtO1wri

.t 1 (1 11 id;Ili

(,

'd/W

! li I

i; i;, -s hri 11 refueling. Because the seconldary cOlliiilml It is an insegral part r of the colpleote cointiniinll yltl

, i:;*, ( it

()1l. ilW.

ii ni11 is required at all timies that p)riniary crnirninnfieit is required except, howevor, for inlilial hild leadili1 Ip icr !)ifl ill power Instil 0.

T he standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and ext iauLte 1reactor building all1osp!.0r.;I (1* 1 (t.

11wit y l in ]

secondary containment isolation condliOlis, with a miniimum -ele-s-el adici

.t<-;ivec Itllatnciiu;tls it it(;

1.,t rhl i it I0 enviroins. One standIby gas ti-eamllenlt system circuit is designed to) i;tnittici;lly stm-1.tupo l or uii()'IaIIIlii I* i, lt.

I rto I

11(

maintain the reactor buildirng ll ressire at ihe design negative pressiire so8)Mi itall leakagle sIcild 1(1 in)(ill t;

.i 11il (iiit circuit fail to start, thie reduIL(dalit alteriate standby gas treatment crcilit is desigi leo 1 to stai t i.i o i dly. I ii:t tI Ili.?Iwo circuits has 100% capacity. Only one of the two standby gas treatirei t systen circfll ts is i*ie.

Ided I, dý;lli ipIll(; r.,'

1ct.or

)

!tiltki t

atmosphere upon containment isolation. If one system is found to be inoperahle, lltere is 11o ino i

unetl ttiti

(

rý 11(to1the (;rtoliti*ilil Wi system performance. Therefore, reactor operation or refueling operation ilnay conltinte while rtii S

ti i:to.11 i;.

If it I circuit is operable, the plant is placed in a Condition that does not require a sU-t11tlby gas treat-lil1uillt ;y,. lt.,i 7 RASESI o, 7 I-). I i.)f I "

ý - ý I

Bases 3.7_ConL1inuer-.:

While only a small amountl of oarticulaes are released from the primary -ofliaini not as a resi ill (if II it ls*i.*

i

,(

tolat

accident, high-efficiency parlictilale fillers before and after the charcoal filters are specified to tii liiliize poterl).tOtiil iictI

• Ie release to Ow environment and to prevenlt cloggi* igof thce charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorhers are inst'llIo (to ro*(uc boHie potenlial release of radioiodine toth le environ eie11.

-TIhe in-place lest restilts shofld indlic le'a10(

a sysleo ii' leak ic 31 U

()I

.flI ti at 1%

bypass leakage for thech larcoal ate dl5 0 ItS LiSil g I alogenaled hydrocari)ltn atnd a1 I-IE.PA filter.li-of, (I

it l(

toleh'aI t,

0 X, roitvi of DOP particLIlates. Laboratory carlmin sample test results indicatel a radioactivemeOthyl iodidle rot*liI t

tlit i

nfl y for e xpect(,;I accident condilion*s.

1he allowable penelralio n for th e laboratory lost is based oin 90% ad.-sorrer *oli (:M6it y

(

t;'.- *r-11111 off-site (lose analysis an(I a safely la-O: O ef

-2. Operation i fthe standbl y os Itreatment cirmuiltS S

'.iI li, ll tully dliftorri t Irho 1ll-dlesign flow will change the renioval eflici.tcy of tl et I t

EPA filter'-; and ci earcoal adsor l

ters. II 110 s

1 PItil('

,rti t

l 1il,(otllntllt"i at niet as specified, the call.ct1a l (

rdoses woil,"1he less thall the gitl(lItliti*e'- 5s -e(1 in 10 CII.- 0 1

fo() It N.

l It*, tt itlt its a.ly/ d.

D.

Prinlary Containmentl Isolatiol

• Valves T-he funtrictioni of the Priniary Contaitllinent Isolation Valves (PCIVs), ili (.;(tl)itiitiorl willi olel1r 1,i lt;i I iitii Uikti.y.:el ts, ii; lo limit fission prodILict release durit g and following postulated Desigtn IBasis Ac:i l let ts 1(,tithitn litii il,,

t i !

It "

Iit(

(,.;)

tl-t-lbtt an adequate primary corltainimoel t boundary is maintained during and alter all n

• ccidruwtit

,y irt'lkfl (I I t1 itli;I tllito 1 iO environment. Therefore, Technical Specifications requirerments provide nIssiit nracthe II nil iraryt, r

ilir y

it l

i :li t

ifiit'iSil;::;i *at I1 the safety analysis will be maintained. Thlese valves are either passive or a-tiwvo (at itoiialicl. Mat lvlA l

,ýcttl tied autlornalic valves (including remote mar itial valves) secured in* t ieir closed position (includi 1(1 11 ;

• l U I',d. t, itit l*,w ltlrot n 11 1,.

valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive dlevices. Check vtitl\\,]

. (It.r( ill *i;tt tiiloll li O0V; lv'!;

dlesigned to close willtout operator action following an accident, are cont-sidered aclive -l evic's.

Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain 111to it tlc g rity of tloP Pi-itaiy ( :it Ii ti itt imt At

,t ii 1; AIi(

initiation is required to tuinirnize tile potential leakage paths frorn the conlaiiimloentt inrl t-! evo; o**, I a I ii'. aI iii!*.

idtl* +t' Details of the Primary Containmenlt isolation valves are discussed in Section 5.2 of the USAR. A Ilitti'titll li-'

ly Containment automatic isolation valves including maximum 0

operating tine is givet i iJSAF

-lt,.

2 The Technical Specifications are niodified by a footnote allowing pet etratiot llfow pral.(s) to he. tiii

u!sc kl I it*t t.rI titll( illy llidt, it Operations Cornmlmittee approved administrative controls. These c)ontrols consist of stiltion irq a li.'ti,;al' I

(.lilti, tt'r at till controls of the valve who is in constant corn inunication with the control rooimi, lh llli!.s way,1* II tO, ir t1't,,i ii td t

t I ly)!

r lh ;tt,1..

when a need for the primary conlainmeint isolation is indicated.

3.7 BASES

/. 1! 0 1i ( 1;

.tI I.

f i

ý,

ý -

1, (1i)-

!

, 1 1 3

Wilh one or more penetration flow palils with one PCIV inoperable, Ithe affected p)e el raliontMLSl I

f C;5 r'Amm.id t It) opoerable slnlt is or isolated within 4 houirs ([8 hours for MSIVs and 72 hotIrs for EFCVs). the 1e 4 holir conpletion limo ii i,- rs; t)sil(l0 t:t)nsiderit tj the lime required to isolate the penelratioil and Ihe relative importance of suLpportnq priniary t niltairl 1 I-8 tho(il.

completion lime for MSIVs allows a peiiod of lime to restore Ihe MSIVs It operal1oe Status givoll II t; I.t utt MS IV i-losiurt-will result in a potential for plant shutdown.. T-ll(

72 Ilotir comlpletion lile for f

EF-C1 Vs is reasonr Ile 10 5

<;i( l;ilt t( l it( sli!

i tic s ril atid the small diameter of thie peiietralion Iipirri combined with Ole ability ofe !le tpell.lratiolt Io a t as ;i1 idJItfti i m ti(llary. Willt one or more penetrations wilthlwo [FCIVs ir iperable, eillter IIe inolperable PCIVs nit ho be rot tutfu

(

!; m i*i usi h

t. is or the affected penetralion flow path l tiisl t*o isolated witlhin 1 hot01r.

Specification 3.7.D.3 requires the mCoaltitiliimlit to he purged and vionltd tltrotiqilig tlhe itaridhy gas I l.<i t llI yll i y

i (IexC(elI during inerling and deinertirug olqiptratittis.

IThis provides for iodine adlc jparticulate ren-loval troti il t; t c ll* imt t

;i tiopluleri

Use of the 2-inch flow path irewvtits dailia.te to the stanlll)y gas treahillnill systelli in It*he w;\\tlt t

()

I, h

ttit;0l cii(leil diiringp purging or ventiing. Use oif the reacltor bulilding pleltmi m aid vent flow )atlh Ir nortiiiq at i t

,ij !( ii (i,i):r aicl is lVt il.it the control room operators to noriilnr thi**.mtivily level of the resuilting effluenIt by us8e of tllh* I 3ltI*:*:

i(-

. ili i Vtt(Wlt Widh-H- aHng, Gas Monitors.

E.

CombLislible Gas Control Syslem

-rhe fuinction of the Cornb)stibl 0Gas Control System (CGCS) is to tiaint ait ioxyIom l

.tmo cri:t1.itittl

. U It i

'I,iti

],

.il

I containment atmrosplhere below comhustille concentrations. Oxyqen may he qonmerat tll it II i t it Ill.

.'n t l I(i, i

, 1 accidenl from radiolysis of reactor coolant.

The Technical Specifications limit oxygen concentrations (luring

-operaliolt Io less IItharl otir I r(;wl *it hy VIi

,h1lii ithriil otpor,

thtt The maintenance of an inert atmosphere diring operation pIreclucdes the h.tiiltl-pl) (0t a coltli it iii1 if tI ttIIt At

,lie m!to t

hol mnetal-water reaction. The other potenlial mechanism for generation of comtbtstible r mixt ire-; i. ratlii,ly:ui i

,I

, it(d it wI itch* It.

been found to he small.

A special report is required to he stubmittedt to the Commission to outline CGCS e(tliprtiei it h uh ir<,

i t

.ti, ;t;tinuio I,

taken if inoperability of one train exceeds thirty clays. Inl addlitioi, if [b01h traitliS are ilol) irahI)kt Io[r IIU1 :it tli*

V hy;, t Io l)1;1!

required to shutdown unlil repairs carn he made.

3.7 BASES 1

Bases 4-7 (ConinLiedl:

D.

Primary Containmenl Isolation Valves Those large pipes comnpiising a portion of the r, actor coolant Sysemn willose failure 0(1'lId reotslit ill tlli:*',!*ill1*1-r1actor coin are stpplied willt aulomnalic" isolation valves (except t lose lines needed for enlmerrele-cy core 0 1)0lill(J.;ySI-lt*.(ioIit r1 iIt 0r containiient cooling).

Thie clostilre ii 00s spocilied in USAR Table 5.2-31) are a(leqilale to p i trev t ( ) I;I; (-f

• f 1(

cto*: lail [r1 tll l

circumferential ruplture of any Olf Ilese tles o tliside the conlnirlltIlt n t ial hItolli 01 t sk1ar lii to rill )ttir(( ll.

r.I li";

, thii isolation valve closure time is sti[ficielnt to provei-nt tiicovering tile core.

Thie primary containlneid isoliOn wll valve:; are llighl ly reliable, havwe low service reqttiniire-ittml.

8 1 (1 It ip, a* l f ;t, ljlt1 dly (:)s()(.

1! ]:

iniialinin sensor and assotciated(;

tichl itimuels are,also checked to delloristrateh htile lcnbility t of t latil h Iti: ih1 lior.

I-oefe'i c1:

Section 5.2.2.5.3 and Table 5-21 3h USAR. The lest inlerval of once per operalin1g c'ycle-, for mjiolltji jit:Iltti;i(,l; 1

o;lltl; ill it aI llutt..

proh)abilily of 1.1 x 10 / that a lille will itot isolate. More [re-tellt lIslinrg for valve o )oporhnility r,lw tfl ill ; h l 1,1 t ti-i:

i ln,;y,;Irr.

Normally closed PCIVs are consider; 0(;operable when:

Mantial valves are clnsed, oi -penied ill accordance wilth1 atplrCopriate wlljirtish1diwt (i

l t( c At itonlatic valves or remote nlktrltal valves are capable of pierlo[rnlilil thleir ir1oln r( I saifty t 11

,+,1 Automatic valves or remote manual valves are de-activatod rtld sectired ill thoir close+ I po,-tila :

1

( i

,hlit I li I.',

included in their design basis, or Blind flanges are in place, or Closed systems are intact.

With one or more penetration flow paths wilh one or more PCIVs inoperable, restore t v1 e Walvw:s to l(

)I

• 1 ti )I(.!

iI;,,* to ift t.!.,

penelration flow paths must be isolaled. The mettiod of isolation mrist inclt.ide Ihe it s(,of at I*to; tot it 1 huttl( I 0 linir ilzit cannot be adversely affected by a single active failtire. Isolalioin barriers 11hat1 tleiNs clilteontzii n81

(!,Ii 00h 81111 ito a(.vai automatic valve, a closed manuial valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow [hrot igl t If t vlwv

, :1:1 ttI, Oxi lit 1 check valve with flow through 1[he valve seciured, cannot be Lised to isolate a pi etnralion with nlyl(y (!

I -'CIV r

Pt t renelkraioi wilh two inoperable PCIVs. For an isolaled penetratio lthe device tised to isolaeht(e 111 enr ltlo 1 :1 tI h*11 tHe

IIsIsest available valve to the primary contailmer*l.

Affected perletration flow pathss lt st be wi.rified I 0hle tit.;

(It(-:d (I

p 8 Ierit dic; I.,

This is necessary to ensure that primary conlainmenlt penetratliois rerIulired to h)o i-oolal( !odl wIt tW*t1 l

cr

,t l l ji(d ;ItO 01, capable of being automalically isolated, 4.7 r-ASES

/',*, !{

!I I,-

• , 130

will be in the isolalioni r)siliofn slh()iild an event occu r. This requiired aclion does rlot require an y1es0lim '. )or1 lvic.:e 53 imitulali( il.

Rather, it involves verification Itlat t lose dovices outside containmellt andi capal le of potentially I eiil iJsIIi!p(.il1ion1ec are in ttle correcl position. The complelion time of "riiontt'ty" for devices otItside containroelt is appropriate I IO itt1, c

11" devices *trO operated under administrative controls and the probability of their nisalignment is low. For thle devil-,-(l-,,(;

primlary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering Startup or I-ol SotIIItdow* ifron oCold Slit 11(d(w, il lrililinty coi*ailiminlit was deinerted while in Cold SuhltdowI1, if not performed in [he previotus 92 days" is basedo(Il en(jinE;tii 3

jtlgeiOjoioi ll ai 1(1is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of tihe devices and olher admlinistrative cun-tiol.;

0!w l.t 1 ili!at levice misalignment is an unlikely possihility.

ThIle surveillance req iireinetits are 1(3li lield by a footnote allowiilnj both active aIId passive isohl;ti ll:3*3 I

t(;( l3 o I o i., 2lal-: '

penelration, that are located inl highi radliation areas can be verified by use of admlinistr[ative Iaw; 1,:3\\ll, wi!

Vl,;i1i0tiollI i)y

• jc.t,

,thse. Irt,*,Ali,;tty<,l~lly 11l0litId.

a(-lniinistrative means is considered acc-iIablo, since access to these areas i; typically * "

1.

lili*y misalignment of thlese devices, 1iet3--e they have been verified in thie proper positioi1, is low.

Thle containment is penetrated by a large number of small diarneter irislrtwrlent lines. A/ Iram+I 1h11133 1

f H, 3 3

t i 3 (til

(

Specification 4.7.D) and examinatiorn of the valves in these lines I1has2 eei ( lovewo!xrl op ti il it lp *

...,n, I

iji0 WIw submitted to the AEC on JLlly 27, 1973.

Ti e main steam line isolation valves are hinctionially tested oni a mnore r-eqle1ll iut 01vltrw )3 t+

ýO1-,d ii, 1

t

.11'"1 I 3 0

,1i;1iiy E.

Combustible Gas Control System The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) is functionally tested oncie every six tIlonttiý3 to1(m!;

III, it 1113 I Ht.331t31 i113; 133 will be available if required. In addition, calibration and mailtellailce of essenlill com.llipo(0li-i; k -)11

((*,,:i

,1

(

11 O*Cproll I cycle.

4.7 BASI--ES

3.

3

,, (3 130