ML14028A109

Initial Exam 2013-301 Draft SRO Written Exam

ML14028A109
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	01/28/2014
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
50-369/13-301, 50-370/13-301
Download: ML14028A109 (75)

Text

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 76 SYSOO4 2.2.22 Chemical and Volume Control System

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SYSOO4 GENERIC Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2)

Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP. Given the following:

• 1EMF-33 (CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR EXHAUST) is in Trip 2 alarm

• 1EMF-71 (S/GALEAKAGE) isinTrip2alarm

• Pressurizer level has been stabilized using AP-1 0 (NC LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS)

• Letdown flow is 45 GPM

• Charging flow is 85 GPM The MAXIMUM time that AP-lO allows for the unit to reach MODE 3 for the conditions specified is (1)

In accordance with SLC 16.9.7 (STBY S/D SYSTEM) Condition C (LEAKAGE), the Standby Makeup Pump (2) have to be declared INOPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

2. WILL B. 1. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

2. WILL NOT C. 1. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />

2. WILL D. 1. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />

2. WILL NOT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 217 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 76 General Discussion With the indications given, the crew would be required to enter AP-lO (NC System Leakage), Case 1 (5/0 Tube leakage). This procedure would direct the crew to stabilize PZR level and determine leak size.

Leakage rate is 78-45-12=21 gpm making the Standby Makeup Pump INOPERABLE in accordance with SLC 16.9.7. Step 6 of AP-10 Case 1, directs an SRO to evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 Condition C limits. The limit is defined as >20 GPM. Per TS 3.4.13 (NC Operational Leakage), the limit for a individual SIG tube leakage of 135 GPD would be exceeded. If this leakage is exceeded, Condition B requires the unit be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Per Step 7 of AP-10, Case 1, if the leakage in one S/G is greater than 125 GPD, the unit is required to be in Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of exceeding 125 GPD.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part(l) Plausible because this is correct per the requirement of Condition B of TS 3.4.13 (NC Operational Leakage) which requires the unit to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. It would reasonable for the applicant to believe this would also be the required time specified in AP-lO.

Part (2) correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) Plausible because this is correct per the requirement of Condition B of TS 3.4.13 (NC Operational Leakage) which requires the unit to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. It would reasonable for the applicant to believe this would also be the required time specified in AP-lO.

Part (2) is plausible if the applicant subtracts actual seal injection (20 GPM) instead of seal return flow (12 GPM) from Charging flow along with subtracting Letdown flow (45 GPM). If that were the case the applicant would determine that total leakage would be 13 GPM (78-45-20) instead of2I GPM (78-45-12). Since the applicant would determine leakage to be less than 20 GPM, the Standby Makeup Pump would NOT have to be declared INOPERABLE.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (I) is correct and therefore plausible.

Part (2) is plausible if the applicant subtracts actual seal injection (20 GPM) instead of seal return flow(12 GPM) from Charging flow along with subtracting Letdown flow (45 GPM). If that were the case the applicant would determine that total leakage would be 13 GPM (78-45-20) instead of2l GPM (78-45-12). Since the applicant would determine leakage to be less than 20 GPM, the Standby Makeup Pump would NOT have to be declared INOPERABLE.

Basis for meeting the KA This K/A is matched because the applicant is first required to demonstrate the ability to determine the actual S/G tube leakage. He is then required to interpret this information as it applies to procedural direction from AP-lO for leakage being greater than tech specs and the application of SLC 16.9.7 limit on leakage.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must perform calculation (solve a problem) and then perform a level of analysis concerning the given indications and predict the impact and determine the correct procedural course of action.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev Idated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions. Neither of the actions described are immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs. These are detailed procedure steps from AP-lO.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure content related to knowing the plant shutdown requirements.

5) The question also requires the applicant to recall a below the bar TS (SLC) limit associated with the S/G tube leakage. Therefore, it is SRO Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 218 of 291

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c 76 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Exam Q92 (Bank 4440)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-lO (NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps)

SLC 16.9.7 (Standby Shutdown System)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-10 Objectives 5, 6, & 7 SYSOO4 2.2.22 Chemical and Volume Control System

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5Y5004 GENERIC Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 219 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 77 SYSO12 2.1.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

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SYSOI2 GENERIC Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10/45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit is at 100% RTP

• Train B, SSPS testing is in progress In accordance with OMP 5-3 (TSAIL) entry into Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS INSTRUMENTATION) for One Rx Trip Breaker Train Inoperable must be made when the (1)

If the RTA Bypass (BYA) breaker is racked in and closed while RTB Bypass (BYB) breaker is racked in and closed, (2) would receive a trip open signal.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. BYB breaker is racked in ONLY

2. RTA and RTB breakers ONLY B. 1. BYB breaker is racked in AND closed

2. RTA and RTB breakers ONLY C. 1. BYB breakeris racked in ONLY

2. RTA, RTB, BYA, and BYB breakers D. 1. BYB breaker is racked in AND closed

2. RTA, RTB, BYA, and BYB breakers Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 220 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 77 General Discussion This is a special case with regards to Tech Spec application. Tech Spec entries are normally made prior to taking action that would make a piece of equipment inoperable. However, as described in OMP 5-3, Tech Spec entry is not made until the RTB Bypass breaker is closed (i.e. when the SSPS General Warning Alarm is received), rendering one RTB train inoperable to allow the maximum amount of time for RTB work in bypass.

This is a special case which would not be expected knowledge for a Reactor Operator.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant mistakenly concludes that racking in the breaker causes a General Warning Annunciator which is the trigger for Tech Spec entry.

The second part is plausible because the applicant could mistakenly conclude that only the RT breakers are tripped when two General Warning Annunciators are received.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the applicant could mistakenly conclude that only the RT breakers are tripped when two General Warning Annunciators are received.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant mistakenly concludes that racking in the breaker causes a General Warning Annunciator which is the trigger for Tech Spec entry.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of their responsibilities related to application of RPS Technical Specification during SSPS testing (which can occur in any mode of plant operation).

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First the applicant must recall from memory the requirements of OMP 5-3 to determine when the Tech Spec for One Reactor Trip Breaker INOPERABLE must be declared.

4ext the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine what signal specifically would cause the reactor trip and/or bypass breakers to open to determine which breakers would receive a signal to open.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/I 1/20 10 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

I) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Specs This is not a I hour Tech Spec.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

This is specifically related to the application of TS 3.3.1 which is below-the-line knowledge.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

This is NOT related to TS Safety Limits in any way.

4) This question requires the applicant to have knowledge of a special case of application of TS 3.3.1 related to the RPS that is beyond RO level knowledge.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 221 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 77 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q77 (Bank 3092)

Development References ntfencerovided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IPE, Reactor Protection System, Section 2.5 (Reactor Trip Switchgear)

OMP 5-3, Technical Specifications Action Item Log, Section 7.1.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-IPE Objective 9 SYSO12 2+/-2 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

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SYSO12 GENERIC Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10/ 45.13) 401-9 Comments: marksIStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 222 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 SYSOI3 A2.02 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Excess steam demand Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a steam line rupture occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

• The operators transitioned from E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) to FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Thermal Shock Condition) due to a RED path on NC Integrity

• NCPs 1A and 1 B were tripped due to high vibration

• NCPs 1C and 1 D continue to operate

• The operator are at step 16 of FR-P.1 ,which requires isolating the cold leg accumulators

• Given the following parameters:

Time 0200 0205 0210 0215 Pzr Pressure (psig) 750 700 650 600 NC Subcooling (°F) +50 +75 +60 +40 RVLIS D/P indication Train A (%) 21 22 24 26 Train B (%) 42 44 51 57 In accordance with FR-P.1,which ONE (1) of the following describes:

1. the earliest time that the CLAs can be isolated?

2. the reason for isolating the CLAs based on current conditions?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 0205

2. To prevent injecting CLA water into the reactor vessel and increasing the thermal stress on the vessel.

B. 1. 0205

2. To prevent injecting the CLA nitrogen bubble into the reactor, creating a gas bubble in the vessel head region.

C. 1. 0210

2. To prevent injecting CLA water into the reactor vessel and increasing the thermal stress on the vessel.

D. 1. 0210

2. To prevent injecting the CLA nitrogen bubble into the reactor, creating a gas bubble in the vessel head region.

Tuesday, October 15,2013 Page 223 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 E 78 General Discussion A steam break has resulted in a PTS condition and FR-P.1 has been implemented. Based on the conditions given and using the table in FR-P.1 as a reference, it can be determined that Reactor Vessel DIP should be >23% on Train A (IA NC Pump OFF and a total of 2 NC Pumps running) and that Train 13 D/P should be >45% (IC NC Pump ON and a total of 2 NC Pumps running). Therefore, 0210 would be the earliest time that the CLAs could be isolated.

Jormally, the reason for isolating CLAs in any emergency condition is to prevent injecting the CLA nitrogen into the reactor. However, condition during performance of FR-P.I are unique in that a PTS concern exists and having the CLAs inject under these conditions would make the PTS condition worse. Therefore, in FR-P.1, the reason for isolating the CLAs it to prevent additional thermal stress on the reactor vessel.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant incorrectly interprets the table in FR-P.l.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant incorrectly interprets the table in FR-P. 1.

The second part is plausible because under most other circumstances this is the reason for isolating the CLAs.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

The second part is plausible because under most other circumstances this is the reason for isolating the CLAs.

Basis for meeting the KA For the conditions given, the applicant must determine the impacts of the excess steam demand on the operation of a portion of the ESFAS (i.e.

CLA5) and demonstrate the ability to use FR-P.1 to mitigate the consequences of the excess steam demand. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog For this situation the applicant must first analyze the conditions given to determine the minimum required Reactor Vessel DIP to allow isolation of the CLAs. The applicant must also recall from memory the reason for isolating CLAs under the conditions given. Since this requires more than one mental step, the question is high cog.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of the question can be answer solely by using systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions in FR-P.l.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question does NOT involve AOP entry conditions. It is also not related to direct-entry EOP conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is analysis of plant conditions using FR-P.l and knowledge of the basis for performing steps in FR-P.1

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 224 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition) Shock Condition) Step 16.

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-FRP Learning Objectives:

SYSO13 A2.02 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3/45.13)

Excess steam demand 401-9 Comments: Remarks!Status The original question was submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on pre-401-9 review comments, did not believe that original question was salvageable. Replaced with new question.

HCF 09/05/20 13 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 225 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 79 SYSO59 A2.03 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 /45.13)

Overfeeding event Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• A fault has occurred on the IA Main Steam (SM) line upstream of the MSIV

• A Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred due to low NC system pressure

• At Step 7 of E-O (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) the OATC reports that the Feedwater Isolation status lights on ISI-4 are NOT LIT

• Narrow Range (NR) levels in 1B, 1C, and ID S/Gs are 78% and INCREASING Procedure Legend:

• FR-H.3 (RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL)

Based on the conditions above:

• a YELLOW PATH on Heat Sink will occur if NR level in the intact S/Gs exceeds aMINIMUM0f (I)

• if a YELLOW PATH occurs while the crew is in E-O, the crew (2) allowed to implement FR-H.3.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 83%

2. IS B. 1. 83%

2. IS NOT C. 1. 92%

2. IS D. 1. 92%

2. IS NOT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 226 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 79 General Discussion The entry condition for FR-H.3 (Response to S/G High Level) is any S/G NR level greater than 83%.

Under the rules of usage for the EOPs, CSF procedure are NOT to be implemented prior to transition from E-0. Since in the conditions given, that transition has not been made, FR-H.3 may NOT be implemented, even if time permits.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because if transition had been made out of E-0, this would be a correct response.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

The first part is plausible because 92% S/G NR level is specified in FR-H.3 as the level above which an evaluation of the overfilled S/G should be performed and the effected S/G should not be steamed until the overfill evaluation is complete.

The second part is plausible because if transition had been made out of E-0, this would be a correct response.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

The first part is plausible because 92% S/G NR level is specified in FR-H.3 as the level above which an evaluation of the overfilled S/G should be performed and the effected S/G should not be steamed until the overfill evaluation is complete.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to predict the impact of the S/G overfill condition and by demonstrating a knowledge of the rules of usage for the CSF procedures the applicant demonstrates the ability to use procedures to correct, control, and mitigate the consequences oftheS/G overfill condition.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant recall from memory the YELLOW PATH entry conditions for FR-H.3. Next, the applicant must analyze the conditions given in the stem to determine that implementation of the CSF procedures is not allowed under the given conditions.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

I) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Part I is related to YELLOW PATH FRP entry conditions. Part 2 is knowledge of EOP rules of usage.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with FR-H.3.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This is related to entry conditions for a YELLOW Path FRP. This is not a direct entry EOP.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is knowledge of YELLOW Path entry conditions and EOP rules of usage.

5) Knowledge of YELLOW Path entry conditions is SRO-level knowledge. Knowledge of EOP rules of usage is SRO-level knowledge.

Therefore, this is an SRO-level question.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 bLevel - Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

OMP 4-3 (Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures) Section 7.15 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective 2 SYSO59 A2.03 Main Feedwater (MFW) System

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Overfeeding event 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on pre-401-9 review comments, did not believe the first part of the original question was salvageable. Replaced first part of question. Then swapped first part and second parts of question for ease of reading and understanding question. HCF 09/05/20 13 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 228 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 8O SYSO78 A2.O1 - Instrument Air System (lAS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Air dryer and filter malfunctions Given the following plant conditions:

• The VI system on Unit I has become heavily contaminated with oil due to a maintenance problem

• The VI Air Dryer packages rapidly clog Based on the conditions above, the impact to VI system operation is that (1)

AP-22 (LOSS OF VI) directs the Operators to (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1VI-1812 (VI Air Dryer Bypass Filter Isol) automatically opens at 85 PSIG

2. bypass the air dryers locally at 82 PSIG if IVI-1 812 fails to open B. 1. IVI-1812 (VI Air Dryer Bypass Filter Isol) automatically opens at 90 PSIG

2. bypass the air dryers locally at 85 PSIG if lVl-1 812 fails to open C. 1. IVI-820 (VI to VS Supply) automatically closes at 85 PSIG

2. manually close IVI-820 at 82 PSIG as a backup to the automatic action D. 1. 1VI-820 (VI to VS Supply) automatically closes at 90 PSIG

2. manually close 1VI-820 at 85 PSIG as a backup to the automatic action Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 229 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 General Discussion With the air dryers clogged, reducing the air load on the system by VI-820 closing will reduce the rate of the VI header pressure decrease.

[-lowever, since VI-820 is downstream of the air dryers the only automatic action which may be successful in restoring VI header pressure is bypassing the air dryers. With the manual bypass flowpath isolated (1VI-93 closed), the automatic bypass must open to restore header pressure.

1VI-I812 automatically opens when VI header pressure decreases to 85 psig. AP-22 directs the Operators to bypass the air dryers locally using if VI header pressure decreases to less than 82 psig. Enclosure 5 has the Operator check that 1VI-18I2 is open and has the operator open the manual bypasses (should normally be open) 1VI-93 and lVI-94 (in series).

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because there are automatic actions which occur when VI header pressure decreases to 90 psig (1VI-820 closes) and 1VI-18l2 automatically opens at 85 psig.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because IVl-820 will slow the rate of pressure decrease and there are automatic actions which occur at 85 psig (IVI 1812 opens).

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because IVI-820 will slow the rate of pressure decrease and lVI-820 does automatically close when VI header pressure decreases to 90 psig.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must understand the operation of the system to diagnose which automatic action will be successful in restoring VI header pressure and must also be familiar with the procedure mitigating strategy to determine which procedure actions are appropriate as directed by AP-22.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is comprehension level because the applicant must understand which of two possible automatic actions that could occur would be effective at allowing VI header pressure to be restored.

Basis for SRO only This is an SRO Only question linked to IOCFR5S.43(b)(5), Procedures. This question can NOT be answered with system knowledge alone. It can NOT be answered by knowing procedure immediate actions or entry conditions. To correctly answer the question the candidate must have knowledge of specific procedural steps.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q80 (Bank 3112)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-22 (LOSS OF VI)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-VI (Instrument Air, Station Air, Breathing Air)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-SS-VI Objective 7 & 15 SYSO78 A2.0l Instrument Air System (lAS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5/ 45.3 / 45.13)

Air dryer and filter malfunctions Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 230 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 8O 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 231 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 L 81 SYSOO2 21 .36 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

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SYSOO2 GENERIC Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6/45.7)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

• The unit is currently in NO MODE

• Preparations for core reload are in progress

• During core offload, Reactor Engineering determined that some alternate fuel assembly moves would be required due to several bowed fuel assemblies In accordance with NSD-414 (FUEL HANDLiNG):

During core reload, the LOWEST level of shift management that can approve the alternative fuel assembly moves is the (1)

When control rod latching commences, The Fuel Handling SRO (2) required to be present in the Reactor Building.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Shift Manager

2. IS B. 1. FuelHandlingSRO

2. IS C. 1. ShiftManager

2. IS NOT D. 1. Fuel Handling SRO

2. IS NOT Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 232 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 8l General Discussion In accordance with NSD-414 (FUEL HANDLING) any alternative fuel moves require the approval of the Fuel Handling SRO.

In accordance with NSD-414, the Fuel Handling SRO must be present in Reactor Building any time core alterations are performed. Control Rod latching is considered as a core alteration since some movement of the control rods (reactivity control components) is required.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because, lAW NSD-414, the OSM has ultimate responsibility for the safety of the reactor core.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because, lAW NSD-414, the OSM has ultimate responsibility for the safety of the reactor core.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant does not understand that latching control rods is considered a core alteration. Since no FUEL is being moved, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the evolution does not constitute a core alteration and therefore the Fuel Handling SRO need not be present in the Reactor Building. Whether control latching is considered a core alteration is a common point of confusion among both SRO applicants and Licensed SROs.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant does not understand that latching control rods is considered a core alteration. Since no FUEL is being moved, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the evolution does not constitute a core alteration and therefore the Fuel Handling SRO need not be present in the Reactor Building. Whether control latching is considered a core alteration is a common point of confusion among both SRO applicants and Licensed SROs.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the procedure (NSD-414) associated with core alterations during fuel movement.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

qeither part of this question can be answered with solely systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

4either part of this question is associate with immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Neither part of this question is associated with AOP or EOP entry conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This question is related to detailed knowledge of the procedure for fuel handling administrative requirements.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 8l Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

4SD-414 (FUEL HANDLING)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-FH-FC (Rev 21) Section 1.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-FH-FC Objective 2 SYSOO2 2.1.36 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

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SYSOO2 GENERIC Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Original question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on pre-401-9 review comments decided that the existing K/A could not be matched at the SRO level.

Requested new K/A from Chief Examiner. Chief Examiner randomly selected new K/A.

Jew question written to replacement K/A. HCF 09/04/20 13 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 234 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 82 SYSOI I A2.06 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /45.13)

Inadvertent PZR spray actuation Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• An inadvertent Safety Injection has occurred

• The crew has implemented ES-ti (SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION)

• All NC pumps are running

• Reactor Vessel D/P is 100%

• The BOP operator informs the CRS that I NC-27C (IA LOOP PZR SPRAY CONTROL) indicates intermediate

• PZR level is 85% and INCREASING Based on the above conditions, the entry conditions of FR-Li (RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL) will be met if PZR level increases to a MAXIMUM of (1)

In accordance with FR-Il, if INC-27C cannot be closed the crew will stop (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 92%

2. 1A and 1 B NC pumps ONLY B. 1. 96%

2. 1A and 1 B NC pumps ONLY C. 1. 92%

2. 1A and 1 B NC pumps AND one additional NC pump D. 1. 96%

2. iA and 1 B NC pumps AND one additional NC pump Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 235 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 82 General Discussion Per F-0, if PZR level increases to greater than 92%, the entry conditions for FR-I.1 (Response to High Pressurizer Level) will be met.

In accordance with FR-I.l if the Pressurizer Spray valve cannot be closed, the crew will be directed to stop IA and 113 NC pumps and one additional NC pump.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because the Pressurizer Spray lines tap off of loops A and B. It is therefore plausible for the applicant to conclude that stopping only the IA and 1 B NC pumps would be necessary to decrease the driving head for the spray lines to a level where spray flow would not occur.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because at 96% Pressurizer level, FR-I.I directs the operators to opening and closing the head vents to stabilize Pressurizer level and limit operation of the PZR PORVs.

Second part is plausible because the Pressurizer Spray lines tap off of loops A and B. It is therefore plausible for the applicant to conclude that stopping only the IA and lB NC pumps would be necessary to decrease the driving head for the spray lines to a level where spray flow would not occur.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because at 96% Pressurizer level, FR-I.I directs the operators to opening and closing the head vents to stabilize Pressurizer level and limit operation of the PZR PORVs.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched since the applicant must be able to predict the impact to the NC system of NOT being able to isolate a mechanically bound Pzr spray valve and direct the crew with the appropriate actions and procedures to recover the plant.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs. This is YELLOW path FRP entry conditions and is therefore not RO knowledge.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure steps within FR-Il.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 236 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 Development References Student References Provided

References:

F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

FR-I.1 (Response to High PZR Level)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRI Objectives 2 & 6 SYSO1 1 A2.06 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3 / 45.13)

Inadvertent PZR spray actuation 9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 237 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 83 SYSO35 A2.04 - Steam Generator System (S!GS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal- functions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Steam flow/feed mismatch Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit is at 100% RTP

• A DCS malfunction occurs and 1A CF Pump is not controlling properly in AUTO

• All SIG NR levels are decreasing slowly due to a mismatch between steam flow and feed flow Procedure Legend:

AP-03 (LOAD REJECTION)

AP-04 (RAPID DOWNPOWER)

In accordance with AP-06 (SIG FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION):

The crew will FIRST attempt to gain control of the 1ACF pump by (1)

If flow from the 1A CF Pump is comrjletely lost, the crew will (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. adjusting the LP and HP governor controls in manual

2. reduce load lAW AP04 to stabilize S/G levels at program level B. 1. selecting Speed Set mode and adjusting the LP governor setpoint

2. reduce load lAW AP-04 to stabilize S/G levels at program level C. 1. adjusting the LP and HP governor controls in manual

2. trip the 1A CF pump AND implement AP-03 D. 1. selecting Speed Set mode and adjusting the LP governor setpoint

2. trip the 1A CF pump AND implement AP-03 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 238 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 83 General Discussion AP-06 will direct the operators to attempt to control the malfunctioning CF pump by placing the IA CF pump to Speed Set on the DCS Feed Pump Control graphic and then manually adjusting the Low Pressure governor setpoint.

If flow from the IA CF pump is completely lost the crew will be directed to trip the 1A CF Pump and go to AP-03 Load rejection. To meet this criteria, Turbine Inlet pressure must be above 500 PSIG. However, with the reactor at 100% RTP, Turbine Inlet pressure will be well above 500 PSIG (approximately 850 PSIG).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because this is the action that will be taken next if the CF pump cannot be controlled in Speed Set mode.

Second part is plausible because this is the AP-06 required action if S/G NR level approaches 17% or 83%.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because this is the AP-06 required action if S/G NR level approaches 17% or 83%.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because this is the action that will be taken next if the CF pump cannot be controlled in Speed Set mode.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because a steam flow / feed flow mismatch has occurred which results in decreasing S/G level and the applicant must determine what actions are required in accordance with AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction).

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to diagnose the conditions given to determine the condition of the plant and then determine the appropriate course of action.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I lated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

I) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

While there is a systems element to this question, neither part of the question can be answered with systems knowledge alone.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with this question.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question requires procedure knowledge that is beyond the procedure entry conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure step sequence not sequence of events within the procedure and knowledge of required actions if the condition can not be corrected.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 83 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW 1

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-06 Objective 5 SYSO35 A2.04 Steam Generator System (S/GS)

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Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal- functions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /45.3 / 45.5)

Steam flow/feed mismatch ECo EEL RemarkslStatus J

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 84 EPEOO9 2.4.4 Small Break LOCA

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EPEOO9 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• A reactor trip has occurred

• Safety Injection is actuated

• The crew implemented E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

• NC pumps have been stopped due to loss of subcooling

• NC System pressure is 1700 PSIG and lowering slowly

• Pzr level is off-scale low

• Containment pressure is 1 .7 PSIG and rising slowly

• FWST level is 300 inches and lowering at 2 inches per minute

• SG pressures are 1050 PSIG and stable

• CA flow is 600 GPM

• The operators have just transitioned to E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)

Procedure Legend:

ES-1.2 (POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION)

ES-1.3 (TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION)

The basis for stopping NC pumps in E-0 is to (1)

Based on the conditions above, the next procedure transition will be to (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. minimize heat input into the NC system

2. ES-1.2 B. 1. minimize mass loss from the NC system

2. ES-1.2 C. 1. minimize heat input into the NC system

2. ES-1.3 D. 1. minimize mass loss from the NC system

2. ES-1.3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 241 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 General Discussion Based on the indications provided a Small Break LOCA is in progress.

The NC pumps are stopped in E-0 when at least one NI or NV pump is running and injecting into the NC system and NC system subcooling is lost. This is done to minimize the inventory loss from the NC system.

Since a small break LOCA is in progress E-1 will direct the operators to transaction to ES-I.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first plausible because there are several other instances in the EOP network where the NC pumps are stopped to minimize heat input to the

.IC system (e.g. FR-Hi, FR-C.I).

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because there are several other instances in the EOP network where the NC pumps are stopped to minimize heat input to the NC system (e.g. FR-H. I, FR-C. I).

The second part is plausible because if the leak was larger, transition would be made to ES-i.3 instead of ES-I.2.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because if the leak was larger, transition would be made to ES-i.3 instead of ES-l.2.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of procedure transition requirements related to a small break LOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the given plant conditions to determine the correct procedure transition.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This question requires the applicant to demonstrate detailed knowledge of the EOPs and their basis and can NOT be answered with systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

This question does not relate to EOP or AOP immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to entry conditions for AOPs and is not related to direct entry EOPs. This question relates to procedure transition criteria within the body of the EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure transition criteria based on analysis of plant conditions.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

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841

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 Job Leveif Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) Background Document Learning Objectives:

MC-OP-EP-E0 Objective 6 EPEOO9 2.4.4 Small Break LOCA

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EPEOO9 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2/45.6) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 243 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 85 APEO22 2.2.2 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup

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APEO22 GENERIC Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. (CFR: 41.6/41.7 /

45.2)

Unit I is operating at 100% RTP when the following alarms are received:

• 1AD-7 /J1 (NC PUMP SEAL INJ LO FLOW)

• IAD-7 /12 (REGEN HX LETDN HI TEMP)

• IAD-7 / G2 (CHARGING LINE ABNORMAL FLOW)

The crew has implemented AP-12 (LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING, OR SEAL INJECTION).

1. Based on plant conditions indicated by the alarms above, what actions are directed by AP-1 2?

2. What actions are directed by AP-1 2 regarding the restoration of letdown during the subsequent recovery?

A. 1. FIRST close the Letdown Orifice Isolations (1NV-458A, 457A, 35A) and THEN close 1 NV-IA, 2A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx).

2. Pressurize the letdown system locally.

B. 1. Close I NV-lA, 2A (NC LID Isol To Regen Hx) and ensure that the Letdown Orifice Isolations (INV-458A, 457A, 35A) auto-close.

2. Pressurize the letdown system locally.

C. I. FIRST close the Letdown Orifice Isolations (INV-458A, 457A, 35A) and THEN close 1 NV-i A, 2A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx).

2. Pressurize the letdown system from the Control Room.

D. 1. Close 1 NV-lA, 2A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx) and ensure that the Letdown Orifice Isolations (1NV-458A, 457A, 35A) auto-close.

2. Pressurize the letdown system from the Control Room.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 85 General Discussion In accordance with AP-12, Loss of Letdown, Charging, or Seal Injection, the crew should first close the Letdown Orifice Isolations since they have indications that charging has been lost. Then because the Regen Hx Letdown Hi Temp alarm is in, they should close the isolations to the Regen Hx (NV-IA, 2A).

During subsequent recovery actions, the crew is procedurally directed to pressurize the letdown system from the control room since the Letdown Orifice Isolations were closed prior to NV-IA and 2A. Had NV-IA and 2A closed first, the crew would be required to pressurized the letdown system locally during restoration.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the letdown line is pressurized locally when the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (INV 458A, 457A, & 35A) close prior to INV-1A & 2A.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant just remembers the step for closing INV-IA and 2A which states:

IF AT ANY TIME, REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP alarm (IAD7-12) is LIT, THEN close the following valves:

1NV-IA 1NV-2A Procedurally the Letdown Orifice Isolations should have already been closed because the alarms in combination provide positive indication that a loss of charging has occurred and the steps to close the orifice isolations come before the steps to close NV-lA and 2A in the RNO column.

If the applicant concludes that closing the Letdown Orifice Isolations first is the correct response then the Letdown Line would have to be pressurized locally in accordance with AP-12 making Part 2 correct.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE: Part I is plausible if the applicant just remembers the step for closing INV-lA and 2A which states:

IF AT ANY TIME, REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP alarm (IAD7-I2) is LIT, THEN close the following valves:

INV-IA INV-2A Procedurally the Letdown Orifice Isolations should have already been closed because the alarms in combination provide positive indication that a loss of charging has occurred and the steps to close the orifice isolations come before the steps to close NV-lA and 2A in the RNO column.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the letdown line is pressurized locally when the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (INV 458A, 457A, & 35A) close prior to 1NV-IA & 2A.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to be able to direct the operation of NV system controls during a Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup based on a knowledge of AP-l2 procedure steps.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first diagnose the conditions given to determine what has caused the alarms. The applicant must then recall from memory the procedure requirements for isolating letdown and the requirements for recovering letdown.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing systems knowledge alone. This requires the applicant to analyze a given set of alarms and Tuesday, October 15,2013 Page 245 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 85 determine what plant conditions could have caused that combination of alarms. The applicant must then determine what procedural actions from AP-12 are appropriate for plant conditions.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions. AP-12 has no immediate actions.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the entry conditions for AOPs. The alarms given are entry conditions for AP-12 However, the applicant is given that AP-12 has been entered and determine what actions from the procedure are appropriate based on the combination of alarms.

4) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the AOPs.

5) This question DOES require the applicant to assess plant conditions (based on a combination of alarms) and determine from that assessment the appropriate steps from AP-12 to be taken. This requires the applicant to have detailed knowledge of specific procedure steps from AP-12.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q85 (Bank 2785)

Development References

References:

AP-12, (Loss of Letdown, Charging, or Seal Injection)

Learning Objectives:

AP12002 APEO22 2.2.2 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup

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APEO22 GENERIC Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. (CFR: 41.6 I 41.7 /

45.2) 401-9 Comments: Remarks!Status Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 246 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 [ 86]

APEO4O AA2.04 - Steam Line Rupture Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions requiring ESFAS initiation Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

• A unit shutdown and cooldown is in progress

• NC system pressure is 1900 PSIG

• NC system temperature is 510°F

• B Train components are in service The following sequence of events occur:

1. A Main Steam line ruptures inside containment

2. 1 2OVAC Vital panel board EKVD de-energizes due to an electrical fault

3. Pressurizer pressure is 1850 PSIG and lowering

4. Containment pressure is 1.3 PSIG and rising slowly (1) would get an automatic START signal. (Assume no operator actions have occurred.)

Per T.S. 3.8.9 (DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OPERATING) bases, the remaining

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7 OPERABLE AC vital buses (2) capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary for safe shutdown of the unit.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. All ECCS equipment

2. ARE B. 1. All ECCS equipment

2. ARE NOT C. 1. Only A Train ECCS equipment

2. ARE D. 1. Only A Train ECCS equipment

2. ARE NOT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 247 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 86 General Discussion For this accident, the Safety Injection Signal from Pressurizer Low Pressure has already been blocked (actions for NC system pressure below P 11). However, the Safety Injection signal for Hi Containment Pressure is still functional and has been actuated due to Containment pressure at 1.3 psig.

The Train A ECCS Train has actuated normally. However, Train B ECCS Train will NOT automatically actuate due to the loss of power to EKVD (Solid State Protection Train B Output Cabinet).

Per T.S. 3.8.9 (Distribution Systems Operating) Bases, with one AC vital bus INOPERABLE, the remaining OPERABLE AC buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary for safe shutdown of the unit.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Only Train A of ECCS starts due to the loss of power to SSPS Train B Output Cabinet. Plausible if candidate does not understand that the loss of EKVD effects SSPS Train B or believes that an signal from either train of SSPS will actuate both trains of ECCS equipment.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Only Train A of ECCS starts due to the loss of power to SSPS Train B Output Cabinet. Plausible if candidate does not understand that the loss of EKVD effects SSPS Train B or believes that an signal from either train of SSPS will actuate both trains of ECCS equipment.

With a loss of one vital AC bus overall reliability is reduced and an additional single failure could result in the minimum ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, second part is plausible.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

With a loss of one vital AC bus overall reliability is reduced and an additional single failure could result in the minimum ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, second part is plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant is given a main steamline rupture inside containment along with a loss of one vital AC bus and must analyze given plant data to determine if an automatic Safety Injection has occurred. Applicant must also understand where each train of SSPS is powered from and that only one train of ECCS has started due to a loss of control power to the other train.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is analysis level because the applicant must analyze the conditions given and determine that a Safety Injection signal has been generated. The candidate must also know that the loss of EKVD dc-energizes the B Train SSPS Output Cabinet which will prevent the SI Train B Sequencer from functioning.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Specs

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) This question requires the applicant to (application, basis)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension MODIFIED 2009 MNS NRC Q56 (BANK 3044) MODIFIED Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 248 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 86 Development References Student References Provided Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Tech Spec 3.8.9 (Distribution Systems Operating) Bases

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Learning Objective:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 7 APEO4O AA2.04 Steam Line Rupture

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions requiring ESFAS initiation 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 249 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 L 87 APEO57 AA2.02 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Core flood tank pressure and level indicators Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

• ID Cold Leg Accumulator (CLA) level indicator 1 NIP5IOO indicates 0% due to a failed transmitter

• At 0200 ID CLA level indicator 1 NIP5101 indicates 22%

• 1 D CLA level is decreasing at 2% I Hr Subsequently:

• At 0230 CLA level indicator INIP5101 fails low due to a loss of instrument power

• l&E expects to return 1 NIP51O1 to service on the next shift at 0800

• The Semi-Daily Surveillance for the next shift is due at 1000 Based on the conditions above, 1D CLA level (1) exceed the Tech Spec 3.5.1 (ACCUMULATORS) low level limit before 1NIP51O1 is returned to service.

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.5.1 Bases, a MINIMUM of (2) CLAs are required to inject to ensure that the core is adequately covered.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. WILL

2. 2 B. 1. WILL NOT

2. 2 C. 1. WILL

2. 3 D. 1. WILL NOT

2. 3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 250 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 87 General Discussion A calculation using curve 7.4 from the Plant Data Book will determine that the CLA level equates to 17.91 gallons per % level.

At an initial level of 24% the CLA contains 7078.84 gallons.

Volume at 0% = 6649 gallons Volume at 100% = 8440 gallons 8440 - 6649 1791 gallons / 100% 17.91 gallons / %

At 24% the volume = 24 x 17.91 = 429.84 gallons + 6649 (volume at 0%) = 7078.84 With the Accumulator level decreasing at 2% / hr, after 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> level will have decreased 12% or 214.92 gallons. The total volume after 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> would be:

7078.84 gallons -214.92 gallons 6863.92 gallons This is BELOW the Tech Spec 3.5.1 low level limit of 6870 gallons.

From the Tech Spec 3.5.1 Bases, a minimum of 3 CLA is required to partially cover the core and ensure that significant clad melt does not occur following a LOCA. This assumes that one CLA discharges through the break and does not make it to the core.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant associates the 4 Accumulators as being divided into two trains as are most safety-related equipment.

If so, the applicant would logically conclude that it only takes one train (or two Accumulators) to fulfill the safety-related function.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly performs the calculation to determine final accumulator volume.

The second part is plausible if the applicant associates the 4 Accumulators as being divided into two trains as are most safety-related equipment.

If so, the applicant would logically conclude that it only takes one train (or two Accumulators) to fulfill the safety-related function.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly performs the calculation to determine final accumulator volume.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to make a determination as to whether the limits of Tech Spec 3.5.1 related to Accumulator level will be exceeded during a loss of CLA level indication due to a loss of instrument power.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to perform a calculation to determine the correct answer.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Specs This is not related to the less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requirement in TS 3.5.1 for two CLAs inoperable.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 This is not related to above-the-line knowledge of TS 3.5.1.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

This question is not related to TS Safety Limits

4) This question requires the applicant to have knowledge of TS 3.5.1 Bases. Therefore, it is SRO-level knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Plant Data Book, Curve 7.4 Tech Spec 3.5.1 (Accumulators)

Tech Spec 3.5.1 Bases Plant Data Book Curve 7.4 Cold Leg Accumulator Learning Objectives:

APEO57 AA2.02 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Core flood tank pressure and level indicators 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 252 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 88 APEO62 AA2.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The valve lineups necessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit is at 25% RTP

• The crew receives a report of flooding in the Unit I B DIG Room

• It is determined to be a major piping failure of the RN System Procedure Legend:

AP-20 (LOSS OF RN)

AP-44 (PLANT FLOODING)

Based on the conditions above, (1) would be used to isolate the piping failure.

Upon completion of the isolation procedure, the KD HX Inlet and Outlet Isolation Valves (1 RN-i 71 B and 1 RN-i 74B) will be (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. AP-20

2. CLOSED ONLY B. 1. AP-20

2. CLOSED with their motor breakers OPEN C. I. AP-44

2. CLOSED ONLY D. 1. AP-44

2. CLOSED with their motor breakers OPEN Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 253 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 88 General Discussion According to AP/OIA!5500144, the purpose of the plant flooding procedure is to provide guidance to mitigate the effects of flooding in the Auxiliary, Turbine, and Service Buildings. Since the lB DG Room is in the Auxiliary Building, the operator would address this procedure to isolate the RN System Leak. According to PSS-RN the lB DIG HX Supply Isolation Valve (RN-171B) will automatically open on SS signal, Blackout or whenever CA-18B (B CA pump supply from Train B RN) is not closed. Because these valves receive automatic open signals, of APIO/A15500144 directs the operator to CLOSE the valves and OPEN the motor breakers respectively.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The purpose of AP-20 is to ensure proper response in the event of a loss of nuclear service water, to assess plant conditions, and identify the appropriate steps for a Loss of Operating RN Train, or a Loss of LU or RC Supply Crossover. This procedure does NOT mitigate the consequences of a leak in the RN System. This is plausible because the applicant may conclude that flooding from the RN System is mitigated by addressing the Loss of RN Procedure Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that the valves must be closed to isolate the leak and therefore, their motor breakers should remain CLOSED.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The purpose of AP-20 is to ensure proper response in the event of a loss of nuclear service water, to assess plant conditions, and identify the appropriate steps for a Loss of Operating RN Train, or a Loss of LLI or RC Supply Crossover. This procedure does NOT mitigate the consequences of a leak in the RN System. This is plausible because the applicant may conclude that flooding from the RN System is mitigated by addressing the Loss of RN Procedure.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that the valves must be closed to isolate the leak and therefore, their motor breakers should remain CLOSED.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must demonstrate the ability to determine the valve lineups (i.e. Valves Closed/Breakers OPEN) necessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition during a Loss of Nuclear Service Water (i.e. using appropriate procedure AP44).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure step sequence not sequence of events within the procedure.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK MNS Exam Bank Q3171 Development References

References:

AP-44 (Plant Flooding)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 88 AP-20 (Loss of RN)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-44 Objectives 2 & 5 APEO62 AA2.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The valve lineups necessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 255 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 89 WEO5 2.4.37 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

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WEO5 GENERIC Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

• A loss of all Feedwater has occurred

• The crew has implemented FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK)

• NC system Feed and Bleed is in progress

• The Shift Manager has assumed the role of Emergency Coordinator

• The TSC is not manned Based on the conditions above, this event will be classified as a/an (1)

In accordance with the Emergency Response (RP) procedures, if emergency conditions prevent manning the TSC within 75 minutes of declaration, responsibility for classification and notification will (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. SiteArea Emergency

2. remain with the Shift Manager B. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. be turned over to the EOF C. 1. General Emergency

2. remain with the Shift Manager D. 1. General Emergency

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 89 General Discussion This event will be classified as a Site Area Emergency based on the Potential Loss of both NCS Barrier AND Fuel Clad Barrier from the RED PATH condition on Heat Sink which required entry into FR-H. 1.

In accordance with the RP procedures, if the TSC cannont be manned within 75 minutes of declaration, the OSM will turn over responsibility for classification and notification to the EOF.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible since the OSM normally only turns over responsibility for classification and notification to the TSC.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant concludes that the Containment Barrier will be lost as a result of the Feed and Bleed (after the PRT ruptures).

Part 2 is plausible since the OSM normally only turns over responsibility for classification and notification to the TSC.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant concludes that the Containment Barrier will be lost as a result of the Feed and Bleed (after the PRT ruptures).

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink has occurred and the applicant must have knowledge of the lines of authority (i.e.

EC responsibilities) during E-Plan implementation.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This is an SRO-Only question because it relates to implementation of the Emergency Plan which is a function only performed by SROs.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

RP-000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP-000 (Classification of Emergency)

Learning Objectives:

1ONE WEO5 2.4.37 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

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WEO5 GENERIC Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10/45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Original question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on Chief Examiners feedback rewrote first part of Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 257 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 question to include a Classification of the event.

Based on feedback during validation, determined that second part of question related to responsibility for making PARs was challengeable. The guidance in the RP procedures is unclear as to whether the OSM can delegate responsibility for making PARs.

Therefore, re-wrote the second part of the question.

HCF 10/08/2013 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 258 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 9O APEOO5 AA2.O1 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Stuck or inoperable rod from in-core and ex-core NIS, in-core or loop temperature measurements Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• A unit startup is in progress

• Reactor power is 4%

• The crew determines that Control Rod M-4 is misaligned by greater than 12 steps In accordance with AP-14 (ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION) Enclosure I (RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD):

The crew will use (1) to determine reactor power during implementation of Enclosure 1.

Based on current plant conditions, the crew is required to (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Excore Nuclear Instruments

2. shutdown to MODE 3 B. 1. Thermal Power Best Estimate

2. shutdown to MODE 3 C. 1. Excore Nuclear Instruments

2. maintain power stable until the cause of the misaligned rod is corrected D. 1. Thermal Power Best Estimate

2. maintain power stable until the cause of the misaligned rod is corrected Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 259 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 General Discussion In accordance with AP-14 with a misaligned or dropped rod and reactor power less than 5%, the crew must shut down to MODE 3.

In accordance with AP-14, the crew will use Thermal Power Best Estimate to determine reactor power during implementation of Enclosure 1.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because during the implementation of most APs and EPs, the crew would use Excore Nuclear Instrument indication to determine reactor power.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because during the implementation of most APs and EPs the crew would use Excore Nuclear Instrument indication to

,

determine reactor power.

Second part is plausible because AP-I4 directs the crews Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available. Later in AP-14, the procedure also directs Do not continue until troubleshooting is complete and IAE determines rod realignment is permissible. Also, in accordance with AP-14, if reactor power was greater than 5%, the appropriate action would be to maintain the plant stable until the misaligned rod could be corrected.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because AP-l4 directs the crews Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available. Later in AP-14, the procedure also directs Do not continue until troubleshooting is complete and IAE determines rod realignment is permissible. Also, in accordance with AP-I4, if reactor power was greater than 5%, the appropriate action would be to maintain the plant stable until the misaligned rod could be corrected.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of what indications are used for power indication when determine appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a misaligned control rod.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine that the reactor is at less than 5% power (i.e. just reached the POAH).

The applicant must then recall from memory that, despite the fact that continued operation is allowed by Technical Specifications, with power less than 5%, AP-14 requires a shutdown to MODE 3.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

qeither part of this question can be answered using systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

Both parts ofthe question require knowledge beyond the immediate actions of AP-l4

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Jeither part of the question is related to entry conditions for AP-14.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 90 This is detailed knowledge of procedure step requirements within the procedure.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-14 (Rod Control Malfunction)

Learning Objectives:

AP 14004 APEOO5 AA2.0I Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Stuck or inoperable rod from in-core and ex-core NIS. in-core or loop temperature measurements 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on pre-401-9 review comments, question retained as written. HCF 09/05/20 13 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 261 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 APEO33 2.1.20 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation

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APEO33 GENERIC Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• A unit startup in progress

• All Power Ranges indicate 6%

• Both Source Range channels are de-energized In accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS INSTRUMENTATION), if BOTH Intermediate Range channels fail LOW, the crew will be required to (1)

Based on the conditions above, in accordance with AP-16 (MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION), if an Intermediate Range channel Control Power fuses are removed, a reactor trip (I) occur.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. reduce power to less than P-6 ONLY

2. WILL B. 1. reduce power to less than P-6 OR increase power to greater than P-ID

2. WILL C. 1. reduce power to less than P-6 ONLY

2. WILL NOT D. 1. reduce power to less than P-6 OR increase power to greater than P-ID

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 9l General Discussion In accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.Icondition G; with Thermal Power between P-6 and P-l0 and two IR neutron flux channels inoperable, the required action is to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions Immediately AND Reduce Thermal Power to less than P-6

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within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> In accordance with the CAUTION at the beginning of AP-l6 Case II, removing IR control power fuses with power less than P-b will result in a reactor trip.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since this would be the correct required action had only one IR Instrument failed The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the control power and instrument power fuses. The instrument power fuses could be removed below P-b without causing a Reactor trip provided the channel is placed in LEVEL TRIP bypass.

Answer 0 Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since this would be the correct required action had only one IR Instrument failed The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the control power and instrument power fuses. The instrument power fuses could be removed below P-b without causing a Reactor trip provided the channel is placed in LEVEL TRIP bypass.

Basis for meeting the KA In this case the applicant demonstrates the ability to interpret and execute procedure steps by demonstrating the ability to apply AP-16 during a Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation.

Basis for Hi Cog iis a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze the plant conditions and determine the power is between P-6 and P 10 and that Power Range indications are available to determine the appropriate action.

Basis for SRO only This question is SRO level since the applicant must know the Tech Spec required action (Not one hour or less) for failure of both IR nuclear instruments during a plant startup.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References

References:

Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS Instrumentation) Conditions F & G Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-ENB (Excore Nuclear Instrumentation)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-ENB Objective 19 APEO33 2.1.20 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation

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APEO33 GENERIC Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 / 45.12)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 9I 1 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 264 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 92]

WEO7 2.4.41 Saturated Core Cooling

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WEO7 GENERIC Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• At 0815 a Reactor Trip and SI actuated automatically due to a Large-Break LOCA

• Actions of E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) were completed at 0845 Conditions at Time = 0900: Conditions at Time 0920:

• NC pressure = 4 PSIG

• NC pressure = 3 PSIG

• RVLIS Lower Range level = 35%

• RVLIS Lower Range level = 33%

• CETs=705°F

• CETs = 715°F

• Subcooling Monitor = -35° F

• Subcooling Monitor = -35°F

• Containment pressure = 3.5 PSIG

• Containment pressure = 2.5 PSIG

• 1EMF-51A=35R/hr

• IEMF-51A30R/hr

• All SIG NR levels offscale low with

• All SIG NR levels offscale low with no CA flow no CA flow 7 Based on the conditions at 0920, which ONE (1) of the following is the classification and associated EAL number for this event? (For the purposes of this question, do NOT consider Emergency Coodinatorjudgement as a basis of classification)

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. Site Area Emergency based on EAL # 4.1.S.1 B. General Emergency based on EAL#4.1.G.1 C. Site Area Emergency based on EAL # 4.1.S.2 D. General Emergency based on EAL#4.1.G.2 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 265 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 92 General Discussion The candidate has been given a set of conditions associated with a large break LOCA and given a copy of RP-000, asked to classify the event.

The conditions given result in the following determinations per RP-000 Enc 4.1 (Fission Product Barrier Matrix)

(Containment Barrier) --- 1 point --- Potential loss due to Core Cooling Red Path for greater than 15 minutes (NCS Barrier) --- 5 Points--- Loss due to GREATER THAN available makeup capacity as indicated by a loss of NCS Subcooling (Subcooling margin indicates -35 deg)

(Fuel Clad Barrier)--- 5 Points--- Loss due to Core Cooling Red Path.

The result of the evaluation above is a total of 11 points (4.1.G.2) (Loss of Any Two Barriers AND Potential Loss of the Third) and the corresponding classification of General Emergency.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant correctly determines that there is a Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier based on Core Cooling RED Path and a Loss of the NCS Barrier based on the leak greater than makeup capability (Loss of Subcooling) but fails to apply the Core Cooling RED Path for greater than 15 minutes to Containment. If that were the case, the applicant would determine that there is a Loss of Both the NCS Barrier and Fuel Clad Barrier, would determine a total of 10 points, and would declare a Site Area Emergency based on 4.1.S.l.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the candidate incorrectly determines that a loss of the containment barrier exists but correctly determines the loss of the other two barriers. This would result in a total of 13 points, a General Emergency classification with an EAL# 4.1 .G. I.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant incorrectly determines that there is an ORANGE Path on Core Cooling. If that were the case, the applicant would determine that there is a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the NCS barriers and determine a total of 9 points which would result in a Site Area Emergency based on EAL 4.1.S.2.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KIA is matched because correct classification of this event hinges on correct application of the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

Basis for Hi Cog This Question represents a higher cognitive level of Application because it involves a multi-part mental process of assembling different combinations of given information to select a correct classification.

Basis for SRO only This question is linked to 10CFR55.43 (b)(7) Emergency Classification Per the guidance in IOCFR55.43 and per the MNS objective referenced for this question, assessing plant conditions and determining the proper classification of emergency is considered SRO level.

A reference is being provided for this question because candidates are not expected to have memorized all of the entry conditions for all classifications.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension MODIFIED 2012 MNS Audit Q92 MODIFIED (Bank 4428)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

RP-000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP-000 (Emergency Classification)

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 92 Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-EAL Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-EAL Objective 6 WEO7 2.4.41 Saturated Core Cooling

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WEO7 GENERIC Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /45.1 1) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus I Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 267 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 93 WEO1 EA2.1 -Rediagnosis Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Rediagnosis) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit was at 100% RTP

• A fault occurs on 1 C SIG inside Containment

• Containment pressure rapidly rises to 3.2 PSIG Procedure Legend:

E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

FR-S.1 (RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /ATWS)

E-1 (LOSS OR REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)

The following sequence of events occurs:

0200 - Crew implements E-0 due to a valid Reactor Trip condition 0201 - Crew transitions to FR-S.1 due to failure of reactor to trip in AUTOMATIC or MANUAL 0203 - Crew manually initiates Safety Injection 0205 - OATC reports that the reactor is tripped 0209 - Crew completes FR-S.1 and transitions back to E-0 0215 - Crew completes E-0 actions and transitions to E-1 If the CRS determines that the crew is responding to the event in the wrong procedure, which ONE (1) of the following indicates the EARLIEST time that the crew could have transitioned to ES-0.0 (REDIAGNOSIS)?

A. 0201 B. 0203 C. 0209 D. 0215 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 268 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 93 General Discussion A faulted SIG has caused Containment pressure to rise to 3 psig. Safety Injection has failed to actuate in auto. The crew mistakenly transitions to E-1 instead of E-2. The earliest that the crew could transition to ES-0.0(Rediagnosis) is 0215 after completing E-0 with a Safety Injection present.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that transition to ES-0.0 is allowed at any time after transition out of E-0 as opposed to when E-0 is completed.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that since Safety Injection has been initiated and transition has been made out of E-0 that the entry conditions for ES-0.0 have been met.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that since Safety Injection has been initiated and the crew is back in E-0 that the entry conditions for ES-0.0 have been met.

Answer 0 Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it required the applicant to demonstrate the ability to determine when transition can be made (i.e. Facility conditions and selection of procedures) to ES-0.0 (Rediagnosis).

Basis for Hi Cog This question requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given and the sequence of events. The applicant also has to recall the entry conditions for implementation of ES-0.0. The applicant must then compare the analysis of the given conditions to the recalled entry conditions to determine the correct answer. Since this question requires more than one mental step, it is a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This question related to procedure selection only and NOT systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

This question related to knowledge of procedure entry conditions and NOT immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to AOP entry conditions and ES-0.0 is NOT a direct-entry EOP.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure step sequence not sequence of events within the procedure.

This question related to procedure entry conditions based on completion of E-0. Entry into ES-0.0 is NOT directed by any EOP but is entered based on CRS judgment.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content and entry conditions. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 269 of 291

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93

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 Development References Student References Provided

References:

OMP 4-3 (Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures)

ES-0.0 (Re-Diagnosis)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E0 Objective 10 WEOI EA2.1 Rediagnosis

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Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Rediagnosis) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 94 GEN2. 1 2.1 .1 GENERIC Conduct of Operations

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Conduct of Operations Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements. (CFR: 41.10/45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• You are the Control Room Supervisor

• An explosion occurs resulting in significant damage in the unit

• The Shift Manager was seriously injured in the explosion and is incapacitated.

• A significant radioactive release is occurring from the Aux Building

• To regain control of the unit, the crew must cross-tie power supplies NOT allowed by Technical Specifications

• The cross-tie operation is NOT defined in EPs or APs

• Immediate action is required Which ONE (1) of the following describes the MINIMUM requirements for applying I OCFR5O.54(X) (CONDITIONS OF LICENSES) in accordance with OMP 4-3 (USE OF ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES)?

A. You may approve this action without any additional concurrence.

B. You must obtain concurrence from one other SRO prior to performing the action.

C. The Plant Manager must be notified prior to the action and must approve the action to be taken.

D. The NRC must be notified prior to the action and must approve the action to be taken.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 94 General Discussion Per OMP 4-3, In cases where a 50.54(x) determination is needed prior to TSC activation, any licensed SRO may make this determination for his assigned unit. IF the on-duty OSM is in the affected control room, then they shall make the 50.54(x) determination. No one below a licensed SRO can make a decision to invoke 5 0.54(x).

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since this is typically required for procedure changes.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above:

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the Plant Manager will be notified either before or after, but no concurrence required.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above:

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since NRC will be notified after. However, no concurrence is required. If immediate actions are not warranted, and time permits, the NRC must be notified prior to the actions.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of Operations Management Procedures for Abnormal/Emergency operation 1 4OT covered by procedure.

< Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This is an SRO-Only question because it relates to Abnormal/Emergency operation NOT covered by procedure and Actions taken outside of License Condition or Tech Specs, which is a function only performed by SROs.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2010 MNS Audit Exam Q95 (Bank 2495)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OMP 4-3 (Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ADM-OMP Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-OMP Objective 5 GEN2.l 2.1.1 GENERIC Conduct of Operations

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Conduct of Operations Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements. (CFR: 41.10/ 45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 272 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 94 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 273 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 L 95j GEN2.1 2.1.45 GENERIC Conduct of Operations

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Conduct of Operations Ability to identif and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication. (CFR: 41.7/43.5 / 45.4)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• A unit startup is in progress

• The unit is at 15% RTP

• A Steam Generator Tube Leak occurs Indications:

• S/G NR Level going up in an uncontrolled manner

• S/G or Steam Line EMFs above normal

• Comparison of S/G Secondary Chemistry samples

1. Comparison of RP frisk of main steam lines

2. S/G CF Flow comparison

3. Comparison of RP frisk of S/G cation columns In accordance with AP-lO (NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS) Case I (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE), ALL of the redundant indications that will be used to identify the leaking S/G are the bulleted indications and Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1 ONLY B. 3 ONLY C. 1AND2 D. 2AND3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 274 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 General Discussion In accordance with AP-lO, the following indications are used to identify the S/G with the tube leak:

1. S/G NR Level going up in an uncontrolled manner

2. S/G or Steam Line EMFs above normal

3. Comparison of S/G Secondary Chemistry samples

4. S/G CF Flow comparison

5. Comparison of RP frisk of S/G cation columns Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses a comparison of the frisk of main steam lines with a frisk of S/G cation columns and concludes that S/G CF Flows are not useful for identifying a leaking S/G.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant and concludes that S/G CF Flows are not useful for identifying a leaking S/G and does not recall that hand-held radiation monitors can be an effective means of identifying a leaking S/G.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the RP frisk of main steam lines with RP frisk of S/G cation columns.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it required the applicant to have knowledge of the diverse indications that are used in AP-lO to identify the S/G with the tube leak.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This is not a systems knowledge based question.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with AP-lO.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to entry conditions for AP-lO.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of steps within the body of the procedure.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided AP-lO (NC System Leak Within The Capacity of Both NV Pumps)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 95

[ining Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-lO Objective 7 GEN2.1 2.1.45 GENERiC Conduct of Operations

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Conduct of Operations Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4) 401-9 Comments: RemarksIStatus This question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on feedback from Chief Examiner, revised stem of question to be less confusing. Otherwise kept question as written.

HCF 09/05/20 13.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 96 GEN2.2 2.2.2 1 GENERIC Equipment Control

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Equipment Control Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

• The unit is at 100% RTP

• The Auxiliary Operator on rounds reports a slightly increased vibration level on the 2A Boric Acid Transfer pump

• The Shift Manager has directed the OTG to perform PT121A142091013A (2A BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP PERFORMANCE TEST) to evaluate the observation

• The Auxiliary Operator reports that the Boric Acid Transfer pump recirc line orifice is bypassed to establish conditions for the test During the performance of PT/2/A/4209/013A, the Boration Flow Path from the Boric Acid Tank is (1)

If the performance test determines that bearing vibration levels are in the ALERT Range, the pump (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following correctly completes the statements above?

A. 1. OPERABLE

2. must be declared inoperable B. 1. OPERABLE

2. is OPERABLE and surveillance frequency is doubled C. 1. INOPERABLE

2. must be declared inoperable D. 1. INOPERABLE

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 General Discussion According to PT/2/A142091013A, the 2A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is operated in recirculation to the BAT through 2NV-392 (Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank Recirc Inlet Isol). This will render the entire flowpath from the BAT through parallel path BA Transfer Pumps inoperable.

According to PTI2IA/4209/013A, when the test is performed the SRO shall evaluate TSAIL model M2-0282 for operability of the Boration Flow Path from the Boric Acid Tank. From this it will be determined that the Boric Acid Flow path is INOPERABLE.

According to PT/2/A/42091013A, if all pump readings are within the ACCEPTABLE Range from the Procedure Test Datasheet, 2A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is Operable. If any pump readings are in the ALERT Range, the 2A Boric Acid Pump is Operable but the Surveillance frequency must be doubled.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the PT has the operator evaluate the TS model for flowpath operability because based on plant conditions, the flowpath may not need to be declared INOPERABLE.

The second part is plausible because the applicant may confuse the actions for the ALERT range and the REQUIRED ACTION range. If vibration levels are in the REQUIRED ACTION range, the pump would be declared INOPERABLE.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the PT has the operator evaluate the TS model for flowpath operability because based on plant conditions, the flowpath may not need to be declared INOPERABLE.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the applicant may confuse the actions for the ALERT range and the REQUIRED ACTION range. If vibration levels are in the REQUIRED ACTION range, the pump would be declared INOPERABLE.

Answer D Discussion T:Seeexplanationabov Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate knowledge of pre- (i.e. the flowpath is declared inoperable prior to test) and post-maintenance (i.e. the ALERT level results in increased frequency of test) operability requirements.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

I) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

The question is related to knowledge of the SLCs and cannot be answered with system level knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are NO immediate actions related to this question.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Related to knowledge of the SLCs and not AOPs or EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of the BA Pump Surveillance test procedure step and TSAIL.

5) This question involves the application of required actions in a surveillance procedure required by the SLCs. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 96 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2009 MNS Audit Exam Q99 (Bank 3217)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

PT/2/A14209/013 A (2A Boric Acid Transfer Pump Performance Test)

Learning Objectives:

NONE GEN2.2 2.2.21 - GENERIC Equipment Control

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Equipment Control Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements. (CFR: 41.10/ 43.2) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 279 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 97 GEN2.3 2.3.14 GENERIC Radiation Control

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Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 /45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

• The unit is at 100% RTP

• The following alarms are received:

o 1 EMF-48 (REACTOR COOLANT HIGH RAD) o IEMF-18 (REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A)

• Chemistry sample indicates that the high activity is due to failed fuel

• Dose-Equivalent Iodine-131 is approximately 5 pCi/gm

• The crew has implemented AP-018 (HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT)

In accordance with AP-018, the crew will (1)

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY) (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. raise Letdown flow to 120 GPM

2. a plant shutdown and coold own to less than 500°F must be performed B. i. raiseLetdownflowtol20GPM;

2. plant operation may continue for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> with sampling NC system every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C. 1. ensure Mixed Bed Demin is in service AND place a Cation Bed Demin in service if requested by Chemistry

2. a plant shutdown and cooldown to less than 500°F must be performed D. 1. ensure Mixed Bed Demin is in service AND place a Cation Bed Demin in service if requested by Chemistry

2. plant operation may continue for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> with sampling NC system every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 280 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 97 General Discussion In accordance with AP-0I8 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant), if the high activity is determined to be as a result of failed fuel, the crew is directed to ensure that a mixed bed demineralizer is in service and place a Cation Demin in service if requested by Chemistry.

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS High Activity), with Dose-Equivalent 1-131 greater than lpCi/gm (SR 3.4.16.2) and less than 60)1/gm, the unit can continue to operate for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> with sampling frequency increased to every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is the AP-018 required action if the high activity is determined to be due to a crud burst.

The second part is plausible because this would be the required action if Dose-Equivalent 1-131 is greater than 60 pCi/gm or if it had been greater than 1 pCi/gm for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. It is plausible that the applicant could confuse the required action for DEl greater than 1 pCi/gm (i.e.

increased sampling frequency) with the action for DEl greater than 60 pCi/gm (required shutdown).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is the AP-018 required action if the high activity is determined to be due to a crud burst.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because this would be the required action if Dose-Equivalent 1-131 is greater than 60 pCi/gm or if it had been greater than I pCi/gm for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. It is plausible that the applicant could confuse the required action for DEl greater than I pCi/gm (i.e.

increased sampling frequency) with the action for DEl greater than 60 pCi/gm (required shutdown).

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must demonstrate a knowledge of radiation hazards during abnormal plant conditions by determining the required actions as a result of the increased radiation hazard.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must evaluate the plant conditions given and recall the required actions as a result of that evaluation. Because this requires more than one mental step, it is a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Specs The actions required are the result of evaluating and determine Tech Spec LCO actions that are greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requirements.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

The information required is below-the-line LCO action knowledge.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

This question does NOT involve TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) This question requires the applicant to evaluate plant conditions and determine TS actions that are below-the-line knowledge and actions that are greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2008 MNS NRC Q97 (Bank 3315)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant)

Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS Specific Activity)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-18 Objective 5 GEN2.3 2.3.14 GENERIC Radiation Control

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Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 282 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 GEN2.3 2.3.6 GENERIC Radiation Control

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Radiation Control Ability to approve release permits. (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit is in MODE 5 in preparation for refueling

• The crew is preparing to place the Containment Purge (VP) system in service

• The Gaseous Waste Release (GWR) is ready for Operations review Procedure legend:

SLC 16.11.6 (DOSE RATE GASEOUS EFFLUENTS)

Which ONE (1) of the following must the CRS verify prior to authorizing the VP release?

A. Source check has been performed B. Operability of 1EMF 35, 36,37 (UNIT VENT)

C. The isotopes present are within release limits D. The release will not exceed the limits of SLC 16.11 .6 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 283 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 General Discussion The Discharge Document is delivered to the Control Room where the Control Room SRO ensures all paperwork is complete prior to authorizing the release. This authorization serves as an acknowledgment by the Control Room SRO that a release is about to take place. He should review the following prior to authorization.

- GWR document agrees with release procedure.

- Recommended Release Rate vs calculated release rates.

- The recommended release rate is the most restrictive release rate or maximum observed system release rate (approximately 23,000 CFM for VP releases).

- EMF utilized (EMF-39) MUST be operable in Modes 5 and 6.

- Expected range of EMF-39, Trip 1, and Trip 2 setpoints.

- Source check has been performed

- Special Instructions.

- All blanks are completed.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses IEMF-35, 36 and 37 with 1EMF-39.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The answer is plausible because it is a function that must be performed prior to the release and is completed by RP personnel.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The answer is plausible because it is a function that must be performed prior to the release and is completed by RP personnel.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the requirements for approving the VP release.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to I OCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This question is not related to system knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with the approval of a GWR.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question involves knowledge of GWR approval requirements and not procedure entry requirements.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure step sequence not sequence of events within the procedure.

This question involves detailed knowledge of the GWR approval process.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 98 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2007 MNS NRC Retake Q97 (Bank 3518)

Development References

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-RGR Rev 1 lB. Section 2.3 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-WE-RGR Objective 3 GEN2.3 2.3.6 GENERIC Radiation Control

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Radiation Control Ability to approve release permits. (CFR: 41.13 /43.4 /45.10) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 285 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 99 99 GEN2.4 2.4.16 GENERIC Emergency Procedures! Plan

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Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. (CFR: 41.10! 43.5 /45.13)

With Unit 1 at 100% RTP the following conditions exist:

• The 1C S/G develops a 10 GPM tube leak

• AP-lO (NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS) has been implemented

• Plant load is reduced using AP-04 (RAPID DOWNPOWER), and manually tripped at 15% power

• The crew has just transitioned to ES-0.1 (REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE)

Subsequently:

• NCS Pressure is 2210 PSIG, and slowly DECREASING

• The crew arrives at Step 23.a of ES-0.1 and is directed to Maintain Pzr pressure AT 2235 PSIG

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• Simultaneously, the crew arrives at Step 18.a of AP-lO and is directed to Depressurize to between 1900-1955 PSIG using normal Pzr spray.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes how the implementation of AP-lO and ES-0.1 is coordinated?

A. Suspend actions in AP-lO until ES-0.1 is complete; THEN Return to AP-lO and complete all required actions.

B. Suspend actions in ES-0.1 until AP-lO is complete; THEN Return to ES-0.1 and complete all required actions.

C. Continue simultaneous implementation of ES-0.1 and AP-lO; If conflicting guidance is provided, AP-1 0 actions will have priority.

D. Continue simultaneous implementation of ES-0.1 and AP-lO; If conflicting guidance is provided, ES-0.1 actions will have priority.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 99 99 General Discussion According to the AP1O Background Document (p7-8; Rev 6), during the performance ofAPlO, if the reactor is tripped, the crew would end up running ES-0. I concurrently with the remainder of this AP. For the potential conflicts in guidance given in the two procedures, the actions that affect the strategy of this AP would take priority. This is because the actions in AP-lO were written to minimize primary-to-secondary leakage by quickly depressurizing and cooling down the NC System. ES-0.l was written to stabilize the plant following a reactor trip. Some examples of conflicting actions are: 1) ES-0.1 would turn Pzr heaters on if NC pressure is low whereas AP/lO instructs the operator to turn off Pzr heaters prior to the NC depressurization; 2) ES-0.1 would establish letdown when Pzr level is greater than the letdown isolation setpoint whereas AP/lO operates letdown on the ability to maintain Pzr level and adequate boration flow; 3) ES-0.I has a step to verify SI actuation on the low Pzr pressure SI setpoint whereas AP/lO purposely depressurizes the NC System and blocks the SI signal: 4) ES-0.1 stabilizes NC temperature whereas AP/lO performs an NC cooldown. This guidance is consistent with the guidance provided in OMP 4-3 (p22; Rev 27), which states that generally the use of APs in conjunction with an EP should be avoided. However, it goes on to say that in some cases it would be proper to use an AP during a major accident that is addressed in the EPs.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

It is plausible because the operator may incorrectly believe that since the EP network has been entered, that the AP no longer takes precedence.

Generally this is true so it would be reasonable for the applicant to believe that an EP would take precedence over an AP.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the operator may incorrectly believe that the AP takes precedence to the point to which the EP must be set aside.

Considering that the remaining actions in ES 0.1 are just clean up and will not address a major problem that has yet to be dealt with, this would seem a reasonable course of action.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the operator may incorrectly believe that the actions of an EP always take precedence over the actions of an EP. In almost every scenario, this would be true so it would not be unreasonable for the applicant to believe that it would in this scenario as well.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate the ability to interpret and execute procedure steps during a SGTL. Specifically he must demonstrate the ability to decide between conflicting procedural guidance.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must perform a level of analysis concerning the given indications and determine the correct procedural course of action.

Basis for SRO only The question is SRO-Only because the question cannot be answered by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, or EOP Entry conditions, but rather requires that the operator know how to implement two procedures concurrently during a specific event (i.e. SGTL).

This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev idated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to IOCFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

I) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions. Neither of the actions described are immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed SRO level procedural selection with conflicting guidance between an higher and lower level procedure.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Q94 (Bank 3203)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 99 Development References Student References Provided BS (Reactor Trip Response) 4P-10 (NC System Leakage)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-AP-10 (NC System Leakage)

Background Document for AP-lO (NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NIV Pumps)

Learning Objectives:

DP-MC-AP-10 Objective 7 GEN2.4 2.4.16 GENERIC Emergency Procedures / Plan

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Emergency Procedures! Plan Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. (CFR: 41.10! 43.5/45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 288 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 ioo GEN2.4 2.4.5 GENERIC Emergency Procedures I Plan

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Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 I 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The unit was at 70% RTP when a steam leak inside containment occurred

• B train equipment was in service

• 1 A DIG is tagged for replacement of a lube oil filter

• Ten minutes after the Safety Injection signal a fault developed on I ETA and it is de-energized

• The STA recommends implementing AP-07 (LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER).

In accordance with OMP 4-3 (USE OF ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES) the CRS (I) implement AP-07 because (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. MAY

2. APs may be implemented concurrently as time and resources allow B. 1. MAY NOT

2. one train of safeguards equipment has power C. I. MAY

2. under the current conditions AP-07 has priority over all other procedures D. 1. MAY NOT

2. concurrent implementation of AP5 is not allowed once an EP has been entered Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 289 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 ioo General Discussion OMP 4-3 cautions the operator regarding the implementation of APs concurrently with EPs, especially if an SI has occurred. This is because APs are generally written assuming an SI has NOT occurred. However, if time and resources allow, the CRS can implement APs concurrently with EPs.

So, for this particular situation, the CRS may implement AP-07 in accordance with the OMP 4-3 rules of usage but must evaluate AP steps to ensure that they do not conflict with any EPs in effect.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses AP-07 with ECA-0.0. In ECA-0.0, the crew would transition to ECA-0. 1 or ECA-0.2 as soon as 1ETA or 1ETB had power restored.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses AP-07 with ECA-0.0. There is a step at the beginning of ECA-0.0 that directs the operators to IOT implement any other EPs during the performance of ECA-0.0. Also, there are times when an AP will take priority over an EP. For example, if AP-lO and ES-0.I are implemented concurrently, they have conflicting guidance regarding NC system pressure control. In this particular instance AP-lO has priority over ES-0.1.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses AP-07 with EPs. OMP 4-3 directs that more than one EP shall NOT be run concurrently unless direct by the procedure.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures (i.e. how the operating procedures are implemented relative to each other).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

I) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This is NOT a systems-related question.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

This is NOT procedure immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This is NOT related to procedure entry conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure rules of usage requirements.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2007 MNS NRC Q99 (Bank 3520)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 ioo Development References Student References Provided

References:

OMP 4-3 (Use of Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures) Section 7.18 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-OMP Objective 5 GEN2.4 2.4.5 GENERIC Emergency Procedures I Plan

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Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

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