05000219/FIN-2010003-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.19 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.19 | ||
| Inspector = J Kulp, S Barr, R Nimitz, J Nicholson, R Bellamy, J Ambrosini, O Masnyk | | Inspector = J Kulp, S Barr, R Nimitz, J Nicholson, R Bellamy, J Ambrosini, O Masnyk-Bailey, S Hammann | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green finding when Exelon cycled valves for maintenance prior to performing scheduled quarterly in-service testing (IST), which resulted in unacceptable preconditioning of valves within the isolation condenser system on April 7. This finding was of very low safety significance and was determined not to be a violation of NRC requirements. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action system as IR 1053801. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency which resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because Exelon did not appropriately coordinate work activities to support long term equipment reliability. [H.3(b)]. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green finding when Exelon cycled valves for maintenance prior to performing scheduled quarterly in-service testing (IST), which resulted in unacceptable preconditioning of valves within the isolation condenser system on April 7. This finding was of very low safety significance and was determined not to be a violation of NRC requirements. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action system as IR 1053801. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency which resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because Exelon did not appropriately coordinate work activities to support long term equipment reliability. [H.3(b)]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000219/2010003 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kulp S Barr R Nimitz J Nicholson R Bellamy J Ambrosini O Masnyk-Bailey S Hammann |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |