05000482/FIN-2012004-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Long, C Peabody, C Speer, G Guerra, J Laughlin, J Watkins, L Ricketson, N Greene, N Makris, N O,' | | Inspector = C Long, C Peabody, C Speer, G Guerra, J Laughlin, J Watkins, L Ricketson, N Greene, N Makris, N O, 'Keefer Kopriva, S Hedger | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = On August 2, 2012, the inspectors reviewed a licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was found to have excessive oil contamination. On August 11, 2011, Wolf Creeks oil sampling program received laboratory results for the turbine side of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The oil analysis had high particulates greater than the action level. The oil was filtered and exchanged several times and returned to service. In February 2012, the Terry turbine and governor system was disassembled and cleaned. The electronic governor regulator to pedestal adapter had significant corrosion and was cleaned. Vendor analyses of the electronic governor regulator found that degraded performance and eventual failure was a likely outcome. The failure to ensure oil quality met industry standards of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor oil system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, and found that a detailed risk evaluation was required because the performance deficiency caused one train to be out of service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The senior reactor analyst estimated the risk of potential increase in pump failure probability caused by the degraded oil conditions. The overall risk of the performance deficiency would increase as the estimated failure probability increased and decrease as the estimated time the pump would run before failure increased. After reviewing the range of risk values over the spectrum of pump performance, Region IV management determined that the significance of the performance deficiency was very low (Green), in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Procedure I-ENG-004, Lubricating Oil Analysis, Revision 3, step 1.1 specified, in part, that oil analysis be performed to detect degrading oil and component conditions. Procedure I-ENG-004, Attachment A, specified quality standards for water and particulates. Contrary to the above, from September 9, 2010, to August 11, 2011, oil analysis failed to identify degrading turbine oil below acceptable limits because water and particulate analyses were not consistently specified or acted upon when limits were exceeded. The licensee has entered this into the corrective action program as condition report 42635. | | description = On August 2, 2012, the inspectors reviewed a licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was found to have excessive oil contamination. On August 11, 2011, Wolf Creeks oil sampling program received laboratory results for the turbine side of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The oil analysis had high particulates greater than the action level. The oil was filtered and exchanged several times and returned to service. In February 2012, the Terry turbine and governor system was disassembled and cleaned. The electronic governor regulator to pedestal adapter had significant corrosion and was cleaned. Vendor analyses of the electronic governor regulator found that degraded performance and eventual failure was a likely outcome. The failure to ensure oil quality met industry standards of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor oil system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, and found that a detailed risk evaluation was required because the performance deficiency caused one train to be out of service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The senior reactor analyst estimated the risk of potential increase in pump failure probability caused by the degraded oil conditions. The overall risk of the performance deficiency would increase as the estimated failure probability increased and decrease as the estimated time the pump would run before failure increased. After reviewing the range of risk values over the spectrum of pump performance, Region IV management determined that the significance of the performance deficiency was very low (Green), in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Procedure I-ENG-004, Lubricating Oil Analysis, Revision 3, step 1.1 specified, in part, that oil analysis be performed to detect degrading oil and component conditions. Procedure I-ENG-004, Attachment A, specified quality standards for water and particulates. Contrary to the above, from September 9, 2010, to August 11, 2011, oil analysis failed to identify degrading turbine oil below acceptable limits because water and particulate analyses were not consistently specified or acted upon when limits were exceeded. The licensee has entered this into the corrective action program as condition report 42635. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Long C Peabody C Speer G Guerra J Laughlin J Watkins L Ricketson N Greene N Makris N O 'Keefer Kopriva S Hedger |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |