05000341/FIN-2016002-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | ||
| Inspector = B Dickson, B Kemker, G O | | Inspector = B Dickson, B Kemker, G O'Dwyer, I Khan, J Bozga, M Doyle, M Jones, P Smagacz, V Myers, V Petrella | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance with an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have a procedure that prescribed instructions to determine the average silt level in the residual heat removal (RHR) reservoir to ensure the stand-alone document ensures silt levels in the reservoir are maintained below the proceduralized limit of 3 inches. Specifically, in 2014 and 2015, the licensee failed to include the documented reservoir surveys or a method to determine the average silt levels in the RHR reservoir. After discussing the issue with the responsible site staff for the 2014 inspection, the licensee was able to locate the reservoir survey map outside of the quality records system; the records for 2015 were not provided. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program, verified that additional margin existed, and confirmed the reservoirs were still able to maintain their required design volume with the silt accumulation. The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because if left uncorrected it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, since licensee procedures failed to prescribe instructions for silt depth determination, and failed to prescribe how responsible site staff determines an average reservoir silt level based on diver inspection reports, both quality related activities, the potential exists for an unacceptable condition to go unnoticed, affecting service water systems operability. The finding was of very-low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of system operability and/or function. The inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance with an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have a procedure that prescribed instructions to determine the average silt level in the residual heat removal (RHR) reservoir to ensure the stand-alone document ensures silt levels in the reservoir are maintained below the proceduralized limit of 3 inches. Specifically, in 2014 and 2015, the licensee failed to include the documented reservoir surveys or a method to determine the average silt levels in the RHR reservoir. After discussing the issue with the responsible site staff for the 2014 inspection, the licensee was able to locate the reservoir survey map outside of the quality records system; the records for 2015 were not provided. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program, verified that additional margin existed, and confirmed the reservoirs were still able to maintain their required design volume with the silt accumulation. The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because if left uncorrected it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, since licensee procedures failed to prescribe instructions for silt depth determination, and failed to prescribe how responsible site staff determines an average reservoir silt level based on diver inspection reports, both quality related activities, the potential exists for an unacceptable condition to go unnoticed, affecting service water systems operability. The finding was of very-low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of system operability and/or function. The inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:23, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2016002 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dickson B Kemker G O'Dwyer I Khan J Bozga M Doyle M Jones P Smagacz V Myers V Petrella |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |