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| author name = Cuthbert L
| author name = Cuthbert L
| author affiliation = Alliance For A Clean Environment
| author affiliation = Alliance For A Clean Environment
| addressee name = Krohn P G
| addressee name = Krohn P
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2
| docket = 05000352, 05000353
| docket = 05000352, 05000353
| license number = NPF-039, NPF-085
| license number = NPF-039, NPF-085
| contact person = Krohn P G
| contact person = Krohn P
| case reference number = EDATS RegionI-2015-0021
| case reference number = EDATS RegionI-2015-0021
| document type = E-Mail
| document type = E-Mail
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:From: Krohn, Paul Sent: Friday, February 06, 2015 4:37 PM To: Heater, Keith  
{{#Wiki_filter:From:                         Krohn, Paul Sent:                         Friday, February 06, 2015 4:37 PM To:                           Heater, Keith


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net
FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net [mailto:aceactivists@comcast.net]
[mailto:aceactivists@comcast.net
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 3:35 PM To: Krohn, Paul Cc: Bower, Fred; Ennis, Rick; NRDC; Evan Brandt
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 3:35 PM To: Krohn, Paul Cc: Bower, Fred; Ennis, Rick; NRDC; Evan Brandt  


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing January 19, 2015 To:      Paul Krohn, NRC Chief Engineering Branch 2
Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing January 19, 2015 To:      Paul Krohn, NRC Chief Engineering Branch 2 From: Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, ACE President Re:      Limerick Nuclear Plant Changes, Tests, Experiments, and Permanent Plant Modifications Approved by NRC, Based On Exelon's Self-Serving, Self-Assessment It is alarming that problems identified by NRC in 1984, before Limerick Nuclear Plant's original license was approved, have persisted up to and through NRC's 10-14 relicensing of Limerick. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon exposes the unresolved complexity of Limerick's problems. Your letter and attachment to Exelon reveals an alarming NRC hands-off-safety trend at Limerick.
 
Limerick's safety problems were not resolved before Limerick was originally licensed.
From:   Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, ACE President Re:      Limerick Nuclear Plant Changes, Tests, Experiments, and Permanent   Plant Modifications Approved by NRC, Based On Exelon's Self-Serving, Self-Assessment It is alarming that problems identified by NRC in 1984, before Limerick Nuclear Plant's original license was approved, have persisted up to and through NRC's 10-14 relicensing of Limerick. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon exposes the unresolved complexity of Limerick's problems. Your letter and attachment to Exelon reveals an alarming NRC hands-off-safety trend at Limerick.  
The NRC section chief in 1984 stated that his staff wanted four items cleared up before licensing Limerick (Mercury 8/31/84). Items he identified included:
 
: 1. Improper procedures
Limerick's safety problems were not resolv ed before Limerick was originally licensed. The NRC section chief in 1984 stated that his staff wanted four items cleared up before licensing Limerick (Mercury 8/31/84).
: 2. Incomplete safety measures
Items he identif ied included:  
: 3. Faulty valves
: 1.     Improper procedures  
: 4. A defective hydrogen remover
: 2.     Incomplete safety measures  
* Three of the four items identified by NRC in 1984 remain unresolved to this day (Confirmed by NRC's safety reports for Limerick relicensing).
: 3.     Faulty valves  
* It is unclear whether or not the fourth item, a defective hydrogen remover, was ever repaired or replaced.
: 4.     A defective hydrogen remover
o We are concerned because At Limerick, at least one accident occurred involving a hydrogen leak. This documented hydrogen leak, identified by
* Three of the four items ident ified by NRC in 1984 remain unresolved to this day (Confirmed by NRC's safety reports for  


Limerick relicensing).
NRC in a safety report occurred after Exelon submitted its application for Limerick relicensing.
* It is unclear whether or not the fourth item, a defective hydrogen remover, was ever repaired or replaced.
o We are concerned about Limerick's original defective hydrogen remover because at TMI, it was a hydrogen explosion that rocked the control room during the TMI partial meltdown.
o We are concerned because At Limerick, at least one accident occurred involving a hydrogen leak. This docum ented hydrogen leak, identified by NRC in a safety report occurred after Exelon submitted its application for Limerick relicensing.
UNACCEPTABLE History repeated itself for Limerick relicensing. Your letter to Exelon indicates that permanent Limerick plant modifications were initiated by Exelon BEFORE NRC's approval of Limerick relicensing (10-14).
o We are concerned about Limerick's original defective hydrogen remover because at TMI, it was a hydrogen expl osion that rocked the control room during the TMI partial meltdown.
* NRC allowed Exelon to put the cart before the horse and rubberstamped its approval of those modifications two months AFTER NRC relicensed Limerick (12-23-14).
UNACCEPTABLE History repeated itself for Limerick relicensing.
Your letter to Ex elon indicates that permanent Limerick plant modifications were initiated by Exelon BEFORE NRC's approval of Limerick relicensing (10-14).
* NRC allowed Exelon to put t he cart before the horse and rubberstamped its approval of those modifications two months AFTER NRC relicensed Lime rick (12-23-14).
EVEN WORSE Exelon assessed the "adequacy" of changes it made at Limerick based on its own reviews.
EVEN WORSE Exelon assessed the "adequacy" of changes it made at Limerick based on its own reviews.
* Of major concern: Exelon c oncluded that an NRC safety evaluation was NOT required for risky changes, including experiments, that Exelon had already begun im plementing at Limerick.
* Of major concern: Exelon concluded that an NRC safety evaluation was NOT required for risky changes, including experiments, that Exelon had already begun implementing at Limerick.
Changes include:
Changes include:
* Experiments
* Experiments
Line 53: Line 48:
* NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
* NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
* Plant Drawings
* Plant Drawings
* Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR)
* Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR)
NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self-evaluations put the public at risk.
NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self-evaluations put the public at risk.
: 1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure.
: 1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure.
: 2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing fo r Exelon's risky changes at Limerick. 3. It is irresponsible fo r NRC to relicense Limerick without requiring Exelon to comply with Commitment #46, which required the testing of Exelon's aging-manage ment program for Limerick.  
: 2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing for Exelon's risky changes at Limerick.
: 4. NRC is putting on blinders and faili ng to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-s erving reports to substitute for actual safeguards.
: 3. It is irresponsible for NRC to relicense Limerick without requiring Exelon to comply with Commitment #46, which required the testing of Exelon's aging-management program for Limerick.
: 4. NRC is putting on blinders and failing to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-serving reports to substitute for actual safeguards.
DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM:
DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM:


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In 2011, NRC issued a "white violation" citing Exelon with noncompliance of a legally binding requirement involving the failure of the feedwater Motor Operated Valve (MOV) which resulted in loss of Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) for longer than specifications allow, according to NRC's Technical Specifications (TS).
In 2011, NRC issued a "white violation" citing Exelon with noncompliance of a legally binding requirement involving the failure of the feedwater Motor Operated Valve (MOV) which resulted in loss of Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) for longer than specifications allow, according to NRC's Technical Specifications (TS).
* NRC defined the violation as a "weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability".
* NRC defined the violation as a weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability.
* NRC stated that this was a "V iolation of a legally binding requirement".
* NRC stated that this was a Violation of a legally binding requirement.
In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM), under Exelon's control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approval
In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM),
: s. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment.  
under Exelons control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approvals. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment.
 
In 2013, the NRC inexplicably granted Exelons request to remove the MOV valve from NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
In 2013, the NRC inexplicably granted Exelon's r equest to remove the MOV valve from NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)  
The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the immediate cause of the loss-of-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape.
 
The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the  
 
immediate cause of the loss-of-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape.
EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD.
EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD.
* In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that  
* In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that included:
 
included:
o permanently fixing the valves in an open position o cutting the power to the valve alarms o removing loss-of-power/overload alarms
o permanently fixing the valves in an open position o cutting the power to the valve alarms o removing loss-of-power/overload alarms
: 1. How can this be? Isn't the opening and closing of valves essential to preventing core meltdowns?
: 1. How can this be? Isn't the opening and closing of valves essential to preventing core meltdowns?
: 2. Was this done because the MOV valve stem broke? If so, when did that happen?
: 2. Was this done because the MOV valve stem broke? If so, when did that happen?
: 3. The MOV valve was inoperable for a month, verified by an NRC inspection report letter to Exelon dated 11-4-11.  
: 3. The MOV valve was inoperable for a month, verified by an NRC inspection report letter to Exelon dated 11-4-11.
: 4. The 11-4-11 letter shows NRC iss ued a white violat ion, stating that it may require additional NRC inspection, yet now NRC has abandoned rigorous oversight of the MOV and its associated systems and alarms.
: 4. The 11-4-11 letter shows NRC issued a white violation, stating that it may require additional NRC inspection, yet now NRC has abandoned rigorous oversight of the MOV and its associated systems and alarms.
* NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT.
* NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT.
* NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK.
* NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK.
QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK: 1. Because the MOV is associated with plant stability, the potential consequences of NRC's lax oversight could be catastrophic.
QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK:
: 1. Because the MOV is associated with plant stability, the potential consequences of NRC's lax oversight could be catastrophic.
* Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations?
* Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations?
* It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true?
* It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true?
: 2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when?  
: 2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when?
: 3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refe rs to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineer ing inspection team for Limerick?}}
: 3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refers to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineering inspection team for Limerick?}}

Latest revision as of 16:59, 31 October 2019

Email Incoming from ACE, Dr. L. Cuthbert, Concerning Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved After Relicensing, on Jan 19, 2015
ML15037A724
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/19/2015
From: Cuthbert L
Alliance For A Clean Environment
To: Paul Krohn
Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
Krohn P
References
EDATS RegionI-2015-0021
Download: ML15037A724 (5)


Text

From: Krohn, Paul Sent: Friday, February 06, 2015 4:37 PM To: Heater, Keith

Subject:

FW: Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing From: aceactivists@comcast.net [1]

Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 3:35 PM To: Krohn, Paul Cc: Bower, Fred; Ennis, Rick; NRDC; Evan Brandt

Subject:

Risky Limerick Permanent Plant Modifications Approved AFTER Relicensing January 19, 2015 To: Paul Krohn, NRC Chief Engineering Branch 2 From: Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, ACE President Re: Limerick Nuclear Plant Changes, Tests, Experiments, and Permanent Plant Modifications Approved by NRC, Based On Exelon's Self-Serving, Self-Assessment It is alarming that problems identified by NRC in 1984, before Limerick Nuclear Plant's original license was approved, have persisted up to and through NRC's 10-14 relicensing of Limerick. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon exposes the unresolved complexity of Limerick's problems. Your letter and attachment to Exelon reveals an alarming NRC hands-off-safety trend at Limerick.

Limerick's safety problems were not resolved before Limerick was originally licensed.

The NRC section chief in 1984 stated that his staff wanted four items cleared up before licensing Limerick (Mercury 8/31/84). Items he identified included:

1. Improper procedures
2. Incomplete safety measures
3. Faulty valves
4. A defective hydrogen remover
  • Three of the four items identified by NRC in 1984 remain unresolved to this day (Confirmed by NRC's safety reports for Limerick relicensing).
  • It is unclear whether or not the fourth item, a defective hydrogen remover, was ever repaired or replaced.

o We are concerned because At Limerick, at least one accident occurred involving a hydrogen leak. This documented hydrogen leak, identified by

NRC in a safety report occurred after Exelon submitted its application for Limerick relicensing.

o We are concerned about Limerick's original defective hydrogen remover because at TMI, it was a hydrogen explosion that rocked the control room during the TMI partial meltdown.

UNACCEPTABLE History repeated itself for Limerick relicensing. Your letter to Exelon indicates that permanent Limerick plant modifications were initiated by Exelon BEFORE NRC's approval of Limerick relicensing (10-14).

  • NRC allowed Exelon to put the cart before the horse and rubberstamped its approval of those modifications two months AFTER NRC relicensed Limerick (12-23-14).

EVEN WORSE Exelon assessed the "adequacy" of changes it made at Limerick based on its own reviews.

  • Of major concern: Exelon concluded that an NRC safety evaluation was NOT required for risky changes, including experiments, that Exelon had already begun implementing at Limerick.

Changes include:

  • Experiments
  • Calculations
  • Analyses
  • Design Change Documentation
  • Procedures
  • NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)
  • Plant Drawings
  • Updated Final Safety Assessment Report (UFSAR)

NRC's reviews and acceptance of Exelon's self-evaluations put the public at risk.

1. We have no confidence in Exelon's self-assessment of its own changes for Limerick operations because Exelon obviously has a vested interest in the outcome. Evidence shows Exelon's data and reports fail to provide full, accurate, and timely disclosure.
2. It is reckless for NRC to have failed to conduct its own independent rigorous testing for Exelon's risky changes at Limerick.
3. It is irresponsible for NRC to relicense Limerick without requiring Exelon to comply with Commitment #46, which required the testing of Exelon's aging-management program for Limerick.
4. NRC is putting on blinders and failing to protect the public, while mindlessly allowing Exelon's self-serving reports to substitute for actual safeguards.

DANGEROUS PERMANENT LIMERICK PLANT MODIFICATIONS TO LIMERICK'S MOV SYSTEM:

Background:

In 2011, NRC issued a "white violation" citing Exelon with noncompliance of a legally binding requirement involving the failure of the feedwater Motor Operated Valve (MOV) which resulted in loss of Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) for longer than specifications allow, according to NRC's Technical Specifications (TS).

  • NRC defined the violation as a weakness in maintaining long-term plant stability.
  • NRC stated that this was a Violation of a legally binding requirement.

In 2012, Exelon requested an amendment taking the MOV out of Technical Specifications (TS), under NRC regulatory control, and into the Technical Manual (TM),

under Exelons control and not regulated by NRC. NRC contacted an unnamed state official for comment on this amendment prior to its approval. It is far from routine for the NRC to ask a state official for comment on its amendment approvals. The NRC stated, in its approval, that the unnamed state official had no comment.

In 2013, the NRC inexplicably granted Exelons request to remove the MOV valve from NRC's Technical Specifications (TS)

The reason this is a major concern is because at TMI, on March 28, 1979, the immediate cause of the loss-of-coolant accident that allowed the uncovering of the core and the melting of about half of it was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of water to escape.

EXELON CHANGES CLEARLY CREATE A SEVERE SAFETY HAZARD.

  • In 2014, Exelon made design changes to the Motor Operated Valve system for delivering water to the reactor core that included:

o permanently fixing the valves in an open position o cutting the power to the valve alarms o removing loss-of-power/overload alarms

1. How can this be? Isn't the opening and closing of valves essential to preventing core meltdowns?
2. Was this done because the MOV valve stem broke? If so, when did that happen?
3. The MOV valve was inoperable for a month, verified by an NRC inspection report letter to Exelon dated 11-4-11.
4. The 11-4-11 letter shows NRC issued a white violation, stating that it may require additional NRC inspection, yet now NRC has abandoned rigorous oversight of the MOV and its associated systems and alarms.
  • NRC IS WILLFULLY BLIND TO THE RISKS INVOLVED WITH THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT.
  • NRC IGNORED LIMERICK'S HISTORY OF VALVE PROBLEMS TO RELICENSE LIMERICK.

QUESTIONS RELATED TO YOUR 12-23-14 LETTER TO EXELON ABOUT LIMERICK:

1. Because the MOV is associated with plant stability, the potential consequences of NRC's lax oversight could be catastrophic.
  • Why would NRC excuse Exelon from compliance with original NRC regulations?
  • It appears that Exelon's MOV experiment would violate NRC regulations if the MOV was still in NRC's Technical Specifications (TS). Isn't that true?
2. Was the defective hydrogen remover ever repaired or replaced? If so, when?
3. Your 12-23-14 letter to Exelon refers to a "team". Was this team comprised of NRC engineers? If not, what company or contractor supplied the engineers? Are they a permanent engineering inspection team for Limerick?