Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, requires each containment isolation valve to be
operable in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. To be
operable, containment isolation valves GTHZ0007 and GTHZ0009, which are Category 3 valves, must be closed with the motive force removed.
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Condition A, Required Action A.1, requires, in part, that the affected penetration flow path for any
inoperable Category 3 containment isolation valve be isolated within
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Additionally, Required Action A.2, requires, in part, that the licensee verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated prior to entering mode 4 from mode 5. Contrary to the above, from April 28, 2015, through May 5, 2015, the licensee failed to verify the affected penetration flow path was isolated prior to entering mode 4 from mode 5 on April 28, 2015. As a result,
Technical specification 3.6.3, Condition A, was not met On May 5, 2015, the licensee discovered that the motive force for valves GTHZ0007 and GTHZ0009 was not removed and the air supply valves had not been locked closed, and the affected penetration flow paths were not isolated prior to entering mode 4 from mode 5 on April 28, 2015. The inspectors noted that although the motive force was not removed for valves GTHZ0007 and GTHZ0009, the valves were in their closed safeguards positions and redundant valves in series were closed with the motive force removed, which ensured each penetration flow path had one
operable valve closed with its motive force removed. Using Exhibit 3,
Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process for Finding At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation), or heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of
hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. Therefore, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green).
