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| number = ML13158A036
| number = ML13158A036
| issue date = 05/16/2013
| issue date = 05/16/2013
| title = Grand Gulf 2013-05-Draft Outlines
| title = 05-Draft Outlines
| author name = Garchow S M
| author name = Garchow S
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/OB
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/OB
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 15: Line 15:
| page count = 7
| page count = 7
}}
}}
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ES-301                              Administrative Topics Outline                            Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station                              Date of Examination: 5/8/2013 Examination Level: RO              SRO                            Operating Test Number: LOT 2012-1 Administrative Topic            Type                    Describe activity to be performed (see Note)                Code*
Verify Surveillances Status for 03-1-01-5 Att. I GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS1 Conduct of Operations                              2.1.25 (3.9/4.2), 2.1.36 (3.0/4.1), 2.1.40 (2.8/3.9),
R-N 2.1.42 (2.5/3.4)
Determine Firewatch Requirements Conduct of Operations                  R-D                        GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS3 2.1.2: (4.1/4.4); 2.1.8: (3.4/4.1); 2.2.22:
(4.0/4.7);2.1.25: (3.9/4.2); 2.4.25: (3.3/3.7)
Tagout Approval GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS3 Equipment Control                      R-N          2.2.13 (4.1/4.3), 2.2.15 (3.9/4.3), 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9),
2.2.40 (3.4/4.7)
Review Liquid Radwaste Discharge Permit GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS4 Radiation Control                      R-N                                2.3.6: 3.1 Emergency Event Classification GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS5 Emergency Procedures/Plan            S/R-N                            2.4.41 - 2.9/4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
* Type Codes & Criteria:          (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs;  4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                              Form ES-301-2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION                                    Date of Examination: 5/8/2013 Exam Level: RO                SRO-I          SRO-U                      Operating Test No.:          LOT-2012-1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title                                  Type Code*            Safety Function
: a. 202001 A4.02 (3.5/3.4); 202002 A4.08 (3.3/3.3) / Reset Recirc S-M                  1 FCV Runback, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR1
: b. 259001 A4.02 (3.9/3.7) / Reactor Feed Pump Startup, S-D-L                  2 GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR4
: c. 218000, K6.06 (3.4/3.6), A1.04 (4.1/4.2), A2.05 (3.4/3.6),                      A-E-L-N-S                  3 A4.01 (4.4/4.1), A4.10 (3.8/3.8) / Emergency Depressurize using ADS/SRVs, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR7
: d. 202001 K1.21 (2.6/2.6), K3.07 (2.9/2.9), A2.04 (3.7/3.8) / Rapid S-L-N                  4 Restart of RWCU Pumps, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR5
: e. 262001 A4.01 (3.4/3.7); A4.02 (3.4/3.4) / Align Buses 16AB and A-S-M                  6 17AC to ESF Transformer 21, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR2
: f. 201005 A2.13 (3.8/3.8); A4.01 (3.7/3.7) / Control Rod A-S-M                  7 Operability Surveillance, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR3
: g. 400000 K1.02 (3.2/3.4), A4.01 (3.1/3.0) / Align CCW to FPCCU A-S-D                  8 Heat Exchanger A, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR6 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
: h. 203000 K4.14 (3.6/3.7)
D-E-L                  4 295016 AA1.07 (4.2/4.3), AK2.02 (4.0/4.1),2.1.30 (4.4/4.0) /
Perform Attachment III of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panels ONEP, GJPM-OPS-2012-1PS1
: i. 262001 A2.11 (3.2/3.6), 295003 AA1.01 (3.7/3.8), 2.1.30                            D-E-R                  6 (4.4/4.0)/ Reset UV Lockouts on BOP Buses GLP-OPS-2012-1PS2
: j. 286000 A1.05 (3.2/3.2), 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9); 2.1.30:
D-E-S-R                  2 4.4/4.02.4.35 (3.8/4.0) / Align Fire Water to LPCS per EP Attachment 26, GLP-OPS-2012-1PS3
@          All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
* Type Codes                                    Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path                                                                4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank                                                              9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant                                                1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature                                                        - / - / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown                                                          1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)                                    2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams                                                                3 /  3 /  2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA                                                                            1/1/1 (S)imulator
ES-301                                    Transient and Event Checklist                              Form ES-301-5 Facility: GGNS                        Date of Exam: 5/08/13                          Operating Test No.: LOT-2012-1 A          E                                                  Scenarios P          V              1                    2                    3                4          T      M P          E                                                                                      O      I L          N            CREW                CREW                CREW              CREW          T      N I        T        POSITION              POSITION            POSITION          POSITION        A I
M C                  S      A      B      S      A      B      S    A      B    S    A      B    L    U A          T        R      T      O      R      T      O      R      T      O    R    T      O          M(*)
N          Y        O      C      P      O      C      P      O    C      P    O    C      P R    I  U T          P E
RX          0                          1                                                  1        1 NOR        0                          1                                                  1        1 I3      I/C        5                          5                                                  10        4 MAJ        1                          1                                                  2        2 TS          2                                                                              2        2 RX NOR I/C MAJ TS RX NOR I/C MAJ TS RX NOR I/C MAJ TS Instructions:
: 1.      Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; ( )Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
: 2.      Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
: 3.      Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
Rev 0 (2/28/12)                                                                                              Page 3 of 7
Appendix D                              Required Operator Actions                          Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1                                  Page 1 of 2 Facility:    Grand Gulf Nuclear Station      Scenario No.:    1              Op-Test No.: LOT-2012-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:                _____________________________
Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:
Surveillance 06-OP-1B33-Q-0001-01 Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test.
1B33F019 RW Process Sampling Outboard Isolation Valve to reopen during stroke testing.
Component Cooling Water temperature control valve fails partially closed, requiring isolating CCW to RWCU and power reduction.
Jet pumps 5/6 failure Loss of Offsite Power followed by an unisolable LOCA in the Drywell.
Div 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing system failure.
RHR A logic power failure (LPCS available by manual action).
Emergency Depressurization required due to low reactor water level.
Initial Conditions: Plant is operating at 100% power. ...
Inoperable Equipment: Division 3 AOT in progress with High Pressure Core Spray system and Division 3 Diesel Generator unavailable Turnover:
* Plant is in steady state operation at 100% power.
* The Division 3 AOT in progress with High Pressure Core Spray system and Division 3 Diesel Generator out of service for maintenance. Division 3 is scheduled to remain unavailable for the next 19 hours.
* Following shift briefing, perform 06-OP-1B33-Q-0001, Attachment 1, Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test.
Scenario Notes:
This is a new scenario.
Validation Time (60-90 min): XX min Rev 0 (2/28/12)                                                                                Page 1 of 7
Appendix D                              Required Operator Actions                                  Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1                                        Page 2 of 2 Event      Malf. No. Event Type                                          Event No.                                                                    Description Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test (06-OP-1B33-Q-1                        N (ATC) 0001, Attachment 1).
1B33F019 RW Process Sampling Outboard Isolation Valve to C (ATC) 2      b33f019_i                      reopen during stroke testing (06-OP-1B33-Q-0001, TS 3.6.1.3, TS (CRS)
TR SR 6.4.1.5).
A (CREW)        Component Cooling Water temperature control valve fails 3      p42R016          R(ATC)        partially closed, requiring isolating CCW to RWCU and power C (ATC)      reduction (05-1-02-V-1 Loss of Component Cooling Water).
A (CREW)        Jet pumps 5/6 rams head failure (05-1-02-III-6 Jet Pump 4        rr011c          C (ATC)      Anomalies, 05-1-02-III-3 Reduction in Recirculation System TS (CRS)      Flow Rate, TS 3.4.3).
Loss of Offsite Power followed by an unisolable LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2 RPV Control, EP-3 Containment Control, 05                                            02-I-1 Reactor Scram, 05-1-02-I-2 Turbine and Generator Trips, 05-1-02-I-4 Loss of AC Power).
z025025_                          When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and 5                      M(CREW)            -191, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure 12_45 trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized) Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -217.
Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task.
I(BOP)        Div 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing system failure (Alarm 6        r21218 Response Instruction 04-1-02-1H13-P864-2A-H1).
RHR A logic power failure (LPCS available by manual action)
When drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig or reactor water level is below -150.3, the crew recognizes Division 1 ECCS fails to automatically initiate and indication of RHR A Logic Power Failure and manually starts LPCS pump using its P601 7        r21220      I(ATC/BOP)          hand switch. Criterion is to align LPCS for injection (by manually starting LPCS pump on P601) prior to Emergency Depressurization AND/OR align RHR A for injection (by manually starting RHR A pump and opening 1E12F053A RHR A Shutdown Cooling Return to Feedwater on P601) prior to going below 125 psig during Emergency Depressurization.
(N)ormal,  (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,      (M)ajor,  (A)bnormal  (TS) Tech Spec
* Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)
Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events                                      1      Abnormal Events                                2 Reactivity Manipulations                          1      Total Malfunctions                              7 Instrument/Component Failures                      5      EP Entries (Requiring substantive action)      1 Major Transients                                  1      EP Contingencies                                1 Tech Spec Calls                                    2      Critical Tasks                                  2 Rev 0 (2/28/12)                                                                                        Page 2 of 7
Appendix D                              Required Operator Actions                          Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2                                  Page 1 of 2 Facility:  Grand Gulf Nuclear Station      Scenario No.:      2              Op-Test No.: LOT-2012-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:                  _____________________________
Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:
* Remove Heater Drain Pump A from service.
* Heater Drain Pump B trip when Heater Drain Pump A is secured.
* RPS/NSSSS pressure trip unit B21N678C fails high.
* Reactor Recirc Pump B trip.
* Condenser boot seal leak, slow loss of vacuum
* Condenser boot seal tear, rapid loss of vacuum, scram, hydraulic block ATWS, power greater than 5%.
* Standby Liquid Control suction valves failure to open
* Wide range level indication Channel A fails as-is Initial Conditions: Plant is operating at 84% power.
Inoperable Equipment: None Turnover:
* Power has been reduced to 84% per 03-1-01-2 Att. VIII, Temporary Downpower, to remove Heater Drain Pump A from service for an emergent maintenance window scheduled for 12 hours.
* Following shift briefing, secure Heater Drain Pump A per 04-1-01-N23-1 section 4.6.
Scenario Notes:
This is a new scenario.
Validation Time (60-90 min): XX min Rev 0 (2/28/12)                                                                                Page 1 of 7
Appendix D                              Required Operator Actions                                  Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2                                          Page 2 of 2 Event      Malf. No. Event Type                                          Event No.                                                                    Description Remove Heater Drain Pump A from service (04-1-01-N23-1 1                      N (ATC) section 4.6).
Heater Drain Pump B trip when Heater Drain Pump A is secured C (ATC) 2        fw231b                        (Alarm Response Instruction 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-B2, 05                              R(ATC) 02-V-5 Loss of Feedwater Heating).
RPS/NSSSS pressure trip unit B21N678C fails high (Alarm ptb21n078        I (ATC)      Response Instructions 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-B2/7A-A2/A2-3 c_a        TS (CRS)        D4, Section Procedure 17-S-06-5 Technical Specification Instrumentation Loop Logic, TS 3.3.1.1, TS 3.3.6.1).
C (ATC)        Reactor Recirc Pump B trip (Alarm Response Instructions 04      4        rr012b      A(CREW)        02-1H13-P680-3A-B10, 05-1-02-III-2 Reduction in Recirculation TS (CRS)        System Flow Rate, TS 3.4.1, TR 3.4.1).
C (ATC)        Condenser boot seal leak, slow loss of vacuum (05-1-02-V-9 5        fw163c A(CREW)        Loss of Condenser Vacuum)
Condenser boot seal tear, rapid loss of vacuum, scram, hydraulic block ATWS, power > 5%, level/power control (05                                            02-V-9 Loss of Condenser Vacuum, 05-1-02-I-1 Reactor Scram, 05-1-02-I-2 Turbine and Generator Trips, EP-2A ATWS RPV Control, EP-3 Containment Control)
Entry into EP2A step L8. Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system fw264c        M (CREW)          alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by 6
c11164                          available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to terminate and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching criteria specified in EP2A step L8.
Criteria specified in EP2A step L-9 are satisfied. Crew restores injection using Condensate/Feedwater as evidenced by feedwater flow to RPV or RPV level trend. Criterion is to give the highest priority to reinitiate injection flow and establish the appropriate level band.
c41329 lo-1c41f031_
7                        C(BOP)        Standby Liquid Control suction valves failure to open r
1c41f031_
g 8        rr041a        I(ATC)        Wide range level indication Channel A fails as-is (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,      (M)ajor,  (A)bnormal  (TS) Tech Spec
* Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)
Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events                                      1        Abnormal Events                                  2 Reactivity Manipulations                          1        Total Malfunctions                              7 Instrument/Component Failures                      6        EP Entries (Requiring substantive action)        2 Major Transients                                  1        EP Contingencies                                1 Tech Spec Calls                                    2        Critical Tasks                                  2 Rev 0 (2/28/12)                                                                                          Page 2 of 7}}

Latest revision as of 04:00, 6 February 2020

05-Draft Outlines
ML13158A036
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/2013
From: Garchow S
Operations Branch IV
To:
Entergy Operations
laura hurley
References
ES-301, ES-301-1 50-416/13-005, 50-417/13-005
Download: ML13158A036 (7)
v • d • e


Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 5/8/2013 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: LOT 2012-1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Verify Surveillances Status for 03-1-01-5 Att. I GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2), 2.1.36 (3.0/4.1), 2.1.40 (2.8/3.9),

R-N 2.1.42 (2.5/3.4)

Determine Firewatch Requirements Conduct of Operations R-D GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS3 2.1.2: (4.1/4.4); 2.1.8: (3.4/4.1); 2.2.22:

(4.0/4.7);2.1.25: (3.9/4.2); 2.4.25: (3.3/3.7)

Tagout Approval GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS3 Equipment Control R-N 2.2.13 (4.1/4.3), 2.2.15 (3.9/4.3), 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9),

2.2.40 (3.4/4.7)

Review Liquid Radwaste Discharge Permit GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS4 Radiation Control R-N 2.3.6: 3.1 Emergency Event Classification GJPM-OPS-2012-1AS5 Emergency Procedures/Plan S/R-N 2.4.41 - 2.9/4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: 5/8/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT-2012-1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. 202001 A4.02 (3.5/3.4); 202002 A4.08 (3.3/3.3) / Reset Recirc S-M 1 FCV Runback, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR1
b. 259001 A4.02 (3.9/3.7) / Reactor Feed Pump Startup, S-D-L 2 GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR4
c. 218000, K6.06 (3.4/3.6), A1.04 (4.1/4.2), A2.05 (3.4/3.6), A-E-L-N-S 3 A4.01 (4.4/4.1), A4.10 (3.8/3.8) / Emergency Depressurize using ADS/SRVs, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR7
d. 202001 K1.21 (2.6/2.6), K3.07 (2.9/2.9), A2.04 (3.7/3.8) / Rapid S-L-N 4 Restart of RWCU Pumps, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR5
e. 262001 A4.01 (3.4/3.7); A4.02 (3.4/3.4) / Align Buses 16AB and A-S-M 6 17AC to ESF Transformer 21, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR2
f. 201005 A2.13 (3.8/3.8); A4.01 (3.7/3.7) / Control Rod A-S-M 7 Operability Surveillance, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR3
g. 400000 K1.02 (3.2/3.4), A4.01 (3.1/3.0) / Align CCW to FPCCU A-S-D 8 Heat Exchanger A, GJPM-OPS-2012-1CR6 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
h. 203000 K4.14 (3.6/3.7)

D-E-L 4 295016 AA1.07 (4.2/4.3), AK2.02 (4.0/4.1),2.1.30 (4.4/4.0) /

Perform Attachment III of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panels ONEP, GJPM-OPS-2012-1PS1

i. 262001 A2.11 (3.2/3.6), 295003 AA1.01 (3.7/3.8), 2.1.30 D-E-R 6 (4.4/4.0)/ Reset UV Lockouts on BOP Buses GLP-OPS-2012-1PS2
j. 286000 A1.05 (3.2/3.2), 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9); 2.1.30:

D-E-S-R 2 4.4/4.02.4.35 (3.8/4.0) / Align Fire Water to LPCS per EP Attachment 26, GLP-OPS-2012-1PS3

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: GGNS Date of Exam: 5/08/13 Operating Test No.: LOT-2012-1 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I

M C S A B S A B S A B S A B L U A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M(*)

N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P R I U T P E

RX 0 1 1 1 NOR 0 1 1 1 I3 I/C 5 5 10 4 MAJ 1 1 2 2 TS 2 2 2 RX NOR I/C MAJ TS RX NOR I/C MAJ TS RX NOR I/C MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; ( )Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

Rev 0 (2/28/12) Page 3 of 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: LOT-2012-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

Surveillance 06-OP-1B33-Q-0001-01 Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test.

1B33F019 RW Process Sampling Outboard Isolation Valve to reopen during stroke testing.

Component Cooling Water temperature control valve fails partially closed, requiring isolating CCW to RWCU and power reduction.

Jet pumps 5/6 failure Loss of Offsite Power followed by an unisolable LOCA in the Drywell.

Div 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing system failure.

RHR A logic power failure (LPCS available by manual action).

Emergency Depressurization required due to low reactor water level.

Initial Conditions: Plant is operating at 100% power. ...

Inoperable Equipment: Division 3 AOT in progress with High Pressure Core Spray system and Division 3 Diesel Generator unavailable Turnover:

  • Plant is in steady state operation at 100% power.
  • The Division 3 AOT in progress with High Pressure Core Spray system and Division 3 Diesel Generator out of service for maintenance. Division 3 is scheduled to remain unavailable for the next 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />.
  • Following shift briefing, perform 06-OP-1B33-Q-0001, Attachment 1, Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time (60-90 min): XX min Rev 0 (2/28/12) Page 1 of 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description Reactor Recirc System Quarterly Valve Test (06-OP-1B33-Q-1 N (ATC) 0001, Attachment 1).

1B33F019 RW Process Sampling Outboard Isolation Valve to C (ATC) 2 b33f019_i reopen during stroke testing (06-OP-1B33-Q-0001, TS 3.6.1.3, TS (CRS)

TR SR 6.4.1.5).

A (CREW) Component Cooling Water temperature control valve fails 3 p42R016 R(ATC) partially closed, requiring isolating CCW to RWCU and power C (ATC) reduction (05-1-02-V-1 Loss of Component Cooling Water).

A (CREW) Jet pumps 5/6 rams head failure (05-1-02-III-6 Jet Pump 4 rr011c C (ATC) Anomalies, 05-1-02-III-3 Reduction in Recirculation System TS (CRS) Flow Rate, TS 3.4.3).

Loss of Offsite Power followed by an unisolable LOCA in the Drywell (EP-2 RPV Control, EP-3 Containment Control, 05 02-I-1 Reactor Scram, 05-1-02-I-2 Turbine and Generator Trips, 05-1-02-I-4 Loss of AC Power).

z025025_ When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and 5 M(CREW) -191, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure 12_45 trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized) Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -217.

Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task.

I(BOP) Div 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing system failure (Alarm 6 r21218 Response Instruction 04-1-02-1H13-P864-2A-H1).

RHR A logic power failure (LPCS available by manual action)

When drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig or reactor water level is below -150.3, the crew recognizes Division 1 ECCS fails to automatically initiate and indication of RHR A Logic Power Failure and manually starts LPCS pump using its P601 7 r21220 I(ATC/BOP) hand switch. Criterion is to align LPCS for injection (by manually starting LPCS pump on P601) prior to Emergency Depressurization AND/OR align RHR A for injection (by manually starting RHR A pump and opening 1E12F053A RHR A Shutdown Cooling Return to Feedwater on P601) prior to going below 125 psig during Emergency Depressurization.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

  • Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 2 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 7 Instrument/Component Failures 5 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 1 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 2 Rev 0 (2/28/12) Page 2 of 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: LOT-2012-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

  • Remove Heater Drain Pump A from service.
  • Heater Drain Pump B trip when Heater Drain Pump A is secured.
  • RPS/NSSSS pressure trip unit B21N678C fails high.
  • Reactor Recirc Pump B trip.
  • Condenser boot seal leak, slow loss of vacuum
  • Condenser boot seal tear, rapid loss of vacuum, scram, hydraulic block ATWS, power greater than 5%.
  • Wide range level indication Channel A fails as-is Initial Conditions: Plant is operating at 84% power.

Inoperable Equipment: None Turnover:

  • Power has been reduced to 84% per 03-1-01-2 Att. VIII, Temporary Downpower, to remove Heater Drain Pump A from service for an emergent maintenance window scheduled for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
  • Following shift briefing, secure Heater Drain Pump A per 04-1-01-N23-1 section 4.6.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time (60-90 min): XX min Rev 0 (2/28/12) Page 1 of 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description Remove Heater Drain Pump A from service (04-1-01-N23-1 1 N (ATC) section 4.6).

Heater Drain Pump B trip when Heater Drain Pump A is secured C (ATC) 2 fw231b (Alarm Response Instruction 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-B2, 05 R(ATC) 02-V-5 Loss of Feedwater Heating).

RPS/NSSSS pressure trip unit B21N678C fails high (Alarm ptb21n078 I (ATC) Response Instructions 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-B2/7A-A2/A2-3 c_a TS (CRS) D4, Section Procedure 17-S-06-5 Technical Specification Instrumentation Loop Logic, TS 3.3.1.1, TS 3.3.6.1).

C (ATC) Reactor Recirc Pump B trip (Alarm Response Instructions 04 4 rr012b A(CREW) 02-1H13-P680-3A-B10, 05-1-02-III-2 Reduction in Recirculation TS (CRS) System Flow Rate, TS 3.4.1, TR 3.4.1).

C (ATC) Condenser boot seal leak, slow loss of vacuum (05-1-02-V-9 5 fw163c A(CREW) Loss of Condenser Vacuum)

Condenser boot seal tear, rapid loss of vacuum, scram, hydraulic block ATWS, power > 5%, level/power control (05 02-V-9 Loss of Condenser Vacuum, 05-1-02-I-1 Reactor Scram, 05-1-02-I-2 Turbine and Generator Trips, EP-2A ATWS RPV Control, EP-3 Containment Control)

Entry into EP2A step L8. Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system fw264c M (CREW) alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by 6

c11164 available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to terminate and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching criteria specified in EP2A step L8.

Criteria specified in EP2A step L-9 are satisfied. Crew restores injection using Condensate/Feedwater as evidenced by feedwater flow to RPV or RPV level trend. Criterion is to give the highest priority to reinitiate injection flow and establish the appropriate level band.

c41329 lo-1c41f031_

7 C(BOP) Standby Liquid Control suction valves failure to open r

1c41f031_

g 8 rr041a I(ATC) Wide range level indication Channel A fails as-is (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

  • Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 2 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 7 Instrument/Component Failures 6 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 2 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 2 Rev 0 (2/28/12) Page 2 of 7

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