Text

GG-2020-02 Draft Operating Test
	ML20058H614
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	02/10/2020
From:	Greg Werner; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Entergy Operations
References
	Download: ML20058H614 (310)
	v • d • e

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 2/3/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: GGNS 2/2020 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Determine Core Flow, given plant parameters, system status or events determine actual Reactor Core Flow.

Conduct of Operations R, N GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AR1 2.1.7 (4.4)

Reactor Water Level Determination, The operator will evaluate plant conditions at the Remote Shutdown Panel to determine Narrow Conduct of Operations R, D Range reactor water level and the status of injection sources.

GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AR2 2.1.25 (3.9)

Emergency Exposure Limits, The operator will evaluate a condition involving abnormally high radiological conditions and determine Radiation Control R, D actions required to administratively control the dose received by determining who authorizes dose extensions in various situations.

GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AR3 2.3.4 (3.2)

Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F, given plant status and parameters determine the time to 200 on a loss of Shutdown Cooling.

Emergency Plan R, N GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AR4 2.4.11 (3.4/3.6)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected) (0)

Rev 0 8/6/2019

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 2/3/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: GGNS 2/2020 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Determine Reportability, This task is to use corporate procedures and given plant conditions to determine the reportability and Conduct of Operations R, D complete applicable notification form GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AS1 2.1.20 (4.6)

Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements, given failure of penetration isolation valve failure, determine Tech Spec Conduct of Operations R, D action and requirements for isolating.

GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AS2 2.1.7 (4.7)

Tagout Removal Approval, given a protective tagging removal, verify restored positions and information.

Equipment Control R, D GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AS3 2.2.15 (4.3) - 2.2.15 (4.3) - 2.2.41 (3.9)

Authorize Emergency Exposure, given plant status and events in progress, determine appropriate radiation exposure limits.

Radiation Control R, D GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AS4 2.3.4 (3.7)

Emergency Classification, given plant status and parameters determine the correct emergency classification.

Emergency Plan R, N GJPM-OPS-2/2020-AS5 2.4.41 (4.6)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes) (4)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected) (0)

Rev 0 8/6/2019

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 2-2020 AR1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 JPM

Title:

Determine Core Flow Facility Number: N/A NEW (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: RO Task: CRO-B33-10 K&A: 2.1.7, (4.4) 2.1.25, (3.9)

Safety Function: Reactivity Control (1) 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 05-1-02-III-3, 05-1-02-III-6 Handout(s) 05-1-02-III-3, 05-1-02-III-6

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 2 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

NONE Safety Concerns:

NONE Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow Task Standard:

Calculates actual core flow

Performs plot on Power to Flow map

Using procedure 05-1-02-III-3 and 05-1-02-III-6 the operator determines actual core flow to be 56.8 mlbm/hr and performs correct plot on Power to Flow Map.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at rated conditions when crew determines a Jet Pump #5 and #6 failure.

Current indications:

RECIRC PMP A/B DRIVING FLO o A - 29,700 gpm o B - 27,100 gpm

TOT JP FLO o 60 mlbm/hr

CAL JP FLO o A - 0.8 mlbm/hr o C - 2.0 mlbm/hr

CYCLOPS Jet Pump Flow indication:

o #5 - 0.8 mlbm/hr o #6 - 0.8 mlbm/hr

Reactor Power o 68.7%

Initiating Cue(s):

CRS has directed you to determine actual core flow and plot on PF map.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow Notes to Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 7.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

Using procedures 05-1-02-III-3 and 05-1-02-III-6, the operator will use the provided indications to determine actual core flow.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 05-1-02-III-3, 5.9 IF cause is determined to be possible Jet Pump failure, THEN REFER to ONEP 05-1-02-III-6, Jet Pump Anomalies Standard: The operator Refers to 05-1-02-III-6, Jet Pump Anomalies Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 05-1-02-III-3, 3.5 VERIFY Thermal Limits are met. Accuracy of Total Core Flow indication May need evaluation.

Standard: The operator determines actual core flow by using information located in the NOTE above step 3.5 of 05-1-02-III-3.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Step 3: 05-1-02-III-3, 3.5 NOTE Core flow May be calculated by summing the indicated flow of the two affected Jet Pumps obtained from Cyclops computer AND subtracting this value twice from the total indicated Jet Pump flow.

Standard: The operator determines actual core flow by using information located in the NOTE above step 3.5 of 05-1-02-III-3.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 05-1-02-III-3, 3.5 NOTE Calculation

Calculates actual core flow.

Jet pump #5 flow 0.8 mlbm/hr + Jet pump #6 flow 0.8 mlbm/hr = 1.6 mlbm/hr TOT JP FLO 60 mlbm/hr - 1.6 mlbm/hr - 1.6 mlbm/hr = 56.8 mlbm/hr Standard: The operator determines actual core flow by using information located in the NOTE above step 3.5 of 05-1-02-III-3 to be 56.8 mlbm/hr Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Step 4: 05-1-02-III-3, Figure 1

Performs plot on Power to Flow map.

Standard: With the given information the operator performs a plot on the Power to flow map Figure 1 and determines to be in the MELLLA + REGION. (+/- 2 mlbm/hour on either side and +/- 2% power on either side.)

Cue: None.

Notes: Attached is a Figure 1 KEY.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR1 Determine Core Flow Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Calculates actual core flow

Performs plot on Power to Flow map

Using procedure 05-1-02-III-3 and 05-1-02-III-6 the operator determines actual core flow to be 56.8 mlbm/hr and performs correct plot on Power to Flow Map.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 11

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION OFF-NORMAL EVENT PROCEDURE

Title:

Reduction in Recirculation No.: 05-1-02-III-3 Revision: 118 Page: 16 System Flow Rate Figure 1 KEY, DO NOT GIVE TO STUDENT GGNS C22 Power/Flow Map for Normal Feedwater Temperature This map is only valid for Normal Feedwater temperature which is defined as the value of Normal Feedwater temperature down to ten degrees F. below that value. For temperatures below that range refer to Figure 2 GGNS C212 Power/Flow Map for Reduced Feedwater Temperature.

CORE FLOW 56.8 Mlbm/hr POWER 68.7%

Revision 00 GJPM-OPS-AB3301 Page 10 of 11

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at rated conditions when crew determines a Jet Pump #5 and #6 failure.

Current indications:

RECIRC PMP A/B DRIVING FLO o A - 29,700 gpm o B - 27,100 gpm

TOT JP FLO o 60 mlbm/hr

CAL JP FLO o A - 0.8 mlbm/hr o C - 2.0 mlbm/hr

CYCLOPS Jet Pump Flow indication:

o #5 - 0.8 mlbm/hr o #6 - 0.8 mlbm/hr

Reactor Power o 68.7%

Initiating Cue(s):

CRS has directed you to determine actual core flow and plot on PF map.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 2-2020 AR2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 JPM

Title:

Reactor Water Level Determination Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AON05 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: RO Task: CRO-C61-OFFNORM-5 K&A: 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2); 2.4.34 - (4.2/4.1)

Safety Function: NA 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 05-1-02-II-1 (Shutdown from the Remote Shutdown Panel)

Handout(s): 05-1-02-II-1 (Shutdown from the Remote Shutdown Panel)

Photo of RSP level and pressure indication (attached)

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 2 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

None Safety Concerns:

None Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination Task Standard(s):

Determine Narrow Range reactor water level is 59.0

Determines that RCIC is not running and not injecting water to the reactor

Determines the HPCS is not injecting to the reactor since the E22-F004 (HPCS injection valve) closed on Wide Range reactor water Level 8 (53.5)

Determines Narrow Range reactor water level is 59, that RCIC is not injecting to the reactor and HPCS is not injecting to the reactor Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination Initial Condition(s):

The Control Room has been evacuated per 05-1-02-II-1 (Shutdown from the remote Shutdown Panel).

An Alert has been declared for the Control Room Evactuation.

The Condensate/Feedwater system is not available for inventory control.

All actions for Control Room Evacuation has been completed.

o Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN o All control rods are inserted o MSIVs are closed o RCIC is initiated o HPCS is initiated

NO 05-1-02-II-1 attatchments are installed.

All SRVs are currently CLOSED and reactor pressure is stable.

You report to the Remote Shutdown Panel to establish reactor water level.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to determine Narrow Range reactor water level and the status of HPCS and RCIC

Use the attached image for current plant conditions.

Consider only the given plant conditions.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination Notes:

None Task Overview:

The operator will evaluate plant conditions at the Remote Shutdown Panel to determine Narrow Range reactor water level and the status of injection sources.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 05-1-02-II-1 Attachment 1

Determine Narrow Range reactor water level is 59.0 Standard: Identify correct Narrow Range Level.

Cue: None.

Notes: Narrow Range level between 57 and 60 is acceptable.

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 05-1-02-II-1 Attachment 1

Determines that RCIC is not running and not injecting water to the reactor Standard: Determines the status of RCIC Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Step 3:

Determines the HPCS is not injecting to the reactor since the E22-F004 (HPCS injection valve) closed on Wide Range reactor water Level 8 (53.5)

Standard: Determines the status of HPCS Cue: None.

Notes: HPCS is not monitored or controllable from the RSP. If reactor water level fails to Wide Range reactor Level 2 (-41.6), E22-F004 will open and HPCS will begin to inject to the reactor. The operator will need to determine this from memory of system operation as there are no references at the RSP to determine the status of HPCS.

To meet the critical task, the operator need only state that HPCS and RCIC is not injecting to the reactor.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR2 Reactor Water Level Determination Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Determine Narrow Range reactor water level is 59.0

Determines that RCIC is not running and not injecting water to the reactor

Determines the HPCS is not injecting to the reactor since the E22-F004 (HPCS injection valve) closed on Wide Range reactor water Level 8 (53.5)

Determines Narrow Range reactor water level is 59, that RCIC is not injecting to the reactor and HPCS is not injecting to the reactor JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 10

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The Control Room has been evacuated per 05-1-02-II-1 (Shutdown from the remote Shutdown Panel).

An Alert has been declared for the Control Room Evactuation.

The Condensate/Feedwater system is not available for inventory control.

All actions for Control Room Evacuation has been completed.

o Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN o All control rods are inserted o MSIVs are closed o RCIC is initiated o HPCS is initiated

NO 05-1-02-II-1 attatchments are installed.

All SRVs are currently CLOSED and reactor pressure is stable.

You report to the Remote Shutdown Panel to establish reactor water level.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to determine Narrow Range reactor water level and the status of HPCS and RCIC

Use the attached image for current plant conditions.

Consider only the given plant conditions.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 2-2020 AR3 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 JPM

Title:

Emergency Exposure Limits Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AEM11 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Emergency Exposure Limits New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: RO Task: CRO-ADMIN-15 K&A: Generic 2.3.4: 3.2/3.7 Safety Function: N/A 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): EN-RP-201 Dosimetry Administration Handout(s) EN-RP-201 Dosimetry Administration

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 3 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

None Safety Concerns:

None Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Emergency Exposure Limits Task Standard:

Determine total dose to limit.

Determine total stay time prior to exceeding limit.

Determine that per EN-RP-201, the individuals supervisor recommends and the Radiation Protection Manager Approves

Determines the correct stay time for this task is 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months to remain below the current limit. Also determines Radiation Protection Manager approval is required to exceed this dose per procedure.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Initial Condition(s):

Max expected dose rate for 166 elevation containment area where the job will be conducted is 200 mrem/hr.

Your current year-to-date exposure TEDE is 1250 mrem and you have no undocumented quarters in the current year.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to enter containment to vent the RHR A system using E12-F107A and E12-F108A and remain there until completely vented.

No authorization has been granted to exceed the current limit.

Considering only TEDE, calculate the maximum stay time before the current Administrative exposure limit is exceeded.

Who must authorize exceeding the exposure limit for this task up to 3000 mrem per year?

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Emergency Exposure Limits Notes to the Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 8.

Task Overview:

The operator will evaluate a condition involving radiological conditions and determine actions required to administratively control the dose received by determining total stay time with current exposure.

Determines approval requirements for exceeding the limit.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Emergency Exposure Limits Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: Calculation, EN-RP-201 5.3 [3]

Determine total dose to limit.

2,000 mrem (exposure limit) - 1250 mrem (ytd exposure) = 750 mrem Standard: Determines the correct does limit for normal operations with no emergency declared and correct dose to be received before the exposure limit is exceeded.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: Calculation

Determine total stay time prior to exceeding limit.

750 mrem = 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months 200 mrem Standard: Determines the correct stay time before the exposure limit is exceeded.

Cue:

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Step 3: EN-RP-201 section 5.4

Determine that per EN-RP-201, the individuals supervisor recommends and the Radiation Protection Manager Approves Standard: Determines Radiation Protection Manager Approves up to 3000 mrem per year.

Cue:

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR3 Emergency Exposure Limits Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Determine total dose to limit.

Determine total stay time prior to exceeding limit.

Determine that per EN-RP-201, the individuals supervisor recommends and the Radiation Protection Manager Approves

Determines the correct stay time for this task is 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months to remain below the current limit.

Also determines Radiation Protection Manager approval is required to exceed this dose per procedure.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 9

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

Max expected dose rate for 166 elevation containment area where the job will be conducted is 200 mrem/hr.

Your current year-to-date exposure TEDE is 1250 mrem.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to enter containment to vent the RHR A system using E12-F107A and E12-F108A and remain there until completely vented.

No authorization has been granted to exceed the current limit.

Considering only TEDE, calculate the maximum stay time before the current Administrative exposure limit is exceeded.

Who must authorize exceeding the exposure limit for this task up to 3000 mrem per year?

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 2-2020 AR4 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 JPM

Title:

Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination Facility Number: N/A NEW (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: RO Task: CRO-E12-11 K&A: 2.4.11 (3.4/3.6)

Safety Function: Heat Removal from the Core 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 05-1-02-III-1 Handout(s) 05-1-02-III-1

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 1 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

NONE Safety Concerns:

NONE Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination Task Standard:

Determines figure 4 is to be used to determine time to 200°F.

Determines Pre-Shuffle 150°F line is to be used.

Using given information, determines time to boil is approximately 0.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Determines figure 7 is to be used to determine time to TAF.

Determines Pre-Shuffle lines are to be used.

Using given information, determines time to TAF is approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months .

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination Initial Condition(s):

On day 5 of a refueling outage the following conditions exist:

Reactor Cavity Pool is being drained for Drywell Head Removal.

Reactor water level is being maintained 95 to 100 Upset Range.

Reactor coolant temperature is 140°F.

RHR A is lined up and providing shutdown cooling through the E12-F053A (RHR A SHUTDN CLG RTN TO FW).

RHR B and ADHR are unavailable.

RWCU is available.

Initiating Cue(s):

RHR pump A trips on overcurrent

Determine the time available before reactor coolant temperature reaches 200°F.

Determine the time to for reactor water level to reach TAF.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination Notes to Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 5.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task has the student to estimate time to reach 200°F following loss of shutdown cooling and determine time to TAF.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Determines figure 4 is to be used to determine time to 200°F.

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 4 due to current water level is 85 to 90 on Upset Range. The bottom of the Main Steam lines are located at 101 vessel level. Therefore, Figure 4 should be used at 12 inches below Main Steam Lines.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Step 2: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Determines Pre-Shuffle 150°F line is to be used.

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 4 Pre-Shuffle line is to be used due to current conditions states that Reactor Cavity drain down is in progress for drywell head removal. Therefore no fuel has been moved and pre-shuffle lines must be used. The 150°F lines are to be used due to current temp is 140°F and the student should use the most conservative line.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 3: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Using given information, determines time to boil is approximately 0.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 4 that there are 0.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or 24 minutes (+/- 0.08 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or 5 minutes) to 200°F.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Step 4: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Determines figure 7 is to be used to determine time to TAF.

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 7 due to current water level is 85 to 90 on Upset Range. The bottom of the Main Steam lines are located at 101 vessel level. Therefore, Figure 7 should be used at 12 inches below Main Steam Lines.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 5: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Determines Pre-Shuffle lines are to be used.

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 7 Pre-Shuffle lines are to be used due to current conditions states that Reactor Cavity drain down is in progress for drywell head removal. Therefore no fuel has been moved and pre-shuffle lines must be used.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Step 6: 05-1-02-III-1, Attachment 1

Using given information, determines time to TAF is approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months .

Standard: The operator determines using procedure 05-1-02-III-1 Attachment I, Figure 7 that there 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months (+/- 1.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months ) to TAF.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Time to 200°F Determination Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Determines figure 4 is to be used to determine time to 200°F.

Determines Pre-Shuffle 150°F line is to be used.

Using given information, determines time to boil is approximately 0.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Determines figure 7 is to be used to determine time to TAF.

Determines Pre-Shuffle lines are to be used.

Using given information, determines time to TAF is approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months .

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 KEY DO NOT GIVE TO STUDENT GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION OFF-NORMAL EVENT PROCEDURE 05-1-02-III-1 Revision: 047 Attachment I Page 10 of 8 0.5 0.4 0.25 Figure 4: Time for Reactor Vessel to reach 200°F for Initial Water Level 12 in Below Main Steam Line Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AR4 KEY DO NOT GIVE TO STUDENT GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION OFF-NORMAL EVENT PROCEDURE 05-1-02-III-1 Revision: 047 Attachment I Page 11 of 8 9 hrs Figure 7: Time to TAF from 12 in Below Main Steam Line Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 12

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

On day 5 of a refueling outage the following conditions exist:

Reactor Cavity Pool is being drained for Drywell Head Removal.

Reactor water level is being maintained 95 to 100 Upset Range.

Reactor coolant temperature is 140°F.

RHR A is lined up and providing shutdown cooling through the E12-F053A (RHR A SHUTDN CLG RTN TO FW).

RHR B and ADHR are unavailable.

RWCU is available.

Initiating Cue(s):

RHR pump A trips on overcurrent

Determine the time available before reactor coolant temperature reaches 200°F.

Determine the time to for reactor water level to reach TAF.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 2-2020 AS1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 JPM

Title:

Determine Reportability Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AAD07 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By:

Exam Developer Date Ops Review:

1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By:

2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By:

Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Determine Reportability New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Classroom Type: SRO Task: SRO-M&S-011 K&A: 2.1.20 4.6, 2.1.1 4.2 Safety Function: N/A PRA Applicability: HPCS is listed as #16 on System Importance to CDF 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Actual Reference(s): EN-LI-108, Event Notification and Reporting EN-OP-133, Operations Notifications EN-OP-133-02, GGNS Operations Notifications Handout(s) EN-LI-108, Event Notification and Reporting EN-OP-133, Operations Notifications EN-OP-133-02, GGNS Operations Notifications

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 2 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

NONE Safety Concerns:

NONE Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Determine Reportability Task Standard:

Determines the ECCS (HPCS) injection due to a valid signal is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reportable event reportable to the NRC Operations Center.

Completes Attachment 1 of EN-OP-133-02 IAW with attached key.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Determine Reportability Initial Condition(s):

The plant is in Mode 3.

RCIC is OOSVC and isolated.

Shutdown Cooling A was being aligned for operation.

While aligning Shutdown Cooling A, an error caused flow to be diverted to the Suppression Pool via the minimum flow valve.

As reactor water level decreased, RHR isolations and a reactor scram signal initiated at Reactor Level 3.

Reactor water level dropped to -45 inches Wide Range before the inventory reduction was terminated by the successful RHR isolation.

High Pressure Core Spray initiated during the event and restored level to the normal band.

Current reactor parameters:

o water level is +30 inches and stable o Reactor pressure 30 psig o Core Flow 0 Mlbm/hr o Reactor Temp 259°F Initiating Cue(s):

You are the Shift Manager.

Determine the MOST limiting reportability of this incident

Complete Attachment 1 of EN-OP-133-02

Another SRO will complete the On-Shift Evaluation.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Determine Reportability Notes to Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 6 Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to corporate procedures and given plant conditions to determine the reportability and complete applicable notification form.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: EN-OP-133-02 & EN-LI-108 Reviews EN-OP-133-02 and EN-LI-108 for notification criteria and determines the relationship of plant conditions to conditions listed as reportable; the associated time frames and who is notified.

Standard: Candidate reviews EN-OP-133-02 and EN-LI-108 for notification criteria and determines the relationship of plant conditions to conditions listed as reportable, the associated time frames and who is notified.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Step 2: EN-OP-133-02 & EN-LI-108

Determines the ECCS (HPCS) injection due to a valid signal is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reportable event reportable to the NRC Operations Center.

Standard: Candidate determines the initiation of HPCS to mitigate an event and resulting injection to the RPV is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reportable event reportable to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with EN-OP-133-02 Attachment 2 item II.2 per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A).

The candidate should also recognize that a RPS actuation with the reactor NOT critical and also a CTMT isolation signal in more than one system due to a level 2 signal is an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months reportable event.

Cue: None Notes: The candidate may use the Quick Reference Table.

SAT / UNSAT Step 3: EN-OP-133-02 Attachment 1

Completes Attachment 1 of EN-OP-133-02.

Standard: Candidate completes Attachment 1 IAW attached KEY Cue: If asked inform student that the CR number is CR-GGN-2019-0000 Another SRO will perform LCO requirements and ON-Shift Evaluation.

Notes: Highlighted areas are required on Attached Key.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS1 Determine Reportability Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Determines the ECCS (HPCS) injection due to a valid signal is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reportable event reportable to the NRC Operations Center.

Completes Attachment 1 of EN-OP-133-02 IAW with attached key.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 9

EN-OP-133-02 Rev. 0 Page 20 of 55 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Operations Notifications Attachment 1 KEY DO NOT GIVE TO Page 1 of 1 STUDENT Operational Event (Typical)

CR# _________________________________ Date: _________________________

Brief Description of Condition: Automatic initiation of HPCS to restore level. Actual or required ECCS injection due to a valid signal ______________________________________________________________________________

LCO Required: Yes: ______ No: ______ LCO Number: ________________________________

Rx Power: __0___ MWt __0___ MWe Average. Power Range Monitor (APRM) Flux: ____0_____%

Rx Mode (circle) 1 2 3 4 5 Rx Level: ___30____ Core Flow: ___0_____% Rx Pressure: ___30____ Rx Temperature: __259°F__

Duty Manager Notified: __________________________ Date / Time: _______________________

On-duty Shift Manager: __________________________ On-shift Evaluation Required: Yes ____ No ____

(Required for all operational type occurrences such as scrams, inadvertent actuations, safety/relief valve (SRV) lifts, ECCS injections, etc.)

On-Shift Evaluation LIST equipment / systems which were automatically or manually started: ________________________________

LIST ANY safety system components which should have activated but did not: ___________________________

Systems injecting: ___________________________________________________________________________

Rx Pressure at time of injection: _______________ Flow Rate: _____________________ GPM Source Water Temperature: _________________ Duration of injection: __________________

If SRVs lifted, LIST EACH SRV and RECORD the number of times EACH lifted: ________________________

LIST other equipment / systems that were available and could have performed the same function as the ones that were inoperable at the start of the event or that failed during the event. _____________________________

Effect of the event on safety or operating parameters: RECORD changes in pertinent parameters. GETARS or SENTINEL can be used to document data. (Example - Record changes in reactor coolant temperature if SDC is lost.) ____________________________________________________________________________________

If any safety related equipment was operated beyond its design specifications, LIST components effected.

Parameters exceeded or value operated at: ______________________________________________________

Length of time operated above design limits: ____________________________________

Date / Time conditions restored to normal: ______________________________________

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 9

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is in Mode 3.

RCIC is OOSVC and isolated.

Shutdown Cooling A was being aligned for operation.

While aligning Shutdown Cooling A, an error caused flow to be diverted to the Suppression Pool via the minimum flow valve.

As reactor water level decreased, RHR isolations and a reactor scram signal initiated at Reactor Level 3.

Reactor water level dropped to -45 inches Wide Range before the inventory reduction was terminated by the successful RHR isolation.

High Pressure Core Spray initiated during the event and restored level to the normal band.

Current reactor parameters:

o water level is +30 inches and stable o Reactor pressure 30 psig o Core Flow 0 Mlbm/hr o Reactor Temp 259°F Initiating Cue(s):

You are the Shift Manager.

Determine the MOST limiting reportability of this incident

Complete Attachment 1 of EN-OP-133-02

Another SRO will complete the On-Shift Evaluation.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 2-2020 AS2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 JPM

Title:

Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AAD16 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: Ronnie Walters / Brandon Meyer 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Classroom Type: SRO Task: SRO-ADMIN-48, SRO-M&S-5, SRO-NO-16 K&A: 2.2.15 (3.9/4.3), 2.2.40 (3.4/4.7), 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9)

Safety Function: N/A 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Actual Reference(s): EN-OP-102 (Protective and Caution Tagging) 02-S-01-17 (Control of Limiting Conditions for Operation)

UFSAR Table 6.2-49 (Attached)

E1240-03 (SPCU Isolation Valve Electrical Schematic)

E0300 (Fuse Tabulation)

M-1099 (SPCU P&ID)

Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Handout(s): EN-OP-102 02-S-01-17 (Control of Limiting Conditions for Operation)

E1240-03 (SPCU Isolation Valve Electrical Schematic)

E0300 page 91 (Fuse Tabulation, P60)

M1099 (SPCU P&ID) 04-1-01-P60-1 (SPCU SOI)

UFSAR Table 6.2-49 sheet 8 of 17 (Attached)

Technical Specifications

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 1 Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

None Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard(s):

The operator identifies valves 1P60F009, 1P60F011, and 1P60F034 must be closed.

The operator identifies 1P60F009 must be deactivated by removing fuse 1P60F016.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements Initial Condition(s):

The plant is in Mode 1.

Suppression Pool Cleanup System is shut down.

1P60F010, SPCU RTN FM CNDS PC FLTRS has failed in the open position.

Initiating Cue(s):

As CRS you are tasked to determine the action necessary to satisfy the Tech Spec requirements in accordance with plant procedures.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements Notes to Evaluator:

None Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

The operator will determine the proper tagout to meet Tech Spec Action requirements for INOP valve P60-F010.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Action A The operator must determine the required Tech Spec Action is to isolate the affected penetration flow path in accordance with TS 3.6.1.3 Action A.1.

Standard: Determines the required action is TS 3.6.1.3 Action A.1.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Step 2: 02-S-01-17 step 6.11.1

The operator determines valves 1P60F009, F011, and F034 must be closed.

Standard: The operator must determine the failed valve is the inboard boundary for the affected penetration and the penetration must be isolated using the outboard valve boundaries for the penetration. Determines the appropriate isolation valves for the penetration using UFSAR Table 6.2-49. P&ID M1099 may also be used. Determines 1P60F010, the failed valve, is the inboard isolation valve; therefore, outboard isolation valves 1P60F009, F011, and F034 must be closed.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Step 3: 02-S-01-17 step 6.11.4

The operator determines fuse 1P60F016 must be removed to electrically deactivate 1P60F009.

Standard: The operator, using E1240-03, determines fuse 1P60F016 must be removed to deactivate 1P60F009. The operator, then using E300, determines Fuse 1P60F016 is the fuse labeled fuse #34 located in 1H13P871 bay G.

Cue: If the operator states he would deactivate 1P60F009 only by closing the local air supply isolation valve, as the Shift Manager direct the student to determine the method to electrically deactivate 1P60F009.

Notes: 02-S-01-17 step 6.11.4 states:

WHEN isolating Primary Containment, Secondary Containment, OR Drywell penetrations to meet action statements of LCOs 3.6.1.3, 3.6.4.2 and 3.6.5.3, USE the following guidance to de-activate automatic valves:

For air-operated valves, PULL the associated fuse OR CLOSE actuator air isolation valve.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS2 Determine Penetration Isolation Requirements Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

The operator identifies valves 1P60F009, 1P60F011, and 1P60F034 must be closed.

The operator identifies 1P60F009 must be deactivated by removing fuse 1P60F016.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 13

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is in Mode 1.

Suppression Pool Clean Up System is shut down.

1P60F010, SPCU RTN FM CNDS PC FLTRS has failed in the open position.

Initiating Cue(s):

As CRS you are tasked to determine the action necessary to satisfy the Tech Spec requirements in accordance with plant procedures.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 2-2020 AS3 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 JPM

Title:

Tagout Removal Approval Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AAD09 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: Ronnie Walters / Brandon Meyer 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Tagout Removal Approval New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 20 Min Setting: Classroom Type: SRO Task: SRO-ADMIN-48, SRO-M&S-5 K&A: 2.2.13 (4.1/4.3), 2.2.15 (3.9/4.3), 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9) 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Safety Function: Equipment Control Performance: Actual Reference(s): EN-OP-102 (Protective and Caution Tagging) 04-1-01-E51-1 (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) SOI)

E-1185- 9, 10, 14 (RCIC Electrical Schematics)

M-1083B (RCIC P&ID)

Handout(s): EN-OP-102 04-1-01-E51-1 E-1185- 9, 10, 14 M-1083B Tagout Tags Sheet (Attached)

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 1 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

None Safety Concerns:

None Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Tagout Removal Approval Task Standard(s):

The operator identifies restoration sequence for electrical breakers for MOVs should precede restoration of MOV handswitch tags.

The operator indentifies the tagout incorrectly restores RCIC steam supply isolation valves 1E51F063 and F064 OPEN, without slowly warming the steam supply lines per EN-OP-102.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Tagout Removal Approval Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at rated power.

RCIC steam supply was tagged out of service 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months ago for diagnostic (VIPER) testing of 1E51F064.

RCIC steam supply line pressure is now 0 psig on 1H13P601 indicator 1E51R602.

Work has been completed.

1E51F064 has been fully and satisfactorily retested, and the LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 for 1E51F064 has been cleared. An LCO for TS 3.5.3 for RCIC steam supply being isolated remains active.

The clearance has been released by the tagout holder.

Initiating Cue(s):

As CRS you are tasked to:

Ensure appropriate restoration positions and instructions are determined in accordance with procedures and/or plant drawings, and

Ensure appropriate restoration sequences are entered on the tagout.

Document any identified errors for restored positions and/or removal sequences by marking up the tagging forms provided.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Tagout Removal Approval Notes to Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 8.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

The operator will determine the proper tagout restoration positions and sequence for the associated RCIC components.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: EN-OP-102 step 5.18[1], third bullet The candidate must determine the correct tag restored position for each tagged component (refer to tagout tag listing).

Standard: Determines the appropriate restored position.

Cue: NONE Notes: In general, RCIC must be warmed at a rate of 90°F per hour to limit thermal stress on piping and components. Also, steam supply valves must be opened slowly to limit steam flow below the RCIC steam line flow isolation setpoint, unless the trip function has been defeated. RCIC steam supply valves 1E51F063, F064, and F076 should be restored as CLOSED before beginning warming per SOI 04-1-01-E51-1 section 4.1.

If the candidate elects to leave the restored positions for 1E51F063 and 1E51F064 as OPEN with explicit restoration instructions to warm RCIC per 04-1-01-E51-1 section 4.1 as the method of restoring the valves OPEN, this is acceptable.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Step 2: EN-OP-102 step 5.18[1], fourth bullet The operator must determine the correct tag removal sequence for each tagged component (refer to tagout tag listing).

Standard: Determines the appropriate removal sequence.

Cue: NONE Notes: In general, electrical power for valves will be restored and tags removed from breakers and fuses, then handswitches will be aligned and handswitch tags removed last. Also, it would be typical to remove the local tag on a MOV before restoring the valves breaker, but in this case there are no local handwheel tags, since 1E51F063 and F076 are inaccessible in the drywell and VIPER testing 1E51F064 is prohibitive of a handwheel tag.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Step 3: EN-OP-102 step 5.18[1], third and fourth bullets

The Operator documents the following:

Tags must be removed from valve electrical supply breakers and restored before removing tags from handswitches.

Standard: Documents corrections.

Cue:

Notes: Corrections listed are the minimum required to prevent adverse plant effects. Any corrections that demonstrate an equivalent understanding is acceptable.

Electrical power for a MOV must be restored before its respective handswitch is restored to enable remote position indication and control function for the handswitch.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Step 4: EN-OP-102 step 5.18[1], third and fourth bullets

The Operator documents the following:

Restored positions for 1E51F063 AND/OR 1E51F076 and 1E51F064 must be closed, OR adequate removal instructions are added to warm RCIC per 04 01-E51-1 section 4.1 as the method for restoring 1E51F063 and 1E51F064 open.

Standard: Documents corrections.

Cue: NONE Notes: Corrections listed are the minimum required to prevent adverse plant effects. Any corrections that demonstrate an equivalent understanding is acceptable.

RCIC steam lines must be warmed per section 4.1 of SOI 04-1-01-E51-1 to prevent excessive thermal stress on piping and components and to prevent RCIC steam flow high isolation actuation, unless bypassed. For RCIC steam line warming, initial SOI position of 1E51F063, F064, and F076 is fully closed. As such, if the candidate specifies restored positions for these valves as CLOSED, before RCIC is warmed, this is acceptable.

Similarly, if the candidate elects to leave the listed restored positions for 1E51F063 and 1E51F064 as OPEN with explicit restoration instructions to warm RCIC per 04-1-01-E51-1 section 4.1 as the method of restoring the valves OPEN, this is acceptable.

The task is complete when the operator determines the adequacy for this Tagout.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS3 Tagout Removal Approval Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 20 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

The operator identifies restoration sequence for electrical breakers for MOVs should precede restoration of MOV handswitch tags.

The operator indentifies the tagout incorrectly restores RCIC steam supply isolation valves 1E51F063 and F064 OPEN, without slowly warming the steam supply lines per EN-OP-102.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 12

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at rated power.

RCIC steam supply was tagged out of service 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months ago for diagnostic (VIPER) testing of 1E51F064.

RCIC steam supply line pressure is now 0 psig on 1H13P601 indicator 1E51R602.

Work has been completed.

1E51F064 has been fully and satisfactorily retested, and the LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 for 1E51F064 has been cleared. An LCO for TS 3.5.3 for RCIC steam supply being isolated remains active.

The clearance has been released by the tagout holder.

Initiating Cue(s):

As CRS you are tasked to:

Ensure appropriate restoration positions and instructions are determined in accordance with procedures and/or plant drawings, and

Ensure appropriate restoration sequences are entered on the tagout.

Document any identified errors for restored positions and/or removal sequences by marking up the tagging forms provided.

NUCLEAR NON-QUALITY RELATED EN-OP-102-01 REV.14 MANAGEMENT MANUAL MULTI-USE:

INFORMATIONAL USE AND PAGE 6 OF 31 REFERENCE USE Protective and Caution Tagging Forms & Checklist ATTACHMENT 9.2 TAGOUT COVER SHEET Clearance: MANUAL_______ Tagout: 1CXX-1 E51-001 - 1E51F064 Component to be worked:

1E51F064 RCIC STM SPLY DRWL OTBD ISOL

==

Description:==

THIS TAGOUT WILL ISOLATE THE RCIC STEAM SUPPLY TO PERFORM VIPER TESTING ON 1E51F064 TEST AND MAINTENANCE TAGS ARE BEING USED FOR 1E51F064 SINCE IT WILL BE OPERATED FOR ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE Placement Inst:

HANG TAGS IN SEQUENCE LISTED. 1E51F063 AND 1E51F076 HANDWHEELS ARE NOT BEING TAGGED LOCALLY DUE TO THEY ARE INACCESSIBLE (IN THE DRYWELL).

Hazards:

HIGH ENERGY SYSTEM.

RCIC STEAM PIPING WILL BE EXTREMELY HOT.

Restoration Inst:

CLEAR TAGOUT FIRST.

AFTER TAGOUT HAS BEEN CLEARED, THEN PLACE RCIC SYSTEM IN STANDBY MODE PER SOI 04-1-01-E51-1 SECTION 4.1.

Attribute Description Attribute Value HIGH ENERGY SYSTEM CONCERNS YES - SEE TAGOUT HAZARDS TECH SPEC IMPACT? LCO 1-TS-XX-0001 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS REQUIRED? NO SCAFFOLD REQUIRED NO WALKDOWN COMPLETE YES TAGOUT PREPARE ISSUES: NO Work Order Number Description XX357XX PERFORM DIAGNOSTIC TESTING (VIPER) FOR 1E51F064 Status Description User Verification Date Prepared Prepared Taw Jackson 2/1/20XX Technical Reviewed Reviewed John T. Chance 2/2/20XX Approved Approved George W. McLintock 2/3/20XX Tags Verified Hung Tags Verified Hung Tim Knox 2/15/20XX Removal Approved Removal Approved Tags Verified Removed Tags Verified Removed

NUCLEAR NON-QUALITY RELATED EN-OP-102-01 REV.14 MANAGEMENT MANUAL MULTI-USE: INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 7 OF 31 AND REFERENCE USE Protective and Caution Tagging Forms & Checklist ATTACHMENT 9.3 TAGOUT TAGS SHEET CLEARANCE: ____MANUAL________ TAGOUT: 1CXX-1 E51-001 - 1E51F064 Tag Tag Equipment Place. Place. Rest. 1st Rest. 2nd Placement/

Serial Type Equipment Description Place. Placement 1st Verif 2nd Verif Rest. Restoration Verif Verif Removal No. Equipment Location Seq. Configuration Date/Time Date/Time Seq. Configuration Date/Time Date/Time Tag Notes 1-E51 -IBISSW-1E51M620 Hoge, AUTO Knox, Tim Dang *RCIC STM LINE WARMUP Tom AUTO AFTER 0001 1 AFTER 2/15/20XX 1 er VLV 1E51F076 2/15/20XX CLOSED CLOSED 05:35

C0A-166 -0C503- 05:00 1-E51 -IBISSW-1E51M609 Hoge, Knox, Tim Dang *RCIC STM SPLY DRWL INBD Tom 0002 1 CLOSE 2/15/20XX 1 OPEN er ISOL 1E51F063 2/15/20XX 05:40

C0A-166 -0C503- 05:05 1-E51 -IBISSW-1E51M610 Hoge, Knox, Tim Dang *RCIC STM SPLY DRWL Tom 0003 1 CLOSE 2/15/20XX 1 OPEN er OTBD ISOL 1E51F064 2/15/20XX 05:45

C0A-166 -0C503- 05:10 1-E51 -CTKBRK- 52-163138 Bow, Bill Sims, Matt Dang

RCIC STM LINE WARMUP 0009 2 OFF 2/15/20XX 2/15/20XX 2 CLOSED er VLV 1E51F076 06:15 07:15

A08-119 -1A207-1-E51 -CTKBRK- 52-163134 Bow, Bill Sims, Matt Dang

RCIC STM SPLY DRWL 0010 2 OFF 2/15/20XX 2/15/20XX 2 CLOSED er INBD ISOL 1E51F063 06:20 07:20

A08-119 -1A207-1-E51 -CTKBRK- 52-153129 Test Bow, Bill Sims, Matt

RCIC STM SPLY DRWL 0011 and 2 OFF 2/15/20XX 2/15/20XX 2 CLOSED OTBD ISOL 1E51F064 Maint 06:25 07:25

A07-119 -1A208-

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 2-2020 AS4 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 JPM

Title:

Emergency Exposure Limits Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-AEM03 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: Ronnie Walters / Brandon Meyer 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Emergency Exposure Limits New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: SRO Task: SRO-A&E-015 K&A: Generic 2.3.4 (3.7)

Safety Function: N/A 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 10-S-01-1 (Activation of the Emergency plan) 10-S-01-17 (Emergency Personnel Exposure Control)

EN-RP-201 (Dosimetry Administration)

Handout(s) 10-S-01-1 (Activation of the Emergency plan) 10-S-01-17 (Emergency Personnel Exposure Control)

EN-RP-201 (Dosimetry Administration)

EAL Flow Charts

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 4 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

NONE Safety Concerns:

NONE Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Emergency Exposure Limits Task Standard:

Determines that the station meets the threshold for an Unusual Event ONLY

Determines expected final exposure following the task

Determines the administrative dose limits and extension process of EN-RP-201 (Dosimetry Administration) is applicable.

Determines that the Plant General Manager and Radiation Protection Manager must approve the dose extension to 3532 mrem during an Unusual Event.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Emergency Exposure Limits Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at 55% power.

There are high radiation levels in containment.

Max expected radiation exposure for containment is 14,000 mrem/hr.

Offgas flow is 75 cfm

Computer point D173001 has been in alarm for 70 minutes.

Computer point D173002 has been in alarm for 5 minutes.

Offgas Pre-treatment radiation monitor is reading 1250 mR/hr.

An operator qualified to perform a task in containment to mitigate the radiation concern has a current year-to-date exposure TEDE of 32 mrem.

The site Emergency Plan has been activated for the current conditions Initiating Cue(s):

You are the Shift Manager and are to determine the requirements to send the qualified operator into containment to mitigate the radiation concern.

The task will take 15 minutes inside containment.

Who must approve the exposure limits for this task considering only TEDE?

What is the Emergency Classification?

Determine the expected final exposure following the task?

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Emergency Exposure Limits Notes to Evaluator:

Remember to record Start time on page 8.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

The operator will evaluate a condition involving abnormally high radiological conditions and determine actions required to administratively control the dose received by determining who authorizes dose extensions in various situations.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 10-S-01-1 EAL Flowchart

Determines that the station meets the threshold for an Unusual Event ONLY Standard: Determines the correct Emergency Classification as Unusual Event SU9 or AU1.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Step 2: Calculation

Determines expected final exposure following the task.

14,000 mrem 1 hr 15 min = 3,500 mrem + 32 mrem = 3,532 mrem hr 60 min Standard: Determines the correct exposure.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 3: 10-S-01-17 section 6.1.2

Determines the administrative dose limits and extension process of EN-RP-201 (Dosimetry Administration) is applicable.

Standard: Determines that the normal dose extension process applies unless an ALERT or above is declared.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Step 4: EN-RP-201 section 5.4

Determines that the Radiation Protection Manager and General Manager Plant Operations (Plant General Manager) must approve the exposure for this task using table in section 5.4 of EN-RP-201.

Standard: Determines correct approval requirements.

Cue: None Notes:

Remember to record stop time SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS4 Emergency Exposure Limits Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Determines that the station meets the threshold for an Unusual Event ONLY

Determines expected final exposure following the task

Determines the administrative dose limits and extension process of EN-RP-201 (Dosimetry Administration) is applicable.

Determines that the Plant General Manager and Radiation Protection Manager must approve the dose extension to 3532 mrem during an Unusual Event.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 9

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at 55% power.

There are high radiation levels in containment.

Max expected radiation exposure for containment is 14,000 mrem/hr.

Offgas flow is 75 cfm

Computer point D173001 has been in alarm for 70 minutes.

Computer point D173002 has been in alarm for 5 minutes.

Offgas Pre-treatment radiation monitor is reading 1250 mR/hr.

An operator qualified to perform a task in containment to mitigate the radiation concern has a current year-to-date exposure TEDE of 32 mrem.

The site Emergency Plan has been activated for the current conditions Initiating Cue(s):

You are the Shift Manager and are to determine the requirements to send the qualified operator into containment to mitigate the radiation concern.

The task will take 15 minutes inside containment.

Who must approve the exposure limits for this task considering only TEDE?

What is the Emergency Classification?

Determine the expected final exposure following the task?

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 2-2020 AS5 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 JPM

Title:

Emergency Event Classification Facility Number: N/A NEW (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: Ronnie Walters / Brandon Meyer 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 Emergency Event Classification New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Classroom Type: SRO Task: SRO-A&E-015 K&A: 2.4.41 - 2.9/4.6 Safety Function: Emergency Procedures/Plan 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Actual Reference(s): 10-S-01-1 Handout(s): EAL flow charts from 10-S-01-1 10-S-01-1 (available)

Manipulations: N/A

Critical Steps: 1 Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

This JPM will be performed after the simulator scenario.

Safety Concerns:

None Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 Emergency Event Classification Task Standard(s):

Within 15 minutes, classifies the event as:

for SCENARIO #1 an ALERT per EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3)

for SCENARIO #2 a SITE AREA EMERGENCY per EAL SS3

for SCENARIO #3 a SITE AREA EMERGENCY per EAL FS1-(FC2 and RC1)

for SCENARIO #4 an ALERT per EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3)

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 Emergency Event Classification Initial Condition(s):

Only the initial conditions for the specific scenario performed by the student as CRS will be given to the student.

Based on the scenario you just participated in:

Scenario #1 - LOCA Feedwater Line break in Turbine Building Emergency Depressurization due to low reactor water level Loss of 4160 V bus 16AB

Scenario #2 - Main Turbine Trip ATWS ESF Transformer 21 lockout

Scenario #3 - LOCA Loss of 4160 V bus 13AD Loss of all RPV level indication Emergency Depressurization due to loss of level indication

Scenario #4 - LOCA Feedwater Line break in Drywell Reactor Recirc line break in the Drywell HPCS Suction line break Emergency Depressurization due to low Suppression Pool water level Initiating Cue(s):

Classify the event.

This JPM is time critical.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 Emergency Event Classification Notes to Evaluator:

Only the initial conditions for the specific scenario performed by the student as CRS is to be given to the student.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

An event classification JPM is required of all licensed SROs not qualified as an Emergency Director in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness Plan.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 10-S-01-1

For Scenario #1 Classify the event as a ALERT

For Scenario #2 Classify the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY

For Scenario #3 Classify the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY

For Scenario #4 Classify the event as an ALERT Standard: For Scenario #1: EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3) (ALERT)

For Scenario #2: EAL SS3 (SITE AREA EMERGENCY)

For Scenario #3: EAL FS1-(FC2 & RC1) (SITE AREA EMERGENCY)

For Scenario #4: EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3) (ALERT)

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 10

GJPM-OPS-2-2020AS5 Emergency Event Classification Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Within 15 minutes, classifies the event as:

o for SCENARIO #1 an ALERT per EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3) o for SCENARIO #2 a SITE AREA EMERGENCY per EAL SS3 o for SCENARIO #3 a SITE AREA EMERGENCY per EAL FS1-(FC2 and RC1) o for SCENARIO #4 an ALERT per EAL FA1-(RC1 or RC3)

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 10

Give this page to the student for Scenario # 1 only Initial Condition(s):

Based on the scenario you just participated in:

o LOCA o Feedwater Line break in Turbine Building o Emergency Depressurization due to low reactor water level o Loss of 4160 V bus 16AB Initiating Cue(s):

Classify the event.

This JPM is time critical.

Give this page to the student for Scenario # 2 only Initial Condition(s):

Based on the scenario you just participated in:

o Main Turbine Trip o ATWS o ESF Transformer 21 lockout Initiating Cue(s):

Classify the event.

This JPM is time critical.

Give this page to the student for Scenario # 3 only Initial Condition(s):

Based on the scenario you just participated in:

o LOCA o Loss of 4160 V bus 13AD o Loss of all RPV level indication o Emergency Depressurization due to loss of level indication Initiating Cue(s):

Classify the event.

This JPM is time critical.

Give this page to the student for Scenario # 4 only Initial Condition(s):

Based on the scenario you just participated in:

o Feedwater Line break in Drywell o Reactor Recirc line break in the Drywell o HPCS Suction line break o Emergency Depressurization due to low Suppression Pool water level Initiating Cue(s):

Classify the event.

This JPM is time critical.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: GGNS 2-2020 Control Room Systems* (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function S1 - Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed A-D-S 1 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1) 202001 A2.04 & A4.01 (3.7)

S2 - Retest MSIV Slow Closure A-D-P-S 3 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2) 239001 A2.11 (4.1)

S3 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test A-D-S-EN 4 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3) 209002: A1.01 (3.6); A4.01 (3.7)

S4 - Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4) 226001 A2.20 (3.7) & A4.07 (3.5) L-M-S-EN 5 S5 - Rotate CCW Pumps (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5) 400000 A2.01 (3.3) & A4.01 (3.1) A-D-S 8 S6 - Place Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6) 261000 A2.13 (3.4) & A4.03 (3.0) L-N-S-EN 9 C1 - Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips (GJPM-OPS-2-2020CR1) 259001 A3.10 (3.4) D-C-L 2 S7 - Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source (RO ONLY) D-S 7 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7) 212000 A2.19 (3.8) & A4.14 (3.8)

In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 - RPS Motor Generator Startup D 7 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1) 212000 A2.01 (3.7) & A1.01 (2.8)

P2 - Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 D-E-L-R 8 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2) 286000 A1.05 (3.2)

P3 - HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown A-E-N 6 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3) 264000 A4.04 (3.7)

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U A 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (5)

(A)lternate path (C)ontrol room C ----- (1)

(D)irect from bank D <9 / <8 / <4 (8)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant E >1 / >1 / >1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature EN >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room sys) (3)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown L >1 / >1 / >1 (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) N-M >2 / >2 / >1 (3)

(P)revious 2 exams P <3 / <3 / < 2 (randomly selected) (1)

(R)CA (S)imulator R >1 / >1 / >1 (1)

S (7)

Rev 0 08/30/2019

JPM

Description:

S1 - Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1) 202001 A2.04 & A4.01 (3.7)

This task is to transfer Reactor Recirculation Pumps to slow speed per IOI - 2, 03-1 2, Power Operations Attachment IV section 8.8.6 and 8.8.7. Upon transfer to slow speed and reopening of both Recirculation Flow Control Valves to 50%, both Reactor Recirculation Pumps will trip to OFF. With the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN at power and no Reactor Recirculation Pumps operating, entry into the Reduction in Recirculation Flow ONEP 05-1-02-III-3, Immediate Operator Actions step 2.1.2 will be required to insert a Manual Reactor Scram.

Placing the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown will NOT insert Control Rods requiring alternate actions to insert the Control Rods by either arming and depressing the Manual Scram pushbuttons OR Initiating ATWS ARI/RPT which will depressurize the Scram Air Header.

S2 - Retest MSIV Slow Closure (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2) 239001 A2.11 (4.1)

This task is to perform a slow closure on MSIV B21-F028A.

Following the closure of the MSIV, recognize High - High temperature in Main Steam Tunnel without Group 1 MSIV isolation. Applicant should manually close all remaining MSIVs (7) using handswitches on P601 panel to isolate the steam leak.

At initial power level Main Steam Line Drains should be closed with the exception of B21-F019, INBD MSL DR OTBD DR VLV which has another valve in the line already closed B21-F016, INBD MSL DR INBD DR VLV.

S3 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3) 209002: A1.01 (3.6); A4.01 (3.7)

This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.

This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources.

HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.

As HPCS is placed in the test return mode the system will experience a failure to initiate and a failure to inject once manually initiated. This will require to arm and depress the initiation pushbutton and then manually open the E22-F004.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

S4 - Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4) 226001 A2.20 (3.7) & A4.07 (3.5)

This task is to secure RHR systems from Containment Spray and align them for injection into the RPV during a LOCA. During the performance one RHR system will not provide sufficient flow to raise RPV water level and the second RHR system will have a failure of E12-F042 LPCI injection valve to open requiring the use of an alternate injection path through E12-F053. Realignment of RHR from Containment Spray to LPCI mode is directed from the Emergency Procedures when there is not Adequate Core Cooling.

Use of Shutdown Cooling lines for injection to the RPV from RHR is allowed per the Emergency Procedures and attachments are provided to facilitate this evolution.

S5 - Rotate CCW Pumps (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5) 400000 A2.01 (3.3) & A4.01 (3.1)

This task is to rotate CCW Pumps per SOI. During the evolution, a trip will occur on one of the operating CCW pumps requiring the restart of the non-operating CCW pump per the Loss of CCW ONEP.

S6 - Place Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6) 261000 A2.13 (3.4) & A4.03 (3.0)

This task is to place one Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode after an automatic initiation signal on Radiation that is still present.

C1 - Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips (GJPM-OPS-2-2020CR1) 259001 A3.10 3.4/3.4

This task defeats the High Reactor Water Level trip of the Reactor Feed Pumps, which under certain conditions is directed by the EOPs to maintain adequate core cooling.

S7 - Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source (RO ONLY)

(GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7) 212000 A2.19 (3.8) & A4.14 (3.8)

This task is to align RPS B power to be supplied from its Normal source, the Motor Generator Set, and to align RPS A power to be supplied from its Alternate source, 480V ESF breaker 52-154204.

P1 - RPS Motor Generator Startup (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1) 212000 A2.01 (3.7) & A1.01 (2.8)

This task is to perform a startup of the RPS Motor Generator and align the RPS Bus to the Normal Supply per the SOI.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

P2 - Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2) 286000 A1.05 (3.2)

This task simulates routing and connecting fire hoses from hose stations to test connections on ECCS injection piping in the Auxiliary Building.

P3 - HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3) 264000 A4.04 (3.7)

This task simulates an auto start of HPCS Diesel Generator with a subsequent oil system failure requiring the operator to EMERGENCY STOP (trip) the HPCS D/G. The Control Room switch and local Emergency Stop switch will not work, the operator must use other means to stop the EDG. Per P81 SOI the lay shaft handle on each diesel engine must be manipulated to stop the EDG.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: GGNS 2-2020 Control Room Systems* (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function S1 - Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed A-D-S 1 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1) 202001 A2.04 & A4.01 (3.7)

S2 - Retest MSIV Slow Closure A-D-P-S 3 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2) 239001 A2.11 (4.1)

S3 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test A-D-S-EN 4 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3) 209002: A1.01 (3.6); A4.01 (3.7)

S4 - Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection (GJPM-OPS-2-2019S4) 226001 A2.20 (3.7) & A4.07 (3.5) L-M-S-EN 5 S5 - Rotate CCW Pumps (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5) 400000 A2.01 (3.3) & A4.01 (3.1) A-D-S 8 S6 - Place Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6) 261000 A2.13 (3.4) & A4.03 (3.0) L-N-S-EN 9 C1 - Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips (GJPM-OPS-2-2020CR1) 259001 A3.10 (3.4) D-C-L 2 In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 - RPS Motor Generator Startup D 7 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1) 212000 A2.01 (3.7) & A1.01 (2.8)

P2 - Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2) 286000 A1.05 (3.2) D-E-L-R 8 P3 - HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3) 264000 A4.04 (3.7) A-E-N 6

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U A 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (5)

(A)lternate path (C)ontrol room C ----- (1)

(D)irect from bank D <9 / <8 / <4 (7)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant E >1 / >1 / >1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature EN >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room sys) (3)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown L >1 / >1 / >1 (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) N-M >2 / >2 / >1 (3)

(P)revious 2 exams P <3 / <3 / < 2 (randomly selected) (1)

(R)CA (S)imulator R >1 / >1 / >1 (1)

S (6)

Rev 0 08/30/2019

JPM

Description:

S1 - Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1) 202001 A2.04 & A4.01 (3.7)

This task is to transfer Reactor Recirculation Pumps to slow speed per IOI - 2, 03-1 2, Power Operations Attachment IV section 8.8.6 and 8.8.7. Upon transfer to slow speed and reopening of both Recirculation Flow Control Valves to 50%, both Reactor Recirculation Pumps will trip to OFF. With the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN at power and no Reactor Recirculation Pumps operating, entry into the Reduction in Recirculation Flow ONEP 05-1-02-III-3, Immediate Operator Actions step 2.1.2 will be required to insert a Manual Reactor Scram.

Placing the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown will NOT insert Control Rods requiring alternate actions to insert the Control Rods by either arming and depressing the Manual Scram pushbuttons OR Initiating ATWS ARI/RPT which will depressurize the Scram Air Header.

S2 - Retest MSIV Slow Closure (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2) 239001 A2.11 (4.1)

This task is to perform a slow closure on MSIV B21-F028A.

Following the closure of the MSIV, recognize High - High temperature in Main Steam Tunnel without Group 1 MSIV isolation. Applicant should manually close all remaining MSIVs (7) using handswitches on P601 panel to isolate the steam leak.

At initial power level Main Steam Line Drains should be closed with the exception of B21-F019, INBD MSL DR OTBD DR VLV which has another valve in the line already closed B21-F016, INBD MSL DR INBD DR VLV.

S3 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3) 209002: A1.01 (3.6); A4.01 (3.7)

This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.

This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources.

HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.

As HPCS is placed in the test return mode the system will experience a failure to initiate and a failure to inject once manually initiated. This will require to arm and depress the initiation pushbutton and then manually open the E22-F004.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

S4 - Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4) 226001 A2.20 (3.7) & A4.07 (3.5)

This task is to secure RHR systems from Containment Spray and align them for injection into the RPV during a LOCA. During the performance one RHR system will not provide sufficient flow to raise RPV water level and the second RHR system will have a failure of E12-F042 LPCI injection valve to open requiring the use of an alternate injection path through E12-F053. Realignment of RHR from Containment Spray to LPCI mode is directed from the Emergency Procedures when there is not Adequate Core Cooling.

Use of Shutdown Cooling lines for injection to the RPV from RHR is allowed per the Emergency Procedures and attachments are provided to facilitate this evolution.

S5 - Rotate CCW Pumps (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5) 400000 A2.01 (3.3) & A4.01 (3.1)

This task is to rotate CCW Pumps per SOI. During the evolution, a trip will occur on one of the operating CCW pumps requiring the restart of the non-operating CCW pump per the Loss of CCW ONEP.

S6 - Place Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode (GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6) 261000 A2.13 (3.4) & A4.03 (3.0)

This task is to place one Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode after an automatic initiation signal on Radiation that is still present.

C1 - Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips (GJPM-OPS-2-2020CR1) 259001 A3.10 3.4/3.4

This task defeats the High Reactor Water Level trip of the Reactor Feed Pumps, which under certain conditions is directed by the EOPs to maintain adequate core cooling.

P1 - RPS Motor Generator Startup (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1) 212000 A2.01 (3.7) & A1.01 (2.8)

This task is to perform a startup of the RPS Motor Generator and align the RPS Bus to the Normal Supply per the SOI.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

P2 - Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2) 286000 A1.05 (3.2)

This task simulates routing and connecting fire hoses from hose stations to test connections on ECCS injection piping in the Auxiliary Building.

P3 - HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown (GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3) 264000 A4.04 (3.7)

This task simulates an auto start of HPCS Diesel Generator with a subsequent oil system failure requiring the operator to EMERGENCY STOP (trip) the HPCS D/G. The Control Room switch and local Emergency Stop switch will not work, the operator must use other means to stop the EDG. Per P81 SOI the lay shaft handle on each diesel engine must be manipulated to stop the EDG.

Rev 0 08/30/2019

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 2-2020 C1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 JPM

Title:

Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-EOP006 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: Johnnie Clack / Mark Watts 10/14/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Control Room Type: RO Task: CRO-EP-006 K&A: 259001 A3.10 3.4/3.4 Safety Function: 2 - Reactor Water Inventory Control System 10CFR 55.45(a) (5)

Performance: Simulated Reference(s): 05-S-01-EP-1/Attachment 6 Handout(s) 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 6

Manipulations: 4

Critical Steps: 4 Low Power: YES Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Control Room operating panels and backpanel P612 is accessible, with permission from the Shift Manager to panels for inspection only.

Safety Concerns:

Possible electric shock while inspecting interior of panels - Do not break the plane of any panels (student should use an appropriate indicating device to identify component/connection locations).

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Task Standard:

Removes relay 1C34A-K7J.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7G.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7A.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7F.

The Reactor Feed Pump Level 9 trips are defeated in accordance with 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6 steps 2.1 thru 2.4.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Initial Condition(s):

EOPs have been entered.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed to perform steps 2.1 through 2.4 of EP Attachment 6.

Another operator will complete the remaining steps of this attachment when directed.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Notes to Evaluator:

RFPT reset controls and indications are on P680.

Panel P612 is in the Main Control Room Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task defeats the High Reactor Water Level trip of the Reactor Feed Pumps, which under certain conditions is directed by the EOPs to maintain adequate core cooling.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6, step 2.1

REMOVE relay 1C34A-K7J.

Standard: Candidate removed relay relay 1C34A-K7J from Main Control Room panel 1H13-P612 Bay B (3rd row from top, 1st relay from left.)

Cue: Relay 1C34A-K7J is removed.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6, step 2.2

REMOVE relay 1C34A-K7G.

Standard: Candidate removed relay relay 1C34A-K7G from Main Control Room panel 1H13-P612 Bay B (3rd row from top, 2nd relay from left.)

Cue: Relay 1C34A-K7G is removed.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Step 3: 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6, step 2.3

REMOVE relay 1C34A-K7A.

Standard: Candidate removed relay relay 1C34A-K7A from Main Control Room panel 1H13-P612 Bay B (2nd row from top, 1st relay from left.)

Cue: Relay 1C34A-K7A is removed.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6, step 2.4

REMOVE relay 1C34A-K7F.

Standard: Candidate removed relay relay 1C34A-K7F from Main Control Room panel 1H13-P612 Bay B (3rd row from top, 3rd relay from left.)

Cue: Relay 1C34A-K7F is removed.

If candidate attempts to enter the P680 panel area, inform the candidate that another operator will perform the remainder of the attachment.

Notes:

Remember to record stop time SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 9

GJPM-OPS-2-2020C1 Defeat Feed Pump Level 9 Trips Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Removes relay 1C34A-K7J.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7G.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7A.

Removes relay 1C34A-K7F.

The Reactor Feed Pump Level 9 trips are defeated in accordance with 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 6 steps 2.1 thru 2.4.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 9

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

EOPs have been entered.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed to perform steps 2.1 through 2.4 of EP Attachment 6.

Another operator will complete the remaining steps of this attachment when directed.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 2-2020 S1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 JPM

Title:

Transfer Recirculation Pumps to slow speed Facility Number: N/A (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-B33-NORMAL 001 K&A: 202001 A4.01 (3.7/3.7); A4.02 (3.5/3.4) 295001 AA1.01 (3.5/3.6); AA1.02 (3.3/3.3)

Safety Function: 1 - Reactivity Control 10CFR55.45(a) (2); (3); (5); (7)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 03-1-01-2 SU, Rev 176 04-1-01-B33-1, Rev 172 04-1-02-1H13-P680, Rev 244 05-1-02-III-3, Rev 118 05-1-02-I-1, Rev 133 Handout(s) 03-1-01-2, Attachment IV 04-1-01-B33-1, Section 4.3

Manipulations: 6

Critical Steps: 6 Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset Simulator to IC-118

Ensure the following :

o Rod Line is <65%

o Reactor Power is <40%

o Insert Override di_1c71m602, P680/11E Mode Switch in RUN o Mark up 03-1-01-2, Attachment IV to step 8.8.6 Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed Safety Concerns:

NONE Task Standard:

Closes Both Recirculation A AND B Flow Control Valves (FCVs) to MIN ED position using RECIRC A(B) FLO CONT on 1H13-P680.

Simultaneously depresses TRANS TO LFMG pushbutton on TRANS TO LFMG/START handswitch for Recirc Pump A AND B on 1H13-P680.

Opens Recirculation FCVs to their MAXIMUM position, and CHECK flow balance between Loops WHILE monitoring Recirc Pump performance on 1H13-P680.

Actions have been taken to insert a manual reactor scram following a trip of both Reactor Recirculation Pumps to off without permission of CRS or referring to procedures.

ARMs and simultaneously depresses Manual SCRAM pushbuttons.

Depresses the ALL RODS pushbutton on 1H13-P680 to confirm all rods in.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 43 % power shutting down the reactor per 03-1-01-2, Power Operations IOI, Attachment IV.

OPRMs are all operable.

LFMGs are available.

Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Action J.1 is NOT in effect.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to perform step 8.8.6 of Attachment IV of 03-1-01-2, then transfer Reactor Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed in accordance with section 4.3 0f SOI 04 01-B33-1.

Another operator will respond to all other alarms.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed Notes to Evaluator:

All controls will be from panel P680 in the Main Control Room.

Remember to record Start time on page 17.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to transfer Reactor Recirculation Pumps to slow speed per IOI - 2, 03-1-01-2, Power Operations Attachment IV section 8.8.6 and 8.8.7. Upon transfer to slow speed and reopening of both Recirculation Flow Control Valves to 50%, both Reactor Recirculation Pumps will trip to OFF. With the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN at power and no Reactor Recirculation Pumps operating, entry into the Reduction in Recirculation Flow ONEP 05-1-02-III-3, Immediate Operator Actions step 2.1.2 will be required to insert a Manual Reactor Scram.

Placing the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown will NOT insert Control Rods requiring alternate actions to insert the Control Rods by either arming and depressing the Manual Scram pushbuttons OR Initiating ATWS ARI/RPT which will depressurize the Scram Air Header.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

Step 1: 03-1-01-2, Att. IV step 8.8.6

CLOSE Both Recirculation A AND B Flow Control Valves (FCVs) to MIN ED position using RECIRC A(B) FLO CONT on 1H13-P680.

Standard: Recirculation A AND B Flow Control Valves (FCVs) are in MIN ED position.

Step 1a FCV A in MIN ED ___________

Step 1b FCV B in MIN ED ___________

Cue: None.

Notes: Sequence of closing FCVs is NOT CRITICAL.

If asked to initial the step in 03-1-01-2 Attachment IV step 8.8.6, MARK the step as complete when the applicant completes the action.

Initialing the IOI is NOT CRITICAL.

Applicant may inform CRS of NOTE in 03-1-01-2 Att. IV about Feedwater Heater isolations.

Inform the applicant another operator will perform the actions of the Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP if an isolation occurs SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 2: 03-1-01-2 Att. IV step 8.8.7 04-1-01-B33-1, Step 4.3.1 Verifies Prerequisites are complete:

(1) LFMG sets available (2) Recirc Loop A(B) FLO CONT are at MIN ED position in MANUAL (3) Reactor Feedwater flow is stable greater than 4.5 mlbm/hr flow (4) Reactor power stable AND less than +40 percent AND Reactor power/flow are below 65 percent load line (5) IF entry into the Controlled Entry Region of Figure 1 is anticipated AND TS 3.3.1.1, Action J.1 is in effect, THEN ENSURE that the requirements for Controlled Entry Region operation are met per 3.2.13 AND 03-1-01-2.

Standard: Prerequisites are verified complete.

Cue: None.

Notes: Applicant may inform CRS of NOTE in 04-1-01-B33-1 step 4.3.2 about Feedwater Heater isolations Inform the applicant another operator will perform the actions of the Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP if an isolation occurs.

IF applicant informs CRS of CAUTION, acknowledge CAUTION.

Requirements for Controlled Entry Region are met.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 3: 04-1-01-B33-1, Step 4.3.2 1

SIMULTANEOUSLY DEPRESS TRANS TO LFMG pushbutton on TRANS TO LFMG/START handswitch for Recirc Pump A AND B on 1H13-P680.

Standard: Simultaneously depresses the Recirc pump A and B TRANS TO LFMG pushbuttons on P680.

Cue: None.

Notes: None SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 4 04-1-01-B33-1, Step 4.3.2.1 (a - f)

CHECK the following on 1H13-P680:

(1) CB-5A, RECIRC PMP A FDR, 252-1103 OPENS (2) CB-5B, RECIRC PMP B FDR, 252-1205 OPENS (3) RECIRC PUMP A AND RECIRC PUMP B AMPS DECLINE (4) RECIRC PUMP A RPM & RECIRC PUMP B RPM STARTS DECLINING (5) CB-1A, LFMG A DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1308 CLOSES (6) CB-1B, LFMG B DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1411 CLOSES Standard: Observes the following:

___ CB-5A, RECIRC PMP A FDR, 252-1103 OPENS

___ CB-5B, RECIRC PMP B FDR, 252-1205 OPENS

___ RECIRC PUMP A AND RECIRC PUMP B AMPS DECLINE

___ RECIRC PUMP A RPM & RECIRC PUMP B RPM STARTS DECLINING

___ CB-1A, LFMG A DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1308 CLOSES

___ CB-1B, LFMG B DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1411 CLOSES Cue: None Notes: The Recirc Pumps are operating in Slow Speed.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 5: 04-1-01-B33-1, Step 4.3.2.2 When Recirc Pumps A & B slow down to 360 - 450 rpm, then ENSURE LFMG A & LFMG B FDR 252-1103A AND 252-1205A, CLOSE.

Standard: Observes LFMG A & LFMG B FDR 252-1103A AND 252-1205A, CLOSE.

Cue: None.

Notes: H13-P680 section 3C.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 6: 04-1-01-B33-1, Step 4.3.2.3

OPEN Recirculation FCVs to their MAXIMUM position, and CHECK flow balance between Loops WHILE monitoring Recirc Pump performance on 1H13-P680.

Standard: Opens Recirculation Flow Control Valves (FCVs) to their MAXIMUM position.

Step 6a FCV A ___________

Step 6b FCV B ___________

See NOTES Below.

Cue: None.

Notes: 1H13-P680 section 3D When BOTH Recirculation FCVs are at 50% valve position the Low Frequency Motor Generators (LFMGs) will trip to OFF.

CB-1A, LFMG A DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1308 OPEN CB-1B, LFMG B DRIVE MTR FDR 152-1411 OPEN CB-2A, LFMG A FDR 252-1103A OPEN CB-2B, LFMG B FDR 252-1205A OPEN Opening the Recirculation FCVs is an acceptable two handed operation. They should be moving the valves in Slow Detent.

The Recirculation Pumps tripping will begin the Alternate Path.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Step 7: 04-1-02-1H13-P680, annunciators 3A-A4; 3A-A10; 3A-E5; 3A-E8 OBSERVES AND REPORTS the following Annunciators on 04-1-02-1H13-P680:

3A-A4 RECIRC PMP A LO SP AUTO XFER NOT AVAIL 3A-A10 RECIRC PMP B LO SP AUTO XFER NOT AVAIL 3A-E5 LFMG A OVERLD/TRIP 3A-E8 LFMG B OVERLD/TRIP Recirculation Pumps A and B have tripped to Off.

Standard: Reports trip of both Recirc Pumps to OFF.

Cue: None.

Notes: Annunciators 1H13-P680-3A-A4; A10; E5 and E8.

Indication of Recirculation Pump circuit breakers in on 1H13-P680 section 3C.

SAT / UNSAT Alternate Path begins with the next step, designated by AP.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 AP Step 8: 05-1-02-III-3 step 2.1/2.1.2

Upon recognition of No Recirculation Loops in operation with the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN, immediately PLACE the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position.

Standard: Places Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.

Cue: None Notes: This action inserts a manual reactor scram.

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 9: 05-1-02-I-1 step 2.1 CONFIRM all Control Rods are fully inserted.

Standard: Confirms all Control Rods have NOT fully inserted.

Cue: None Notes: Applicant will depress the ALL RODS on 1H13 P680 and observe the following on the full core display:

(1) all green LEDs illuminated for control rods OR/AND (2) all control rod position indications indicate --

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 13 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 AP Step 10: 05-1-02-I-1 step 2.4

If a Failure to De-energize ATWS occurs, THEN ARM and simultaneously DEPRESS Manual SCRAM pushbuttons.

Standard: Arms and Depresses at least 1 - RPS DIV 1 OR DIV 3 AND 1 - RPS DIV 2 OR DIV 4 Manual SCRAM pushbutton.

Cue: None Notes: These pushbuttons are not required by logic to be depressed simultaneously. As long as one from each RPS channel A and B is initiated a Full Scram will occur.

If Step 11 is performed this step is N/A and NOT Critical.

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 11: 05-1-02-I-1 step 2.5.2

Initiate ARI/RPT.

Standard: Arms and Depresses ATWS ARI/RPT MANUAL TRIP Channel 1 and Channel 2 pushbuttons.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P680 section 3C This action will initiate the ATWS ARI system to depressurize the Scram Air Header.

If Step 10 is performed this step is N/A and NOT Critical.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 14 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 AP Step 12: 05-1-02-I-1 step 2.1

CONFIRM all Control Rods are fully inserted.

Standard: Confirms all Control Rods have fully inserted by depressing the ALL RODS pushbutton on 1H13-P680 and observe the following on the full core display:

(1) all green LEDs illuminated for control rods OR/AND (2) all control rod position indications indicate --

Cue: None Notes: Applicant will depress the ALL RODS on 1H13 P680 and observe the following on the full core display:

(1) all green LEDs illuminated for control rods OR/AND (2) all control rod position indications indicate --

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 15 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 AP Step 13: 05-1-02-I-1 step 2.2 CONFIRM Reactor power decreasing.

Standard: Observes Reactor power decreasing on APRMs and IRMs.

Cue: None Notes: Inform applicant the JPM is TERMINATED Remember to record stop time SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 16 of 18

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S1 Transfer Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Closes Both Recirculation A AND B Flow Control Valves (FCVs) to MIN ED position using RECIRC A(B)

FLO CONT on 1H13-P680.

Simultaneously depresses TRANS TO LFMG pushbutton on TRANS TO LFMG/START handswitch for Recirc Pump A AND B on 1H13-P680.

Opens Recirculation FCVs to their MAXIMUM position, and CHECK flow balance between Loops WHILE monitoring Recirc Pump performance on 1H13-P680.

Actions have been taken to insert a manual reactor scram following a trip of both Reactor Recirculation Pumps to off without permission of CRS or referring to procedures.

ARMs and simultaneously depresses Manual SCRAM pushbuttons.

Depresses the ALL RODS pushbutton on 1H13-P680 to confirm all rods in.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 17 of 18

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 40 % power shutting down the reactor per 03-1-01-2, Power Operations IOI, Attachment IV.

OPRMs are all operable.

LFMGs are available.

Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Action J.1 is NOT in effect.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to perform step 8.8.6 of Attachment IV of 03-1-01-2, then transfer Reactor Recirculation Pumps to Slow Speed in accordance with section 4.3 0f SOI 04 01-B33-1.

Another operator will respond to all other alarms.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 2-2020 S2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 JPM

Title:

Retest MSIV Slow Closure Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-2017S2 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2 Validation by Ops Validation Crew nd Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-B21-SU/SD-001 K&A: 239001: A2.11 (4.1/4.3); A3.01 (4.2/4.1); A4.01 (4.2/4.0)

Safety Function: 3 - Reactor Pressure Control PRA Applicability: Accident Type Contribution to Core Damage Frequency - Break Outside Containment 10CFR 55.45(a) (3); (4); (8)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 04-1-01-B21-1, Rev. 55, Nuclear Boiler System 05-1-02-III-5, Rev. 53, Automatic Isolations EN-OP-120, Rev. 2, Operator Fundamentals Program Handout(s): 04-1-01-B21-1 Step 5.4

Manipulations: 11

Critical Steps: 10 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Previous 2 NRC Exams (2017 randomly selected)

Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset Simulator to IC-136 OR

Create event 1 iodib21m603a(1)==1

Insert malfunction ms066d to 50.00 - Steam Leak in Aux Bldg Tunnel: MSL D

Insert remote function ATT09 to DONE - Defeating all MSIV and MSL Drain Isolation Interlocks

Icon on 1H13-P680 right side PDS Operator Guide - EP4 Initial Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard:

Placed handswitch for B21-F028A on 1H13-P601 to the TEST position

Depressed and held the MSIV TEST pushbutton until B21-F028A indicates full closed

Placed B21-F028A handswitch to the CLOSE position, then released MSIV TEST P/B

Manually closed the following MSIVs:

B21-F028B, MSL B CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028C, MSL C CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028D, MSL D CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F022A, MSL A DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022B, MSL B DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022C, MSL C DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022D, MSL D DRWL INBD ISOL Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure Initial Condition(s):

Plant is approximately 55% power during initial startup after refueling outage

MSIV, B21-F028A, was reworked during the outage Initiating Cue(s):

Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a slow closing of MSIV B21-F028A, using 04-1-01-B21-1, Nuclear Boiler System SOI, section 5.4

After MSIV B21-F028A reaches full closed, place handswitch for B21-F028A to the CLOSE position for data collection Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure Notes to Evaluator:

All controls and indications for this task are on panel P601 Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to perform a slow closure on MSIV B21-F028A.

Following the closure of the MSIV, applicant should recognize High - High temperature in Main Steam Tunnel without Group 1 MSIV isolation. Applicant should manually close all remaining MSIVs (7) using handswitches on P601 panel to isolate the steam leak.

At initial power level Main Steam Line Drains should be closed with the exception of B21-F019, INBD MSL DR OTBD DR VLV which has another valve in the line already closed B21-F016, INBD MSL DR INBD DR VLV.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time on page 12 Step 1: 04-1-01-B21-1, Step 5.4.2 a

PLACE associated MSIV handswitch on 1H13-P601 to TEST Standard: Placed handswitch for B21-F028A on 1H13-P601 to the TEST position.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 19C SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 04-1-01-B21-1, Step 5.4.2 a

DEPRESS MSIV TEST pushbutton. Holding pushbutton slow closes valve fully.

Standard: Depressed and held the MSIV TEST pushbutton until B21-F028A indicates full closed, indicated by green light on and red light off.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 19C SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Step 3: 04-1-01-B21-1, Step 5.4.2 b

IF desired, WHEN MSIV is fully CLOSED, PLACE MSIV handswitch from TEST to CLOSE, THEN RELEASE pushbutton.

Standard: After B21-F028A reaches the full closed position, placed B21-F028A handswitch to the CLOSE position, then releases MSIV TEST P/B.

Cue: None Notes: When handswitch is placed in the CLOSE position, a steam line break will occur inside the Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel.

SAT / UNSAT SIMULATOR OPERATOR - ENSURE EVENT 1 ACTUATES.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Alternate Path begins with the next step, designated by AP.

AP Step 4: EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b (10), Control Recognize a valid Group 1 MSIV isolation signal.

Standard: Recognized a Group 1 MSIV isolation signal by observing the following four alarms:

P601-18A(19A)-A3 and A4, MSL PIPE TNL CH-A (B,C,D) TEMP HI/INOP Cue: If asked, indication on 1H13-P632 TJRS-R608 Point 1 indicates 260°F Notes: Applicant may look at PDS Operator Guide EP4 Initial and notice point for Steam Tunnel Temperature in alarm SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 AP Step 4: EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b (10), Control Recognize Group 1 MSIV isolation did not occur.

Standard: Recognized all remaining (7) MSIVs are open

B21-F028B, MSL B CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028C, MSL C CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028D, MSL D CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F022A, MSL A DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022B, MSL B DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022C, MSL C DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022D, MSL D DRWL INBD ISOL Indication of MSIVs open is red lights on, green lights off Cue: If applicant reports a failure of a Group 1 isolation; respond as the CRS, I understand failure of Group 1 isolation; Also if asked the ATC will place the Mode Switch to shutdown.

Notes:

Applicant may report EP-4 entry condition. If reported EP-4 entry, acknowledge the report.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 AP Step 6: EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b (10), & 05-1-02-III-5, Step 2.1

Place all remaining MSIV handswitches (7) to the CLOSE position.

Standard: Placed the following remaining MSIV handswitches (7) to the CLOSE position:

_____ B21-F028B, MSL B CTMT OTBD ISOL

_____ B21-F028C, MSL C CTMT OTBD ISOL

_____ B21-F028D, MSL D CTMT OTBD ISOL

_____ B21-F022A, MSL A DRWL INBD ISOL

_____ B21-F022B, MSL B DRWL INBD ISOL

_____ B21-F022C, MSL C DRWL INBD ISOL

_____ B21-F022D, MSL D DRWL INBD ISOL Indication of MSIVs closed is green light on, red light off Cue: None Notes: Per EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b (10)

ENSURE appropriate manual action is taken when automatic systems do not actuate when required or when the equipment has not responded as expected.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 AP Step 7: EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b (10), & 05-1-02-III-5, Step 2.1 Place the following MSL Drain handswitches to the CLOSE position.

B21-F019, INBD MSL DR OTBD DR VLV

B21-F067A, OTBD MSL A DR VLV (should be closed based on initial power)

B21-F067B, OTBD MSL B DR VLV (should be closed based on initial power)

B21-F067C, OTBD MSL C DR VLV (should be closed based on initial power)

B21-F067D, OTBD MSL D DR VLV (should be closed based on initial power)

B21-F016, INBD MSL DR INBD DR VLV (should be closed based on initial power)

Standard: Placed the following MSL Drain valve handswitches to the CLOSE position:

_____ B21-F019, INBD MSL DR OTBD DR VLV Indication of MSL Drain Valves closed is green light on, red light off Cue: None Notes:

These valves should already be closed due to initial power level. B21-F019 has another valve (B21-F016) in the line closed therefore would NOT be critical.

EVALUATOR TERMINATE JPM after all MSIVs (8) MSIVs handswitches are in the closed position.

Only 7 valves are required to be manually closed due to one was closed per the SOI retest.

RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S2 Retest MSIV Slow Closure Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Placed handswitch for B21-F028A on 1H13-P601 to the TEST position

Depressed and held the MSIV TEST pushbutton until B21-F028A indicates full closed

Placed B21-F028A handswitch to the CLOSE position, then released MSIV TEST P/B

Manually closed the following MSIVs:

B21-F028B, MSL B CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028C, MSL C CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F028D, MSL D CTMT OTBD ISOL

B21-F022A, MSL A DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022B, MSL B DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022C, MSL C DRWL INBD ISOL

B21-F022D, MSL D DRWL INBD ISOL JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 13

Give this page to the applicant Initial Condition(s):

Plant is approximately 55% power during initial startup after refueling outage

MSIV, B21-F028A, was reworked during the outage Initiating Cue(s):

Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a slow closing of MSIV B21-F028A, using 04-1-01-B21-1, Nuclear Boiler System SOI, section 5.4

After MSIV B21-F028A reaches full closed, place handswitch for B21-F028A to the CLOSE position for data collection

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 2-2020 S3 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 JPM

Title:

Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-E2217 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2 Validation by Ops Validation Crew nd Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-E22-008, 010 K&A: 209002: A1.01-3.6/3.7; A4.01 - 3.7/3.7 Safety Function: 4 - Heat Removal from Reactor Core PRA Applicability: HPCS system is #16 on System Importance to CDF 10CFR 55.45(a) (3); (4); (5); (7)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Rev. 130 EN-OP-120, Rev. 2 02-S-01-43, Rev 7 Handout(s) 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005

Manipulations: 5

Critical Steps: 4 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: YES Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset Simulator to IC-120

Run Schedule File GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3

Ensure HPCS MOV test switch in TEST. HPCS system OOSVC lit.

Verify flags are on the following alarm:

o P601-16A-H5, HPCS SYS OOSVC

Verify status light is on:

o HPCS MOV IN TEST STATUS Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard:

The HPCS pump is started for full test return flow, Suppression Pool to Suppression Pool, IAW 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, when both Main Feed Pumps trip and HPCS fails to auto initiate. Student must recognize the failed initiation (-41.6 inches Wide Range Reactor Water Level) and manually initiate HPCS. Then the student must recognize the failure to inject and manually open E22-F004 (HPCS Injection Valve) prior to wide range reactor water level reaching -160 inches.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Initial Condition(s):

06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, HPCS Quarterly Functional Test, Attachment 1 is in progress at step 5.2.2 t.

SSW C is in STANDBY

All Prerequisites are met

Reactor power is at approximately 100%

You are filling the position of CRO Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to continue with 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, HPCS Quarterly Functional Test, Attachment 1.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Notes to Evaluator:

All controls and indications for this task are on panel 1H13-P601 and P870.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.

This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources. HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.

As HPCS is placed in the test return mode the system will experience a failure to initiate and a failure to inject once manually initiated. This will require to arm and depress the initiation pushbutton and then manually open the E22-F004.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time on page 13 Step 1: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 t PLACE the SSW DIV 3 MOV TEST switch in the TEST position.

Standard: Places the SSW DIV 3 MOV TEST switch in the TEST position Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: : 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 u OBSERVE that "SSW DIV 3 MOVS IN TEST MODE" annunciator, 1H13-P870-5A-G2, Alarms Standard: Observes that "SSW DIV 3 MOVS IN TEST MODE" annunciator, 1H13-P870-5A-G2, Alarms.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Step 3: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 v OBSERVE that SSW D3 MOV IN TEST STATUS light energizes.

Standard: Observes that SSW D3 MOV IN TEST STATUS light energizes Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 w

START HPCS pump using HPCS PUMP handswitch AND VERIFY HPCS pump starts Standard: Operator starts the HPCS Pump utilizing its handswitch on P601 and observes pump indicating lights shows a pump start Cue: If requested, Pre-start checks on the HPCS pump are completed satisfactory.

If operator wants to perform a plant announcement for starting HPCS pump, respond that all announcements have been made Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Step 5: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 w VERIFY the following has occurred:

(1) F012, HPCS MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL, OPENS as discharge pressure indicated on PI-R601, HPCS PMP DISCH PRESS, increases above 130 psig.

(2) HPCS Room Cooler Fan has started USING indication above HPCS PMP RM CLR T51-B001 handswitch on Panel 1H13-P870-5C.

(3) SSW LOOP C (HPCS SSW) on Panel 1H13-P870-5C started automatically Standard:

(1) F012, HPCS MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL, OPENS as discharge pressure indicated on PI-R601, HPCS PMP DISCH PRESS, increases above 130 psig.

(2) HPCS Room Cooler Fan has started USING indication above HPCS PMP RM CLR T51-B001 handswitch on Panel 1H13-P870-5C.

(3) SSW LOOP C (HPCS SSW) on Panel 1H13-P870-5C started automatically. Student verifies P41-F011 (PSW FROM CCW HX) and P41-C002C (HPCS SVC WTR PMP (LOOP C)is running.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Step 6: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 x OPEN FX019 Standard: Operator request a plant operator to open E22-FX019 Cue: When requested to open E22-FX019, report the valve is open.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 7: 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, Att. 1 Step 5.2.2 y

THROTTLE F023 as necessary to achieve a flow of approximately 7193 gpm (tolerance:

>7176 to 7225 gpm) as indicated on HPCS PUMP FLOW indicator 1E22-FI-R603 Standard: Operator opens E22-F023 to achieve desired flow.

Cue: Upon reactor scram, give scram report,

1. Mode switch is in Shutdown

2. Reactor Water Level is -20 Wide Range and lowering,

3. All rods are in.

4. B Feedwater line break in the Drywell If candidate moves toward P680 to respond to alarms, notify that another operator will respond to the P680.

Notes:

As F023 starts to open, a trip of both reactor feed pumps will occur. This will result in a failed initiation of HPCS.

The operations contained in the remainder of this JPM are not contained in the HPCS surveillance or SOI.

SAT / UNSAT Alternate Path begins with the next step, designated by AP.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 AP Step 8: EN-OP-120, Attachment 9.2, Monitoring

Verify and report automatic system actuations or response, which includes operator actions if the plant has not responded as expected Standard: Operator recognizes failed initiation of HPCS by observing system high drywell pressure (greater than 1.39 psig) and low reactor water level (less than -41.6) on P601 and reports failure to the CRS.

Cue: Act as CRS and acknowledge the operators report Notes: Operator may elect to take action to initiate HPCS injection prior to reporting failure to CRS. This is acceptable.

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 9: EN-OP-120, Attachment 2, Control

Take manual actions (IAW procedure direction, if available) when automatic actions do not occur.

Standard: USING HPCS MAIN INIT pushbutton on 1H13-P601 by ROTATING collar to the ARMED position AND PUSHING red button Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 AP Step 10 EN-OP-120, Attachment 2, Monitoring

Verify and report automatic system actuations or response, which includes operator actions if the plant has not responded as expected.

Standard: Operator recognizes failed injection of HPCS by observing system indications on P601(E22-F004 (HPCS Injection Valve) fails to open) and reports failure to the CRS Cue: Act as CRS and acknowledge the operators report Notes: Operator may elect to take action to inject HPCS prior to reporting failure to CRS. This is acceptable.

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 11: EN-OP-120, Attachment 2, Control

Take manual actions (IAW procedure direction, if available) when automatic actions do not occur.

Standard: Opens the E22-F004 (HPCS Injection Valve) using its handswitch on P601 and observing its red light is on and its green light is off Cue: None Notes: Once the E22F004 is opened the evaluator may stop the JPM.

RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S3 Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

The HPCS pump is started for full test return flow, Suppression Pool to Suppression Pool, IAW 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, when both Main Feed Pumps trip and HPCS fails to auto initiate.

Student must recognize the failed initiation (-41.6 inches Wide Range Reactor Water Level) and manually initiate HPCS. Then the student must recognize the failure to inject and manually open E22-F004 (HPCS Injection Valve) prior to wide range reactor water level reaching -160 inches.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 13

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, HPCS Quarterly Functional Test, Attachment 1 is in progress at step 5.2.2 t.

SSW C is in STANDBY

All Prerequisites are met

Reactor power is at approximately 100%

You are filling the position of CRO Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to continue with 06-OP-1E22-Q-0005, HPCS Quarterly Functional Test, Attachment 1.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 2-2020 S4 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 JPM

Title:

Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-E12015 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-E12-015; CRO-E12-003; CRO-EP-012 K&A: 226001 A4.01: 3.5/3.4; A4.03: 3.5/3.4; A4.07: 3.5/3.5; 2.1.30: 3.9/3.4 A2.04: 3.0/3.0 203000 A2.13: 3.2/3.3; A3.01: 3.8/3.7; A4.02: 4.1/4.1 Safety Function: Containment (5)

PRA Applicability: Accident Type Contribution to Core Damage Frequency - Break Outside Containment 10CFR 55.45(a) (3); (4); (7)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 04-1-01-E12-1, Rev 155 05-S-01-EP-1 Att. 12 Handout(s): 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII.

Manipulations: 3

Critical Steps: 3 Low Power: YES Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: YES Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset to IC-128

Using PDS computer HOT KEY, display Reactor Water Level.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard:

Depresses the CTMT SPR A RESET pushbutton

Depresses the CTMT SPR B RESET pushbutton

Manually opens the E12-F042A using handswitch

Manually opens the E12-F042B using handswitch

RHR A is injecting to the RPV via E12-F042A and RHR B is injecting through E12-F042B Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Initial Condition(s):

A LOCA has occurred on Feedwater line B in the Drywell.

RHR A and B are operating in Containment Spray.

The CRS has entered applicable EPs.

Adequate Core Cooling is NOT assured.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed by the CRS to secure Containment Spray and align LPCI A and B for RPV injection to restore reactor water level.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Notes to Evaluator:

All controls and indications for this task are on panel P601

The simulator will be in FREEZE until the candidate is ready to perform actions.

The Evaluator will CUE the simulator operator to begin the JPM by removing the simulator from FREEZE.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to secure RHR systems from Containment Spray and align them for injection into the RPV during a LOCA.

During the performance the injection valves have been manually overridden, therefore the injection valves, E12-F042A and B must be manually opened.

Realignment of RHR from Containment Spray to LPCI mode is directed from the Emergency Procedures when there is not Adequate Core Cooling.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

CUE the simulator operator to begin the JPM by removing the simulator from FREEZE Remember to record Start time Step 1: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (1)

DEPRESS CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton.

Standard: Depresses the CTMT SPR A RESET pushbutton.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20B SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (2)

ENSURE white light above CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton extinguishes.

Standard: Verifies the white light above the CTMT SPR A RESET pushbutton extinguishes Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20B SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 3: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (3)

ENSURE E12-F042A(B), RHR A(B) INJ SHUTOFF VLV Opens (Unless overridden by previous EP step).

Standard: Recognizes E12-F042A did not auto open and is overridden closed.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20C SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (3)

Manually opens E12-F042A usning handswitch RHR A INJ SHUTOFF VLV.

Standard: Opens E12-F042A using handswitch.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20C SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 5: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (4)

ENSURE E12-F028A(B), CTMT SPRAY A(B) SPARGER INJ VLV Closes.

Standard: Verfies E12-F028A, CTMT SPRAY A SPARGER INJ VLV Closes.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20C SAT / UNSAT Step 6: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown ENSURE RHR A is injecting into the reactor.

Standard: Verifies RHR PMP A DISCH FLO is rising.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 20B SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 7: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (1)

DEPRESS CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton.

Standard: Depresses the CTMT SPR B RESET pushbutton.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17B SAT / UNSAT Step 8: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (2)

ENSURE white light above CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton extinguishes.

Standard: Verifies the white light above the CTMT SPR B RESET pushbutton extinguishes Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17B SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 9: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (3)

ENSURE E12-F042A(B), RHR A(B) INJ SHUTOFF VLV Opens (Unless overridden by previous EP step).

Standard: Recognizes E12-F042B did not auto open and is overridden closed.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17C SAT / UNSAT Step 10: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (3)

Manually opens E12-F042B usning handswitch RHR A INJ SHUTOFF VLV.

Standard: Opens E12-F042B using handswitch.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17C SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 11: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (4)

ENSURE E12-F028A(B), CTMT SPRAY A(B) SPARGER INJ VLV Closes.

Standard: Verfies E12-F028B, CTMT SPRAY B SPARGER INJ VLV Closes.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17C SAT / UNSAT Step 12: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown ENSURE RHR B is injecting into the reactor.

Standard: Verifies RHR PMP B DISCH FLO is rising.

Cue: None Notes: 1H13-P601 section 17B SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Step 13: 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VII, Containment Spray Shutdown, Step (5)

REFER to Step 5.3.2 of this procedure WHEN time permits.

Standard: Refers to SOI for this step.

Cue: NONE Notes:

EVALUATOR TERMINATE JPM after both RHR systems are injecting into the reactor.

RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 14

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S4 Secure Containment Spray and Align for RPV Injection Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Depresses the CTMT SPR A RESET pushbutton

Depresses the CTMT SPR B RESET pushbutton

Manually opens the E12-F042A using handswitch

Manually opens the E12-F042B using handswitch

RHR A is injecting to the RPV via E12-F042A and RHR B is injecting through E12-F042B JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 13 of 14

Give this page to the applicant Initial Condition(s):

A LOCA has occurred on Feedwater line B in the Drywell.

RHR A and B are operating in Containment Spray.

The CRS has entered applicable EPs.

Adequate Core Cooling is NOT assured.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed by the CRS to secure Containment Spray and align LPCI A and B for RPV injection to restore reactor water level.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 2-2020 S5 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 JPM

Title:

Isolate CCW to FPCCU HT EX B Facility Number: N/A NEW (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Isolate CCW to FPCCU Ht Ex B JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-P42-007; CRO-P42-004 K&A: 400000 A4.01: 3.1/3.0; A2.01: 3.3/3.4 2.1.30: 3.9/3.4; 2.1.31: 4.2/3.9; 295018 AK3.04: 3.3/3.3; AA1.01: 3.3/3.4 Safety Function: 8 - Plant Service Systems PRA Applicability: Accident Type Contribution to Core Damage Frequency - Break Outside Containment 10CFR 55.45(a) (3); (4); (7)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 04-1-01-P42-1, Rev. 61, section 5.5.1.3 EN-OP-120, Rev. 2, Operator Fundamentals Program 05-1-02-V-1, Rev 26, Loss of CCW ONEP Handout(s) 04-1-01-P42-1, Precautions and Limitations and section 5.5

Manipulations: 5

Critical Steps: 3 Low Power: NO Emergency/Abnormal: YES RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: NO Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset Simulator to IC - 126 Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Isolate CCW to FPCCU Ht Ex B Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard:

Closes 1P42-F028B, CCW OUTBD INL TO FPHX B using its respective handswitch.

Closes 1P42-F203, CCW INB INL TO FPHX B. using its respective handswitch.

After verification of failure to auto start, manually starts CCW pump B using its respective handswitch.

CCW Pumps B and C are operating.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Isolate CCW to FPCCU Ht Ex B Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at 100% power.

CCW pumps A and C are operating

FPCCU Heat Exchangers A and B are in service.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to Remove Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B from Service, per SOI 04-1-01-P42-1 section 5.5.1.3.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Isolate CCW to FPCCU Ht Ex B Notes to Evaluator:

All controls and indications for this task are on panel 1H13-P870.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to isolate the B FPCCU heat exchanger.

During the evolution, a trip will occur on one of the operating CCW pumps, with at failure to start of the Standby pump, requiring the restart of the non-operating CCW pump per the Loss of CCW ONEP.

Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 04-1-01-P42-1, Step 5.5.1.3 a and b

3. PERFORM following to remove only FPHX B from service:

a. REFER TO Limitation 3.2.3.

b. ENSURE FPHX A is in-service.

Standard: Refers to Limitation 3.2.3 Cue: inform student if asked that valves will be tagged in the left position per the SOI and G41 system is isolated to the B heat exchanger.

If asked, per initial conditions, FPHX A and B are currently in service.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Step 2: 04-1-01-P42-1, Step 5.5.1.3 c IF FPHX B is isolated with 1P42-F028B, CLG WTR INL TO FPHX B AND 1P42-F032B, CCW INBD INL FM FPHX B, CLOSED THEN ENSURE G41, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, water flow is secured to FPHX B.

Standard: Ensures that FPCCU water flow is secured to FPHX B Cue: G41 system is isolated to the B heat exchanger.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 3: 04-1-01-P42-1, Step 5.5.1.3 d At 1H13-P870-8B, PLACE CCW DIV 2 MOV TEST switch to TEST.

Standard: Places CCW DIV 2 MOV TEST switch to TEST.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Step 4: 04-1-01-P42-1, Step 5.5.1.3 e

At 1H13-P870-8C, CLOSE 1P42-F028B, CCW OUTBD INL TO FPHX B Standard: Places control switch for 1P42-F028B, CCW OUTBD INL TO FPHX B to CLOSE position Cue: NONE Notes: NONE SAT / UNSAT Step 5: 04-1-01-P42-1, Step 5.5.1.3 f At 1H13-P870-8B, PLACE CCW DIV 2 MOV TEST switch to NORM Standard: Places CCW DIV 2 MOV TEST switch to NORM.

Cue: NONE.

Notes: NONE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Step 6: 04-1-01-P42-1, 5.5.1.3 g At 1H13-P870-2B PLACE CCW DIV 1 MOV TEST switch to TEST.

Standard: Places CCW DIV 1 MOV TEST switch to TEST.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 7: 04-1-01-P42-1, 5.5.1.3 h

At 1H13-P870-2C, CLOSE 1P42-F203, CCW INB INL TO FP HX B.

Standard: Places control switch for 1P42-F203, CCW INB INL TO FPHX B to CLOSE position Cue: NONE Notes:

ALTERNATE PATH BEGINS ON NEXT STEP SAT / UNSAT Alternate Path begins with the next step, designated by AP.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 BOOTH ACTIONS When green indication for 1P42-F203 is lit, ensure trigger fires and the A CCW pump trips.

AP Step 8: 04-1-01-P42-1 Recognize the following:

CCW A Pump trip.

P870-5A-B1, CCW PMP A TRIP

P870-5A-C1, CCW DISCH HDR PRESS LO-LO

P870-5A-C2, CCW PMP A/C DISCH PRESS LO

P870-8A-E1, CCW PMP B DISCH PRESS LO Standard: Recognizes alarms Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 AP Step 9: 05-1-02-V-1, Step D1

Recognize the STANDBY CCW pump should have started but did not.

IF ONE CCW pump is running, OR CCW Pressure is < 100 psig, THEN START AVAILABLE CCW Pump(s) A(B)(C).

Standard: Places control switch for B CCW pump to START position Cue: NONE Notes:

This action is a subsequent action and is required to be performed with procedure in hand and directed by CRS, however, it is also an automatic action that did not occur, therefore, the operator is required to ensure automatic actions occur without direction.

EN-OP-120, Operator Fundamentals Program, step 5.1.1.b.10), ENSURE appropriate manual action is taken when automatic systems do not actuate when required or when the equipment has not responded as expected.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 AP Step 10: 04-1-01-P42-1 Recognize the CCW B started and CCW system parameters are back to normal.

Standard: Verifies 2 CCW pumps are running and header pressure is >100 psig.

Cue: NONE Notes:

The evaluator will end the JPM RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 13

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S5 Isolate CCW to FPCCU Ht Ex B Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Closes 1P42-F028B, CCW OUTBD INL TO FPHX B using its respective handswitch.

Closes 1P42-F203, CCW INB INL TO FPHX B. using its respective handswitch.

After verification of failure to auto start, manually starts CCW pump B using its respective handswitch.

CCW Pumps B and C are operating.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 13

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at 100% power.

CCW pumps A and C are operating

FPCCU Heat Exchangers A and B are in service.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to Remove Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B from Service, per SOI 04-1-01-P42-1 section 5.5.1.3.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 2-2020 S6 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 JPM

Title:

Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode Facility Number: N/A NEW (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-T48-OFFNORM-3 K&A: 261000 A4.03: 3.0/3.0; A4.09: 2.7/2.7 Safety Function: Radioactivity Release (9) 10CFR 55.45(a) (6); (8); (10)

Performance: Perform Reference(s): 04-1-01-T48-1, Rev 39 Handout(s): 04-1-01-T48-1, Section 5.2.

Manipulations: 4

Critical Steps: 4 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: No RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: YES Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset to IC-122 Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode Safety Concerns:

None Task Standard:

Places SGTS DIV 1 MODE SEL handswitch to STBY position

Turns SGTS DIV 1 MAN INIT RESET key-locked handswitch to RESET position AND back to NORM, to reset automatic OR manual initiation signal

Places handswitch for ENCL BLDG RECIRC FAN A to STOP

Places handswitch for SGTS FLTR TR A EXH FAN to STOP.

SBGT A is STANDBY Mode with SBGT B in OPERATION.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System in STANDBY Mode Initial Condition(s):

An inadvertent SBGT initiation has occurred on Fuel Pool Sweep Radiation monitors.

All Initiations signals have been reset.

Both SBGT A and B are running in the AUTO Mode.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed by the CRS to place SBGT system A to STANDBY Mode per 04 01-T48-1 Section 5.2

Steps 5.2.2 a through 5.2.2 d are complete.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode Notes to Evaluator:

All controls and indications for this task are on panel P870 Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task is to place one SBGT system in the STANDBY Mode per System Operating Instruction.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time Step 1: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e WHEN SGTS has completed an adequate Enclosure Building vacuum drawdown, THEN PLACE one SGTS filter train in STANDBY, IF desired, as follows:

(1) IF SBGT automatically started as a result of high radiation OR inoperative signals from either Fuel Handling Area OR Fuel Pool Sweep Ventilation radiation monitors, THEN ENSURE the initiating condition is clear.

(2) IF SBGT automatically started as a result of an NSSS LOCA signal, THEN ENSURE the initiating condition is clear AND RESET NSSS LOCA signal per SOI 04-1-01-M71-1.

Standard: Ensures all auto start signals are clear. Initial conditions on CUE sheet states All Initiations signals have been reset Cue: If asked notify student of Initial Conditions.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Step 2: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (3)

PLACE SGTS DIV 1(2) MODE SEL handswitch to STBY position.

Standard: Places SGTS DIV 1(2) MODE SEL handswitch to STBY position.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 3: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (4)

VERIFY SGTS DIV 1(2) MODE SEL handswitch amber light is lit Standard: Recognizes SGTS DIV 1(2) MODE SEL handswitch amber light is lit.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Step 4: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (5)

VERIFY SGTS DIV 1(2) IN STBY MODE annunciator alarms Standard: Recognizes SGTS DIV 1(2) IN STBY MODE annunciator, P870-2A-F3 alarms.

Cue: If applicant addresses the ARI, notify them that another operator will address the ARI Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 5: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (6)

TURN SGTS DIV 1(2) MAN INIT RESET key-locked handswitch to RESET position AND back to NORM, to reset automatic OR manual initiation signal.

Standard: Turns SGTS DIV 1 MAN INIT RESET key-locked handswitch to RESET position AND back to NORM, to reset automatic OR manual initiation signal.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Step 6: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (7)

PLACE handswitch for ENCL BLDG RECIRC FAN A(B) to STOP Standard: Places handswitch for ENCL BLDG RECIRC FAN A to STOP.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 7: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (8)

PLACE handswitch for SGTS FLTR TR A(B) EXH FAN to STOP.

Standard: Places handswitch for SGTS FLTR TR A EXH FAN to STOP.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Step 8: 04-1-01-T48-1, Step 5.2.2 e (9)

VERIFY adequate Enclosure Building vacuum drawdown still exists.

Standard: Verifies Enclosure Building vacuum is greater than or equal to -0.25 wc by monitoring ENCL BLDG PRESS 1T48-PDR-R602A (or B)

Cue: Notify the applicant that another operator will finish the operation.

Notes:

The evaluator will end the JPM RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S6 Place Standby Gas Treatment System A in STANDBY Mode Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Places SGTS DIV 1 MODE SEL handswitch to STBY position

Turns SGTS DIV 1 MAN INIT RESET key-locked handswitch to RESET position AND back to NORM, to reset automatic OR manual initiation signal

Places handswitch for ENCL BLDG RECIRC FAN A to STOP

Places handswitch for SGTS FLTR TR A EXH FAN to STOP.

SBGT A is STANDBY Mode with SBGT B in OPERATION.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 12

Give this page to the applicant Initial Condition(s):

An inadvertent SBGT initiation has occurred on Fuel Pool Sweep Radiation monitors.

All Initiations signals have been reset.

Both SBGT A and B are running in the AUTO Mode.

Initiating Cue(s):

You have been directed by the CRS to place SBGT system A to STANDBY Mode per 04 01-T48-1 Section 5.2

Steps 5.2.2 a through 5.2.2 d are complete.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 2-2020 S7 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 JPM

Title:

Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-C7107 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1st Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew Date Validated By: April Hargrave / Benny White 10/10/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Simulator Type: RO Task: CRO-C71-004 K&A: 212000 A2.02 (3.7/3.9), A4.14 (3.8/3.8)

Generic 2.1.30 (4.4/4.0)

Safety Function: Instrumentation (7)

PRA Applicability: RPS is listed as #5 on the System Importance to CDF 10CFR 55.45(a) (6); (8); (10)

Performance: Actual Reference(s): 04-1-01-C71-1, Rev. 37, sections 5.1 and 5.2 Handout(s): 04-1-01-C71-1 sections 5.1 and 5.2

Manipulations: 4

Critical Steps: 4 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: No RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Reset to IC 124 Safety Concerns:

None Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Task Standard:

Places handswitch MG SET B TRANSFER TO MG B on 1H13-P610

Places SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in reset on 1H13-P680

Places MG SET A TRANSFER handswitch on 1H13-P610 to ALT A.

Places SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in RESET on 1H13-P680.

RPS B has been transferred to its Normal power source and RPS A was transferred to its Alternate power source IAW 04-1-01-C71-1.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at rated power.

Electrical Maintenance is taking readings on all RPS EPA breakers under routine preventative maintenance task.

RPS A is aligned to its Normal Source

RPS B is aligned to its Alternate Source.

Initiating Cue(s):

The SRO with the Command Function has directed you to re-align RPS B to its Normal source in accordance with section 5.2 of 04-1-01-C71-1. THEN align RPS A to its Alternate source in accordance with section 5.1 of 04-1-01-C71-1. Notify Electrical Maintenance via the Plant Paging System when the alignment is complete.

RPS B Motor Generator Set has been verified to be operating normally IAW 04-1 C71-1 section 4.1

It has been verified no other work is in progress that could cause half scrams or half isolations.

MSIV solenoids have been verified to be energized and all Pilot Solenoids are indicating amperage on 1H13-P622 and P623 panels.

Alternate power supply is available for RPS A per section 4.3.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Notes to Evaluator:

RPB B must be aligned first and the half scram reset prior to proceeding with RPS A.

Failure to reset the half scram will result in a full scram on the transfer of RPS A. RPS B must be performed first per 04-1-01-C71-1 section 3.5 and FSAR 8.3.1.1.5.4. The only section of the sequence that is critical is one divisions half scram must be reset before the other divisions power supply is transferred to avert a full scram.

Task Overview:

This task is to align RPS B power to be supplied from its Normal source, the Motor Generator Set, and to align RPS A power to be supplied from its Alternate source, 480V ESF breaker 52-154204.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time RPS B Step 1: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.2.2.a Ensure the following lights are illuminated prior to the transfer of the RPS bus:

RPS Div 1 SCRAM SOL VLV 1A and 1B lights ON (5C1)

RPS Div 2 SCRAM SOL VLV 2A and 2B lights ON (7C1)

RPS Div 3 SCRAM SOL VLV 3A and 3B lights ON (5C1)

RPS Div 4 SCRAM SOL VLV 4A and 4B lights ON (7C1)

Standard: Observes white scram solenoid valve lights lit.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Step 2: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.2.2.b CHECKS GENERATOR B NORMAL FEED AVAILABLE lights are lit on 1H13-P610.

Standard: Checks normal feed light for Generator B to ensure power is available.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT NOTE: The following step causes a Division 2 half scram due to break-before-make contacts on the power transfer switch.

Step 3: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.2.2.c

PLACE handswitch MG SET B TRANSFER TO MG B on 1H13-P610.

Standard: TRANSFER RPS B to its normal power source.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Step 4: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.2.2.d

PLACE SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in reset on 1H13-P680.

Standard: Resets Div 2 half scram. Takes Div 2 and 4 SCRAM RESET HS to reset on P680-7C1.

Cue: None Notes:

SAT / UNSAT RPS A Step 5: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.1.2.a Ensure the following lights are illuminated prior to the transfer of the RPS bus:

RPS Div 1 SCRAM SOL VLV 1A and 1B lights ON (5C1)

RPS Div 2 SCRAM SOL VLV 2A and 2B lights ON (7C1)

RPS Div 3 SCRAM SOL VLV 3A and 3B lights ON (5C1)

RPS Div 4 SCRAM SOL VLV 4A and 4B lights ON (7C1)

Standard: Observes white scram solenoid valve lights lit.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Step 6: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.1.2.b CHECK GENERATOR A ALTERNATE FEED AVAILABLE white lights are lit on 1H13-P610.

Standard: Verifies power is available to RPS A via breaker 52-154204 and EPA breakers.

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT NOTE: The following step causes a Division 1 half scram due to break-before-make contacts on the power transfer switch.

Step 7: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.1.2.c

PLACE MG SET A TRANSFER handswitch on 1H13-P610 to ALT A.

Standard: TRANSFER RPS A to its alternate power source Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Step 8: SOI 04-1-01-C71-1 step 5.1.2.d

PLACE SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in RESET on 1H13-P680.

Standard: Resets the Division 1 half scram. Takes Div 1 and 3 SCRAM RESET HS to reset on P680-5C1.

Cue: None Notes: If needed, acknowledge transfer as CRS.

Evaluator can end JPM.

RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 12

GJPM-OPS-2-2020S7 Transfer RPS B to Normal Power Source and RPS A to Alternate Power Source Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Places handswitch MG SET B TRANSFER TO MG B on 1H13-P610

Places SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in reset on 1H13-P680

Places MG SET A TRANSFER handswitch on 1H13-P610 to ALT A.

Places SCRAM RESET handswitches for tripped channels in RESET on 1H13-P680.

RPS B has been transferred to its Normal power source and RPS A was transferred to its Alternate power source IAW 04-1-01-C71-1.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 12

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is at rated power.

Electrical Maintenance is taking readings on all RPS EPA breakers under routine preventative maintenance task.

RPS A is aligned to its Normal Source

RPS B is aligned to its Alternate Source.

Initiating Cue(s):

The SRO with the Command Function has directed you to re-align RPS B to its Normal source in accordance with section 5.2 of 04-1-01-C71-1. THEN align RPS A to its Alternate source in accordance with section 5.1 of 04-1-01-C71-1. Notify Electrical Maintenance via the Plant Paging System when the alignment is complete.

RPS B Motor Generator Set has been verified to be operating normally IAW 04-1 C71-1 section 4.1

It has been verified no other work is in progress that could cause half scrams or half isolations.

MSIV solenoids have been verified to be energized and all Pilot Solenoids are indicating amperage on 1H13-P622 and P623 panels.

Alternate power supply is available for RPS A per section 4.3.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 2-2020 P1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 JPM

Title:

RPS Motor Generator Startup Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-C7101 (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1 Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew st Date Validated By: Johnnie Clack / Mark Watts 10/14/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Setting: Plant Type: NLO Task: NOB-C71-002, 003, 004, 005 K&A: 212000 A2.01 3.7/3.9 A1.01 2.9/2.9 G2.1.30 3.9/3.4 Safety Function: Instrumentation (7)

PRA Applicability: RPS is listed as #5 on the System Importance to CDF 10CFR 55.45(a) (6); (8); (10)

Performance: Simulate Reference(s): 04-1-01-C71-1, Section 4.1 Handout(s) 04-1-01-C71-1, Section 4.1

Manipulations: 6

Critical Steps: 6 Low Power: No Emergency/Abnormal: No RCA entry: No Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Area is accessible

Do not operate plant equipment.

Fill in the appropriate train for initial conditions and initiating cues prior to commencing the JPM (There are 3 blanks).

Safety Concerns:

Extreme caution should be taken around the RPS Motor Generator Set to prevent accidental contact with the controls.

Use care when working around or near rotating equipment.

Adjust which RPS Room to go to based on plant Protected Train.

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GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup Task Standard:

Depresses MOTOR ON pushbutton on panel 1C71-S001A(B) for 5 seconds

Closes GENERATOR OUTPUT circuit breaker on panel 1C71-S001A(B).

Pushes the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003A(B) panel.

Closes breaker 1C71-S003A(B).

Pushes the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003C(D) panel.

Closes breaker C71-S003C(D).

RPS A(B) Motor/Generator is running at rated speed and voltage per 04-1-01-C71-1, Section 4.1.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 3 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 100% power.

Repairs have been completed on RPS (A or B) Motor/Generator.

04-1-01-N32-1 Manual Valve Lineup Checksheet has been completed for C71-PT-N005A - D and C71-PT-N006A - H

04-1-01-C71-1 Handswitch Lineup Checksheet, Attachment V, has been completed, as required.

04-1-01-C71-1 Electrical Lineup Checksheet, Attachment III, has been completed, as required.

RPS (A or B) Bus is being supplied by the Alternate Feed.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to perform section 4.1 of the SOI to startup the RPS (A or B)

Motor/Generator.

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GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup Notes to Evaluator:

JPM may be performed on either RPS A or B System, depending on plant conditions. The RPS train components are identified as A(B) within this JPM.

DO NOT OPERATE PLANT EQUIPMENT.

Task Overview:

This task is to perform a startup of the RPS Motor Generator and align the RPS Bus to the Normal Supply per the SOI.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 5 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time on page 15 Step 1: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 a CHECK OPEN GENERATOR OUTPUT circuit breaker on panel 1C71-S001A(B) on MG set.

Standard: Verifies that the circuit breaker's operating handle is in the "down" position, indicating an open breaker.

Cue: Circuit breaker handle is down.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 b CHECK RPS MG A(B) Output Breakers 1C71-S003A(B) AND 1C71-S003C(D) are open.

Standard: Verifies that the EPAs' operating handles are in the "OFF/RESET OPEN" position.

Cue: Circuit breakers are in the OFF position.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 3: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 c CHECK switches on RPS MG A(B) Output Breakers 1C71-S003A(B) and 1C71-S003C(D) are in NORM.

Standard: Verifies that the "Undervoltage", "Overvoltage" and "Underfrequency" test switches on RPS MG A(B) Output Breakers 1C71-S003A(B) and 1C71-S003C(D) are in the NORM position.

Cue: All switches in NORM.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 d

DEPRESS MOTOR ON pushbutton on panel 1C71-S001A(B) for 5 seconds AND:

OBSERVE the RED ON light illuminates.

OBSERVE that the output voltage meter indicates output is present.

Standard: Simulates depressing the "MOTOR ON" pushbutton on panel 1C71-S001A(B) and observes the RED ON light illuminates and the output voltage meter indicated output is present.

Cue:

1. MOTOR ON pushbutton has been depressed.

2. RED ON light is illuminated

3. Output voltage meter indicates output is present Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 5: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 e CHECK generator output is 122-128 Vac on meter on panel 1C71-S001A(B).

IF meter DOES NOT indicate in this range, CONTACT electrical group to adjust voltage as necessary.

Standard: Observes voltmeter on motor generator control panel 1C71-S001A(B) is indicating between 122 and 128 VAC.

Cue: As indicated (if MG is running. 124V if not running).

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 6: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 f

CLOSE GENERATOR OUTPUT circuit breaker on panel 1C71-S001A(B).

Standard: Simulates pulling up on the circuit breaker's operating handle on panel 1C71-S001A(B) to close the breaker.

Cue: Circuit breaker handle is up.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 7: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 g CHECK the ELECT PROT ASSY INPUT and the POWER SUPPLY OUTPUT red lights are lit at the 1C71-S003A(B) ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY panel.

Standard: Check the ELECT PROT ASSY INPUT and the POWER SUPPLY OUTPUT red lights are lit at the 1C71-S003A(B) ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY panel.

Cue: Red lights are lit Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 8: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 h VERIFY the trip targets are reset on the following 1C71-S003A(B) relays:

UNDER VOLTAGE

OVER VOLTAGE

UNDER FREQUENCY Standard: Checks for presence of orange "trip target" lights.

Cue: Orange lights lit on UNDERVOLTAGE and UNDER FREQUENCY.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 9: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 i

To reset the relay, PUSH the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003A(B) panel.

Standard: Simulates pushing the TARGET RESET pushbuttons for UNDER VOLTAGE and UNDER FREQUENCY and verifies all target lights are out.

Cue: No orange lights lit.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 10: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 j

CLOSE breaker 1C71-S003A(B).

Standard: Simulates closing breaker 1C71-S003A(B) by rotating its operating handle counter-clockwise until it snaps into the "ON" position.

Cue: Circuit Breaker handle is in the ON position.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 11: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 k CHECK that the ELECT PROT ASSY OUTPUT red light on the 1C71-S003A(B) panel is lit.

Standard: Checks that the red ELECT PROT ASSY OUTPUT light on 1C71-S003A(B) is lit.

Cue: Red light is lit.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 12: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 l CHECK the ELECT PROT ASSY INPUT AND the POWER SUPPLY OUTPUT red lights are lit at the 1C71-S003C(D) ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY panel.

Standard: Check the ELECT PROT ASSY INPUT and the POWER SUPPLY OUTPUT red lights are lit at the 1C71-S003C(D) ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY panel.

Cue: Red lights are lit.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 11 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 13: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 m VERIFY the trip targets are reset on the following 1C71-S003C(D) relays:

UNDER VOLTAGE

OVER VOLTAGE

UNDER FREQUENCY Standard: Checks for presence of orange "trip target" lights.

Cue: Orange lights lit on UNDERVOLTAGE and UNDER FREQUENCY.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 14: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 n

To reset the relay, PUSH the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003C(D) panel.

Standard: Pushes the TARGET RESET pushbuttons for UNDER VOLTAGE and UNDER FREQUENCY and verifies all target lights are out.

Cue: No orange lights lit.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 15: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 o

CLOSE breaker C71-S003C(D).

Standard: Checks for presence of orange "trip target" lights Simulates closing breaker 1C71-S003C(D) by rotating its operating handle counter-clockwise until it snaps into the "ON" position.

Cue: Circuit Breaker handle is in the ON position.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 16: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 p CHECK that the ELECT PROT ASSY OUTPUT red light on the 1C71-S003C(D) panel is lit.

Standard: Checks that the red ELECT PROT ASSY OUTPUT light on 1C71-S003C(D) is lit.

Cue: Red light is lit.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 13 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 Step 17: 04-1-01-C71-1 step 4.1.2 q CHECK GENERATOR A NORMAL FEED AVAILABLE white lights are lit on 1H13-P610.

Standard: Simulates contacting Control Room Operator to verify white lights on 1H13-P610.

Cue: As Control Room Operator report that control room will complete the remaining steps in the SOI.

Notes:

Evaluator can end JPM.

RECORD STOP TIME ON NEXT PAGE SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 14 of 16

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P1 RPS Motor Generator Startup Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 15 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Depresses MOTOR ON pushbutton on panel 1C71-S001A(B) for 5 seconds

Closes GENERATOR OUTPUT circuit breaker on panel 1C71-S001A(B).

Pushes the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003A(B) panel.

Closes breaker 1C71-S003A(B).

Pushes the TARGET RESET pushbutton on the appropriate relay, on the 1C71S003C(D) panel.

Closes breaker C71-S003C(D).

RPS A(B) Motor/Generator is running at rated speed and voltage per 04-1-01-C71-1, Section 4.1.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 15 of 16

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 100% power.

Repairs have been completed on RPS (A or B) Motor/Generator.

04-1-01-N32-1 Manual Valve Lineup Checksheet has been completed for C71-PT-N005A - D and C71-PT-N006A - H

04-1-01-C71-1 Handswitch Lineup Checksheet, Attachment V, has been completed, as required.

04-1-01-C71-1 Electrical Lineup Checksheet, Attachment III, has been completed, as required.

RPS (A or B) Bus is being supplied by the Alternate Feed.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to perform section 4.1 of the SOI to startup the RPS (A or B)

Motor/Generator.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 2-2020 P2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 JPM

Title:

Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Facility Number: GJPM-OPS-EOP26C (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1 Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew st Date Validated By: Johnnie Clack / Mark Watts 10/14/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 JPM Attributes:

New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Setting: Plant (Inside CAA)

Type: NLO Task: AON-P64-025 K&A: 286000 A1.05:3.2/3.2 295031: EA1.08 3.8/3.9; 2.1.30: 4.4/4.0 2.4.35 3.8/4.0 Safety Function: 8 - Plant Service Systems PRA Applicability: RHR is listed as #3 on the System Importance to CDF 10CFR 55.45(a) (5); (6); (7)

Performance: Simulate Reference(s): 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 Handout(s): 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26

Manipulations: 6

Critical Steps: 6 Low Power: Yes Emergency/Abnormal: Yes RCA entry: Yes Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

Auxiliary Building 119 elev., Areas 9/10 are accessible with radiation levels ALARA Safety Concerns:

Wear appropriate personal protective equipment.

Don't forget ALARA

No climbing. Point up or down while you explain what you are going to do.

DO NOT operate plant equipment Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 2 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Task Standard(s):

Removes nozzle from existing hose.

Attaches additional 50 feet of hose.

Attaches hose to RPV fill connection 1E12-F056C/F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Opens Hose Station 13B isolation valve SP64-FA12V, Area 9 by stairwell

Opens fill connection 1E12-F056C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Opens fill connection 1E12-F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Fire Water has been aligned to RHR C, pathway 2, in accordance with 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 26.

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GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Initial Condition(s):

A LOCA has occurred.

The reactor is shutdown with RPV level still lowering

The SRO with the Command Function is implementing EP-2 actions Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to align Fire Water for injection through RHR C per 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26, Injection into RPV with Fire Protection Water System beginning at step 2.3.

A ladder and extra fire hoses are being dispatched to the area.

A spanner wrench has been obtained.

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 4 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Notes to Evaluator:

Fire hoses and nozzles are not to be disturbed during task performance.

The only portion of the sequence that is critical is that the fire hose is connected before either the fire hose station valve or the pair of injection line test connection valves is opened.

Remember to record Start time on page 9.

Task Overview: (Detailed description of task)

This task simulates routing and connecting fire hoses from hose stations to test connections on ECCS injection piping in the Auxiliary Building.

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GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time on page 14 Step 1: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26, Step 2.3 PERFORM the ALTERATION SHEET for each desired injection pathway.

Standard: Candidate recognizes section 2.3.2 INJECTION PATHWAY #2 RHR C INJECTION LINE is the correct pathway.

Cue: NONE Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 a LOCATE HOSE STATION 13B (Area 9 E1 119 by stairwell)

Standard: Locates hose station 13B (Area 9 EL. 119 by the stairwell).

Cue: None.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 6 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Step 3: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 b

REMOVE nozzle from existing hose.

Standard: Describes removal of the nozzle from the hose on Hose Station 13B using common technique for right hand threads.

Cue: The nozzle is removed.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 4: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 c

ATTACH an additional 50 feet of hose.

Standard: Locates 50 foot section of hose (provided by Plant Services in the Initial Conditions) and connects it to the hose on the hose reel of HS-13B using common technique for right hand threads.

Cue: When asked, tell the operator that Plant Services has placed a 50 foot section of hose beneath hose station HS-13B. After the candidate describes connecting the hose section, state the hose has been attached.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 7 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Step 5: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 d

ROUTE AND ATTACH hose to RPV fill connection 1E12-F056C/F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Standard: Locates 1E12-F056C/F057C in the piping penetration room Area 9/10 and describes routing the hose from hose station 13B into the room and connecting it to the special fitting at E12-F057C using common technique for right hand threads.

Cue: The hose is connected.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 6: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 e

SLOWLY OPEN Hose Station 13B isolation valve SP64-FA12V, Area 9 by stairwell.

Standard: Describes slowly opening Hose Station 13B isolation valve SP64-FA12V by turning the handle counter-clockwise.

Cue: The hose is pressurized and you feel resistance in the counter-clockwise direction.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 8 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Step 7: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 f

SLOWLY OPEN fill connection 1E12-F056C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Standard: Describes slowly opening fill connection 1E12-F056C by turning the valve handle counter-clockwise.

Cue: You feel resistance in the counter-clockwise direction.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 8: 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26 step 2.3.2 g

SLOWLY OPEN fill connection 1E12-F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Standard: Describes slowly opening fill connection 1E12-F057C by turning the valve handle counter-clockwise.

Cue: You feel resistance in the counter-clockwise direction.

Notes: After 1E12-F057C is opened the evaluator may stop the JPM.

Remember to record stop time SAT / UNSAT Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 9 of 11

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P2 Align Fire Water to RHR C per EP Attachment 26 Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 10 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Removes nozzle from existing hose.

Attaches additional 50 feet of hose.

Attaches hose to RPV fill connection 1E12-F056C/F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Opens Hose Station 13B isolation valve SP64-FA12V, Area 9 by stairwell

Opens fill connection 1E12-F056C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Opens fill connection 1E12-F057C, located in the piping penetration room Area 9/10.

Fire Water has been aligned to RHR C, pathway 2, in accordance with 05-S-01-EP-1, Attachment 26.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 10 of 11

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

A LOCA has occurred.

The reactor is shutdown with RPV level still lowering

The SRO with the Command Function is implementing EP-2 actions Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to align Fire Water for injection through RHR C per 05-S-01-EP-1 Attachment 26, Injection into RPV with Fire Protection Water System beginning at step 2.3.

A ladder and extra fire hoses are being dispatched to the area.

A spanner wrench has been obtained.

Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2-2020 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 2-2020 P3 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Operating Test Job Performance Measure JPM Number: GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 JPM

Title:

HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Facility Number: N/A New (If Bank or Modified from Bank)

Prepared By: Steve Reeves 10/1/2019 Exam Developer Date Ops Review: Jonathan Smith 10/3/2019 1 Validation by Ops Rep or Ops Validation Crew st Date Validated By: Johnnie Clack / Mark Watts 10/14/2019 2nd Validation by Ops Validation Crew Date Approved By: Tracy Tharp 10/24/2019 Project Lead or Exam Team Lead Date

HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown New Modified Direct from bank Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 20 Min Setting: Plant (outside CAA)

Type: NLO Task: NOB-P81-OFFNORM-14 K&A: 264000 4.04 3.7/3.7 Safety Function: Electrical (6) 10CFR 55.45(a) (5); (6)

Performance: Simulated Reference(s): 04-1-01-P81-1, Section 6.6 Handout(s) 04-1-01-P81-1, Section 6.6

Manipulations: 3

Critical Steps: 2 Low Power: Yes Emergency/Abnormal: Yes RCA entry: Yes Engineered Safety Function: No Simulator Setup/Required Plant Conditions:

HPCS Diesel Generator room available.

Safety Concerns:

Extreme caution should be taken around the Diesel Generator.

Use care when working around or near rotating equipment.

DO NOT operate plant equipment

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Task Standard(s):

Pulls the lay shaft handle on the 'A' engine front-left side toward you OR pushes the lay shaft handle on the 'B' engine front-right side away from you.

On 1H22-P118, Places UNIT MODE SEL SW to MAINT position

The HPCS Emergency Diesel Generator is Shutdown IAW P81 SOI.

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Control Room has experienced a Division 3 HPCS spurious LOCA signal that is sealed in.

Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator is running and NOT tied to the respective electrical bus.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to monitor the Diesel Generator for proper operation and prepare for parallel operation.

Start with 04-1-01-P81-1, Step 5.2.1 a,

Step 5.2.1b and 5.2.1c are complete in the Control Room

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Notes to Evaluator:

Unless otherwise stated, all controls and indications are at local panels 1H22-P028 and 1H22-P118 in the Div. 3 D/G room at Area 12, El. 133.

DO NOT OPERATE PLANT EQUIPMENT.

Remember to record Start time on page 11.

Task Overview:

This task simulates an auto start of HPCS Diesel Generator with a subsequent oil system failure requiring the operator to EMERGENCY STOP (trip) the HPCS D/G. The Control Room switch and local Emergency Stop switch will not work, the operator must use other means to stop the EDG.

Per P81 SOI the lay shaft handle on each diesel engine must be manipulated to stop the EDG.

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Critical tasks are underlined, italicized, and denoted by an (*)

NOTE: The sequence of the following steps is critical unless otherwise noted.

Remember to record Start time on page 11 Step 1: 04-S-01-P81-1, Step 5.2.1 a Diesel generator running close to synchronous speed (Approximately 900 RPM).

Standard: Locates local tachometer and verifies >900 rpm Cue: Inform candidate that engine speed is 900 rpm Notes:

SAT / UNSAT Step 2: 04-S-01-P81-1, Step 5.2 NOTIFIES Control Room that prerequisites are complete locally Standard: Notifies control room Cue: You receive the following alarm on panel 1H22-P118:

LOW LUBE OIL PRESSURE (B1)

LUBE OIL SYSTEM FAULT (F2)

When checked, inform the operator that Lube Oil System pressure is 10 psig on PI-R016A/B and lowering.

Notes: Alternate Path begins at the next step.

SAT / UNSAT

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 AP Step 3: 04-1-02-1H22-P118, 1A-B1 Step 1.2 WHEN following conditions are met:

Lube oil pressure is less than or equal to 20 psig, 60 seconds after DG13 speed is greater than or equal to 150 rpm

LOCA OR 73 percent BUV signal does NOT exist THEN DG13 will trip.

Standard: NA Cue: :

When checked, inform the operator that the engine is still running at 900 rpm

When checked, inform the operator that Lube Oil System pressure is 10 psig on PI-R016A/B and lowering.

If the operator calls the control room requesting guidance, inform the operator that there is noise coming from the DG bearings.

Notes: The operator should take the action to shutdown DG 13 due to a failure to trip.

If the operator contacts the control room and asks for guidance that would constitute a failure on this JPM.

SAT / UNSAT

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 AP Step 4: 04-1-02-1H22-P118, 1A-B1 Step 2.1 CHECK following:

Lube oil pressure as read on:

1P81-R016A, HPCS ENG A LUBE OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR 1P81-R016B, HPCS ENG B LUBE OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR

DG13 is at rated speed Standard: Checks lube oil pressure Cue: Lube oil pressure is 10 psig and lowering Notes:

SAT / UNSAT

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 AP Step 5: 04-1-02-1H22-P118, 1A-B1 Step 2.2.a IF non-emergency conditions exist AND conditions of Section 1.0 Step 2 apply, THEN ENSURE DG13 has tripped

a. IF DG13 has NOT tripped, THEN on 1H13-P601-16C, DEPRESS HPCS DSL ENG EMERG STOP pushbutton.

Standard: Notifies Control Room to depress the STOP pushbutton Cue: Diesel Generator is still running Notes:

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 6: 04-1-02-1H22-P118, 1A-B1 Step 2.2.b IF DG13 CANNOT be shut down remotely, THEN on 1H22-P118 panel, DEPRESS EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN pushbutton to immediately shutdown DG13.

Standard: Depresses the EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN pushbutton on 1H22P118.

Cue: Diesel Generator is still running Notes: Candidate can also use SOI 04-1-01-P81-1, step 6.6.2 a SAT / UNSAT

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 AP Step 7: 04-1-01-P81-1, Step 6.6.2 b

IF the HPCS diesel generator CANNOT be shut down by performing Step 6.6.2a, THEN ATTEMPT to SHUT DOWN the engine by PULLING the lay shaft handle on the 'A' engine front-left side toward you OR by PUSHING the lay shaft handle on the 'B' engine front-right side away from you.

Standard: Locate the lay shaft on the A or B engine and pull or push respectively. Refer to figure 1 attached.

Cue: 1) Prior to performing this step, if asked inform the student that breaker 152-1701 is OPEN and excitation is de-energized.

2) After the student performs the step inform that Diesel Generator speed is lowering.

3) CRS directs you to put Div 3 D/G in MAINT.

Notes:

SAT / UNSAT AP Step 8: 04-1-01-P81-1, Step 5.4.2 a

On 1H22-P118, PLACE UNIT MODE SEL SW to MAINT position Standard: Places UNIT MODE SEL SW to MAINT position.

Cue: Diesel Generator UNIT MODE SEL SW is in MAINT position.

Notes:

Evaluator may end the JPM Remember to record stop time SAT / UNSAT

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 Figure 1, Fuel Rack Lay Shaft Handle and Overspeed Lever

GJPM-OPS-2-2020P3 HPCS Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown Time Critical Alternate Path Validation Time: 20 Min Operator: ____________________________________License: RO / SRO Date: __________

Evaluators Name: ______________________ Evaluators Signature:__________________________

Start Time:___________ Stop Time:____________

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: ________Required Time (min):________ Actual Time (min):_________

Task Standard(s):

Pulls the lay shaft handle on the 'A' engine front-left side toward you OR pushes the lay shaft handle on the 'B' engine front-right side away from you.

On 1H22-P118, Places UNIT MODE SEL SW to MAINT position

The HPCS Emergency Diesel Generator is Shutdown IAW P81 SOI.

JPM Results (circle one): SAT UNSAT Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

Revision 00 8/30/2019 Page 12 of 13

Give this page to the student Initial Condition(s):

The plant is operating at 100% power.

The Control Room has experienced a Division 3 HPCS spurious LOCA signal that is sealed in.

Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator is running and NOT tied to the respective electrical bus.

Initiating Cue(s):

The CRS directs you to monitor the Diesel Generator for proper operation and prepare for parallel operation.

Start with 04-1-01-P81-1, Step 5.2.1 a

Step 5.2.1b and 5.2.1c are complete in the Control Room

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: GGNS 2-2020-2 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power.

Inoperable equipment: None Turnover: Div 1 work week. Place SSW A in recirculation mode for chemistry sample Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description p41f005a_i C (BOP, CRS) Place SSW A in Recirc for chemistry sample. P41-F005A 1

TS (CRS) trip on stroke. LCO 3.7.1, Cond D, 3.8.1, Cond B, 3.6.3.3.

Cond A Recirc suction flow transmitter loses power. PLCO 3.3.1.1 2 ftb33n014b_e C (ATC, CRS)

Cond. A and PLCO TR 3.3.2.1 C (BOP, CRS) 3 p43152a TBCW pump trip and standby pump fails to auto start A (Crew) z025025_60_37 C (ATC, CRS) 3 control rods scram in due to air leak 4 z025025_56_37 A (Crew)

LCO 3.1.3, Cond C z025025_52_37 TS (CRS) 5 tc093 M (CREW) Spurious Main Turbine Trip ATWS > 5% power (CT-1) terminates injection to lower Rx level 6 c11164 M (CREW)

(CT-2) initiates standby liquid control (CT-3) inserts control rods 7 RF Att. 11 C (ATC, CRS) Defeat RWCU isolation on SLC initiation 8 r21180 C (BOP, CRS) ESF 21 lockout (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec Revision 0 8/30/2019 1

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Quantitative Attributes Table E3-301-4 Attribute Actual Description Target Malfunctions after

RWCU fails to isolate on SLC initiation 1-2 2 EOP entry

ESF 21 lockout

SSW A return valve P41F005A trip on stroke

TBCW pump trip and standby pump fails to auto start Abnormal Events 2-4 4

B33 Flow Xmitter failure

3 control rods scram in

Spurious main turbine trip Major Transients 1-2 2

ATWS EOP entries requiring 1-2 1

ATWS, EP-2A substantive action Entry into a contingency EOP 1 1

ATWS, EP-2A with substantive actions

(CT-1) When control rods fail to scram, crew inserts all control rods to position 02 or beyond before exiting EP-2A

(CT-2) During failure to scram conditions with power > 5%

RTP, terminates feedwater injection within 90 seconds of ARI/RPT initiation and prevents injection from all other Preidentified critical sources (except boron, CRD, and RCIC) as necessary to 2-3 3 tasks lower RPV level to below -70 wide range prior to exiting EP-2A.

(CT-3) With Reactor Power above 5%, inject Standby Liquid Control system within 5 minutes AND/OR prior to suppression pool temperature reaching 110°F, whichever is later.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

Respond to a trip of P41-F005A, SSW A return valve when placing SSW A in recirc.

Respond to a failure of a Rx Recirc suction flow transmitter failure that results in a rod block

Respond to a trip of a TBCW pump and the standby pump fails to auto start

Respond to 3 control rods scramming in due to an air leak

Respond to a spurious turbine trip

Respond to an ATWS that generates > 5% Rx power

Respond to a failure of RWCU to isolate on Standby Liquid Control initiation

Respond to an ESF 21 lockout Initial Conditions:

Plant is operating at 100% power.

Inoperable Equipment:

None Planned activities:

Place SSW A in recirculation mode per step 5.10 of SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 for a chemistry sample immediately after turnover. The sample will be drawn later in the shift.

Scenario Notes:

This scenario is a NEW Scenario.

Validation Time: 70 minutes Revision 0 8/30/2019 3

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Event 1 - P41-F005A trip on stroke (Initial Setup - Automatic)

The BOP operator will place SSW A in recirculation mode for a chemistry sample per SOI 04-1-01-P41-1, section 5.10. The pump discharge relief valve will be open requiring the operator to place flow through the RHR A heat exchanger. When the F005A handswitch is taken to open, its breaker will trip. This will require placing the Div 1 DG in maintenance and racking out the Div 1 DW purge compressor breaker. LCO 3.7.1, Cond D, 3.8.1, Cond B, 3.6.3.3, Cond A.

Event 2 - Recirc flow transmitter failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

A B Rx recirculation loop suction transmitter will lose power and input 0 flow into B APRM/OPRM trip logic. When investigated, flow input will be half of the other APRM/OPRMs since a similar suction flow transmitter on the A Recirc loop continues to provide input. Per ARI instruction, the APRM should be declared inop, bypassed, and potential LCO 3.3.1.1 and potential TR 3.3.2.1 identified.

Event 3 - TBCW pump trip with standby pump auto start failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

A TBCW pump trip will occur and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The BOP operator should recognize the failure of the standby pump to start and start the standby pump. The CRS should enter 05-1-02-V-2, Loss of Turbine Building Cooling Water ONEP and ensure parameters have stabilized.

Event 4 - Three control rods scram in (Triggered by Lead Examiner) 3 control rods will scram in due to an air leak. This will require entry into 05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions ONEP and require reducing Recirc flow to 70 mlbm/hr.

Lowering Recirc flow will require entry into 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP to ensure Rx and Recirc system parameters are as expected.

If an operator is dispatched to investigate, he will simulate isolating the air leak which will allow 2 of the 3 control rods to settle. LCO 3.1.3, Cond C should be identified for the inop control rod(s).

There is a potential this will be misdiagnosed as 3 control rods drifting in, which requires a manual scram.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Event 5 - Spurious Main Turbine Trip (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

A spurious main turbine trip will occur. The automatic actions of the turbine trip ONEP should be verified.

Event 6 - Hydraulic Block ATWS > 5% RTP (Initial Setup - Automatic)

When the reactor scrams due to the turbine trip, an ATWS occurs due to a hydraulic block of both scram discharge volumes. EP-2A is entered via EP-2. Reactor power will be above 5% RTP. Crew will install the necessary attachments to bypass RPS and RC&IS interlocks and insert controls rods via manual scrams and RC&IS (CT-3).

Terminate and Prevent is required because reactor power is above 5% RTP. RPV level is intentionally lowered below -70 inches wide range in order to lower core inlet subcooling which prevents/suppresses instabilities and lowers reactor power (CT-1).

Bypass valves will control reactor pressure. Turbine pressure setpoint should be lowered to 900 psig to lower RPV pressure below the reset value for low-low set valves.

When RCIC initiates on low RPV level, it will trip.

When SLC A and B is initiated, SLC A suction valve will trip on open signal and SLC pump A will not start.

Event 7 - RWCU fails to auto isolate on SLC injection (Initial Setup - Automatic)

RWCU fails to auto isolate on level 2 (-41.6) or SLC initiation. When the immediate action to inject SLC is performed (CT-2), (a minimum) 1 RWCU MOV will be required to be closed to prevent RWCU from removing SLC from the RPV. With SLC injection, Rx power will lower. Based in the ATWS power level, sufficient SLC content is being injected and combined with rod insertion, the Rx will be shutdown.

Event 8 - ESF 21 lockout (Initial Setup - Automatic)

ESF 21 will lockout. The Div 2 DG will automatically tie to 16AB and Div 3 DG will automatically tie to 17AC. This will require a re-terminate/prevent of Div 2 ECCS and restoration of CRD pump B.

Termination:

Once control rods are being inserted and as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task (CT-1) During failure to scram conditions with power > 5%,

terminate feedwater injection to lower RPV level to below -70 wide range within 90 seconds following ATWS ARI/RPT initiation. This is a time critical action.

terminate and prevent all other injection sources (except boron, CRD, and RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV level to below -70 wide range prior to exiting EP-2A.

Event 6 Safety Regarding lowering level below -70 wide range, to prevent or mitigate the Significance consequences of any large irregular neutron flux oscillations induced by neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities. RPV water level is lowered sufficiently below the elevation of the feedwater sparger nozzles. This places the feedwater spargers in the steam space providing effective heating of the relatively cold feedwater and eliminating the potential for high core inlet subcooling. For conditions that are susceptible to oscillations, the initiation and growth of oscillations is principally dependent upon the subcooling at the core inlet; the greater the subcooling, the more likely oscillations will commence and increase in magnitude.

24 below the lowest nozzle in the feedwater sparger has been selected as the upper bound of the RPV water level control band. This water level is sufficiently low that steam heating of the injected water will be at least 65% to 75% effective (i.e., the temperature of the injected water will be increased to 65% to 75% of its equilibrium value in the steam environment). This water level is sufficiently high that most plants without the capability to readily defeat the low RPV water level MSIV isolation should be able to control RPV water level with feedwater pumps to preclude the isolation.

Cueing A scram is initiated (either automatically or manually) and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 02 and reactor power is > 5% on panel P680 indications and SPDS and RPV level is > -70 wide range on SPDS and PDS.

Critical Task (CT-2) With Reactor Power above 5% inject Standby Liquid Control system within 5 minutes OR prior to suppression pool temperature reaching 110°F.

Event 6 Safety GGNS-NE-16-00004, Time Critical Operator Actions for Grand Gulf, Attachment 1 Significance 02-S-01-40, EP Technical Bases, Attachment IX Steps Q2 - Q4 If reactor power remains above the APRM downscale setpoint (5%) following multiple attempts to scram the reactor (EP-2 Step 1, EP-2A Step 1), boron injection is initiated immediately to preclude power oscillations, avoid challenges to primary containment temperature and pressure limits, and ensure that the plant remains in a controlled state.

SLC is the normal method of injecting boron into the RPV. Both pumps are started to increase the injection rate and shorten the time required to complete boron injection.

Cueing Operator verifies SLC is injecting IAW 04-1-01-C41-1, Attachment VI, Verification of Standby Liquid Control Injection.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task (CT-3) When control rods fail to scram, crew inserts all control rods to position 02 or beyond before exiting EP-2A EVENT 6 Safety Failure to effect shutdown of the reactor when a RPS setpoint has been exceeded Significance would unnecessarily extend the level of degradation of the safety of the plant. This could further degrade into damage to the principle fission product barriers if left unmitigated. The crew is authorized by Conduct of Operations to take mitigating actions when automatic safety systems fail to perform their intended function. Action to shut down the reactor is required when RPS and control rod drive systems fail IAW EP-2A.

Cueing

A scram is initiated (either automatically or manually) and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 02.

If an operator or the crew significantly deviates from, or fails to, follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review (NUREG 1021, Appendix D). An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 7.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-27 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2-2020 Scenario 2.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-27

Ensure all procedures are marked as indicated for turnover conditions.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Procedures that may be used in this scenario:

IOI 03-1-01-2, Power Operations

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-1A-C2

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-B1

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-D1

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P864-1A-D2

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-4A-B2

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-4A2-C5

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-B10

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-5A-C11

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-71-A11

Technical Specification

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-5A-B3

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P870-5A-C4

05-1-02-V-2, Loss of TBCW ONEP

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-4A2-D4

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-4A2-E4

05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions ONEP

05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirc System Flow Rate ONEP

02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy

EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations

05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP

05-1-02-II-1, Turbine and Generator Trip ONEP

05-S-01-EP-2, RPV Control

05-S-01-EP-2A, ATWS RPV Control

SOI 04-1-01-N21-1, Feedwater System

05-S-01-EP-3, Containment Control

05-1-02-III-5, Automatic Isolations ONEP

SOI 04-1-01-E51-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

SOI 04-1-01-C11-1, Control Rod Drive System

SOI 04-1-01-G33-1, Reactor Water Cleanup System

SOI 04-1-01-C41-1, Standby Liquid Control System Revision 0 8/30/2019 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Start SBT report and any other required recording devices.

Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Place SSW A in recirculation mode per SSW SOI 04-1-01-P41-1, P41-F005A trip on stroke signal Initial Setup - Automatic TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 0 CRS Directs BOP to place SSW A in recirculation mode per 04-1-01-P41-1, section 5.10.

Performs the following per SOI:

5.10.2 Instructions

1. PLACE SSW DIV 1 MOV TEST switch to TEST.

NOTE

Starting SSW A Pump can cause 1P41-F299A, SSW C001A DISCH S/R VALVE, to lift.

2 RO

1P41-F299A should reseat at approximately 125 to 128 psig discharge pressure.

2. PLACE SSW A Basin Recirculation in service as follows:

3. ENSURE 1P41-F006A, SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV, is OPEN.

4. START 1P41-C001A, SSW PMP A.

If asked if 1P41-F299A, SSW C001A DISCH S/R VALVE is lifted, respond YES, Booth P41-F299A is open.

Performs the following:

5. IF 1P41-F299A, SSW C001A DISCH S/R VALVE, lifted and did NOT seat, THEN PERFORM following:

a. OPEN 1P41-F001A, SSW PMP A DISCH VLV.

3 RO b. OPEN 1P41-F014A, SSW INL TO RHR HX A.

c. ENSURE 1P41-F068A, SSW OUTL FM RHR HX A, is OPEN.

d. OPEN 1P41-F005A, SSW LOOP A RTN TO CLG TWR A.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reports the following when P41-F005A is stroked:

Annunciator P870-1A-C2, SSW DIV 1 OOSVC 5 RO

Status light, OVLD OR PWR LOSS SSW VALVE

P870-1C, P41-F005A, both red and green lights out.

Refers to ARI If directed to check breaker 52-15512 for P41-F005A, after 3 minutes report the breaker is tripped.

Booth If directed to check local position of P41-F005A, after 3 minutes report valve is closed.

Directs BOP to place Div 1 DG in maintenance and to rack out Div 1 drywell purge 7 CRS compressor breaker.

Directs NOB to report to Div 1 DG to place it in maintenance.

8 BOP Directs NOB to rack out breaker 52-15105 for DW purge compressor A.

If directed, after 3 minutes report as NOB you are ready to place Div 1 DG in maintenance.

Booth When directed to depress and release local MAINTENANCE MODE SELECT PB, insert trigger 7.

Depresses and holds DG 11 MAINT PERM PB on P864-1C 9 BOP Directs NOB to depress and release local MAINTENANCE MODE SELECT PB Reports the following expected P864 alarms:

1A-B1, DIV 1 DSL ENG TRIP

1A-D1, DG 11 AUTO START NOT AVAIL

1A-D2, DIV 1 DSL GEN TROUBLE 10 BOP Reports the following P864-1B status light:

DG 11 NOT AVAIL Reports Div 1 DG is in maintenance mode After 5 minutes, insert trigger 8 and report Div 1 drywell purge compressor Booth breaker 52-15105 is racked out.

Reports the following expected P870 alarm:

13 BOP

4A-B2, CGCS DIV 1 OOSVC Revision 0 8/30/2019 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs RO to place SSW A in standby.

Enters Tech Specs and identifies the following LCOs:

3.7.1 Condition D, One SSW subsystem inop, Notes 1 Enter applicable conditions and required actions of LCO 3.8.1 for

. DGs made inop by SSW.

D.1 Restore SSW subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.8.1 Condition B, One required DG inop for reason other than Condition F.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit(s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter AND 15 CRS B.2 Declare required feature(s), supported by the inop DG, inop when the redundant required feature(s) are inop within 4 hrs from discovery of Cond B concurrent with inop of redundant required features AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DGs are not inop due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DGs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

AND B.3.3 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

3.6.3.3 Condition A, One drywell purge subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore drywell purge subsystem to operable status within 30 days Secures SSW A by performing the following:

CLOSE 1P41-F014A.

CLOSE 1P41-F001A.

15 BOP

STOP 1P41 C001A, SSW PMP A.

STOP 1Y47 C001A, SSW PMPHS O/A FAN.

PLACE SSW DIV 1 MOV TEST switch to NORM.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Event No:2 Event

Description:

B33 flow transmitter failure Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following alarms:

P680-4A2-C5, CONT ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK

P680-5A-B10, APRM UPSC/OPRM ALM

P680-5A-C11, APRM FLOW UPSC/COMP

P680-7A-A11, APRM CH 2 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP 16 ATC Recognizes APRM status lights:

UPSC TR OR INOP

UPSC ALM

FLOW COMP Refers to ARIs Directs RO to perform the following per ARI 7A-A11:

3.4 OBSERVE the APRM recorders on 1H13-P680. IF APRM 2 is NOT upscale OR is failed upscale, the alarm May be due to inoperative equipment. CHECK the APRM 2 module on 1H13-P670 to help DETERMINE the cause of the Inop.

3.4.1 BYPASS APRM channel 2 until the cause of the inoperative 18 CRS condition is corrected.

a. BYPASS an APRM channel by SELECTING appropriate BYPASS SELECT joystick on 1H13-P680.

(1) PLACE joystick in desired channel position.

b. ENSURE the appropriate BYP indication is present on the APRM module Main Display header on 1H13-P669, P670, P671 OR P672, AND the BYP status light is back-lit on 1H13-P680 (11E).

Performs the actions of ARI 7A-A11:

20 BOP

Reports APRM CH 2 module on P670 is indicating approximately 42%.

22 ATC Bypasses APRM Channel 2 and reports APRM channel 2 is bypassed.

23 CRS Verifies alarms are clear for APRM CH 2 23 CRS Directs I&C to investigate APRM Ch 2 If directed to investigate wait 3 minutes and report one of the two flow Booth transmitter inputs to APRM B has failed downscale.

Enter Tech Specs and identifies Potential LCO for APRM Ch 2 25 CRS

3.3.1.1, RPS Instrumentation

TR 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation Revision 0 8/30/2019 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Event No:3 Event

Description:

TBCW pump trip / Stby pump fails to auto start Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following P870 alarms:

1) 5A-B3, TBCW PMP A TRIP

2) 5A-C4, TBCW PMPS DISCH PRESS LO 25 RO Determines Standby TBCW pump did not auto start, manually starts TBCW Pump C using handswitch.

Reports to CRS, TBCW pumps B and C are operating Evaluator Note: The Standby TBCW pump should be started prior to reaching step B3 of the LOSS OF TBCW ONEP IAW EN-OP-200 step 5.1(9) which states:

Failed Automatic Actions

a. ENSURE operators backup automatic action when they fail to occur.

b. IF an automatic control malfunctions, THEN ESTABLISH manual control.

Enters and directs Subsequent Actions from 05-1-02-V-2, Loss of Turbine Building Cooling Water. Performs update.

A. Partial Loss of TBCW 26 CRS B3 IF REQUIRED to RESTORE TBCW flow to pre-event values, THEN START AVAILABLE TBCW Pumps.

B4 MONITOR Key Parameters, USE Attachment 2.

Reports the following alarm has cleared:

26 BOP

3) 5A-C4, TBCW PMPS DISCH PRESS LO Monitors parameters per Attachment 2 and reports no significant changes to 27 BOP parameters (next page).

Directs plant operator and electrical maintenance to investigate TBCW pump A 28 CRS trip, breaker 152-1313.

If directed to perform post-start checks on TBCW pump C and investigate TBCW pump A trip:

Wait 3 minutes and report locally at TBCW pump, there is no Booth indication for the A pump trip and pump C is operating normally.

Wait 3 minutes and report breaker 152-1313 is tripped with 86 device lockout and instantaneous trip flags.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL PARAMETER MONITORING Loss Of TBCW System Monitoring Monitored Parameter and Action Indication Limit T1 T2 T3 T4 TBCW Temperature PDS P43N055 100°F Restore and Maintain LESS THAN limit TBCW Temperature PDS P43N055 120°F Reactor Scram Limit Turbine Hydraulic Fluid Temperature PDS N32N001 OR 150°F Reactor Scram Limit / Remove from Service N32-R614 (1H13-P680)

Main Turbine Lube Oil Temperature PDS N34N101 OR 150°F Reactor Scram Limit / Sys. Action Required N34-R601 (1H13-P680)

TBCW Pressure PDS P43N045 OR 45 psig Pump Auto Start P43-R601 (1H13-P870)

TBCW Flow PDS P43N021 12,000 gpm Single Pump Flow Limit RFPT A Lube Oil Temp. PDS N21N007A OR 150°F Pump Operating Limit N21-TR-R619A (1H13-P878)

RFPT B Lube Oil Temp. PDS N21N007B OR 150°F Pump Operating Limit N21-TR-R619B (1H13-P878)

Condensate Booster Pump Oil Temp. Local 150°F Pump Operating Limit Revision 0 8/30/2019 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Event No:4 Event

Description:

3 Control Rods Scram Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

There is a possibility this will be misdiagnosed as multiple rods drifting. If this occurs the ATC may place the Rx Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Recognizes and reports the following:

P680 alarms:

4A2-D4, HCU TROUBLE

4A2-E4, CONTROL ROD DRIFT Status Lights:

SCRAM VLV 30 ATC

HCU FAULT

ROD DRIFT Control Rods indication --

60-37

56-37

52-37 Reports three control rods have Scrammed.

Enters 05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod / Drive Malfunctions ONEP, performs Update Directs RO to reduce core flow to 70 Mlbm/hr.

2.4 Inadvertent Scram of More Than One Control Rod 2.4.1 IF more than one but less than eight Control Rods have scrammed, THEN:

31 CRS

REDUCE Reactor core flow to 70 Mlbm/hr.

OR

IF core flow CANNOT be promptly reduced, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor.

2.4.2 IF eight OR more Control Rods have scrammed, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM Reactor Using Recirc FCVs, reduces RPV Core flow to 70 Mlbm/hr.

After 70 mlbm/hr core flow is reached, RO plots point on Power / Flow map and 32 ATC determines to be in the OPRM Armed Region.

Monitors for Thermal Hydraulic Instability Enters 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirc System Flow Rate ONEP, performs Update 33 CRS Issues a Critical Parameter and directs RO to monitor for additional Control Rod Drifts and Scrams Revision 0 8/30/2019 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Dispatches NOB to investigate HCUs:

60-37 35 CRS

56-37

52-37 If dispatched to investigate HCUs, wait 3 minutes, trigger EVENT 9 and report Booth via the pager the air line for control rod HCU 60-37 has a leak. HCU 60-37 air isolation valve was closed.

36 ATC Reports control rods 56-37 and 52-37 have settled to position 00.

Evaluator Note: 60-37 will not settle due to not having air supplied to the scram valves. This will keep the scram valves open and prevent settling.

If directed to isolate the HCU notify control room that you must return to the Control Room for procedure and briefing.

Booth If directed to close the 103QJ and 105QJ, wait 3 minutes and report that 103QJ and 105QJ are closed. This action will have no effect if trying to get the rod to settle.

38 CRS Directs Plant Operator to isolate HCU 60-37 per SOI.

Enters Tech Specs and identifies the following LCO:

3.1.3 Condition C, One or more control rods inop for reasons other than Conditions A or B.

40 CRS C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

AND C.2 Disarm the associated CRD within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

40 CRS Notifies Reactor Engineering of the scrammed rods.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Event No:5, 6, 7, 8 Event

Description:

Spurious main turbine trip (Event 5)

ATWS (Event 6)

RWCU fails to isolate on SLC initiation (Event 7)

ESF 21 lockout (Event 8)

Critical task 1- During failure to scram conditions with power > 5%,

terminate feedwater injection to lower RPV level to below -70 wide range within 90 seconds following ATWS ARI/RPT initiation. This is a time critical action.

terminate and prevent all other injection sources (except boron, CRD, and RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV level to below -70 wide range prior to exiting EP-2A.

Critical task 2 - With Reactor Power above 5%, inject Standby Liquid Control system within 5 minutes AND/OR prior to suppression pool temperature reaching 110°F.

Critical task 3 - When control rods fail to scram, crew inserts all control rods to position 02 or beyond before exiting EP-2A.

Event 5 - Triggered by Lead Examiner Events 6, 7, 8 are automatic TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate Trigger 5 Booth Malfunction(s):

Spurious main turbine trip Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP 2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 CONFIRM all Control Rods are fully inserted.

2.2 CONFIRM Reactor power decreasing.

2.3 IF Pressure Control System is maintaining reactor pressure greater than 850 psig, THEN PLACE Reactor Mode switch to 41 ATC SHUTDOWN.

When the Turbine trips on reverse power, verifies the following Automatic Actions have occurred and determines no immediate actions are required:

Turbine Stop Valves Close

Turbine Control Valves Close

Generator Output Breakers J5228 AND J5232 Open 41 ATC Recognizes and reports Hydraulic Block ATWS Revision 0 8/30/2019 14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Performs Immediate Operator Actions for ATWS per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP

VERIFY Reactor Recirc Pumps are transferred to LFMGs o Ensures CB5 A & B breakers are OPEN

INITIATE ARI/RPT o Arms and Depresses ATWS ARI/RPT Channel 1 & 2 pushbuttons

INHIBIT ADS 42 ATC o Places ADS A & ADS B MANUAL INHIBIT switches to INHIBIT POSITION

INITIATE AND OVERRIDE HPCS o While holding 1E22F004, HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV handswitch in CLOSE position, arm and depress manual system initiation pushbutton for HPCS o After indication of pump start, then trip HPCS Pump o Ensure HPCS Pump and 1E22F004, HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV override alarms are sealed in Revision 0 8/30/2019 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF ATWS is greater than 5% power, THEN PERFORM the following:

Using 04-1-01-C11-1 hard card, performs the following:

Turns SLC A and B handswitches to START

1. CHECK system initiation by OBSERVING following:

a. CHECK Squib Valves fired on following:

1) 1C41-F004A, SLC PUMP C001A DISCHARGE SQUIB VALVE

White SQUIB VLV READY light OFF

2) 1C41-F004B, SLC PUMP C001A DISCHARGE SQUIB VALVE

White SQUIB VLV READY light OFF

3) Annunciator SLC System A OOSVC ON

4) Annunciator SLC SYSTEM B OOSVC ON

5) SLC A SYS STATUS SQUIB A LOSCONT/PWRLOSS light ON

6) SLC B SYS STATUS SQUIB B LOSCONT/PWRLOSS light ON

b. CHECK OPEN Tank Outlet Valves:

1C41 F001A

1C41 F001B

c. SLC Pump A RUNNING 43 ATC d. SLC Pump B RUNNING

e. RWCU ISOLATES:

G33-F004, RWCU PMP SUCT CTMT OTBD ISOL, CLOSED

G33-F001, RWCU PMP SUCT DRWL INBD ISOL, CLOSED.

G33-F251, RWCU SPLY TO RWCU HXS, CLOSED

2. CHECK SLC INJECTING INTO the RPV by observing following:

SLC Pump discharge pressure greater than reactor pressure.

SLC Tank Level lowering.

Nuclear instrumentation lowering.

Reports RWCU failed to auto isolate.

o Isolates the following valves using their control room handswitches:

G33-F001 (P601-11C, normally closed)

G33-F004 (P601-11C)

G33-F251 (P870-9C)

CRITICAL TASK; With Reactor Power above 5% inject Standby Liquid Control system within 5 minutes AND/OR prior to suppression pool temperature reaching 110°F Reports Storage Tank Outlet Valve, C41-F001B failed to open and SLC pump B not 44 ATC running.

Performs update and enters the following:

Reactor Scram ONEP, 05-1-02-I-1, 44 CRS EP-2, RPV Control Directs all personnel to evacuate Containment due to reactor scram.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Transitions from EP-2, RPV Control, to EP-2A, ATWS RPV Control 44 CRS Verifies ATC performed immediate actions of Reactor Scram ONEP, 05-1-02-I-1 for ATWS > 5%

Directs RO to terminate feedwater injection to the reactor vessel

Verifies Feedwater flow is terminated 45 CRS Directs RO to align Condensate/Feedwater on Startup Level Contol Directs RO to maintain RPV water level between -70 and -130 wide range IF directed to Terminate and Prevent Feedwater Injection THEN:

o PUT 1C34-LK-R600, FW LVL MASTER CONT in manual mode by depressing MAN push button.

45 BOP o LOWER 1C34-LK-R600, FW LVL MASTER CONT setpoint by DEPRESSING the OUT pushbutton UNTIL OUTPUT is at -5.00 percent.

CRITICAL TASK: Terminate Feedwater injection within 90 seconds of ARI/RPT initiation.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Performs the following using 04-1-01-N21-1 hard card:

1. IF Reactor pressure is dropping rapidly during performance of this attachment, THEN

a. SELECT SPEED AUTO OR MANUAL on running Reactor Feed Pump.

b. LOWER Reactor Feed Pump discharge pressure to maintain Reactor level below 58 inches.

NOTE The following steps can be performed concurrently.

2. PERFORM the following:

MINIMIZE the output of 1C34-LK-R602, RX WTR LVL SU CONT to CLOSE N21-F513.

MINIMIZE the output of 1N21-HC-R609, FW CU RECIRC VLV to CLOSE N21-F510.

DEPRESS the CLOSE pushbutton for the N21-F040, FW SU BYP VLV AND ENSURE valve is closed.

3. OPEN the following valves:

N21-F001, SU FCV OUTL ISOL VLV.

46 BOP N21-F010A, HP FW HTR STRNG A SU OUTL VLV.

N21-F010B, HP FW HTR STRNG B SU OUTL VLV.

4. SELECT MAN on FW LVL MASTER CONT (1C34-LK-R600).

5. CLOSE the following valves:

N21-F009A, FW HTR 6A OUTL VLV.

N21-F009B, FW HTR 6B OUTL VLV.

6. IF NO RFPTs are in operation AND required, THEN START one RFPT per Attachment VI.

7. IF using a RFPT, THEN PLACE a RFPT in SPEED AUTO with respective RFPT discharge pressure approximately 250 psid above reactor pressure.

8. ENSURE OPEN RFP A(B) DISCH VLV N21-F014A(B) for RFPTs that are operating OR as needed to establish a flow path for Condensate.

9. ADJUST 1C34-LK-R602, RX WTR LVL SU CONT as necessary in MAN or AUTO to control N21-F513 to maintain desired Reactor level. N21-F040 and N21-F009A(B) May be OPENED/CLOSED as necessary to augment flow.

10. WHEN plant conditions require removing unneeded RFPT AND two RFPTs are running, THEN TRIP unneeded RFPT.

11. REFER to Section 5.14 of the procedure WHEN time permits.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When RPV level falls below -41.6 WR, provides update and directs ATC to verify 47 CRS level 2 initiations and isolations.

Verifies and reports Level 2 isolations complete using the isolation status board as a quick reference and verifying the following alarms:

P870-3A-A4, CTMT-DRWL ISOL DIV 1 OPER annunciator sealed in

P870-3A-B3, AUX BLDG ISOL DIV 1 OPER annunciator sealed in

P870-9A-A4, CTMT-DRWL ISOL DIV 2 OPER annunciator sealed in 48 ATC

P870-9A-B3, AUX BLDG ISOL DIV 2 OPER annunciator sealed in Verifies all Emergency D/Gs are running with cooling water Restores Instrument air to containment by opening the following valves:

P53-F001

P53-F007 49 ATC When RPV level lower below -41.6 WR, reports RCIC initiation and RCIC trip.

Directs RPV pressure control band of 800-1060 psig using main turbine bypass 50 CRS valves.

Directs turbine pressure setpoint to be lowered to 900 psig.

50 BOP Lowers pressure setpoint to 900 psig and maintains RPV pressure within band.

Directs I&C to install EP Attachment 8 for MSIVs Directs I&C to install EP Attachment 18, 19, and 20 to defeat RC&IS interlocks and RPS scram signals CRS May direct I&C to install EP Attachment 12 for RHR injection through feedwater sparger May direct I&C to install EP Attachments 1 and 3 for RCIC Role Play: When directed to install Attachments, select Remotes and EP 51 Booth ATT tab; Select attachment to be installed, select INSTALL and Insert:

Notify CRS as each Attachment indicates DONE.

51 CRS Directs RO to maximize CRD for flow Revision 0 8/30/2019 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Performs Immediate Operator action to start one pump per 05-1-02-IV-1, CRD Malfunctions ONEP:

2.1.2 IF running CRD pump trips, THEN START standby CRD pump as follows:

a. IF required, RE-ENERGIZE MCCs 15B42 AND 16B42 on 1H13-P864.

b. PLACE CRD SYS FLO CONT in MANUAL AND REDUCE output to zero.

c. START standby CRD pump.

d. IF no scram signal is present, THEN SLOWLY ADJUST CRD SYS FLO CONT to 54-66 gpm after charging pressure is normal.

51 ATC

e. RETURN CRD SYS FLO CONT to AUTO with tapeset at 54-66 gpm.

Maximizes CRD flow per 04-1-01-C11-1, Attachment VII, CRD SOI:

1. Ensure oil pump is running on the non-running CRD Pump A(B).

2. With one CRD pump already running, THEN START standby CRD PMP A(B).

3. PLACE CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL.

4. Using CRD SYS FLOW CONT C11-R600, fully OPEN C11-F002A(B),

CRD FLO CONT VLV.

5. IF maximizing CRD for flow, THEN fully OPEN C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV.

When directed to Maximize CRD for pressure, Maximizes CRD for pressure per 04 01-C11-1, Attachment VII, CRD SOI:

54 ATC IF maximizing CRD for pressure THEN FULLY CLOSE C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV.

Set the following as a Critical Parameters:

55 CRS

Reactor Power of 5%

Suppression Pool Temperature Recognizes and reports:

1) 16AB loss of power 56 ATC

2) Div 2 D/G restored bus power by observing 152-1608, BUS 16AB FDR FM DG 12 closed.

Directs ATC to verify power restored to 16AB and re-override Div 2 ECCS systems, 57 CRS RHR B only.

Directs ATC to restore CRD pump B to service Overrides RHR B injection valve E12-F042B and E12-F042C by taking their 59 ATC handswitches to the CLOSE position.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After attachments 18, 19, and 20 are installed, directs to maximize CRD for 60 CRS pressure and insert Control Rods Booth If directed to reset RC&IS, insert event 12 Insert Control Rods by performing the following:

Reset the Reactor Scram using scram reset switches on P680

Allow Scram Discharge Volume to drain as indicated on P680

Depress Manual Scram pushbuttons on P680

Verify Rod motion 63 BOP

Reset the Reactor Scram using scram reset switches on P680

Select a Control Rod in gang mode and depress the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton on P680 CRITICAL TASK; Crew is to insert control rods by manual scram and/or normal rod insertion following installation of EP Attachments 18, 19, and 20 prior to exiting EP-2A.

65 CRS Enters all legs of EP-3 and provides update.

67 CRS Direct RO to energize Div 1 and Div 2 Hydrogen Igniters.

Using 04-1-01-E61-1 hard card, performs the following:

Energizes Div 1 and Div 2 Hydrogen Igniters by performing the following:

VERIFY Running A(B) CTMT AND A(B) DW H2 Analyzers OR Start by PLACING handswitches to START on P870-4C and P870-10C

VERIFY the amber light on for the 0-10% scale on recorders 1E61-R602A(B) on P870-4B and P870-10B.

70 RO

ENSURE A(B) CTMT AND A(B) DW H2 Analyzers have been in service for >

60 seconds.

VERIFY A(B) CTMT AND A(B) DW H2 Concentration is < 2.9% AND THEN

ENERGIZE Div 1 H2 Igniters by PLACING H2 IGNITER SYS A handswitch to ON position on P870-4C.

ENERGIZE Div 2 H2 Igniters by PLACING H2 IGNITER SYS B handswitch to ON position on P870-10C.

(Critical TASK in BOLD)

Termination:

Once control rods are being inserted and as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 If this scenario is used for EAL classification:

Site Area Emergency - SS3, Automatic scram fails to shut down the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 2 Give this page to the CRS Crew Turnover:

Reactor Power: 100%

MOC EOOS: GREEN Integrated Risk: NORMAL Work Week: Div 1 Inop Equipment: None Place SSW A in recirculation mode per step 5.10 of SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 for a chemistry sample immediately after turnover. The sample will be drawn later in the shift.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: GGNS 2-2020-4 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 79% power.

Inoperable equipment: Div 1 diesel generator, E30-F001A Turnover: Sequence exchange completed last shift. Reactor Engineering is verifying rod pattern and thermal limits prior to raising core flow.

Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description SLC B squib valve failure 1 c41f004b_a TS (CRS) LCO 3.1.7, Cond D With Div 1 DG inop, LCO 3.1.7, Cond E in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months C (ATC, CRS) 2 n34098 Turbine lube oil temp controller failure A (ALL)

I (BOP, CRS) Spurious RCIC initiation (TS) 3 e51188 A (ALL) LCO 3.5.3, Cond A TS (CRS) LCO 3.3.5.2, Cond B C (BOP, ATC, CRS) 4 r21139d 28AG lockout A (ALL) fw203 5 M (CREW) Recirc pumps downshift / LFMG trip / THI rr190b 6 rr063a M (CREW) LOCA fw171a Feedwater line break in DW, F065A isolation valve 7 M (CREW) trips on stroke.

b21f065a_i ct218e ct219b HPCS supp pool leak / Door failure / SPMU failure /

8 O/Rs e30f002b C (ATC, CRS) emergency depressurization.

stem/disc (CT-1) (CT-2) separation (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec Revision 0 8/30/2019 1

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 Quantitative Attributes Table E3-301-4 Attribute Actual Description Target Malfunctions after

HPCS suppression pool leak / door failure 1-2 2 EOP entry

E30-F002B stem/disc separation

Turbine lube oil temp controller failure Abnormal Events 2-4 3

Spurious RCIC initiation

28AG lockout

Recirc pumps downshift / 1 LFMG trip / THI Major Transients 1-2 3

LOCA

Feedwater line break in DW / inability to isolate EOP entries

LOCA, EP-2 requiring 1-2 3

HPCS Suppression pool leak / door failure, EP-3 substantive action

HPCS Suppression pool leak / door failure, EP-4 Entry into a contingency EOP

Alternate level control, EP-2 1 2 with substantive

Emergency Depressurization, EP-2 actions (CT-1) Emergency Depressurize the RPV prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 ft.

Preidentified critical 2-3 2 (CT-2) After Emergency Depressurization, restore and tasks maintain RPV level above -191 using available injection systems prior to exiting EP-2.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

Respond to a SLC squib valve loss of power

Respond to a turbine lube oil temperature controller failure

Respond to a spurious RCIC initiation

Respond to a 28AG lockout

Respond to a double recirc pump downshift / 1 LFMG failure / THI / failure to auto scram

Respond to a LOCA

Respond to a feedwater line break in the DW that cannot be isolated

Respond to a suppression pool leak into HPCS with door failure and SPMU failure Initial Conditions:

Plant is operating at 79% power following a rod sequence exchange.

Inoperable Equipment:

Division 1 diesel generator

Suppression Pool Makeup valve E30-F001A Scenario Notes:

This scenario is a NEW Scenario.

Validation Time: 65 minutes Revision 0 8/30/2019 3

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Event 1 - SLC B squib valve loss of power (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

With Div 1 DG inop and with B SLC inop, LCO 3.1.7, Cond D. With Div 1 DG inop, LCO 3.1.7, Cond E in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Event 2 - Turbine lube oil temperature controller failure failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

The controller should be placed in manual IAW ARI P680-10A-D3 and restore lube oil temperature to 113°F.

Event 3 - Spurious RCIC initiation (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

RCIC will initiate due to a spurious level 2 initiation signal. The BOP operator will secure RCIC per the hardcard by closing the trip/throttle valve, placing its controller in manual, and reducing its controller output to minimum. RCIC should be declared inop since it cannot automatically start / inject.

Event 4 - 28AG lockout (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

(reference CR GG-2019-3822)

Based on alarms received, the crew should recognize a loss of multiple PSW pumps due to 28AG lockout. The crew should enter 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power ONEP and 05-1-02-V-11, Loss of Plant Service Water ONEP. The bus is locked out and the crew should identify a computer point from the Loss of AC power ONEP and determine the bus cannot be reenergized. With core flow already at 70Mlbm/hr, control rods should be inserted to achieve < 50% Rx power. The BOP operator should start the (one) available PSW pump and optimize flow from all operating pumps.

Event 5 - Recirc pumps downshift / LFMG failure / THI_

(Initial Setup - Automatic)

When the 3rd control rod is inserted, both of the recirc pumps will downshift due to faulty feedwater flow input to the cavitation interlock circuitry. The B LFMG will trip 40 seconds later. 60 seconds later, THI will start ramping in. Based on the rate THI is ramping in, the ATC should observe THI and place the Rx mode switch in shutdown prior to receiving an automatic Rx scram on OPRMs.

Event 6 - LOCA (Initial Setup - Automatic)

After the reactor is scrammed, a recirc suction leak will occur resulting in high drywell pressure ECCS initiations and isolations.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 Event 7 - Feedwater break in drywell (Initial Setup - Automatic)

A feedwater line A break will occur in the drywell. An attempt should be made to isolate the leak by closing FW INL SHUTOFF VLV, B21-F065A, but the breaker will trip on stroke signal. This will leave HPCS as the primary high pressure injection system available to maintain Rx level.

Event 8 - HPCS suppression pool leak (Initial Setup - Automatic)

HPCS suppression pool suction line will develop a leak between the suppression pool and its suction isolation valve E22-F015. Suppression pool level will start lowering. EP-3 should be entered and Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) should be initiated (may auto initiate). Both divisions of SPMU will receive an initiation signal. fail. SPMU valves E30-F001A is already inop with its breaker open. E30-F002B will experience a stem/disc separation resulting in no water being added to the suppression pool. HPCS room level will start rising and will lead to a HPCS pump trip as water gets in the motor. After the pump trip, HPCS pump room door will fail resulting in a continual drain of the suppression pool into the auxiliary building. With the HPCS pump trip, RPV level will start lowering and will require entry into the Alternate Level Control Leg of EP-2. RCIC should be aligned for injection, CRD maximized for flow, and SLC injected. Emergency depressurization is required prior to suppression pool level falling below 14.5 feet. After emergency depressurization, low pressure ECCS will restore RPV level. CT-1 and CT-2.

Termination:

Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level is stabilized above TAF and as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

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Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4 Critical Task (CT-1) Emergency Depressurize the RPV prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 ft.

Event 8 Safety 02-S-01-40 Att. VI, EP Steps SPL-6 through 9.

Significance Suppression pool water must be maintained above 14.5 ft. to ensure that steam discharged through the horizontal vents following a primary system break will be adequately condensed. If a primary system break were to occur with suppression pool water level below this elevation, pressure suppression capability would be unavailable and primary containment pressure could exceed structural limits.

If suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above 14.5 ft., emergency RPV depressurization is required since the RPV is not permitted to remain at pressure if pressure suppression capability is unavailable. Consistent with the definition of cannot be maintained a decision that suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above 14.5 ft can be made before level actually reaches this value.

Cueing Red light indication on at least 7 SRVs Critical Task (CT-2) After Emergency Depressurization, restore and maintain RPV level above -191 (CT-2) using available injection systems prior to exiting EP-2.

Event 8 Safety 02-S-01-40 Att. IV, EP Step L-14 Significance The Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to preclude any clad temperature in the uncovered portion of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Adequate core cooling is ensured if one of two conditions exists after the RPV is depressurized:

RPV water level can be restored and maintained above the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (-191 in.). The core is then cooled by a combination of submergence and steam cooling, even with no core spray flow.

Design core spray flow requirements are satisfied (HPCS or LPCS flow above 7000 gpm and RPV water level above -216 in., the elevation of the top of the jet pumps). The core is then cooled by spray cooling, even if the core remains uncovered.

Cueing Positive injection flow established and reactor level rising

If an operator or the crew significantly deviates from, or fails to, follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review (NUREG 1021, Appendix D). An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy Revision 0 8/30/2019 6

Appendix D Simulator Outline Form ES-D-1 GGNS 2-2020 NRC Scenario 4

- Per 02-S 01-40, EP-1, Step ED-6: Seven open SRVs is the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depressurization (MNSRED) and is the least number of SRVs which corresponds to a Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure (MSCP) sufficiently low that the ECCS with the lowest head will be capable of making up the SRV steam flow at the corresponding MSCP. The MNSRED is utilized to assure the RPV will depressurize and remain depressurized when emergency depressurization is required. Refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the MNSRED and the MSCP.

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Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 7.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-26 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2-2020 NRC Exam Scenario 4.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-26

Ensure all procedures are marked as indicated for turnover conditions.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

Perform the following on 1H13-P870:

Place SPMU DIV 1 OOSVC switch to INOP

Verify SPMU DIV 1 OOSVC annunciator is illuminated

Verify SPMU D1 MOV OVERLD PWR LOSS status light is illuminated

Verify SPMU D1 OOSVC SWITCH ACT status light is illuminated

Verify SMPU DIV 1 INBD DUMP VLV E30-F001A red and green lights are out

Place a red tag on handswitch SMPU DIV 1 INBD DUMP VLV E30-F001A

Perform the following on 1H13-P864:

Verify P864-1A-B1, DIV 1 DSL ENG TRIP annunciator is illuminated

Verify P864-1A-D1, DG 11 AUTO START NOT AVAIL annunciator is illuminated

Verify DG 11 NOT AVAIL status light is illuminated

DG 11 BRKR OUT/CONT PWR FAIL status light is illuminated

Place a red tag on handswitch BUS 15AA FDR FM DG 11:152-1508

Place a red tag on handswitch DIV 1 DSL ENG RMT MAN START pushbutton

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

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B. File loaded verification:

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B. File loaded verification:

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B. File loaded verification:

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Procedures that may be used in this scenario:

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-18A-H4

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-10A-D3

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-21A-A3

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P601-21A-G6

05-1-02-V-5, Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP:

04-1-01-E51-1, RCIC SOI

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P854-1A-A5

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P807-3A-C1

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P807-3A-D2

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P807-3A-C1

05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power ONEP

05-1-02-V-11, Loss of Plant Service Water ONEP

04-1-01-P44-1, Plant Service Water SOI

04-1-01-R21-18, 18AG SOI

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-3A-D4

ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-3A-D10

05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP

05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP

05-1-02-I-2, Turbine and Generator Trips ONEP

IOI 03-1-01-2, Power Operations, Attachment VIII, Temporary Downpower

Technical Specification

SOI 04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat Removal System SOI

02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy

05-S-01-EP-2, RPV Control

05-S-01-EP-3, Containment Control

05-S-01-EP-4, Auxiliary Building Control

05-1-02-III-5, Automatic Isolations ONEP

04-1-01-C11-1, Control Rod Drive System SOI

04-1-01-N32-2, Turbine Generator Control SOI

04-2-02-E30-1, Suppression Pool Makeup SOI

EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations Revision 0 8/30/2019 13

SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Start SBT report and any other required recording devices.

Event No: 1 Event

Description:

standby liquid control B squib valve loss of power Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following indications on P601:

18A-H4, SLC SYS B OOSVC alarm 0 BOP

SQUIB B LOSCNT PWRLOSS status light

SQUIB BLB READY light out Refers to ARI 5 CRS Contacts Electrical Maintenance to investigate If directed to investigate SLC Squib valve, wait 3 minutes and report a WO Booth is required for additional investigation.

Enters Tech Specs and identifies the following LCOs:

3.1.7 Condition D, One SLC subsystem inop for reasons other than Conditions A, B, or C.

D.1 Restore SLC subsystem to operable status within 7 days 10 CRS With Div 1 DG inop, will enter the following in 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s:

3.1.7 Condition E, Two SLC subsystem inop for reasons other than Conditions A, B, or C.

E.1 Restore one SLC subsystem to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

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Event No: 2 Event

Description:

turbine lube oil temperature controller failure Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and responds the following alarm on P680:

10A-D3, TURB LUBE OIL TEMP HI 10 ATC Recognizes and reports Turbine Lube Oil Temperature Controller (1N34-R602) has failed.

Evaluator Note: it is expected the ATC will place the turbine lube oil temperature controller in manual and establish manual control prior to reaching step 3.3 of ARI IAW EN-OP-200 step 5.1(9) which states:

Failed Automatic Actions

a. ENSURE operators backup automatic action when they fail to occur.

b. IF an automatic control malfunctions, THEN ESTABLISH manual control.

Per ARI:

3.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION 3.1 MONITOR TURB BRG OIL TEMP indicator on 1H13-P680-10B, normal operating temperature Should be approximately 113°F.

3.3 IF the TURB LUBE OIL TEMP CONT control deviation signal to the TBCW valve is near zero, indicating a possible controller problem, 12 CRS THEN TAKE manual control of the turbine lube oil temperature controller 1N34-TK-R602 AND increase TBCW valve opening signal.

3.4 MONITOR for high turbine bearing metal temperatures, on Recorder 1N32-R650 on 1H13-P822, OR on the computer OPERATOR GUIDE titled "BEARING LOG.

Directs ATC to place Turbine Lube Oil Temperature Controller (1N34-R602) in MANUAL and restore temperature to 113°F.

Evaluator Note: If BOP responds to R650 recorder (backpanel), provide feedback that all bearing temperature parameters indicate normal trends.

Places Turbine Lube Oil Temperature Controller (1N34-R602) in MANUAL and 13 ATC restores temperature to 113°F.

15 CRS Directs I&C to investigate Turbine Lube Oil Temperature Controller.

If directed to investigate Turbine Lube Oil Temperature Controller, Booth acknowledge the command. No actions will be taken.

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Event No: 3 Event

Description:

spurious RCIC initiation Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following P601 alarms:

21A-A3, RCIC PMP DISCH FLO LO 16 BOP

21A-G6, ECIC GL SEAL COMPR AUTO START Reports Spurious RCIC initiation Confirms spurious initiation by 2 independent means Enters and directs Subsequent Actions from 05-1-02-V-5, Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP:

17 CRS C.1 CHECK by AT LEAST TWO indications that RCIC Initiation is NOT VALID.

C.2 IF RCIC initiation is NOT VALID, THEN TRIP RCIC.

Attempts to trip RCIC using RCIC TURB TRIP pushbutton.

18 BOP Reports RCIC failed to trip.

19 CRS Directs BOP to secure RCIC using hard card.

Evaluator Note: The RCIC trip pushbutton will fail and requires a shutdown per the hard card.

Secures RCIC using SOI 04-1-01-E51-1 hard card by performing the following:

IF desired to shutdown RCIC AND maintain RCIC available:

20 BOP

Close Turbine Trip AND Throttle Valve.

Place Flo controller in manual AND reduce to minimum.

22 CRS Directs I&C maintenance to investigate RCIC initiation If requested to investigate RCIC initiation, wait 5 minutes and report trip Booth units B21-N692A, B, E, and F are all indicating normal and more investigation is required.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters Tech Specs and identifies the following LCOs:

3.5.3 Condition A, RCIC system inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means HPCS is operable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND A.2 Restore RCIC to operable status within 14 days 30 CRS 3.3.5.3 Condition B, from table 3.3.5.3-1 B.1 Declare RCIC system inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Revision 0 8/30/2019 17

Event No: 4 Event

Description:

4160 V Bus 28AG overcurrent trip Triggered by Lead Examiner TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following alarm:

P854-1A-A5, PSW RADIAL WELL TROUBLE

P807-3A-C1, 4.16KV BUS 28AG UNDERVOLTAGE 30 BOP

P807-3A-D2, 4.16KV BUS 28AG INCM FDR 152-2801 TRIP

P807-3A-F2, 480V LCC 28BG1 UNDERVOLTAGE Refers to ARIs and reports loss of bus 28AG 31 CRS Enters 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power ONEP, performs Update 31 BOP Reports loss of PSW pumps E, F, J, and K Enters and directs subsequent actions from 05-1-02-V-11, Loss of Plant Service Water ONEP for a Significant Loss of PSW:

B1 REDUCE Reactor Power to 50% of Rated Thermal Power; PERFORM the following:

a. REDUCE Core Flow to 70 Mlbm/hr, USE FAST Detent (core flow is already at 70 mlbm/hr)

b. INSERT Control Rods, 32 CRS USE RE Instructions.

B3 START Radial Well Pumps from Main Control Room, RESTORE PSW pressure to pre-event values, USE Attachment 2 Hardcard.

B5 OPTIMIZE Operating Radial Well Pump(s) flow, RESTORE PSW pressure to pre-event values, USE Attachment 2 Hardcard.

B6 MONITOR TBCW Temp. Control Valve on PDS P44N094.

Using 04-1-01-P44-1 hard card, starts Radial Well Pump M and optimizes Radial 33 BOP Well pump flows.

34 ATC Monitors and provides updates for TBCW TCV position.

Determines by computer point SR21S712 that 28AG is locked out. Performs 34 ATC update.

(With core flow already at 70 mlbm/hr), Inserts control rods to achieve < 50% Rx 35 ATC power.

Evaluator note: when the 4th control rod is inserted, events 5-8 will automatically occur.

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Event No: 5 Event

Description:

Both Recirc pumps downshift / LFMG B Trip / LASALLE POWER OSCILLATIONS (Event 5)

LOCA (Event 6)

Feedwater rupture in drywell with inability to isolate (Event 7)

Unisolable suppression pool leak HPCS / water tight door failure (Event 8)

Critical task 1- Emergency Depressurize the RPV prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 ft.

Critical task 2- After Emergency Depressurization, restore and maintain RPV level above -191 using available injection systems prior to exiting EP-2.

(Initial Setup - Automatic)

TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and reports the following P680 alarms:

3A-A3, RX LVL 40/32 HI/LO 37 ATC

3A-D4, RECIRC PMP A AUTO TRIP XFER TO LO SP

3A-D10, RECIRC PMP B AUTO TRIP XFER TO LO SP Reports Recirc system double downshift Enters 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP, 38 CRS performs update.

Recognizes and reports the following P680 alarms:

3A-E8, LFMG B OVERLD/TRIP Reports Recirc pump B tripped to OFF Per ONEP:

NOTE WHEN in single loop operation, IF indicated core flow is less than approximately 38 mlbm/hr (34% of rated), the jet pump reverse flow 39 logic is inaccurate. Under these conditions, actual total core flow Must ATC be determined by manually adding together the jet pump loop flows.

This is because the natural circulation force is greater than active loop driving force AND forward flow is actually taking place.

Performs plot on Power / Flow Map.

Assumes THI watch. Monitors for THI as directed by performing the following:

Monitors APRM indications

Monitors LPRM indications

Selects different control rods and monitors LPRM indications 39 CRS Directs ATC to monitor for THI with no concurrent duties.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitors for THI.

Per ONEP:

2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS (OPRMs OPERABLE) 2.1 IF ANY of the following conditions of Steps 2.1.1 OR 2.1.2 exist, THEN IMMEDIATELY PLACE the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position.

2.1.1 WHEN operating in the OPRM Armed Region of Figure 1 or Figure 2, thermal hydraulic instability is detected by:

39 ATC a. At least 2 of the following 4 alarms: [IER L2-15-34 Rec. 1A]

Annunciators APRM CH 1 (2) (3) (4) UPSC TRIP/

OPRM TRIP/INOP AND The corresponding two computer points in alarm:

C51NC065 (NC066, NC067, NC068), APRM 1 (2) (3)

(4) OPRM TRIP OR

b. Thermal Hydraulic Instability symptoms being observed on neutron instrumentation Recognizes and reports THI.

Places the reactor mode switch in shutdown.

Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram and verifies the following Turbine Trip automatic actions have occurred per 05-1-02-I-2, Turbine and Generator Trips ONEPs:

2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 PLACE Reactor Mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

40 ATC 2.2 CONFIRM all Control Rods are fully inserted.

2.3 CONFIRM Reactor power decreasing.

Verifies the following Automatic Actions have occurred and determines no immediate actions are required:

Turbine Stop Valves Close

Turbine Control Valves Close

Generator Output Breakers J5228 AND J5232 Open Reports ALL RODS IN Recognizes and reports A Feedwater line break in the Drywell by observing A Feedwater line flow rising or maximum with B Feedwater line flow at or near zero.

41 BOP Trips all condensate pumps.

Attempts to close B21-F065A, reports breaker trip.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If directed to investigate B21-F065A breaker (52-153111), wait 3 minutes and Booth report breaker is in the trip free position 41 ATC Reports 1.39 psig drywell pressure.

Performs update and enters the following:

Reactor Scram ONEP, 05-1-02-I-1, 42 CRS

Turbine and Generator Trips ONEP, 05-1-02-I-2

EP-2, RPV Control Directs ATC to verify High Drywell isolations, initiations, and DGs.

42 CRS Directs ATC to restore the Aux Building.

Verifies and reports High Drywell pressure isolations complete using the isolation status board as a quick reference and verifying the following alarms:

P870-3A-A4, CTMT-DRWL ISOL DIV 1 OPER annunciator sealed in

P870-3A-B3, AUX BLDG ISOL DIV 1 OPER annunciator sealed in

P870-9A-A4, CTMT-DRWL ISOL DIV 2 OPER annunciator sealed in 43 ATC

P870-9A-B3, AUX BLDG ISOL DIV 2 OPER annunciator sealed in Reports Div 2 and Div 3 Emergency D/Gs are running with cooling water.

Reports all ECCS initiations have occurred and HPCS is injecting.

Restores Aux building by opening Instrument Air isolation valves:

P53-F001 and F007 Directs BOP to control RPV level using HPCS with a level band of -30 to +50 43 CRS WR using HPCS.

Reports no CRD pumps operating. Performs the following immediate actions:

2.1.2 IF running CRD pump trips, THEN START standby CRD pump as follows:

44 ATC a. IF required, RE-ENERGIZE MCCs 15B42 AND 16B42 on 1H13-P864.

b. PLACE CRD SYS FLO CONT in MANUAL AND REDUCE output to zero.

c. START standby CRD pump.

e. RETURN CRD SYS FLO CONT to AUTO with tapeset at 54-66 gpm.

Directs ATC to control RPV pressure with a band of 450-600 psig using turbine 44 CRS bypass valves to reduce the driving head of the leak.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Performs the following per 04-1-01-N32-2 hard card:

1. At 1H13-P680-9C, Simultaneously PRESS and HOLD following MAN BYP CONT pushbuttons to energize Manual Bypass Valve Controller:

REL

MAN BYP

2. WHEN MAN BYP CONT ON light comes ON, THEN RELEASE pushbuttons.

3. As directed by Control Room Supervision, MAINTAIN Reactor pressure PER established pressure band as follows:

44 ATC a. IF lowering Reactor pressure, THEN PRESS MAN BYP CONT RAISE pushbutton.

b. IF raising Reactor pressure, THEN PRESS MAN BYP CONT LOWER pushbutton.

c. At 1H13-P680-9D, OBSERVE following position indicators to determine Main Turbine Bypass Valve positions:

1N11-R602A, BPV 1 POSITION INDICATOR

1N11-R602B, BPV 2 POSITION INDICATOR

1N11-R602C, BPV 3 POSITION INDICATOR 44 CRS Enters all legs of EP-3, performs update.

Reports the following:

45 ATC

EP-4 alarm, P870-5A-H1, HPCS PMP RM FLOODED.

EP-4 alarm, P680-8A1-B4, HPCS RM SMP LVL HI-HI.

Suppression pool level is trending down.

Enters EP-4 and performs an update.

Directs ATC to secure HPCS and verify HPCS is isolated from suppression pool.

46 CRS Directs ATC that suppression pool level is a critical parameter and provide frequent updates.

Directs BOP to inject with RCIC per the hard card.

Using 04-1-01-E51-1 hard card, performs the following:

1. OPEN Trip Throttle Valve.

46 BOP

2. OPEN/CHECK OPEN E51-F013.

3. RAISE flow with Flo Controller.

Evalu47ator note: If HPCS is not secured, it will trip as room level rises.

47 CRS Directs HPCS pump breaker to be racked out.

Role Play: If directed to rack out HPCS pump breaker, acknowledge the Booth command. After 5 minutes, insert Event 7 and report HPCS pump breaker has been racked out.

48 BOP Reports E22-F015 full closed and suppression pool level continues to trend down.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 48 CRS Directs ATC to initiate Div 2 SPMU.

Using 04-1-01-E30-1 hard card, performs the following:

1.0 MANUAL INITIATION OF SPMU 1.1 For each division:

1. PLACE SPMU MODE SEL handswitch to AUTO 49 ATC 2. PLACE SPMU DUMP TEST switch in TEST.

3. DEPRESS both SPMU MAN INIT pushbuttons.

4. ENSURE suppression pool level is rising.

Reports Div 2 SPMU valves opening and suppression pool level is not rising.

Determines one of the valves has a stem/disc separation.

The HPCS pump room door will fail 10 minutes after the scram. If directed to ensure HPCS room door is secure, acknowledge the command. After 2 Booth minutes, determine from the DIRECTOR the status of MF ct219b. If ct219b is active, respond the door is open and cannot be secured. If ct219b is not active, report the door is secure.

50 BOP With RCIC injecting, reports RPV level is trending down.

Directs ATC to maximize CRD for flow.

50 CRS Directs ATC to inject SLC A.

If directed to maximize CRD for flow, using 04-1-01-C11-1 hard card, performs the following:

1. Ensure oil pump is running on the non-running CRD Pump A(B).

2. With one CRD pump already running, THEN START standby CRD PMP A(B).

51 ATC

3. PLACE CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL.

4. Using CRD SYS FLOW CONT C11-R600, fully OPEN C11-F002A(B),

CRD FLO CONT VLV.

5. IF maximizing CRD for flow, THEN fully OPEN C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Using 04-1-01-C41-1 hard card, performs the following:

Turns SLC A handswitches to START

1. CHECK system initiation by OBSERVING following:

a. CHECK Squib Valves fired on following:

1) 1C41-F004A, SLC PUMP C001A DISCHARGE SQUIB VALVE

White SQUIB VLV READY light OFF

3) Annunciator SLC System A OOSVC ON

5) SLC A SYS STATUS SQUIB A LOSCONT/PWRLOSS light ON

b. CHECK OPEN Tank Outlet Valves:

51 ATC

1C41 F001A

c. SLC Pump A RUNNING

e. RWCU ISOLATES:

G33-F004, RWCU PMP SUCT CTMT OTBD ISOL, CLOSED

G33-F001, RWCU PMP SUCT DRWL INBD ISOL, CLOSED.

G33-F251, RWCU SPLY TO RWCU HXS, CLOSED

2. CHECK SLC INJECTING INTO the RPV by observing following:

SLC Pump discharge pressure greater than reactor pressure.

SLC Tank Level lowering.

Nuclear instrumentation lowering.

52 BOP Reports RPV level continues to lower.

Enters Alternate Level Control Leg of EP-2, performs update.

52 CRS Directs ATC to INHIBIT ADS.

Directs BOP that RPV level is a critical parameter and provide frequent updates.

Determines suppression pool level cannot be maintained > 14.5.

53 CRS Enters Emergency Depressurization Leg of EP-2 and performs update.

53 CRS Directs opening of 8 ADS/SRVs.

Opens 8 ADS/SRV valves using handswitches on P601.

Reports 8 ADS valves are open.

54 RO CRITICAL TASK; When it is determined that suppression pool level cannot be maintained above 14.5, the crew opens at least seven SRVs prior to suppression pool level reaching 14.5.

Directs the BOP the following critical parameters:

55 CRS

Low pressure ECCS injection

RPV level above TAF Revision 0 8/30/2019 24

TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At RPV pressure of 476 psig verifies and reports all Low Pressure ECCS injection valves opening.

Reports LPCS injection.

57 BOP When RPV pressure is < 300 psig, reports RHR A, B, C injection.

Reports RPV level above TAF.

CRITICAL TASK: After Emergency Depressurization, restore and maintain RPV level above -191 using available injection systems prior to exiting EP-2.

Exits Alternate Level Control leg of EP-2.

59 CRS Directs BOP to control RPV level within a band of -30 to +50 WR using LPCS and RHR C.

When directed by BOP, secures SLC by turning SLC handswitches to STOP.

61 ATC When directed by BOP, restores CRD to normal by securing one CRD pump and transferring CRD FCV to AUTO.

63 CRS Direct ATC to start Hydrogen Igniters.

If directed, verifies Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Analyzers Operating on P870.

63 ATC Verifies drywell and containment hydrogen concentrations are < 2.9%.

Starts Div 1 and Div 2 Hydrogen Igniters.

65 CRS Directs ATC to maximize suppression pool cooling.

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TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If directed to place RHR A and B in suppression pool cooling, performs the following per SOI 04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment VI hard card:

(1) On Panel 1H13-P870-1B(7B), CHECK SSW A(B) in service by observing > 7,900 gpm on indicator E12-R602A(B), SSW HX A(B) SSW FLO.

(2) IF SSW A(B) is NOT in service, THEN PRESS BOTH SSW Div 1(2) MAN INIT, LOGIC A(B) and LOGIC C(D) pushbuttons, and ENSURE the following lineup on Panel 1H13-P870-1B(7B):

(a) SSW A(B) Pump, RUNNING.

(b) P41-F001A(B), SSW PMP A(B) DISCH VLV, OPEN.

(c) P41-F005A(B), SSW LOOP A(B) RTN TO CLG TWR A(B), OPEN.

(d) P41-F014A(B), SSW INL TO RHR HX A(B), OPEN.

(e) P41-F006A(B), SSW PMP A RECIRC VLV, CLOSED.

(3) ENSURE OPEN E12-F003A(B), RHR HX A(B) OUTL VLV.

(4) IF necessary, THEN RESET Ctmt Spray Logic A(B), by performing the following:

(a) DEPRESS CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton 65 ATC (b) ENSURE white light above CTMT SPR A(B) RESET pushbutton extinguishes.

(c) OVERRIDE E12F042A(B) RHR A(B) INJ SHUTOFF VLV CLOSED (Unless overridden by previous EP step)

(d) ENSURE E12F028A(B) CTMT SPRAY A(B) SPARGER INJ VLV Closes (e) WHEN time permits, THEN REFER TO Step 5.3.2 of this procedure .

(5) ENSURE RHR PMP A(B) running .

(6) BEGIN OPENING E12-F024A(B), RHR A(B) TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL.

(7) CLOSE E12-F048A(B), RHR HX A(B) BYP VLV.

(8) ENSURE OPEN E12-F024A(B), RHR A(B) TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL.

(9) WHEN flow exceeds 1154 gpm, THEN ENSURE E12-F064A(B), RHR A(B) MIN FLO TO SUPP POOL, closes.

(10) WHEN time permits, THEN REFER to Section 5.2 of this procedure.

(Critical TASK in BOLD)

Termination:

Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level is stabilized above TAF and as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

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If this scenario is used for Emergency Classification:

ALERT - FA1 from RC1, ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of EITHER Fuel Clad or RCS Revision 0 8/30/2019 27

Give this page to the CRS

`

Crew Turnover:

Reactor Power: 79%

MOC EOOS: GREEN Integrated Risk: HIGH, Sequence Exchange Work Day: Div 1 Inop Equipment:

Div 1 diesel generator

E30-F001A

Div 1 DG is inop due to an oil leak. Div 1 DG will not be restored until next shift.

06-OP-1R20-W-0001, Attachment 2 (AC/DC lineup verification), is next due in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

Suppression Pool Makeup Valve E30-F001A failed its stroke time last shift and is tagged out for troubleshooting.

The plant is operating at 79% power following a Control Rod sequence exchange.

Reactor Engineering is verifying rod pattern and thermal limits prior to returning to 100% Rx power. They will inform the crew when to raise Rx power.

Step 12.8 of IOI-2, Attachment VIII, is complete Revision 0 8/30/2019 28

SCENARIOS 1 & 3 OMITTED AS THEY WERE UNUSED SPARE SCENARIOS AND WERE PLACED IN THE LICENSEES EXAM BANK

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Exam: 2 / 3 / 2020 Operating Test No.:GGNS 2-2020 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 5 6 5 4 20 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 2 3 9 2 2 1 TS 2 2 2 2 8 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3 3 3 2 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 2 3 9 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3 3 3 3 12 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 2 3 9 2 2 1 TS RX NOR I/C MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional I/C malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For new reactor facility licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Grand Gulf Date of Examination: 2/03/2020 Operating Test No.:GGNS 2/2020 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC ATC ATC ATC BOP BOP BOP BOP CRS CRS CRS CRS 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2, 3, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 5, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 3, 1, 3, ALL ALL ALL ALL Interpret/Diagnose Events 5, 6, 5, 6, 5, 6, 6, 8, 4, 5, 6, 4, 5, 4, 7, 8 7, 8 7 7 7 and Conditions 2, 3, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, ALL ALL ALL ALL Comply with and 5, 6, 5, 6, 5, 7, 5, 6, 3, 4, 3, 6, 3, 5, 4, 7, 7, 8 8, 5, 7 6, 7, Use Procedures (1) 2, 3, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 3, 3, 4, N/A N/A N/A N/A Operate Control 5, 6, 5, 6, 5, 7 5, 6, 3, 4, 6, 5, 7 7, 8, 7 5, 7 Boards (2) 2, 3, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, ALL ALL ALL ALL Communicate 5, 6, 5, 6, 5, 6, 5, 6, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 8 7, 8 7 8, 5, 7 6 5, 6 5, 7, and Interact 8, N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ALL ALL ALL ALL Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 14 1, 4 1, 3 1, Comply with and Use TS (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes TS compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Forms ES 303 1 and ES 303 3 describe the competency rating factors.)

ML20058H614

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