ML20216H671

Insp Repts 50-338/98-01,50-338/98-01 & 72-0016/98-01 on 980125-0307.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20216H671
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	04/03/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216H649	List: ML20216H644 ML20216H671
References
50-338-98-01, 50-338-98-1, 50-339-98-01, 50-339-98-1, 72-0016-98-01, 72-16-98-1, NUDOCS 9804210211
Download: ML20216H671 (25)

See also: IR 05000338/1998001

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-338. 50-339. 72-16

License Nos:

NPF-4. NPF-7

Report Nos:

50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01

Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility:

North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2

Location:

1022 Haley Drive

Mineral. Virginia 23117

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Dates:

January 25 through March 7. 1998

Inspectors:

M. Morgan. Senior Resident Inspector

R. Gibbs. Resident Inspector

P. Fillion. Reactor Inspector (Sections E2.1 and E8.1)

L. Garner. Senior Project Engineer (Section 08.4)

W. Stansberry. Security Specialist (Sections S2.2. S2.9.

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S3.2. S4.1. S5.2. 56.3 and S7.3)

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Approved by:

R. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

ENCLOSURE

9804210211 980403

E

PDR

ADOCK 05000338

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PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,

engineering, maintenance, and plant support.

The report covers a six-week

period of resident ins)ection.

In addition, it includes the results of

announced inspections ]y regional inspectors.

Doerations

Receipt. inspection, and storage of new fuel was acceptable.

Issues

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regardirig personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and

corrected (Section 01.2).

Response to increased Lake Anna level met Technical Specification

requirements and operation of the Lake Anna spillway was proper

(Section 01.3).

The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the B condensate

pump was repaired was prudent (Section 01.4).

Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate. timely, and proper

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(Section 01.5).

Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump was adequately performed.

A

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disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list

(Section 02.1).

Proper actions were taken to meet Technical Specification requirements

when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from service.

Operator

knowledge of the limiting condition for operation and required service

water system pressures was good (Section 04.1).

Maintenance

Communications self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during

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the Unit 1 train 8 solid state protection system test were good (Section

M1.1).

The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief

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valves was properly performed.

Technical Specifications and other

techriical requirements were satisfied (Section M1.2).

Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.

Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were

noted (Section M1.3).

The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump

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performance criteria (Section M1.3).

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Enaineerina

Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection

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period for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

construction.

The observed ISFSI activities were adequately performed

(Section E1.1).

A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was

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timely in resolving safety significant issues (Section E2.1).

Plant Sucoort

Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were

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accurate and were )osted properly.

Several other effective practices

used to inform worcers of radiological conditions were noted (Section

R1.1).

Posting and control of high radiation areas was appropriate (Section

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R1.1).

The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in

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compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical

Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing

Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures (Section S2.2).

Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security

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protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

Construction implementation was appropriate (Section S2.9).

A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security

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Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical

Security Plan commitments and practices (Section S3.2).

Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their

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assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly

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force and armed response tactics (Section S4.1).

The security force was being trained in an excellent manner and in

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accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory

requirements (Section $5.2).

The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel

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immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical

Security Plan requirements (Section S6.3).

The documented problem analyses for five security-related deviation

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reports were adequate (Section S7.3).

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Reoort Details

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Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100-percent reactor power.

Power was

reduced to 88 percent on February 12 when the B high pressure heater drain

) ump and the B condensate pump experienced motor bearing failures and had to

)e secured. 'On February 16, power was increased to 92 percent after the

B heater drain pump was repaired and placed in service.

On February 21. the

B condensate pump was. repaired, placed in service, and power was increased to

100 percent.

Power remained at or near 100 percent for the remainder of the

inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

Unit

coastdown for the April 1998 refueling outage began on March 1.

I, Operations

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Conduct of Operations

01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500)

The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper

-staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures.

The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain

awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to

verify operational safety, and compliance with Technical Specifications

(TSs).

Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically

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reviewed from control room indications to assess operability.

Frequent

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)lant tours were. conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping.

Jeviation Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety

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concerns were properly reported and resolved.

The inspectors found that-

daily operations were conducted in accordance with regulatory

requirements and plant procedures.

01~2 Receint. Insoection. and Storace of New Fuel

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a.

Insoection Scone (71707. 60705)

On February 3 and February 5, the inspectors observed receipt,

inspection and temporary storage of new fuel designated for the April

1998 Unit 2 refueling outage.

b.

Observations and Findinos

Operations personnel conducted the new fuel receipt activities

in accordance with 0-0P-4.2, " Receipt and Storage of New Fuel,"

Revision 12.

Fuel received was in good condition and the shipping

containers did not show indications of damage or improper handling.

Appropriate rigging and handling of the containers and proper movement

of the fuel from its horizontal storage position.to a vertical

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inspection position was observed. . Appropriate use and control of the

new fuel handling tool and crane / hoist was also observed.

The operators

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and Health Physics (HP) technicians who inspected the fuel were

knowledgeable.

Communications between the new fuel handling coordinator

and other members of the fuel handling team were good.

Use of

industrial safety and HP equipment (i.e.

use of cotton gloves, safety

glasses, and hearing protection) was adequate. After inspection of the

fuel by the coordinator and a corporate refueling engineer, the fuel was

properly stored in the new fuel storage sites.

The following deficiencies were observed by the inspectors. immediately

reported to operations, and promptly addressed by management:

Movement of the refueling crane / bridge required about six feet of

movement over a stairwell which runs between the fuel container

receipt and new fuel storage area. This stairway area was not

appropriately roped-off or designated as an " Caution Area" during

bridge movement.

Ropes and caution signs were subsequently placed

in these areas shortly after the February 5 inspection.

Hard hats were not routinely worn by the bridge crane o)erators

and the new fuel handling coordinator because the hats

lampered

wearing of communications equipment.

Clarification of hard hat

use in the new fuel handling areas was addressed by management.

During a subsequent inspection. the inspectors noted that

personnel were following the guidance for use of hard hats in the

area.

A checkoff sheet, which was used as a place-keeping tool by the

new fuel handling coordinator. was not appropriately used.

Procedure steps were initialed, however. several steps were not

checked-off on the checkoff sheet upon completion.

This oversight

did not negatively affect fuel handling and inspection activities.

The coordinator immediately corrected the oversight and no further

problems were noted.

c.

Conclusions

Receipt. inspection and storage of new fuel was acceptable.

Issues

regarding personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and

corrected.

01.3 Doeration of the Lake Anna Soillway (71707)

On February 5. the inspectors toured the Lake Anna Spillway area.

Due

to heavy rains. lake level increased and exceeded the local area

resident notification level of 250.9 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) and TS 4.7.6.1.B surveillance requirement level of a 251 feet MSL.

Entry into

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TS 4.7.6.1.8 required the licensee to measure lake level every two

hours.

The inspectors verified the TS requirement was met.

Because

call-outs were made to local area residents and local highway department

officials, both the NRC Operations Center and the resident inspectors

were notified.

During the tour, the inspectors noted that the spillway

dam gates were opened to urgency level control positions of three feet

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on two of the three available spillway dam gates.

Hydraulically-powered

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generators located at the base of the dam were secured in accordance

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with spillway operating procedures.

While touring the area, the

inspectors examined spillway diesel conditions following February 3

troubleshooting and repair activities (Reference Section 01.5).

The

inspectors noted.that the spillway diesel was in good condition. The

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-inspectors also noted that overall spillway operation was appropriate

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and in accordance with the operating procedure.

Response to_ increased

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Lake Anna level met TS requirements and operation of the Lake Anna

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spillway was proper.

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01'.4 Unit 1 Power Reduction Review

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a.

InsDeetion scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed an operational transient caused by lower motor

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bearing failures'of a high pressure heater drain pump and a condensate

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pump.

The inspectors also discussed with operations management the

decision to remain at a reduced power level while the condensate pump

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'was'out of service for repair,

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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On February 12 while the plant was operating at 100 percent power.'the

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B high pressure heater drain pump lower motor bearing. failed, requiring

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the pump to be secured.

In order to compensate for the decrease in

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suction pressure to the main feedwater pumps, the B condensate-pump,

which was in standby, was manually started.

Shortly afterwards, its

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lower motor bearing also failed resulting in its shutdown by operator's.'

Reactor power was quickly reduced to.88 percent in accordance with

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abnormal procedures. -DRs N-98-370 and N-98-371 were initiated for the

bearing failures to determine the causes_'and evaluate appropriate-

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corrective actions. The B high pressure heater drain pump was repaired

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and power-was increased to 92 percent on February 16. On February 21.

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repairs were completed for the B. condensate pump and power was returned

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to 100 percent. The actions taken by the licensee in response to these

equipment failures were appropriate.

The inspectors discussed with the Operations Superintendent why power

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was limited to 92 percent during the time period the standby condensate

pump was out of service for repair.

Power could have been increased to

nearly 100 percent once the heater drain pump was returned to service.

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The superintendent indicated that the decision to remain at 92 percent

-power _was prudent.

He stated that the loss of another high or low

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pressure heater drain pump or failure of a high level divert valve could

possibly cause a steam generator level transient and challenge plant

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operation.

The decision was, in

Jart, based on simulator observations

and.' reduced output of one of the ligh pressure heater drain pumps that

had been observed since the May 1997 refueling outage. The inspectors

had noted previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-338, 339/97011.

Section 01.2, that there had been increased attention by operators

regarding operation of the secondary plant.

Specifically, maintaining

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adequate feedwater header pressure had been an operator concern since

the Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs) had been replaced during the May

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1997 refueling outage.

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c.

Conclusions

The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the Unit 1 B

condensate pump was repaired was prudent.

Increased operator attention

of secondary plant operations continued as a result of the moisture

separator reheater replacement project completed during the May 1997

refueling outage.

01.5 NRC Notifications

a.

Insoection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the following NRC notifications to determine if

the reports were accurate, timely, and proper for the events.

b.

Observations and Findinas

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On January 28. February 4. and February 17, 4-hour non-emergency

notifications were made because the licensee contacted local county

highway departments and local downstream residents concerning rising

Lake Anna water level.

Plant procedures required local notifications

when lake level reached 250.9 feet MSL.

Heavy rains had caused the lake

level to increase.

Because local officials were contacted. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi) required the licensee to notify the NRC.

DRs N-98-212.

N-98-290, and N-98-407 were initiated. Reporting actions were

appropriate.

On January 29. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made to the NRC

because the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) failed

and could not be restored within one hour.

The system was subsequently

repaired and returned to service several hours later.

10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) required the ERFCS failure to be reported within one hour

to the NRC.

DR N-98-218 was initiated to determine the-cause and

address appropriate corrective actions.

Reporting actions were

appropriate.

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On February 3. the Lake Anna spillway emergency diesel generator failed

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to start during its operability test. A fuse holder for a control

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circuit fuse had lost its spring tension causing the fuse to become

loose.

The fuse holder was repaired and the diesel was returned to

service later that day.

Plant procedures required notification to the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Because an offsite agency was

contacted.10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi) required a 4-hour non-emergency

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notification to the NRC.

DR N-98-263 was initiated to determine the

cause and address appropriate corrective actions.

Reporting actions

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were appropriate.

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On February 17. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made because

both data links to the local emergency off-site facility and the central

emergency offsite facility were lost and not restored within 1-hour.

The system was repaired and. returned to service the following day.

10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) required the communication capability loss to.be

reported within one hour to the NRC.

Reporting actions were

appropriate

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Conclusions

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Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate, timely, and proper.

'02

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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02.1 Unit 1 Charcina Pumo 1-CH-P-1 A'Taa Out Review

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a.

Insoection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed tagging activities associated with charging pump

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1-CH-P-1A.

The pump was removed from service for routine preventive

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maintenance and seal leak repair.

b.. Observations and Findinas

On February 23. the inspectors verified that the tag out of 1-CH-P-1A

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was properly performed:. tagging record 1-98-CH-0007 was referenced. All

tags were in place and all equipment was in the recuired positions.

The

tagging record had.been properly signed off, inclucing independent

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verification, and properly authorized by licensed operators.

The

ins)ectors evaluated the tagging record to ensure it was proper for the

wort and no problems were found.

During the review, the inspectors found that one of the tagged items

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disabled a low lube oil temperature annunciator.

The disabled

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annunciator was not. on the disabled annunciator list.

The inspectors

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discussed this observation with the Operations Superintendent who stated:

that the individuals involved with the tag nut had attempted to add the.

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annunciator to the list.

The individuals however, had not properly

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. saved the changes to the computerized list. The licensee initiated DR

N-98-466 to determine why the annunciator was not properly added to

list.

c;

Conclusions

Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump'was adequately performed. A

disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list.

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04

Operator Knowledge and Performance

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04.1 Service Water (SW) System Throttlina Alianment Review (71707)

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On January 30. the inspectors performed a review of the SW system

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configuration and the required system pressure to ensure TS and

procedural requirements were met.

Operators were also interviewed to

determine their awareness of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)

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and system operating limits.

Because a Unit 1 SW pump had been removed

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from service. TS action 3.7.4.2.a was in effect. This action required

throttling of component cooling water heat exchanger SW flows within 72

hours after the SW pump became inoperable.

The licensee properly

adhered to this requirement.

The operating procedure required the pump

discharge pressure to be maintained between 54 and 70 psig.

The

inspectors verified SW system pressure was within this pressure range.

0)erators displayed a good knowledge of the system pressure limits and

t1e LCO action statement requirements.

Proper actions were taken to

meet TS requirements when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from

service.

Operator knowledge of the LCO and required SW system pressures

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was good.

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08

Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901, 92700, 92903)

08.1

(Closed) URI 50-338. 339/97002-01:

review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6

requirement for SNSOC review of programs.

On March 6. 1997, the

licensee identified that no process existed to ensure that TS 6.5.1.6.a

would be satisfied for changes to the Primary Coolant Sources Outside

Containment program.

Specifically. TS 6.5.1.6.a requires, in part, that

the Station Nuclear Safety And Operating Committee (SNSOC) shall be

responsible for review of all programs required by TS 6.8.4 and changes

thereto.

The above program is listed in TS 6.8.4. The licensee had

initiated DR N-97-577 to determine the root cause and address

appropriate corrective actions.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for DR N-97-577 and found

that the program procedure was revised to ensure that subsequent changes

would require SNSOC approval.

Past procedure revisions to the program

procedure were reviewed by the inspectors and no changes had been made

without SNSOC approval.

Other plant programs listed in TS 6.8.4 were

also reviewed to determine if a process existed which required SNSOC

approval before changes were made to the programs.

These other programs

had required SNSOC approval and changes to the programs had received

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SNSOC approval.

08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort_.(LER) 50-338/97006:

entered TS 3.0.3 due

to inoperable control rod indicators.

On July 31, 1997, with Unit 1 at

100 percent power. TS 3.0.3 was entered because two Individual Rod

Position Indicators (IRPI) in the same group were ino)erable.

Saecifically, the IRPI for control rod M4 was inoperaale due to testing

w1en the IRPI for control rod M12 failed. This condition was outside

the requirements of TS 3.1.3.2.a.

The IRPI for control rod M4 was

immediately returned to operable status and TS 3.0.3 was exited.

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IRPI for control rod M12 was repaired shortly afterwards.

Because TS 3.0.3 was entered. an LEP,was required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

The licensee initiated DRs N-97-2210 and N-97-2294 to

determine the root cause and address appropriate corrective actions.

The inspectors reviewed operating logs, responses to the DRs. and

discussed the event with several personnel including a licensing

engineer. the system engineer, and the Instrument and Control (I&C)

supervisor.

The inspectors determined that the LER accurately reflected

the event and was timely.

The cause and corrective actions were also

reviewed.

Engineering and the maintenance departments concluded that

the cause of the event was aging of the operational amplifier.

Part of

the corrective actions included immediate replacement of the failed

ampli fier.

The inspectors discussed with the system engineer and the I&C supervisor

if consideration had been given to replacing amplifiers that had reached

a certain service life.

They stated that because the amplifiers had

been very reliable since their original installation and since the IRPI

system was being monitored in accordance with the licensee's Maintenance

Rule program, it was decided to address individual failures as they

occurred.

The engineer and supervisor also stated that if more failures

occurred in the future causing performance criteria to be exceeded,

consideration would be given to more aggressively evaluate amplifier

replacements.

The licensee properly responded to the event and issued an appropriate

LER.

The cause of the event was understood and appropriate corrective

actions were taken.

08.3 (Closed) VIO 50-338. 339/97002-03:

failure to assure that control room

chart recorders were marked.

On March 28, 1997, during a control board

walkdown, the inspectors identified that operators had not correctly

verified proper o)eration of the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps'

Number 1 Seal Leacoffs and the Unit 2 Nuclear Power Range chart

recorders.

The control room operator turnover checklist and logs and

operating records procedures required the operators to verify recorder

operation.

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the violation dated

May 23. 1997.

The response addressed the reason for the violation and

discussed corrective steps that were taken and the results achieved.

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The root cause of the violation was improper emphasis on verification of

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proper chart recorder inking. The operators had relied upon redundant

indications.

Corrective actions included:

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initiation of a DR

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adjustment of the recorder pens * upscale travel and subsequent

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recorder pen re-priming

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implementation of a daily general operating procedure to ensure

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control room recorders function properly

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operator coaching to emphasize th'e importance of verifying

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recorder function.

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- Since the violation occurred, the inspectors have on numerous occasions

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checked control room recorders for proper operation. The inspectors

have not identified any instance where recorders-had not been inking as

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required.

The inspectors have also noted daily operator log entries

which documented performance of the recorder operability verification

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procedure.

Proper actions were taken to ensure control room chart

-recorders function as required.

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08.4 (Ocen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-338. 339/96003-05:

review Final Safety

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Analysis Report discrepancies.

The ins)ectors reviewed various

documents concerning actions taken by t1e licensee'to address specific

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discrepancies comprising this-item.

Additional reviews are necessary to

complete inspection activities associated with the individual parts of

this URI and determine their significance.

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II. Maintenance-

M1-

. Conduct of Maintenance

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M1.1 Train B Solid State Protection System Test

a.

Insoection Scooe (61726)

On February 19, the inspectors observed I&C technicians perform portions

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of 1-PT-36.1B, " Train B Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Channel

Functional Test." Revision 23.

The inspection focused on procedure

adherence.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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The inspectors observed implementation of the test in the control room

and at the local test panels.

In the control room the inspectors found

that the controlling technician carefully followed the procedure.

Steps

were initialed when completed and effectively communicated to those

involved with the test.. The technicians at the local test panels also

carefully'followed their procedure. There were two examples during the

test when the procedure steps and associated notes were somewhat

complex.

The technicians stopped the procedure, discussed the steps to

ensure they understood them fully, and then completed the steps without

problems.

Communications were good. The inspectors observed one of the

technicians and the system engineer, who was observing the test to

' address potential problems. effectively assist another technician when

he was out of sequence when repeating back completed steps.

The

technicians also used good self-checking practices.

The inspectors verified that the test equipment was in good condition

and calibrated.

Expected test responses for the test circuits were also

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veri fied.

Switches manipulated during the test were verified to be

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placed in the correct positions.

The switches were also verified to be

placed in their proper positions when the test was completed.

c.

Conclusions

Communications, self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during

the Unit 1 train B solid state protection system test were good.

M1.2 Unit 2 Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Test

a.

Insoection Scooe (61726)

The inspectors observed operators perform 2 PT-213.38. Valve Inservice

Testing Steam Generator PORVs (2-MS-PCV-201A. 2-MS-PCV-201B. and 2-MS-

PCV-201C)," Revision 7.

The purpose of the test was to satisfy TS 4.0.5

and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Sections 3.1 and 7.5

requirements,

b.

Observations and Findinas

On February 24. the inspectors observed performance of 2-PT-213.38 in

the control room, at the PORVs in the main steam valve house and in the

cable vault area.

The test involved isolation of the PORVs from the

main steam header and subsequent manual cycling of the PORVs both

locally and from the control room. Also during the test. Appendix R

switches were operated to ensure that when the switches were placed in

the " FIRE EMER CLOSE" position that operation from the control room was

inhibited.

The test was properly approved on the Plan of the Day and was evaluated

for on-line maintenance risk in accordance with the licensee's

Maintenance Rule program. The test was performed while the Station

Blackout Diesel and a Unit 1 charging pump were out of service. The

licensee's evaluation showed that the maintenance configuration resulted

in a " green" window for up to seven days, which was acceptable.

The inspectors observed that valve operation was smooth and met open and

close timing requirements.

The valves were examined and their condition

was good. All components associated with the test. including the PORVs'

manual isolation and bypass valves, were properly labeled and were

operated without difficulty.

The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the test and found

that procedure execution was good. Operators followed their procedure

in a step-by-step manner and communicated completion of steps

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effectively between the three stations.

There was also appropriate

management oversight.

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c.

Conclusions

The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief

valves was properly performed.

Technical Specifications and other

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technical requirements were satisfied.

M1.3 Unit 1 Charaina Pumo Maintenance

a.

Insoection Scooe (62707)

The inspectors observed various maintenance activities associated with

Unit 1 charging pump 1-CH-P-1A. The inspectors also reviewed the

Maintenance Rule program assessment of the pump.

b.

Observations and Findinas

On February 23, charging pump 1-CH-P-1A was removed from service to

repair a small seal leak and to perform various preventive maintenance

activities. The inspectors observed maintenance activities on numerous

occasions to evaluate enhanced work practices that had been recently

implemented.

Maintenance procedures were carefully followed. A procedure reader was

dedicated for seal repair maintenance. This individual controlled the

evolution and ensured that the work was performed in a step-by-step

manner.

This practice was observed during most aspects of the seal

repair efforts.

The inspectors discussed with the workers improvements to work )ractices

for the charging pumps.

One of the most noteworthy practices tlat had

been incorporated was the location change of the seal repair

maintenance.

Previously. the maintenance was performed in the pump

cubicle area on the floor. The seal repair activities were moved to the

decontamination building in a more controlled and comfortable work

environment.

The workers felt that this change was helpful due to the

delicate nature of seal repairs.

Foreign' Material Exclusion (FME) practices were observed and were found

'to be adequate.

For the most part. FME control efforts were initially

performed, however, the inspectors identified two examples of FME

deficiencies after the work had started. The deficiencies were pointed

out to the workers who took immediate corrective action.

These

deficiencies were also discussed with the job foreman.

1

The work was erformed in a contaminated area, therefore, full anti-

c

contamination clothing was required to be worn by the workers. The

inspectors checked for proper radiological practices on several

occasions and no problems were found.

l

Aspects of the Maintenance Rule program were evaluated to determine if

!

the program properly tracked pump performance. The Plan of the Day was

!

reviewed during the course of the maintenance.

The inspectors found

'

!

l

!

I

11

that the planning department actively considered the risk impacts of

having the pump out of service with other plant equipment unavailable.

Further the unavailability performance criteria was monitored.

When

the maintenance began there were 122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br /> of unavailability logged

against the pump.

The unavailability performance criteria was 438

hours.

The projected increase in unavailability was about 132

additional hours which was below the 438 hour0.00507 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.242063e-4 weeks <br />1.66659e-4 months <br /> limit.

The licensee was

effective in implementing Maintenance Rule program requirements.

The pump was returned to service on March 1.

Initially, the pump seal

leaked about ten drops per minute and later decreased to less than three

drops per minute.

On March 3. the inspectors observed the pump in

operation and no leakage was observed.

The inspectors discussed with an

engineering supervisor what was considered acceptable leakage.

The

supervisor stated that due to the design of the seal that zero leakage

was very difficult to achieve.

Component engineering was in the process

of defining acceptable seal leakage and after discussions with them it

was determined that some small amount of leakage (i.e. , one to two drops

per minute) may become acceptable.

c.

Conclusions

Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.

Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were

noted.

The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump

performance criteria.

4

III. Enaineerin_g

El

Conduct of Engineering

El.1

Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storaae Installation (ISFSI) Construction (60853)

On March 3. the inspectors toured the ISFSI pad area and observed the

following:

Perimeter fencing was complete along the south, east and west

.

areas.

The north perimeter fence was scheduled for completion in

'

April 1998.

The inner security fence was complete and security isolation zone

.

equipment was being installed.

The new ISFSI roadway paving began on March 2.

Use of the roadway

was scheduled for the week of March 9, 1998.

Alarm and emergency power panels were installed and were being

.

prepared for wiring installation.

,

(

.

.

1

12

Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection

period: the ISFSI construction schedule was four weeks behind the

'

original schedule.

The ISFSI activities observed by the inspectors were

adequately performed.

E2

Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Manaaement of Enaineerina Workload

a.

Insoection Scone (37550)

The inspectors evaluated the quality of engineering involvement in site

activities through evaluation of the management of the total engineering

work load.

The inspectors evaluated the responsiveness to request for

engineering assistance and timeliness of engineering work on safety

'

significant issues.

The following specific inspection activities were conducted:

i

Reviewed the summary of 1996 and older active (open) Request for

'

.

Engineering Assistance (REA)

Reviewed the summary of active REAs having an assigned priority of

1 to 100 and 427 to 477 (the lowest 50)

Reviewed the summary of all active REAs assigned to electrical

.

system engineers and electrical design engineers

From the three summaries mentioned above, selected a sample of 27

potentially safety significant issues that required engineering

involvement, and requested additional information on the sample

selected to provide a complete picture of the issues and how they

were prioritized.

Reviewed the summary of active (open) Commitment Tracking System

.

(CTS) items that had been extended past the original due date:

the CTS was maintained by Nuclear Licensing, and was generally

reserved for more significant external or internal commitments.

Reviewed and evaluated the summary of currently late DRs assigned

.

to engineering.

The program called for closure of DRs within 30

days of initiation.

I

Reviewed and evaluated various statistical and trend data on the

.

number of REAs. CTS items. DRs. drawing update items, vendor

manual update items, etc.

Reviewed recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to

improve management of the engineering work load.

l

L

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. - _ _ _ .

13

As an example of the licensee's performance in the area of

special programs the inspectors evaluated the Motor Operated

Valve (MOV) program from the scheduling and timeliness viewpoints.

An NRC report covering inspection of the MOV program was reviewed

to determine the quality of that program.

The basic requirement applicable to the scope of inspection was

10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Quality Assurance Criteria: especially Criterion

XVI. Corrective Action.

b.

Observations and Findings

Recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to improve

management of the engineering workload included the following:

Creation of a consolidated data base for tracking individual work

.

items using more sophisticated computer software than previously

used for the multiple departmental data bases.

Previously there

were 45 separate data bases.

The new software had the capability

to generate reports sorted by many input fields.

Arrangement of all REAs and design changes in order of priority.

.

The priorities were established by the four system engineering

supervisors.

A management review team provided oversight of the

process.

Previously, the REAs and design changes were approved

(or rejected) by the management review team and assigned one of

three priority codes.

'

Establishment of goals for the reduction of the engineering work

backlog.

The inspectors found that the number of CTS items granted time limit

extensions by management was small

and there was no particular safety

significance associated with the extensions.

All due date extensions

were approved by management.

While the CTS data base had been intended

for more significant items, it also contained minor items due to the

lack of confidence in the de)artmental data bases as an effective

tracking tool.

To rectify t1is situation. an " internal items" data base

was created, which was a subpart of the consolidated data base mentioned

above.

It contained about 300 items.

The inspectors observed that 1593 DRs initiated in 1997 were assigned to

engineering.

This exceeded the number closed by engineering in that

same time period by 109.

The inspectors also observed that the number

of late DRs was small, and most of these were only a few days late.

Evaluation of the 27 active REAs selected for further review led to the

conclusion that engineering was timely with regard to resolving

regulatory issues.

A similar finding was made with regard to the motor

operated valve program.

. _____

.

.

14-

The number of open REAs and Design' Change Packages (DCPs) dated 1996 and

older is summarized as follows:

Year

REAS

QCPg

A

P

1985.

0

1

1989

0

1

1991

0-

5

1992

0

4

1993

2-

6

1994

18

21

1995

32

38

.1996

145

49

The inspectors was not aware of any self-assessments in the same area as

this inspection, although as stated above. the subject had received

special management attention.

c.

Cpnclusions

A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was

timely in' resolving safety significant issues.

E8

Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903, 92700)

E8.1

(Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50-338. 339/97004-04:

review of

additional- controls on molded-case circuit breaker set points. The

licensee revised the applicable electrical maintenance 3rocedure to

2

include instructions on establishing the set ]oint of tie magnetic

element.

The inspectors confirmed that the clange was made by review of

. procedure 0-EPM-0304-01. " Testing / Replacing 480-Volt Breaker

Assemblies." Revision 23. Steps 4.7, 6.1.4 and 6.2.4.

The inspectors

. agreed that the procedure would provide an acceptable level of set point

control.

IV. Plant Support-

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1.1 Radiolooical Survey Maos and Hiah Radiation Area Postinos Walkdown

a.

Insoection Scooe (71750)

The inspectors walked down various areas in the Radiation Control Area

(RCA) with an HP technician to ensure that posted survey maps were

accurate and that all high radiation areas were properly posted and

locked if required.

b.

Observations and Findinos

On March 4'. the inspectors reviewed survey maps posted outside the main

entrance to the RCA and found that each general area in the RCA had

!

.

.

15

updated maps with recent survey data.

The inspectors selected several

areas to verify that the maps reflected actual plant conditions and no

problems were found.

While reviewing the survey maps, the inspectors

noted the posting of additional color coded radiological maps for each

elevation of the auxiliary building.

The combination of the survey maps

and the color coded maps was an effective means to inform workers of

radiation dose rates prior to entering the RCA.

During the walkdown the inspectors ensured that all areas designated as

high radiation areas were ]roperly posted.

In addition, radiation level

surveys were taken at the )oundary of selected high radiation areas to

ensure the areas were roped off properly.

No problems were found. All

locked high radiation doors were locked and posted as required.

The

i

ins)ectors also checked for proper control of access keys to the locked

hig1 radiation areas. The keys were controlled by the HP supervisor.

An inventory of the keys for the very high radiation areas was performed

and all keys were in place.

1

There were several other practices noted during the walkdown which

informed workers of radiological conditions. The inspectors noted the

presence of multiple low dose waiting areas.

These areas were marked

with a sign and a flashing green light.

Surveys of the areas were taken

to ensure the radiation levels were low.

The readings were less than

one millirem per hour.

Also noted were radiation area " flip" signs.

The color coded signs were olaced throughout the RCA to inform workers

of radiation levels. The H) office also had a remote monitoring system

which monitored multiple area dose rates.throughout the RCA. This

.

system was used. in part, to detect sudden changes in higher risk areas

'

such that appropriate actions could be taken.

c.

Conclusions

l

Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were

l

accurate and were posted properly.

Posting and control of high

radiation areas was appropriate.

There were several other effective

practices used to inform workers of radiological condition;

\\

j

S2

Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications

a.

Insoection Scoce (81700)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication

equi) ment to ensure that applicable criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9

of tle Physical Security P1an (PSP), appropriate Security Contingency

Plan Implementing Procedures (SCPIPs) and Security Plan Implementing

Procedures (SPIPs) were being implemented.

i

i

.

.

16

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors verified that annunciation of protected and vital area

alarms occurred audibly and visually in tb alarm stations. The

licensee equipped both stations with communication equipment and limited

' Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) assessment capabilities.

Alarms were

tamper-indicating and self-checking, and were provided with an

uninterruptable power supply.

These stations were continually manned by

capable and knowledgeable security operators.

The stations were

independent yet redundant in o)eration.

The interior of the alarm

station was not visible from tie protected area.

No single act could

remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding

to an alarm.

Alarm station walls, doors, floors, ceiling and windows

were bullet-resistant.

The inspectors evaluated the provision operation, and maintenance of

internal and external security communication links, and determined that

they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function.

Each

security force member could communicate with an individual in each of

the ' continuously manned alarm stations, who could call for assistance

from other security force personnel and local law enforcement agencies.

Each alarm station had the capability for continuous two-way voice

communication with the sheriff's department through radio or separate

commercial telephone service.

The licensee had compensatory measures

for defective or inoperable communication equipment.

c.

Conclusions

The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in

l

compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical

>

Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing

Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures.

S2.9 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installations

,

a.

Insoection Scooe (81001)

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the proposed protection for the

ISFSI as addressed in Chapter 8 of the PSP.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The licensee had ir!dicated in Chapter 8 of the PSP the following

protection functions for the ISFSI: three perimeter barriers intrusion

detection system of the protected area barrier, assessment capabilities

l

of annunciated alarms of the isolation zones'. single vehicle access

!

portal. vehicle barrier system. Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS). and a

testing and maintenance program for the 3rotection equipment. A

memorandum of understanding concerning t1e response commitments of the

I

.

17

licensee and the sheriff's department had not been executed at the time

of this inspection.

The inspectors visited the ISFSI construction site

to evaluate installation progress of the security protection equipment.

At the time of the visit a perimeter barrier was partially in

) lace,

the UPS foundation was constructed, and electrical cabling was )eing

installed around the site.

Chapter 8 would remain in the PSP while the ISFSI was being constructed.

Once construction was completed and security systems were tested and

operational. Chapter 8 would be celeted from the PSP and established as

a separate ISFSI Security Plan.

c.

Conclusions

Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security

protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

Construction implementation was appropriate.

S3

Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation

S3.2 Security Procedures

a.

Insoection Scoce (81700)

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's SPIPs and SCPIPs to

verify that the procedures were consistent with PSP commitments and

practices.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed five SPIPs and four SCPIPs.

Procedures

implementing plan changes, which the licensee had determined not to

!

decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, were reviewed and

discussed with appropriate licensee management to verify the validity of

the determination. Also, the impact of the imp'.emented changes on the

respective plans and overall program was evaluated.

l

The Security. Contingency, and Safeguards Training and Qualification

l

plans were revised and reviewed in accordance with approved licensee

l

procedures before changes were implemented.

Changes were incorporated.

as appropriate. into the im)lementing procedures. The changes that were

reviewed did not decrease t7e effectiveness of the respective plans.

c.

Conclusions

A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security

Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical

Security Plan commitments and practices.

1

.

.

I

4

18

S4

Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

,

l

S4.1 Security Force Reauisite Knowledge

a.

Inspection Scone (81700)

The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they

possessed adequate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and

responsibilities, including response, use of deadly force, and armed

response tactics.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors interviewed approximately 20 security personnel,

including supervisors, and witnessed approximately 30 others in the

3erformance of their duties. Members of the security force were

(nowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments

and procedures, and armed res)onse tactics.

The inspectors found that

armed response personnel had 3een instructed in the use of deadly force

as required by 10 CFR Part 73.

c.

Conclusions

Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their

assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly

force, and armed response tactics.

S5

Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification

SS.2 Trainino Records

a.

Insoection Scone (81700)

The inspectors interviewed security personnel and reviewed security

personnel training and qualification records to ensure that the criteria

in the Training and Qualification Plan were met.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors interviewed 12 security non-supervisory personnel and two

supervisors about the quality and timeliness of training provided.

Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their

responsibilities, plan commitments and procedures. Twelve randomly

selected training records were reviewed by the inspectors concerning

training. firearms, testing job / task performance and requalification.

Members of the security organization were requalified at least every 12

l

months in the performance of their assigned tasks. both normal and

contingency.

This included the conduct of physical exercise

requirements and the completion of the firearms course.

Through the

records review and interviews with security force personnel, the

I

inspectors found that the requirements of 10 CFR 73. Appendix B.

-

.

19

Section 1.F. concerning suitability. physical and mental qualification

data-. test results and other proficiency requirements were met.

The interviews and training records reviewed revealed an excellent

training program due to the thoroughness of the records and dedication

-

of the training personnel.

c.

Conclusions

The security force was being trained in an excellent manner an in

accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory

requirements.

S6

Security Organization and Administration

S6.3. Staffino Levels

a.

Insoection Scooe (81700)

-The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security

officers and armed personnel immediately available at the facility to

fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the PSP. The-

inspectors also verified that one full-time member of the security

organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not-

' have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities.

l

during an incident.

b.

Qbservations and Findinos

L

The licensee has an onsite physical protection system and security

l

organization.

Their objective was to provide assurance against an

L

unreasonable risk to public health and safety. . The security

!

organization and physical

3rotection system were designed to protect

'

against the design basis tareat of radiological sabotage as stated in

10 CFR 73.1(a). At least one full-time manager of the security

organization was always onsite and had no duties that conflicted with

the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This

individual had the authority to direct the physical protection

activities of the organization. The inspectors reviewed four shift

rosters and interviewed security force personnel on two shifts. This

verified that the licensee had the number of trained security officers

and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response

. requirements and commitments of the PSP.

f

'

c.

Conclusions

,

. The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel

-

immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical

Security Plan requirements.

One full-time member of the security

organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not

have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities

during an incident.

.

. .

(

20

S7

~ Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities

- 57.3 Problem Analysis

a.

Insoection Scoce (81700)

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated a sample of documented problem

analyses conducted by the licensee since the last inspection.

b.

Observations and Findinas

Five DRs were reviewed to verify that' the problems'were appropriately

assigned for review, appropriately analyzed. reached logical

conclusions, and prioritized for corrective action. The five DRs

reviewed were found to be adequate in the problem analysis process. The

inspectors discussed with .the licensee enhancements that would improve

the problem analysis of the DR process.

c.

Conclusions

The documented problem. analyses for five security-related deviation

reports were adequate.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1-

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee

management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on March 12, 1998, The

licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The. inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during

the inspection should.be considered proprietary.

No proprietary

information was identified.

,

.

4

-

,

1

e

1

.

.

21

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

B. Foster. Superintendent Station Engineering

.

C. Funderburk. Superintendent. Outage Planning

E. Grecheck. Manager. Station Operations and Maintenance

j

J. Hayes. . Director, Nuclear Oversight

D. Heacock. Manager. Station Safety and Licensing

M. Kansler Vice President. Nuclear Operations-

P. Kemp. Supervisor. Licensing

L. Lane. Superintendent. Operations

T. Maddy. Superintendent. Security

W. Matthews. Site Vice President

H. Royal. Superintendent. Nuclear Training

D. Schappell

Superintendent. Site Services

R. Shears. Superintendent. Maintenance

A. Stafford. Superintendent. Radiological Protection

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

)

'

IP 37550:

Engineering

IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

IP 40500:

Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and

Preventing Problems

IP 60853:

hsite Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI

IP 60705:

F aparation For Refueling

IP 61726:

Surveillance Observations

IP 62707:

Maintenance Observations

IP 71707:

Plant Operations

IP 71750:

Plant Support Activities

IP 81001:

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (s)

IP 81700:

Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

i

IP 92700:

Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power

Reactor Facilities

IP 92901:

Followup - Plant Operations

IP 92903:

Followup - Engineering

ITEMS CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

50-338. 339/97002-01

URI

review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6 requirement

for SNSOC review of programs (Section 08.1)

i

50-338/97006

LER

entered TS 3.0.3 due to inoperable control rod

indicators (Section 08.2)

50-338. 339/97002-03

VIO

failure to assure that control room chart

i

recorders were marked (Section 08.3)

J

.

.

2

2

50-338, 339/97004-04

1F1

review of additional controls on molded-case

circuit breaker set points (Section E8.1)-

Discussed

50-338, 339/96003-05

URI

review Final Safety Analysis Report

discrepancies (Section 08.4)

/

A

l

f

I-

/