05000275/FIN-2012002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | ||
| Inspector = L Micewski, L Willoughby, M Peck, N Makris, N O | | Inspector = L Micewski, L Willoughby, M Peck, N Makris, N O'Keefe | ||
| CCA = P.2 | | CCA = P.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.2 | | INPO aspect = PI.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after operations personnel declared diesel generator 2-3 operable after failing to meet all surveillance test acceptance criterion. On December 22, 2011, diesel generator 2-3 did not meet frequency acceptance criteria during technical specification surveillance testing. Plant operators declared the diesel operable after applying an engineering evaluation. The inspectors identified that the evaluation was not appropriate to the conditions of the failed test. The licensees corrective actions included corrective maintenance, re-performance of the surveillance test, and entering the condition into the corrective action program as Notifications 50449027 and 50449504. The failure of operations personnel to recognize that diesel generator surveillance results indicated that the system was not fully operable was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because the licensees engineering evaluation created a reasonable doubt that the system was operable, similar to Example 3.k in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than the technical specification outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. The most significant contributor to this performance deficiency was that operators did not review and understand the diesel generator surveillance results sufficiently to recognize that the condition did not match the previously-evaluated condition that was used to conclude the diesel generator remained operable. Therefore, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after operations personnel declared diesel generator 2-3 operable after failing to meet all surveillance test acceptance criterion. On December 22, 2011, diesel generator 2-3 did not meet frequency acceptance criteria during technical specification surveillance testing. Plant operators declared the diesel operable after applying an engineering evaluation. The inspectors identified that the evaluation was not appropriate to the conditions of the failed test. The licensees corrective actions included corrective maintenance, re-performance of the surveillance test, and entering the condition into the corrective action program as Notifications 50449027 and 50449504. The failure of operations personnel to recognize that diesel generator surveillance results indicated that the system was not fully operable was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because the licensees engineering evaluation created a reasonable doubt that the system was operable, similar to Example 3.k in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than the technical specification outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. The most significant contributor to this performance deficiency was that operators did not review and understand the diesel generator surveillance results sufficiently to recognize that the condition did not match the previously-evaluated condition that was used to conclude the diesel generator remained operable. Therefore, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component. | ||
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Latest revision as of 23:18, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2012002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Micewski L Willoughby M Peck N Makris N O'Keefe |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |