05000482/FIN-2011009-02: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93812 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93812 | ||
| Inspector = N O | | Inspector = N O'Keefe | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, with two examples, because the licensee failed to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that the emergency diesel generators would perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed. In the first example, the licensee failed to change the loading requirements in Surveillance Test Procedure STS KJ-005A, Manual/Auto Start, Sync & Loading Of EDG (emergency diesel generator) NE01, when the design basis accident loading of the emergency diesel generators was increased. In the second example, the licensee failed to perform testing required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Standard 387 to recertify the system following replacement of the mechanical governor. The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the significance determination process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification issue that was confirmed not to represent an actual loss of safety function of the emergency diesel generator, since the unit was still able to operate properly in the isochronous mode. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee decided not to perform all required certification testing per Regulatory Guide 1.9 Revision 3 prior to declaring Emergency Diesel Generator A operable following replacement of the mechanical governor | | description = The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, with two examples, because the licensee failed to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that the emergency diesel generators would perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed. In the first example, the licensee failed to change the loading requirements in Surveillance Test Procedure STS KJ-005A, Manual/Auto Start, Sync & Loading Of EDG (emergency diesel generator) NE01, when the design basis accident loading of the emergency diesel generators was increased. In the second example, the licensee failed to perform testing required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Standard 387 to recertify the system following replacement of the mechanical governor. The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the significance determination process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification issue that was confirmed not to represent an actual loss of safety function of the emergency diesel generator, since the unit was still able to operate properly in the isochronous mode. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee decided not to perform all required certification testing per Regulatory Guide 1.9 Revision 3 prior to declaring Emergency Diesel Generator A operable following replacement of the mechanical governor | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:17, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2011009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N O'Keefe |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |