ML032340718

December 2002 Exam 50-259/2002-301 Final Simulator Scenarios & Outlines

ML032340718
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/16/2003
From:	Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
To:	Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority
Shared Package
ML032380265	List: IR 05000259/2002301 ML030210502 ML030210538 ML032340716 ML032340718 ML032340719 ML032340720 ML032340722 ML032340723 ML032340725 ML032340728
References
50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301 50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301
Download: ML032340718 (32)

See also: IR 05000259/2002301

Text

Final Submittal

BROWNS FERRY

EXAM 2002-301

50-259, 50-260, & 50-296

DECEMBER 13,16-19,2002

1.

As Given Simulator Scenario Operator Actions ES-

D-2

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE

02NRC-3

Scenario Obiective

Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization contingency procedure based on are2

radiation.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions:

100% RTP

D diesel generator tagged

Events:

Alternate stator cooling water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure

APRM failure

Slow loss of HP feedwater heating on B string

Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation

Inadvertent RCIC start

RCIC steam leak

Scenario Seauence

The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps

APRM 2 fails high

A slow (hut slowly increasing) leak develops in B2 high pressure heater requiring isolation

The reactor water cleanup system spuriously isolates

RCIC gets an inadvertent initiation signal and is secured

RCIC develops an unisolable steam leak requiring emergency depressurization on high area radiation

Event one - Alternate stator cooline water pumps

The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps.

Malfunctions required

None

Objective:

Evaluate the DUO in use of normal operating procedures.

Success Path:

Start 2B stator cooling water pump and stop 2A stator cooling water pump

Event two - Failure of APRM 2

The BUO determines APRM 2 has failed and bypasses the APRM.

Malfunctions Required

1

Objective:

Evaluate the BUO on use of the Alarm Response Procedures in responding to the failed APRM. Evaluate

the SRO on use of Technical Specifications.

Success Path

The BUO manually bypasses APRM 2 and the SRO determines only three APRMs required.

Event three - Slowlv increasine leak on B2 high Dresswe heater

The crew will respond to a rising high pressure heater level in accordance with the ARPs and AOI-6-1A.

Malfunctions Required

1

Objective:

Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a rising high pressure heater

level.

Success Path:

Determine which heater has the leak

Dispatch personnel to investigate

Reduce reactor power to <91% when steam valves isolate

Reduce power to <79% when the feedwater isolation valves are closed

Notify reactor engineer

Event four: S

p

p

The crew responds to an isolation of the RWCU.

Malfunctions Required:

1

Objective:

Evaluate the BUO and DUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the

reactor water cleanup system.

Success Path:

Ensure auto actions (isolations) have occurred

Check area temperatures and radiation

Notify chemistry and reactor engineering

Return system to service following determination of cause

Event 5 -

The crew responds to an inadvertent RCIC initiation.

Malfunctions Required:

1

Objective:

Evaluate the DUO and SRO in-response toan abnormal occurrence.

Success Path:

Recognize RCIC initiation

Secure RCIC

Initiate and investigation

Event 6 - RCIC steam leak

The crew will respond to an unisolable RCIC system leak and emergency depressurize due to high area

radiation in secondary containment.

Malfunctions Required: 1 ( 2 if HPCI is initiated)

Objective:

Evaluate the crew on their response to a major event - an unisolable leak in the reactor building which leads

to emergency depressurizing due to two area radiations above max safe.

Success Path

Recognize all three reactor feedpumps tripped

Initiate manual scram

Enter EOI-1

Recognize HPCI fails to control in automatic and take manual control

Return to RCIC for level control after HPCI logic power loss

Dispatch personnel to isolate RCIC when leak occurs

Enter EOI-3

Maintain RPV level with C RFP after RCIC loss

Emergency depressurize per C2 when 2 area radiations above max safe

Enter EOI-2

Initiate suppression pool cooling

Scenario Recaoitulation

Total Malfunctions

6

Abnormal Events 5

Major Transients 2

EOIs Entered

3

EO1 Contingencies

1 (C2)

Appendix D

Scenario Outline Final Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)

~~~~~~~~~

~

~

Event No.

'acility: Brown Fern, Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

ixaminers:

Operators:

Op-Test No.: -

Malf. No. Event Type*

Event

Description

nitial Conditions: 100% RTP, D diesel generator tagged for mainrenance

~ - --,

C(DU0)

H eater tube rupture

(SRO)

sw05

CWJO)

Spurious isolation of the reactor water cleanup system

TO2

C(DU0)

Inadvertent RCIC start

batch

C(BU0)

Trip of all RFPs

hP07

C(DU0)

HPCI Flow controller failure

IC09

M(ALL)

RCIC leak into secondary containment requiring emergency depressurization

'urnover: Alternate stator cooling water pumps per OI-35A. Section 6.3., 2B Reactor Feedwater pump oscillating

nd is in Auto to collect data. Storms passing through the area.

one

!N(DUO) b UO alternates stator cooling water pumps.

I

I

I

Inn116

/(BUO)

Failure of APRM 2

Slowly increasing leak in B2 high pressure heater string (recirc and drive

Ifw05b

P,,,,)

lrods,

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

~~~~

....

~~

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 1

Page 1

of -1-

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, SI)

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 2

Page 1

of -1-

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Time

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

!B

nnounces BYPASS VALVES TO CONDENSER NOT CLOSED alarm

er 2-ARP-9-6A, Window 9

SRO

Directs entry into 2-AOI-6-1A

B

Adjusts flow and power as directed by the SRO

Verifies valve positions per Attachment 1 and monitors thrust bearing temperature

educes reactor power with upper runback

tD

befers to 2-01-6 for turbine load restrictions

IDetermines load restricted to 920 MWe

I

I

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

p-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 3 Page 1

of 2

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, Sl)

Op-Test No.:

~

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 4

Page 1

of 2

Event Description: Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation

D

SRO

Enters AOI-64-2A

D

D

D

D

Notifies chemistry that RWCU system is out of service

Checks area temperatures

Checks area radiation monitors for rise

Requests reactor engineering to make heat balance check

Notifies chemistry that RWCU is out of service

>KU

irects RWCU returned to service per 2-01-69 when cause determined

II

I

I

ispatch AUO to RWCU control Panel for return to service

I

I/

ID

peturn RWCU per 2-01-69

I

SRO

Reset PCIS

Notify chemistry of return to service

Evaluate Tech Specs (TRM TSR 3.4.1) chemistry sampling is required if

not returned to service

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

D

D

Op-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 4

Page 2

of 2

vent Description: Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation

ens 2-FCV-69-8

Closes 2-FCV-69-8

Notifies SRO that RWCU has been returned to service

I

I

irects the AUO to place the demins in service as 2-FCV-69-8 is closed

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.:

5

Page

of 1

Op-Test No.: -

Event Description: Inadvertent RCIC start.

Time

etermines T.S. 3.5.3 - 14 Day LCO for RCIC h o p

Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

D

Announces RCIC inadvertent start

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, SI)

p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: 6

Page 1

of -3-

I

~~

SRO

SRO

SRO

Enters EOI-1 on low reactor water level

Directs level controlled by HPCI and CRD Per Appendices SD and SB

Enters AOI-100-1

D

D

Uses HPCI for reactor water level control per Appendix SD

Recognizes HPCI fails to control in AUTO

Transfers HPCI to manual control

D

B

Controls RPV level with HPCI in manual

Raises CRD flow per Appendix 5B

D

[After water level is controlled at -50 with HPCI) Recognizes HPCI logic

power failure

Op-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: 02NRC-3

Event No.: A

Page 2

of _1_

Event Description: RCIC Steam Leak

~

Time

1

(SRO

irects RCIC placed in service

places RCIC in service

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

D

Verifies RCIC low controller in auto/600 gpm

D

Resets and opens 2-FCV-71-9

SRO

B

SRO

B

Directs C Reactor Feedpump for level control per Appendix 5A

Controls RPV level with C reactor feedpump per Appendix 5.4

Directs Appendix 8G or restoration of drywell air

Performs Appendix 8G

(Continued)

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Time

Position

SRO

SRO

SRO

SRO

Applicants Actions or Behavior

Determines 2 area radiations above max safe

Directs emergency depressurization per C2

Determines suppression pool level >5.5 feet

Directs BUO to open 6 ADS valves

D

Opens 6 ADS valves

D

D

B

Determines ADS valves 1-19 and 1-34 failed to open

Opens 2 additional ADS valves

Verifies reactor feedpump discharge valves closed

SRO

D

SRO

B

Directs all available suppression pool coolinc per Appendix 17A

Initiates suppression pool cooling per Appendix 17A

Directs H202 Analyzers placed in service

Places H202 Analyzers in service

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE

02NRC-4

Scenario Obiective

Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization (C2) and alternate level control (CI) EO1

contingency procedures.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions: 79% RTP, 2C RHR pump tagged, 2-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI Flow Ratc Test, in progrcss.

Events:

Place Suppression Pool cooling in service

Power asccnsion

HPCI steamline breaks during flow rate SR and fails to auto isolate

CRD pump 2A trip with manual stm of IB CRD pump

SRV-1-04 fails open

Recirculation pump vibration, seal lcakage and scram

MSIV closureLOCA

Scenario Sequence

Place Suppression Pool cooling in service

Continue power ascension at prescribed rate

HPCI steamline breaks during SR requiring manual isolation and EOI-3 entry

SRV-1-04 fails open and closes when DUO responds by cycling the valve

2A Recirc pump develops vibration problems to the point of causing seal failure, requiring pump trip and

isolation but the suction valve will not close

drywell pressure begins increasing

Power oscillations develop requiring a manual scram due to failure of OPRM channels

Thc MSIVs fail closcd due to a fuse failure in the Group I isolation circuit

The RPV water level drop to below -100" requiring implementation of CI, alternate level control

When water level reaches TAF (-162") thc crew emergency depressurizes and reestablishes normal water

level with low pressure systems

Event one - LOOD I1 RHR in Suooression Pool cooling

The DUO will place Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling per 2-01-74,

Malfunctions required: None

Objective:

Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.

Success Path:

2B and 2D RHR pumps in Suppression Pool cooling

Event two - Power ascension

The crew will raise reactor power at the prescribed rate using recirc flow.

Malfunctions required

None

Objective:

Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions,

Success Path

Use peer checker

Raise reactor power at the desired rate

Event three - HPCI steamline break

The crew will respond to a HPCI steamline leak, and failure to auto isolate, in accordance with the

Abnormal Operating Instructions and will briefly enter EOI-3.

Malfunctions Required 2

Objective:

Evaluate the crew in use of Abnormal Operating Instructions during a HPCI steamline break and failure to

auto isolate. Evaluate the SRO who will briefly enter EOI-3 and make a technical specification

determination.

Success Path:

Recognize HPCI steamline break - alarms, area temps, area radiation

Recognize failure of HPCI to auto isolate and manually isolate

Close FCV-1-55 and FCV-1-56

Determine unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO (TS 3.5.1.D-HPCI and C RHR imp)

Determine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to tag a HPCI steamline isolation valve closed (TS 3.6.1.3)

Event 4 - CRD Dump 2A trie

The crew will respond to a trip of 2A CRD pump in accordance with 2401-85-3.

Malfunctions required. 1

Objective:

Evaluate crew response to an abnormal event (CRD pump trip) using the Abnormal Operating Instructions.

Success Path

Recognize pump trip

Place flow controller in manual at zero demand

Start 1B CRD pump and open discharge valve to Unit 2

Use manual potentiometer to set CRD flow between 45 -60 GPM and cooling water @P to 20 PSID

Place flow controller in automatic

Event 5 - SRV-1-04 fails onen

The crew will respond to an SRV failing open using the Abnormal Operating Instructions. The valve will

close when cycled.

Malfunctions required:

1

Objective:

Evaluate the crew on Abnormal Operating Instruction usage while responding to an open SRV.

Success Path:

Recognize SRV open

Cycle the valve

Recognize valve close

Event 6 - Recirc vibration. seal leakaee. Dower oscillations and scram

The crew will experience 2A recirc pump vibration which leads to seal failure, pump trip and power

oscillations requiring a manual scram.

Malfunctions required 4

Objective:

Evaluate the crew response to an abnormal event (recirc pump vibration, leakage, trip) using the abnormal

operating instructions and recognizing power oscillations requiring a scram.

Success Path:

Recognize pump vibration and dispatch personnel

Change pump speed

Recognize seal failure

Trip and isolate recirc pump

Recognize failure of suction valve to isolate and dispatch personnel to investigate

Recognize power oscillations

Manually scram

Event 7 - MSIV closureLOCA

When the crew inserts a manual scram the MSIVs close due a fuse failure leaving them with RCIC, CRD

and SLC for high pressure level control with an increasing recirc pump piping leak. They will ultimately

be required to depressurize due to being unable to maintain RPV level above TAF.

Malfunctions Required:

2

Objective:

Evaluate the crew in recognizing a condition requiring a manual scram (power oscillation) and

implementation of the EOIs including contingencies C1 (alternate level control) and C2 (emergency

depressurization).

Success Path

Recognize MSIV closure

Control pressure 800-1000 psig with alternate means (SRVs, RCIC)

Attempt to maintain RPV level +2 to +S1

Enter EOI- 1 and 2

Initiate suppression pool cooling

Spray the suppression chamber

Initiate a cooldown

Spray the drywell

trip 2B recirc pump

stop drywell blowers

Report CRD pumps tripped

Send personnel to perform Appendix 7B, RPV Makeup from the SLC Test Tank

At RPV level -100 to -122 enter C1

Inhibit ADS

Stop spraying containment

Emergency depressurize when RPV level reaches TAF

Restore RPV level to +2 to +51 with low pressure systems

Scenario Recapitulation

Total Malfunctions:

lo

Abnormal Events:

3

Major Transients: 2

EOIs Entered

3

EO1 Contingencies

2

.-

4

rdOla

C(BU0)

CRD pump 2A trips

5

adOlc

C(DU0)

6

thlla

M(ALL)

Recirc pump vibration, total seal failure.

(SRO)

SRV-1-04 fails open and closes when cycled

thl2a

thlOa

C(BU0)

Failure of Recirc suction valve to close

override

L

rpl 1

th33b

M(ALL)

MSIV closure, main steamline leak in drywell

rdOla

C(BU0)

1B CRD pump trips

rdOlb

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument. (C)omponent, (M)ajorAppendix D

Operator Actions

Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Op-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 1

Event Description: Place Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling

Page 1_

of 1

Time

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

SRO

Directs placing Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling in service

DUO

I

I

hrottle open 2-FCV-23-52 to establish flow (1350-4500 gpm)

Places suppression pool cooling in service per 2-01-74:

Start RHRSW pump B2B1

Throttle open 2-FCV-23-46 to establish flow (1350-4500 gpm)

Open 2-FCV-74-71

Start 2B RHR pump

Throttle open 2-FCV-74-73 to establish flow of 7000-10000 gpm

Start RHRSW pump DuDl

I

I

I

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2

Page 1

of 1

nt Description: Power ascension

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3

Event Description: HPCI steam line break

Page 1

of 2

Time

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

SRO

Directs DUO to continue with 2-SR-3.5.1.7 at Step 7.11

DUO

Starts SGT C per 2-01-65

Starts HPCI Steam Packing Exhauster

&ens 2-FCV-73-36

Throttles open 2-FCV-73-35 (- 7 seconds)

Announce HPCI turbine start over plant PA system

I

I

place Aux Oil pump HS to start

II

Announces Reactor Bldg Hi Rad alarm

Evacuates HPCI area

Opens 2-FCV-73-30

Opens 2-FCV-73-16

DUO

I

phrottles 2-FCV-73-35 & 36 to establish rated flow at - 1150 psig

I

Closes 2-FCV-73-2 & 3

Notifies Rad Con

Monitors lowering HPCI area temperatures and radiation levels

SRO

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (RS, S1)

Determines Unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO (TS 3.5.1.D - HPCI and C RHR imp)

Determines 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to isolate and tag either FCV-73-2 or 3 (TS 3.6.1.3)

ent Description: CRD pump 2A trip

SRO

It

I

I

I

Calls for maintenance/outside US to check 2A CRD pump

I1

I

I

II

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8,

S1)

Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: -5_

Event Description: SRV-1-04 fails open

Page 1

of 1

Time

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

Crew

Recognizes SRV open

SRO

DUO

I

I

II

SRO

verifies in ITS that SRV is still operable as relief valve

alarm

lowering generator output

Directs response IAW AOI-1-1

Determines SRV-1-04 from acoustic monitor

II

I

Places SRV-1-04 from close to open several times

Reports SRV-1-04 closed

Op-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6

Event Description: Recirc vibration, seal leakage, power oscillations'-and scram

Page 1

of 2

.~ ~~.

..

~~~~~

.

~~

~

~

~

~

~

I

Position

BUODUO

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Announces Recirc 2A vibration alarm and consults ARP (9-4A- )

Dispatches AUO to local panel to check vibration

E

Time

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

SRO

BUODUO

Monitors Recirc pump temperatures

Contact Reactor Engineer

Directs BUO to reduce speed of 2A R ecirc pump to reduce vibration

BUO reduces Recirc A speed and DUO serves as peer checker

I

board

SRO

BUODUO

I

(Continued)

Announces Recirc A seal leakage alarm

Identifies seal leakage via instrumentation

Recognizes lowering pressure on R ecirc pump A #1 seal

Directs crew to watch for signs of increased leakage

Recognizes Recirc pump A seal leakoff high alarm and informs SRO

Recognizes lowering pressure on Recirc pump A outboard seal and

SRO

BUODUO

informs SRO

When vibration report received or dual seal failure is reported, directs

A R ecirc pump tripped and isolated

Directs actions IAW AOI-68-1

Trips Recirc pump A and closes the discharge valve

Dispatches AUO to Recirc MG set to control temperatures

Determines Recirc A suction valve will not close and informs SRO

irects AUO to attempt to close R ecirc A suction valve from electrical

Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6

Page 2

of 2

Event Description: Recirc vibration, seal leakage, power oscillations and scram (Continued)

Time

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

BUO

Check power/flow map to verify in region 1

Checks APRMs and LPRMs for indication of power oscillations

Informs SRO of power oscillation indications

Directs inserting emergency shove sheet control rods

SRO

PRMs to scram at s

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

p-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7

Page 1

of 4

ent Description: MSIV closureLOCA

SRO

Directs determining cause of MSIV isolation (Group 1)

Directs Appendix 8G, CAD crosstie to DW control air

Enters EOI-2 and directs:

Appendix 12, venting primary containment

places H202 analyzers in service

II

I

ISuppression pool cooling placed in service, Appendix 17A

I

Appendix 12, venting primary containment

Places H202 analyzers in service

Verifies all available DW cooling in service

Verification of all available DW cooling in service

II

I

k f o r m s Appendix 8G, CAD crosstie to DW control air

I

BUO

I

I

(Continued)

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Op-Test No.: -

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7

Event Description: MSIV closureLOCA (Continued)

Page 2

of 4

I

I

SRO

I

Time I

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

BUODUO

onitors containment parameters

When suppression chamber pressure exceeds 12 psig or SRO

determines drywell temperature cannot be maintained <280F then

directs the following:

DUO

Sprays the suppression chamber IAW Appendix 17C

Ensure Recirc pumps tripped

Stop all drywell blowers

Drywell sprays IAW Appendix 17B

BUO

Trips Recirc pump B

Secures drywell blowers

(Continued)

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (RE, Sf)

Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7

Page 3

of 4

Appendix D

Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)

Time

~

p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7

Position

Applicants Actions or Behavior

SRO

When RPV water level reaches TAF (-162 ) and before -190 enters

C2 and directs the following:

Open 6 ADS valves

Restore RPV level to +2 to +51

Page 4

of A

DUO

When directed by SRO, terminates containment sprays and aligns

RHR for LPCI injection

Opens and verifies open 6 ADS valves (Critical Task)

Core Spray (Appendix )

Condensate (Appendix )

I

I

I

BUODUO

Pstores RPV water level to +2 to +51 using: (Critical Task)

SRO

A

I

I

HR (Appendix )

Classifies event as a Site Area Emergency (1.141)