ML18348A199

LER 1977-063-00 Re Iodine Removal System Hydrazene Tank, LER 1978-001-00 Re Containment Door Interlock Failure & LER 1978-002-00 Re Setpoints of Five Valves Were Outside Band

ML18348A199
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	01/20/1978
From:	Hoffman D, Mcknight E Consumers Power Co
To:	James Keppler NRC/RGN-III
References
LER 1977-063-00, LER 1978-001-00, LER 1978-002-00
Download: ML18348A199 (6)

Text

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• Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

• Area Code 517 788-0550 January 20, 1978 Mr James G Keppler Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region III US Nuclear RegulatorJ. Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - EVENT REPORTS 77-63,78-001 .L\ND 78-002

• Attached are three reportable occurrences for the Palisades Plant.

David F Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC: ft. Sch,vencer, USNRC

• Jl\N 2 3 1978

• ._ )

• Palisades NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C7-n1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORJ CONTROL BLOCK: I .I 1G) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

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[))TI I During testing of 1:1econdary sysYem safety valves, the setpoints of five

[))))I valves were found to be outside the band allowed by TS 3.1.7.c. Event is l))I] I non-repetitive. It is considered unlikely that this condition could have

[)))) permitted overpressurization. of the secondary system. Redundant heat 1

[)))) I removal systems were available and operable. This occurrence had no effect I

[TII] on public health and safety.

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBc;oDE SU~ODE

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OJ)) I The cause of setpoint drift is* not yet known., The valves are Crosby valve 1 and Gage Co, Model HA55, direct actuating and made of carbon steel. Design I rating is 1000 PSIG at 550 degrees. All 24 main steam system safety DJ)) I valves were tested and adjusted as necessary. Future evaluation and

[J]3J I corrective action will be based on data obtained from future testing.

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Attachment to LER 78-002/0lT-O Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket Number 050-255 As required by Technical Specification 4.2, Table 4.2.2 (item 4) setpoint testing of five main steam safety valves was performed. Unacceptable test results required testing of additional valves, and ultimately, all twenty-four main steam safety valves were tested. Five valves had setpoints outside the Technical Specification allowable pressure band of 975 psig - 1035 psig.

Technical Specification 3.1.7.c requires twenty-three main steam safety valves to be operable; 19 valves met the operability requirements of this specification.

The "as found" setpoints of the unacceptable valves were:

RV-0703 1061 psig RV-0719 956 psig RV-0705 1041 psig RV-0720 957 psig RV-0706 1036 psig The consequences of this condition are considered to be minimal for the following reasons:

t_. The out of specification condition of RV-0703 can be ignored, since specification 3.1.7.c permits one valve to be inoperable.

2. Because the setpoints of RV-0719 and 0720 were low, they would have opened early in the event of a high pressure condition, thereby tending to result in an early achievement of required blowdown.

3. The setpoints of RV-0705 and 0706, although high, were close to the required pressure band. The effect of their lifting late in the event of a high pressure condition would delay blowdown, but it is considered that this effect would be off-set by the early lifting of RV-0719 and 0720.

4; On September 24, 1977 an event similar to that discussed in the basis for specification 3.1.7 occurred. A loss of turbine load with a delayed tripping of the reactor took place. (For details, see LER 77-047).

Secondary system pressure was adequately controlled by use of the atmos-pheric steam dumps and no main steam safety valves lifted.

To correct the condition, the valves with out of specification setpoints were reset and retested. Future corrective actions will be based on the results of future testing. As reported to the Commission by letter dated February 11, 1974, previous test failures of the main steam safety valves have occurred. However, the 1974 testing employed nitrogen as the test medium. Since the valves are now tested with steam, the occurrences are not considered to be similar for purposes of trend analysis. There are no other valves of this type in use at the Palisades Plant.

• Palisades NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 11-n1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: I IG) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

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())!]I During an entry into containmen~ through the personnel airlock, the door

~ I interlock failed, allowing both airlock doors to be simultaneously open.

[]JI] This breach of containment with PCS temperattire at 278 degrees violated

!)))) I TS.3.1.6.A. No radioactive release occurred. This event is similar to

(())] I LER 77-39. If this condition occurred with the containment building

(([I) under pressure, a radioactive release could result. This event had no

[))))

1 effect on public health and safety. I 7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE COOE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

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o:::I]J I Simultaneous opening of both airlock doors was permitted by the locking IJJJJ mechanism being out of adjustment. This condition resulted from normal use. The doors are tagged to warn personnel of the condition, the

[II)) I worn components will be repaired or replaced when material availability

[Ifil I and scheduling permit. Airlock manufactured by WJWooley, Co, Model CSM-1.1 7 8 9 80 l'JQI FACILITY STATUS  % POWER /OTHER STATUS \:;;:/

METHOD OF DISCQVERV QISCOVERV QESCRIPTION

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Attachment to LER-78-001 Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 050-255

• On January 7, 1978, during an entry into the containment building through the personnel airlock, the interlock mechanism which normally functions to prevent simultaneous opening of both the inner and outer door failed. Because the inner door had already been opened from inside the containment building, both doors of the airlock were simultaneously opened, thereby causing a breach of containment. The reactor was shutdown and plant cooldown was in progress with primary coolant system temperature at 278 degrees Fahrenheit. This occurrence is a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.6.a, which requires containment integrity to be maintained whenever primary coolant system temperature is greater than 210 degrees. At the time of the occurrence, air was flowing into containment; as a result, no radioactive release through the airlock occurred.

Upon discovery that both doors were open, the outer airlock door was immediately closed. It is estimated that containment integrity was violated for less than one minute. The airlock doors have been marked with signs which caution personnel to verify that the opposite door is closed prior to entering the lock.

To permit understanding the method by which the interlock failed, a brief explan-ation of the operation of the interlock is provided as follows:

When either door is opened, a cable connected to the door moves a pawl into a

• sawtooth gear, which when engaged by the pawl, prevents the second door from being unlocked. The failure on January 7, 1978 was caused by the cable coming out of adjustment (i.e., not moving the pawl sufficiently to insure adequate engagement with the sawtooth gear) and by the pawl becoming worn such that it does not always securely engage the sawtooth gear. The cable will be adjusted and when both material availability and scheduling permit, the cable and pawl will be replaced.

Licensee Event Report 77-039 describes a similar occurrence.

'\ **"" *

• Palisades NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17-771 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: I 1Q (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION!

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[))II 1During functional testing of io'CH'.'ne removal system components, open links

[)))) were found in the circuit which operates one of the outlet valves to T-102 I 1

fil!J 1 (iodine removal system hydrazene tank). This* condition represents a

[II!] I degradation of the LCO of TS 3.19.1.c. Event non-repetitive. Redundancy

(())] provided by CV-0437A, which can pass full flow of hydrazene; therefore, 1

~ 1this event by itself did not result in loss of hydrazene injection capa-IIlil 1bility. Event had no effect on public health and safety. I 7 s 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

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DI[] I It is believed the links were left open through personnel error .. lJpon IIDJ discmrery, the links were closed and the circuit tested. Terminal links OJ)) in the Control Room and safety related switchgear were inspected; no IIIIJ I problems in critic al circuits were found. Existing link/ Jumper controls III!] I will be reviewed. A PM to inspect wiring boards will be established.

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