ML071150333: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:SUSGS science far a changing world Department of the Interior US Geological Survey Box 25046 MS-974 Denver CO, 80225 April 17, 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Alexander Adams NRR/ADRO/DPRPPRT MS 0-12 G-13.Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Adams, This letter is to report a violation of our operating procedure requirement for control of the key to the reactor control console at the US Geological Survey TRIGA reactor facility (license R-1 13, Docket 50-274).On Thurs~day, 2007, the reactor.was operated for 8,hours at full power and shutdown .at 1352 hours. At 1511 ihours, the daily shutdown checklist' was' crmpleted and-around | {{#Wiki_filter:SUSGS science far a changing world Department of the Interior US Geological Survey Box 25046 MS-974 Denver CO, 80225 April 17, 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Alexander Adams NRR/ADRO/DPRPPRT MS 0-12 G-13. | ||
.1630 hours. the facility was secured for the day. Wlhenh.the;operator began a startup checklist the next morning (April 13) around 0740 hours' he found that the lockbox containing the reactor console keys was not securely latched and could be opened by pulling on the door.GSTR Procedure | Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Adams, This letter is to report a violation of our operating procedure requirement for control of the key to the reactor control console at the US Geological Survey TRIGA reactor facility (license R-1 13, Docket 50-274). | ||
#1, paragraph 3(e) states, "After the final shutdown for the day, a shutdown checklist shall be completed and the console. key shall be under the control of a licensed operator or locked in the key box." Contrary to this requirement, the console key was not locked in the key box during the night of April 12-13, 2007.This violation was caused by failure of the operator to ensure that the lock box cover was latched after reactor operations were completed on April 12, 2007.. Operatorshad been previously instructed to ensure that the lock box was latched securely by pulling on the cover after it was shut.Recurrence of this event will be prevented by two actions: (1) all operators will be instructed on proper use of the lock box that contains, the console keys,. and (2) for a period of at: least: three months, locking of the box will be verified by'a sec .6od person at the end of, reactor operations on each | On Thurs~day, April*..12,ý 2007, the reactor.was operated for 8,hours at full power and shutdown .at 1352 hours. At 1511 ihours, the daily shutdown checklist'was' crmpleted and-around .1630 hours. the facility was secured for the day. Wlhenh.the;operator began a startup checklist the next morning (April 13) around 0740 hours' he found that the lockbox containing the reactor console keys was not securely latched and could be opened by pulling on the door. | ||
This erification will be recorded on a checklist kept in the control room. At the end of the three mbnth | GSTR Procedure #1, paragraph 3(e) states, "After the final shutdown for the day, a shutdown checklist shall be completed and the console. key shall be under the control of a licensed operator or locked in the key box." Contrary to this requirement, the console key was not locked in the key box during the night of April 12-13, 2007. | ||
/~period, the Reactor Supervisor will evaluate whether this verification check should be continued or not.In addition, the staff will investigate the possible use of a different type of key lock box that would be less subject to errors of the type made in this event.Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this issue.Sincerely, Tim DeBey USGS Reactor Supervisor}} | This violation was caused by failure of the operator to ensure that the lock box cover was latched after reactor operations were completed on April 12, 2007.. Operatorshad been previously instructed to ensure that the lock box was latched securely by pulling on the cover after it was shut. | ||
Recurrence of this event will be prevented by two actions: (1) all operators will be instructed on proper use of the lock box that contains, the console keys,. and (2) for a period of at: least: three months, locking of the box will be verified by'a sec .6od person at the end of,reactor operations on each the reacor is operated. This erification | |||
:daythat will be recorded on a checklist kept in the control room. At the end of the three mbnth | |||
/~ | |||
period, the Reactor Supervisor will evaluate whether this verification check should be continued or not. | |||
In addition, the staff will investigate the possible use of a different type of key lock box that would be less subject to errors of the type made in this event. | |||
Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this issue. | |||
Sincerely, Tim DeBey USGS Reactor Supervisor}} |
Latest revision as of 08:06, 23 November 2019
ML071150333 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | U.S. Geological Survey |
Issue date: | 04/17/2007 |
From: | Timothy Debey US Dept of Interior, Geological Survey (USGS) |
To: | Alexander Adams NRC/NRR/ADRA/DPR |
References | |
Download: ML071150333 (2) | |
Text
SUSGS science far a changing world Department of the Interior US Geological Survey Box 25046 MS-974 Denver CO, 80225 April 17, 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Alexander Adams NRR/ADRO/DPRPPRT MS 0-12 G-13.
Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Adams, This letter is to report a violation of our operating procedure requirement for control of the key to the reactor control console at the US Geological Survey TRIGA reactor facility (license R-1 13, Docket 50-274).
On Thurs~day, April*..12,ý 2007, the reactor.was operated for 8,hours at full power and shutdown .at 1352 hours0.0156 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.14436e-4 months <br />. At 1511 ihours, the daily shutdown checklist'was' crmpleted and-around .1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />. the facility was secured for the day. Wlhenh.the;operator began a startup checklist the next morning (April 13) around 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />' he found that the lockbox containing the reactor console keys was not securely latched and could be opened by pulling on the door.
GSTR Procedure #1, paragraph 3(e) states, "After the final shutdown for the day, a shutdown checklist shall be completed and the console. key shall be under the control of a licensed operator or locked in the key box." Contrary to this requirement, the console key was not locked in the key box during the night of April 12-13, 2007.
This violation was caused by failure of the operator to ensure that the lock box cover was latched after reactor operations were completed on April 12, 2007.. Operatorshad been previously instructed to ensure that the lock box was latched securely by pulling on the cover after it was shut.
Recurrence of this event will be prevented by two actions: (1) all operators will be instructed on proper use of the lock box that contains, the console keys,. and (2) for a period of at: least: three months, locking of the box will be verified by'a sec .6od person at the end of,reactor operations on each the reacor is operated. This erification
- daythat will be recorded on a checklist kept in the control room. At the end of the three mbnth
/~
period, the Reactor Supervisor will evaluate whether this verification check should be continued or not.
In addition, the staff will investigate the possible use of a different type of key lock box that would be less subject to errors of the type made in this event.
Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this issue.
Sincerely, Tim DeBey USGS Reactor Supervisor