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| | document type = OPERATING LICENSES-APPLIATION TO AMEND-RENEW EXISTING, TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS | | | document type = OPERATING LICENSES-APPLIATION TO AMEND-RENEW EXISTING, TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:P R.IC)R.I"EV 1 ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING) | | {{#Wiki_filter:R.IC) R.I"EV PACCELERATED 1 RIDS PROCESSING) |
| REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE: 95/03/31 NOTARIZED: | | REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| YES DOCKET g FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 50-316 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316, AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E. | | ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE: 95/03/31 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET g FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316, AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) |
| Indiana Michigan Power Co.(formerly Indiana&Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| Application for amends to licenses DPR-58&DPR-74.Amends would modify TS 3.9.4 to provide flexibility in operation of containment personnel. | | Application for amends to licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends would modify TS 3.9.4 to provide flexibility in operation of containment personnel. airlocks during core alterations. |
| airlocks during core alterations. | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOOID TITLE: OR COPIES RECEIVED:.LTR Submittal: General Distribution t ENCL J SIZE: |
| DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOOID COPIES RECEIVED:.LTR t ENCL J SIZE: TITLE: OR Submittal: | | NOTES: |
| General Distribution NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA HICKMAN,J INTERNAL: LE CENTE 01 NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2'XTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD NMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
| | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 HICKMAN,J 1 1 INTERNAL: LE CENTE 01 1 1 NMSS/DWM/LLDP 2 2 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 0 NOAC 'XTERNAL: |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT.504-2083)TO ELI!vIINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS'YOU DON'T NEED!TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 13 ENCL 12 R | | NRC PDR 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| Indiana Michigan Power Company'P.O.Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 FI March 31, 1995 AEP:NRC'1220 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen: | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELI!vIINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTIONLISTS FOR DOCUMENTS'YOU DON'T NEED! |
| Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.9.4 FOR CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCK REQUIREMENTS This letter and its attachments constitute an application for, amendment to the technical specifications (T/Ss)for Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.Specifically, we are proposing to modify T/Ss 3.9.4 entitled Refueling Operations,. | | TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 13 ENCL 12 |
| | |
| | R Indiana Michigan Power Company |
| | 'P.O. Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 FI March 31, 1995 AEP:NRC'1220 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen: |
| | Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.9.4 FOR CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCK REQUIREMENTS This letter and its attachments constitute an application for, amendment to the technical specifications (T/Ss) for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Specifically, we are proposing to modify T/Ss 3.9.4 entitled Refueling Operations,. |
| Containment Building Penetrations, to provide flexibility in the operation of the containment personnel airlocks during CORE ALTERATIONS by expanding the existing limiting condition for operation to include the establishment of containment closure capability requirements. | | Containment Building Penetrations, to provide flexibility in the operation of the containment personnel airlocks during CORE ALTERATIONS by expanding the existing limiting condition for operation to include the establishment of containment closure capability requirements. |
| This proposed amendment is consistent with Amendments 194 (DPR-53)and 171 (DPR-69)approved for use at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in the NRC's transmittal of August 31, 1994.The Calvert Cliffs amendment allows the personnel airlock doors to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided certain administrative controls are in place.Attachment 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed changes, the justification for the changes, and our determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92.Attachment 2 contains the existing T/S pages marked to reflect the proposed changes.Attachment 3 contains the proposed T/S pages.We believe the proposed changes will not result in (1)a significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (2)a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.I.GC03>95040601'PO 950331 PDR ADOCK 05000315~,.P'PDR | | This proposed amendment is consistent with Amendments 194 (DPR-53) and 171 (DPR-69) approved for use at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in the NRC's transmittal of August 31, 1994. The Calvert Cliffs amendment allows the personnel airlock doors to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided certain administrative controls are in place. |
| | Attachment 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed changes, the justification for the changes, and our determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92. Attachment 2 contains the existing T/S pages marked to reflect the proposed changes. Attachment 3 contains the proposed T/S pages. |
| | We believe the proposed changes will not result in (1) a significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (2) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. |
| | I. GC03> |
| | 95040601'PO 950331 |
| | ~,. PPDR ADOCK 05000315 |
| | 'PDR |
| | |
| | U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP:NRC'1220 Page 2 These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee. |
| | In compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l), copies of this letter and its attachments have been transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and to the Michigan Department of Public Health. |
| | Sincerely, g'E9 q |
| | E. E. Fitzpatrick Vice President r |
| | (~ SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 8/n/ DAY OF ~A 1995 No, ary Pubiic My Commission Expires: -M- 5'5'h Attachments CC: A. A. Blind G. Charnoff J. B. Martin NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector - Bridgman J. R. Padgett |
| | |
| | 'I ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES TO THE DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS |
| | |
| | ~ ~ E, to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 1 I. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES The proposed amendment to technical specification (T/S) 3.9.4 makes the following specific changes to the Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 T/Ss: |
| | S 3 9 4 A. Expand Limiting Condition For Operation 3.9.4, item "b" (page 3/4 9-4) to include the ability to leave both personnel airlock doors in the "open" position during CORE ALTERATIONS. |
| | As a result, closure capability of the containment airlock doors will be assured in one of two ways; 1) one airlock door will be maintained closed during CORE ALTERATIONS, or 2) both airlocks may remain open provided certain restrictions are satisfied including the positioning of dedicated personnel at the airlock to facilitate closure., |
| | B. A footnote has also been added to define what constitutes an OPERABLE airlock door when implementing the "both airlock doors open" option of the specification. |
| | C. Revise the Bases for specification 3/4.9.4 (page B 3/4 9-1) to include the restrictions associated with the "both airlock doors open" option. |
| | II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES Technical specification 3.9.4 requires that a minimum of one personnel airlock door, as well as other containment penetrations be closed during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. Although the present technical specification requires a minimum of one airlock door to be closed during refueling, the UFSAR analysis of a radioactive release resulting from a fuel handling accident inside containment, takes no credit for containment isolation. |
| | During a refueling outage, other work in the containment does not stop during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS. This requires that personnel operate the airlock doors to enter and exit the containment. Studies of airlock door operation and maintenance at Cook Nuclear Plant have identified the following trends. Airlock usage, during the 1994 refueling outage, for the periods bounding CORE ALTERATIONS (Sept. 16th - 20th and Oct. 18th - 25th) totalled 10,200 entries and exits. Assuming four to five individuals entered the containment per airlock cycle, the average number of airlock cycles during CORE ALTERATIONS is conservatively estimated to be greater than 200 per day. Such heavy use of the airlock doors was not anticipated during its design. As a result of this unexpectedly heavy use, failures of the door have manifested themselves as to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 2 problems in the gear and interlock alignments of the doors locking mechanism and handwheel failures. |
| | In addition to the wear and maintenance concerns described above, the Calvert Cliffs submittal raised concerns regarding worker safety and the practical reality of the airlock's ability to prevent the release of radioactive material following a fuel handling accident. |
| | Calvert Cliffs provided the following argument which we believe to be accurate, realistic and applicable to Cook Nuclear Plant: |
| | "There are a large number of people in the containment during a refueling outage, even during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS. Should a fuel handling accident occur, it take a number of cycles of the airlock to evacuate personnel would from containment. With each airlock cycle, more containment air would be released. While waiting for their turn to exit, the "workers would be exposed to the released activity." |
| | To address the potential for worker exposure and to increase the availability/maintainability of the personnel airlock door at Cook Nuclear Plant, we propose to allow both airlocks to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided the following administrative controls are established. |
| | The airlock doors shall be controlled in the following manner: |
| | : 1. a minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, or |
| | : 2. both airlock doors may be open provided: |
| | : a. one door in each airlock is OPERABLE, |
| | : b. refueling cavity level is greater than 23 feet, and |
| | : c. a designated individual is available at all times to close the airlock if required. |
| | When considering the proposed amendment, the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident were reviewed. Two cases are discussed in the UFSAR, one for a fuel handling accident in the auxiliary building, the other for a similar accident inside containment. The design basis accident is the complete rupture of the highest rated spent fuel assembly. When considering the two accident analyses the containment event was considered to provide the bounding conditions. |
| | This was based on the fact that no reduction in the potential thyroid does was assumed since charcoal filtration was not considered and no credit was taken for containment isolation. The accident inside containment (assuming 3588 MWT power operation) gave |
| | |
| | to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page 3 a 0-2 hour site boundary thyroid dose of approximately 100 rem, and a whole body dose of 1.4 rem. Both of these values remain significantly below the 300 rem thyroid and 25 rem whole body limits established in 10 CFR 100. Based on these findings, determined that allowing both airlock doors to remain open during it was CORE ALTERATIONS would not increase the analyzed site boundary dose resulting from a fuel handling accident. Compared to the analyzed case, the dose consequences of a release through an open airlock may even be reduced because of retention time in the auxiliary building and the possibility of filtration through the auxiliary building ventilation system. |
| | III. 0 CFR 50 92 CRITERIA Per 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration if the change does not: |
| | involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, |
| | : 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or |
| | : 3. involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. |
| | Criterion 1 The design basis fuel handling accident is the rupture of the highest rated fuel assembly. As discussed previously, the consequences of an accident inside containment (i.e., site boundary dose), with both airlock doors are bounded by the existing fuel handling accident currently presented in our UFSAR. |
| | Since the containment airlock doors do not affect the failure mechanism of a fuel assembly during a fuel handling accident, we believe that this amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Additionally, no credit was taken for containment closure in the accident analysis. Therefore, based on these considerations, it is concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. |
|
| |
|
| U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 AEP:NRC'1220 These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee.
| | to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 4 Criterion 2 As stated in response to criterion one, the position of the containment airlock doors in no way affects the mechanism by which a spent fuel assembly is damaged during a fuel handling accident. |
| In compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l), copies of this letter and its attachments have been transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and to the Michigan Department of Public Health.Sincerely, q g'E9 r (~E.E.Fitzpatrick Vice President SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 8/n/DAY OF~A 1995 No, ary Pubiic My Commission Expires:-M-5'5'h Attachments CC: A.A.Blind G.Charnoff J.B.Martin NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector-Bridgman J.R.Padgett
| | Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. |
| 'I ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES TO THE DONALD C.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
| | Criterion 3 The margin for safety as defined in 10 CFR 100 has not been reduced. |
| ~~E, Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 1 I.DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES The proposed amendment to technical specification (T/S)3.9.4 makes the following specific changes to the Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 T/Ss: S 3 9 4 A.Expand Limiting Condition For Operation 3.9.4, item"b" (page 3/4 9-4)to include the ability to leave both personnel airlock doors in the"open" position during CORE ALTERATIONS.
| | As discussed previously, the existing fuel handling accident analysis for an event inside containment takes no credit for the isolation of containment. As a result, the position of the airlock doors has no impact on the analyzed site boundary doses resulting from such an accident. Based on these considerations, it concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in is a margin of safety. |
| As a result, closure capability of the containment airlock doors will be assured in one of two ways;1)one airlock door will be maintained closed during CORE ALTERATIONS, or 2)both airlocks may remain open provided certain restrictions are satisfied including the positioning of dedicated personnel at the airlock to facilitate closure., B.A footnote has also been added to define what constitutes an OPERABLE airlock door when implementing the"both airlock doors open" option of the specification.
| |
| C.Revise the Bases for specification 3/4.9.4 (page B 3/4 9-1)to include the restrictions associated with the"both airlock doors open" option.II.JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES Technical specification 3.9.4 requires that a minimum of one personnel airlock door, as well as other containment penetrations be closed during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.
| |
| Although the present technical specification requires a minimum of one airlock door to be closed during refueling, the UFSAR analysis of a radioactive release resulting from a fuel handling accident inside containment, takes no credit for containment isolation.
| |
| During a refueling outage, other work in the containment does not stop during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS.
| |
| This requires that personnel operate the airlock doors to enter and exit the containment.
| |
| Studies of airlock door operation and maintenance at Cook Nuclear Plant have identified the following trends.Airlock usage, during the 1994 refueling outage, for the periods bounding CORE ALTERATIONS (Sept.16th-20th and Oct.18th-25th)totalled 10,200 entries and exits.Assuming four to five individuals entered the containment per airlock cycle, the average number of airlock cycles during CORE ALTERATIONS is conservatively estimated to be greater than 200 per day.Such heavy use of the airlock doors was not anticipated during its design.As a result of this unexpectedly heavy use, failures of the door have manifested themselves as Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 2 problems in the gear and interlock alignments of the doors locking mechanism and handwheel failures.In addition to the wear and maintenance concerns described above, the Calvert Cliffs submittal raised concerns regarding worker safety and the practical reality of the airlock's ability to prevent the release of radioactive material following a fuel handling accident.Calvert Cliffs provided the following argument which we believe to be accurate, realistic and applicable to Cook Nuclear Plant: "There are a large number of people in the containment during a refueling outage, even during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS.
| |
| Should a fuel handling accident occur, it would take a number of cycles of the airlock to evacuate personnel from containment.
| |
| With each airlock cycle, more containment air would be released.While waiting for their turn to exit, the"workers would be exposed to the released activity." To address the potential for worker exposure and to increase the availability/maintainability of the personnel airlock door at Cook Nuclear Plant, we propose to allow both airlocks to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided the following administrative controls are established.
| |
| The airlock doors shall be controlled in the following manner: 1.a minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, or 2.both airlock doors may be open provided: a.one door in each airlock is OPERABLE, b.refueling cavity level is greater than 23 feet, and c.a designated individual is available at all times to close the airlock if required.When considering the proposed amendment, the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident were reviewed.Two cases are discussed in the UFSAR, one for a fuel handling accident in the auxiliary building, the other for a similar accident inside containment.
| |
| The design basis accident is the complete rupture of the highest rated spent fuel assembly.When considering the two accident analyses the containment event was considered to provide the bounding conditions.
| |
| This was based on the fact that no reduction in the potential thyroid does was assumed since charcoal filtration was not considered and no credit was taken for containment isolation.
| |
| The accident inside containment (assuming 3588 MWT power operation) gave
| |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1 to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page 3 a 0-2 hour site boundary thyroid dose of approximately 100 rem, and a whole body dose of 1.4 rem.Both of these values remain significantly below the 300 rem thyroid and 25 rem whole body limits established in 10 CFR 100.Based on these findings, it was determined that allowing both airlock doors to remain open during CORE ALTERATIONS would not increase the analyzed site boundary dose resulting from a fuel handling accident.Compared to the analyzed case, the dose consequences of a release through an open airlock may even be reduced because of retention time in the auxiliary building and the possibility of filtration through the auxiliary building ventilation system.III.0 CFR 50 92 CRITERIA Per 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration if the change does not: involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, 2.create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3.involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.Criterion 1 The design basis fuel handling accident is the rupture of the highest rated fuel assembly.As discussed previously, the consequences of an accident inside containment (i.e., site boundary dose), with both airlock doors are bounded by the existing fuel handling accident currently presented in our UFSAR.Since the containment airlock doors do not affect the failure mechanism of a fuel assembly during a fuel handling accident, we believe that this amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
| | ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1220 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES MA%MD TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES |
| Additionally, no credit was taken for containment closure in the accident analysis.Therefore, based on these considerations, it is concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
| |
|
| |
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| Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 4 Criterion 2 As stated in response to criterion one, the position of the containment airlock doors in no way affects the mechanism by which a spent fuel assembly is damaged during a fuel handling accident.Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
| | e1 |
| Criterion 3 The margin for safety as defined in 10 CFR 100 has not been reduced.As discussed previously, the existing fuel handling accident analysis for an event inside containment takes no credit for the isolation of containment.
| | ~ ~}} |
| As a result, the position of the airlock doors has no impact on the analyzed site boundary doses resulting from such an accident.Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
| |
| ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1220 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES MA%MD TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES e1~~}}
| |
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MONTHYEARML17335A5551999-10-12012 October 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d for Spray Additive Sys to Relocate Details Associated with Acceptance Criteria & Test Parameters to Associated TS Bases ML17335A5591999-10-11011 October 1999 Supplement to Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,replacing Correct TS Pages Inadvertently Included in 990923 Submittal.Attached Pages Also Include Appropriate Administrative Changes ML17335A5411999-10-0101 October 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Containment Recirculation Sump Water Inventory.Calculation & non-proprietary WCAP-15302 Rept Also Encl ML17326A1571999-09-23023 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,involving Movement of Loads in Excess of Design Basis Seismic Capability of Auxiliary Bldg Load Handling Equipment & Structures ML17326A1421999-09-17017 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,to Allow Credit of Rod Cluster Control Assemblies for Cold Leg Large Break LOCA Subcriticality.Ts Pages & non-proprietary Versions of WCAP-15246 Encl.Proprietary Version Withheld ML17326A1161999-09-10010 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7,TS Tables 4.4-3,3.4-1 & TS Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.2 Re RCS & Gas Storage Tank Sampling ML17326A0921999-08-17017 August 1999 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,to Change TS 3/4.4.5 & Bases for TS 3/4.4.5,3/4.4.6.2 & 3/4.4.8 to Remove voltage-based Repair Criteria,F* Repair Criteria & Sleeving Methodologies from Unit 1 TS & Clarify Bases Sections ML17325B6041999-05-21021 May 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Limitations of Positive Reactivity Additions in Several TS Action Statements ML17325B5511999-04-19019 April 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems & Associated Bases to Provide one-time Extension of 18-month Surveillance Interval for Specific SRs ML17335A3661998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,adding TS for Distributed Ignition Sys ML17335A3631998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,revising TS 3/4.7.7, Sealed Source Contamination & Associated Bases to Address Testing Requirements for Fission Detectors ML17335A3591998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,making Administrative Changes to Remove Obsolete Info,To Provide Consistency Between Units 1 & 2,to Provide Consistency with Std Tech Specs,To Provide Clarification & to Correct Typos ML17335A3561998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.6.5.1, Ice Condenser,Ice Bed & Associated Bases to Reflect Max Ice Condenser Flow Channel Blockage Assumed in Accident Analyses ML17335A2631998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Containment Sys Bases 3/4.6.1.4 Re Internal Pressure & 3/4.6.1.5 Re Air Temp ML17335A2761998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,placing Tighter Restrictions on Amount of Time RWST Water Level Instrumentation Can Be Out of Svc Before Compensatory Actions Are Required ML17335A2671998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3.4.1.3, RCS - Shutdown & Associated Bases to Provide Separate Requirements for Modes 4 & 5 with Loops Filled & Mode 5 with Loops Not Filled ML17335A2311998-09-14014 September 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing Runout Limits for Safety Injection Pump to 675 Gpm Unless Pump Is Specifically Tested to Higher Flow Rate Not Exceeding 700 Gpm ML17335A1901998-08-28028 August 1998 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,requesting Extension of SG Surveillance,Which TSs Require to Be Performed on or Before 990408,until End of Current Refuel Cycle Currently Scheduled for Mar 2000.W/assessment of SG Degradation & TSs ML17334A7471998-06-10010 June 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-54 & DPR-78,changing Implementation Date to Reduce Boric Acid Concentration in Boric Acid Storage Sys.Attachment 1 to Ltr Contains Description of Proposed Change & Justification for Change ML17334B7011998-03-0303 March 1998 Application for Amends to TS for Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Removing Word Immediately from Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2.b.4 & Revising Plants TS 3/4.6.4 Bases ML17334B6561997-10-0808 October 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-78,changing TSs 3/4.6.5 & 3/4.5.5 to Increase Both Minimum Required Ice Mass Per Ice Basket & Total Minimum Required Ice Mass. Proprietary Summary of Sump Inventory Calculations,Encl ML17333B0431997-09-19019 September 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,deleting Requirement for Automatic Valve Closure Feature on RHR Sys Suction from RCS ML17333A9831997-08-11011 August 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,allowing Filling of ECCS Accumulators W/O Declaring ECCS Equipment Inoperable ML17335A2101997-08-0101 August 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,deleting Wording When Secondary Steam Supply Pressure Is Greater than 310 Psig from TS ML17333A8281997-03-26026 March 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Modifying TS 4.7.5.1.e.2 Which Describes Control Room Ventilation Sys Autostart Functions ML17333A8311997-03-26026 March 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing Grammatical Correction to Wording of Unit 2 TS 3.4.8,Action a for Modes 1,2 & 3 & Returning Frequency Requirement to TS 4.7.1.2.c & 4.7.1.2.d That Was Inadvertently Deleted ML17333A7121996-12-20020 December 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Requesting Rev of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Insp Frequency ML17334B5941996-07-11011 July 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS to Support Operation of Unit 2 at Increased Core Rated Thermal Power of 3,588 Mwt.Rev 1 to WCAP-14489, ...Unit 2 3,600 Mwt Uprating Program Licensing Rept Encl ML17334B5901996-06-19019 June 1996 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,addressing Applicable Requirements of NRC GL 95-05, Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for Repair of Westinghouse SG Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking. ML17334B5891996-06-11011 June 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,removing TSs Certain Requirements for Administrative Controls,Related to QA Requirements,Per Administrative Ltr 96-05 ML17333A4201996-04-0808 April 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,moving TS 4.0.4 Exemption Statement for MSSVs Into Section 4.7.1.1 ML17333A3551996-03-12012 March 1996 Application for Amend to License DPR-74,removing TSs Re Shutdown & Control Rod Position Indication While in Modes 3, 4 & 5 ML17334B5751996-02-29029 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS to Reduce Boric Acid Concentration in Boric Acid Storage Sys from Approx 12 Percent to Approx 4 Percent by Weight. Technical Rept Presenting Justificaion for Changes Encl ML17334B5741996-02-26026 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 5.6.2 to Increase Current Limit on Nominal Fuel Assembly Enrichment for New,Westinghouse - Fabricated Fuel Stored in New Fuel Storage Racks ML17333A3201996-02-22022 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,proposing to Remove Requirement That Operations Superintendent Must Hold or Have Held Sol at Plant or Similar Reactor ML17333A3151996-02-22022 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Table 4.8-1,DG Test Schedule by Ref Rg 1.9,Rev 3 Rather than Rg 1.108,Rev 1 Criteria for Determination of Valid DG Test ML17333A2641996-01-12012 January 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Section 4.4.11 to Eliminate SR Demonstrating Operability of Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer PORVs & Block Valves ML17333A2391995-12-19019 December 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 3/4.6.1.2,3/4.6.1.3,3/4.6.1.6 & 3/4.6.1.6 to Require Types A,B & C Tests (Overall Integrated & Local Containment Leakage Rate) to Be Performed Per 10CFR50,App J Option B ML17332B0111995-11-10010 November 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Ts,By Modifying Surveillance Testing of EDG During Refueling & Normal Operations ML17332A9971995-10-20020 October 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,proposing to Add Exemption to TS 4.0.4 in Surveillance Requirements for MSIV ML17332A9111995-08-0606 August 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,informing That Licensee Has 45 Days from Date of Issuance to Implement Amend Unless Otherwise Specified ML17334B5561995-08-0404 August 1995 Application for Exigent Amend to License DPR-58,modifying TS 4.4.5.4 & 4.4.5.5 for Repair of Hybrid Expansion Joint Sleeved SG Tubes.Proprietary W Rept WCAP-14446, Repair...Of Hybrid Expansion Joint...Tubes Encl.W Rept Withheld ML17332A8271995-06-30030 June 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing TS Section 5.3.1 to Allow Fuel Reconstitution,Per GL 90-02, Suppl 1 ML17334B5501995-06-20020 June 1995 License Amend Request to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,to Remove Requirements for Fire Protection Systems from Licenses & Guidance in GL 86-10,GL 88-12 & GL 93-07 ML17332A7991995-06-15015 June 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 to Reduce Duration of Surveillance Testing for EDGs During Refueling Operations from 24 H to 8 H ML17334B5481995-05-26026 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Support Operation of Unit 1 at SG Tube Plugging Levels Up to 30%,make One Unit 1 TS More Nearly Like Corresponding Unit 2 TS & Maintain Consistency of Unit 2 Criteria ML17334B5461995-05-26026 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Tech Specs 3/4.3.1 (Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation) & 3/4.3.2 (ESFAS Instrumentation) & Bases to Relocate Tables of Response Time Limits to Ufsar,Per GL 93-08 ML17332A7661995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Incorporate Cycle & Burnup Dependent Peaking Factor Penalty ML17332A7741995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 5.3.1 to Allow Fuel Reconstitution,Per GL 90-02,Suppl 1 ML17332A7771995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Table 4.3-2 to Change Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Manual Actuation Sys Surveillance Frequency from Monthly to Quarterly 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS
MONTHYEARML17335A5551999-10-12012 October 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d for Spray Additive Sys to Relocate Details Associated with Acceptance Criteria & Test Parameters to Associated TS Bases ML17335A5591999-10-11011 October 1999 Supplement to Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,replacing Correct TS Pages Inadvertently Included in 990923 Submittal.Attached Pages Also Include Appropriate Administrative Changes ML17335A5411999-10-0101 October 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Containment Recirculation Sump Water Inventory.Calculation & non-proprietary WCAP-15302 Rept Also Encl ML17326A1571999-09-23023 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,involving Movement of Loads in Excess of Design Basis Seismic Capability of Auxiliary Bldg Load Handling Equipment & Structures ML17326A1421999-09-17017 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,to Allow Credit of Rod Cluster Control Assemblies for Cold Leg Large Break LOCA Subcriticality.Ts Pages & non-proprietary Versions of WCAP-15246 Encl.Proprietary Version Withheld ML17326A1161999-09-10010 September 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7,TS Tables 4.4-3,3.4-1 & TS Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.2 Re RCS & Gas Storage Tank Sampling ML17326A0921999-08-17017 August 1999 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,to Change TS 3/4.4.5 & Bases for TS 3/4.4.5,3/4.4.6.2 & 3/4.4.8 to Remove voltage-based Repair Criteria,F* Repair Criteria & Sleeving Methodologies from Unit 1 TS & Clarify Bases Sections ML17325B6041999-05-21021 May 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Limitations of Positive Reactivity Additions in Several TS Action Statements ML17325B5511999-04-19019 April 1999 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems & Associated Bases to Provide one-time Extension of 18-month Surveillance Interval for Specific SRs ML17335A3661998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,adding TS for Distributed Ignition Sys ML17335A3631998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,revising TS 3/4.7.7, Sealed Source Contamination & Associated Bases to Address Testing Requirements for Fission Detectors ML17335A3591998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,making Administrative Changes to Remove Obsolete Info,To Provide Consistency Between Units 1 & 2,to Provide Consistency with Std Tech Specs,To Provide Clarification & to Correct Typos ML17335A3561998-12-0303 December 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.6.5.1, Ice Condenser,Ice Bed & Associated Bases to Reflect Max Ice Condenser Flow Channel Blockage Assumed in Accident Analyses ML17335A2631998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Containment Sys Bases 3/4.6.1.4 Re Internal Pressure & 3/4.6.1.5 Re Air Temp ML17335A2761998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,placing Tighter Restrictions on Amount of Time RWST Water Level Instrumentation Can Be Out of Svc Before Compensatory Actions Are Required ML17335A2671998-10-0808 October 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3.4.1.3, RCS - Shutdown & Associated Bases to Provide Separate Requirements for Modes 4 & 5 with Loops Filled & Mode 5 with Loops Not Filled ML17335A2311998-09-14014 September 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing Runout Limits for Safety Injection Pump to 675 Gpm Unless Pump Is Specifically Tested to Higher Flow Rate Not Exceeding 700 Gpm ML17335A1901998-08-28028 August 1998 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,requesting Extension of SG Surveillance,Which TSs Require to Be Performed on or Before 990408,until End of Current Refuel Cycle Currently Scheduled for Mar 2000.W/assessment of SG Degradation & TSs ML17334A7471998-06-10010 June 1998 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-54 & DPR-78,changing Implementation Date to Reduce Boric Acid Concentration in Boric Acid Storage Sys.Attachment 1 to Ltr Contains Description of Proposed Change & Justification for Change ML17334B7011998-03-0303 March 1998 Application for Amends to TS for Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Removing Word Immediately from Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2.b.4 & Revising Plants TS 3/4.6.4 Bases ML17334B6561997-10-0808 October 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-78,changing TSs 3/4.6.5 & 3/4.5.5 to Increase Both Minimum Required Ice Mass Per Ice Basket & Total Minimum Required Ice Mass. Proprietary Summary of Sump Inventory Calculations,Encl ML17333B0431997-09-19019 September 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,deleting Requirement for Automatic Valve Closure Feature on RHR Sys Suction from RCS ML17333A9831997-08-11011 August 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,allowing Filling of ECCS Accumulators W/O Declaring ECCS Equipment Inoperable ML17335A2101997-08-0101 August 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,deleting Wording When Secondary Steam Supply Pressure Is Greater than 310 Psig from TS ML17333A8281997-03-26026 March 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Modifying TS 4.7.5.1.e.2 Which Describes Control Room Ventilation Sys Autostart Functions ML17333A8311997-03-26026 March 1997 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing Grammatical Correction to Wording of Unit 2 TS 3.4.8,Action a for Modes 1,2 & 3 & Returning Frequency Requirement to TS 4.7.1.2.c & 4.7.1.2.d That Was Inadvertently Deleted ML17333A7121996-12-20020 December 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74, Requesting Rev of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Insp Frequency ML17334B5941996-07-11011 July 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS to Support Operation of Unit 2 at Increased Core Rated Thermal Power of 3,588 Mwt.Rev 1 to WCAP-14489, ...Unit 2 3,600 Mwt Uprating Program Licensing Rept Encl ML17334B5901996-06-19019 June 1996 Application for Amend to License DPR-58,addressing Applicable Requirements of NRC GL 95-05, Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for Repair of Westinghouse SG Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking. ML17334B5891996-06-11011 June 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,removing TSs Certain Requirements for Administrative Controls,Related to QA Requirements,Per Administrative Ltr 96-05 ML17333A4201996-04-0808 April 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,moving TS 4.0.4 Exemption Statement for MSSVs Into Section 4.7.1.1 ML17333A3551996-03-12012 March 1996 Application for Amend to License DPR-74,removing TSs Re Shutdown & Control Rod Position Indication While in Modes 3, 4 & 5 ML17334B5751996-02-29029 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS to Reduce Boric Acid Concentration in Boric Acid Storage Sys from Approx 12 Percent to Approx 4 Percent by Weight. Technical Rept Presenting Justificaion for Changes Encl ML17334B5741996-02-26026 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 5.6.2 to Increase Current Limit on Nominal Fuel Assembly Enrichment for New,Westinghouse - Fabricated Fuel Stored in New Fuel Storage Racks ML17333A3201996-02-22022 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,proposing to Remove Requirement That Operations Superintendent Must Hold or Have Held Sol at Plant or Similar Reactor ML17333A3151996-02-22022 February 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Table 4.8-1,DG Test Schedule by Ref Rg 1.9,Rev 3 Rather than Rg 1.108,Rev 1 Criteria for Determination of Valid DG Test ML17333A2641996-01-12012 January 1996 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Section 4.4.11 to Eliminate SR Demonstrating Operability of Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer PORVs & Block Valves ML17333A2391995-12-19019 December 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 3/4.6.1.2,3/4.6.1.3,3/4.6.1.6 & 3/4.6.1.6 to Require Types A,B & C Tests (Overall Integrated & Local Containment Leakage Rate) to Be Performed Per 10CFR50,App J Option B ML17332B0111995-11-10010 November 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising Ts,By Modifying Surveillance Testing of EDG During Refueling & Normal Operations ML17332A9971995-10-20020 October 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,proposing to Add Exemption to TS 4.0.4 in Surveillance Requirements for MSIV ML17332A9111995-08-0606 August 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,informing That Licensee Has 45 Days from Date of Issuance to Implement Amend Unless Otherwise Specified ML17334B5561995-08-0404 August 1995 Application for Exigent Amend to License DPR-58,modifying TS 4.4.5.4 & 4.4.5.5 for Repair of Hybrid Expansion Joint Sleeved SG Tubes.Proprietary W Rept WCAP-14446, Repair...Of Hybrid Expansion Joint...Tubes Encl.W Rept Withheld ML17332A8271995-06-30030 June 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,changing TS Section 5.3.1 to Allow Fuel Reconstitution,Per GL 90-02, Suppl 1 ML17334B5501995-06-20020 June 1995 License Amend Request to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,to Remove Requirements for Fire Protection Systems from Licenses & Guidance in GL 86-10,GL 88-12 & GL 93-07 ML17332A7991995-06-15015 June 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 to Reduce Duration of Surveillance Testing for EDGs During Refueling Operations from 24 H to 8 H ML17334B5481995-05-26026 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Support Operation of Unit 1 at SG Tube Plugging Levels Up to 30%,make One Unit 1 TS More Nearly Like Corresponding Unit 2 TS & Maintain Consistency of Unit 2 Criteria ML17334B5461995-05-26026 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Tech Specs 3/4.3.1 (Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation) & 3/4.3.2 (ESFAS Instrumentation) & Bases to Relocate Tables of Response Time Limits to Ufsar,Per GL 93-08 ML17332A7661995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Incorporate Cycle & Burnup Dependent Peaking Factor Penalty ML17332A7741995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 5.3.1 to Allow Fuel Reconstitution,Per GL 90-02,Suppl 1 ML17332A7771995-05-25025 May 1995 Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Table 4.3-2 to Change Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Manual Actuation Sys Surveillance Frequency from Monthly to Quarterly 1999-09-23
[Table view] |
Text
R.IC) R.I"EV PACCELERATED 1 RIDS PROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9504060190, DOC.DATE: 95/03/31 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET g FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316, AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Application for amends to licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends would modify TS 3.9.4 to provide flexibility in operation of containment personnel. airlocks during core alterations.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOOID TITLE: OR COPIES RECEIVED:.LTR Submittal: General Distribution t ENCL J SIZE:
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 HICKMAN,J 1 1 INTERNAL: LE CENTE 01 1 1 NMSS/DWM/LLDP 2 2 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 0 NOAC 'XTERNAL:
NRC PDR 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELI!vIINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTIONLISTS FOR DOCUMENTS'YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 13 ENCL 12
R Indiana Michigan Power Company
'P.O. Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 FI March 31, 1995 AEP:NRC'1220 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.9.4 FOR CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCK REQUIREMENTS This letter and its attachments constitute an application for, amendment to the technical specifications (T/Ss) for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Specifically, we are proposing to modify T/Ss 3.9.4 entitled Refueling Operations,.
Containment Building Penetrations, to provide flexibility in the operation of the containment personnel airlocks during CORE ALTERATIONS by expanding the existing limiting condition for operation to include the establishment of containment closure capability requirements.
This proposed amendment is consistent with Amendments 194 (DPR-53) and 171 (DPR-69) approved for use at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in the NRC's transmittal of August 31, 1994. The Calvert Cliffs amendment allows the personnel airlock doors to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided certain administrative controls are in place.
Attachment 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed changes, the justification for the changes, and our determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92. Attachment 2 contains the existing T/S pages marked to reflect the proposed changes. Attachment 3 contains the proposed T/S pages.
We believe the proposed changes will not result in (1) a significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (2) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
I. GC03>
95040601'PO 950331
~,. PPDR ADOCK 05000315
'PDR
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP:NRC'1220 Page 2 These proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee.
In compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l), copies of this letter and its attachments have been transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and to the Michigan Department of Public Health.
Sincerely, g'E9 q
E. E. Fitzpatrick Vice President r
(~ SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 8/n/ DAY OF ~A 1995 No, ary Pubiic My Commission Expires: -M- 5'5'h Attachments CC: A. A. Blind G. Charnoff J. B. Martin NFEM Section Chief NRC Resident Inspector - Bridgman J. R. Padgett
'I ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP:NRC:1220 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES TO THE DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
~ ~ E, to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 1 I. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES The proposed amendment to technical specification (T/S) 3.9.4 makes the following specific changes to the Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 T/Ss:
S 3 9 4 A. Expand Limiting Condition For Operation 3.9.4, item "b" (page 3/4 9-4) to include the ability to leave both personnel airlock doors in the "open" position during CORE ALTERATIONS.
As a result, closure capability of the containment airlock doors will be assured in one of two ways; 1) one airlock door will be maintained closed during CORE ALTERATIONS, or 2) both airlocks may remain open provided certain restrictions are satisfied including the positioning of dedicated personnel at the airlock to facilitate closure.,
B. A footnote has also been added to define what constitutes an OPERABLE airlock door when implementing the "both airlock doors open" option of the specification.
C. Revise the Bases for specification 3/4.9.4 (page B 3/4 9-1) to include the restrictions associated with the "both airlock doors open" option.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES Technical specification 3.9.4 requires that a minimum of one personnel airlock door, as well as other containment penetrations be closed during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. Although the present technical specification requires a minimum of one airlock door to be closed during refueling, the UFSAR analysis of a radioactive release resulting from a fuel handling accident inside containment, takes no credit for containment isolation.
During a refueling outage, other work in the containment does not stop during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS. This requires that personnel operate the airlock doors to enter and exit the containment. Studies of airlock door operation and maintenance at Cook Nuclear Plant have identified the following trends. Airlock usage, during the 1994 refueling outage, for the periods bounding CORE ALTERATIONS (Sept. 16th - 20th and Oct. 18th - 25th) totalled 10,200 entries and exits. Assuming four to five individuals entered the containment per airlock cycle, the average number of airlock cycles during CORE ALTERATIONS is conservatively estimated to be greater than 200 per day. Such heavy use of the airlock doors was not anticipated during its design. As a result of this unexpectedly heavy use, failures of the door have manifested themselves as to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 2 problems in the gear and interlock alignments of the doors locking mechanism and handwheel failures.
In addition to the wear and maintenance concerns described above, the Calvert Cliffs submittal raised concerns regarding worker safety and the practical reality of the airlock's ability to prevent the release of radioactive material following a fuel handling accident.
Calvert Cliffs provided the following argument which we believe to be accurate, realistic and applicable to Cook Nuclear Plant:
"There are a large number of people in the containment during a refueling outage, even during fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS. Should a fuel handling accident occur, it take a number of cycles of the airlock to evacuate personnel would from containment. With each airlock cycle, more containment air would be released. While waiting for their turn to exit, the "workers would be exposed to the released activity."
To address the potential for worker exposure and to increase the availability/maintainability of the personnel airlock door at Cook Nuclear Plant, we propose to allow both airlocks to be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided the following administrative controls are established.
The airlock doors shall be controlled in the following manner:
- 1. a minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, or
- 2. both airlock doors may be open provided:
- a. one door in each airlock is OPERABLE,
- b. refueling cavity level is greater than 23 feet, and
- c. a designated individual is available at all times to close the airlock if required.
When considering the proposed amendment, the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident were reviewed. Two cases are discussed in the UFSAR, one for a fuel handling accident in the auxiliary building, the other for a similar accident inside containment. The design basis accident is the complete rupture of the highest rated spent fuel assembly. When considering the two accident analyses the containment event was considered to provide the bounding conditions.
This was based on the fact that no reduction in the potential thyroid does was assumed since charcoal filtration was not considered and no credit was taken for containment isolation. The accident inside containment (assuming 3588 MWT power operation) gave
to,AEP:NRC:1220 Page 3 a 0-2 hour site boundary thyroid dose of approximately 100 rem, and a whole body dose of 1.4 rem. Both of these values remain significantly below the 300 rem thyroid and 25 rem whole body limits established in 10 CFR 100. Based on these findings, determined that allowing both airlock doors to remain open during it was CORE ALTERATIONS would not increase the analyzed site boundary dose resulting from a fuel handling accident. Compared to the analyzed case, the dose consequences of a release through an open airlock may even be reduced because of retention time in the auxiliary building and the possibility of filtration through the auxiliary building ventilation system.
III. 0 CFR 50 92 CRITERIA Per 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration if the change does not:
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated,
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or
- 3. involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Criterion 1 The design basis fuel handling accident is the rupture of the highest rated fuel assembly. As discussed previously, the consequences of an accident inside containment (i.e., site boundary dose), with both airlock doors are bounded by the existing fuel handling accident currently presented in our UFSAR.
Since the containment airlock doors do not affect the failure mechanism of a fuel assembly during a fuel handling accident, we believe that this amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Additionally, no credit was taken for containment closure in the accident analysis. Therefore, based on these considerations, it is concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
to AEP:NRC:1220 Page 4 Criterion 2 As stated in response to criterion one, the position of the containment airlock doors in no way affects the mechanism by which a spent fuel assembly is damaged during a fuel handling accident.
Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3 The margin for safety as defined in 10 CFR 100 has not been reduced.
As discussed previously, the existing fuel handling accident analysis for an event inside containment takes no credit for the isolation of containment. As a result, the position of the airlock doors has no impact on the analyzed site boundary doses resulting from such an accident. Based on these considerations, it concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in is a margin of safety.
ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1220 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES MA%MD TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES
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