05000482/FIN-2012004-08: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| (3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Long, C Peabody, C Speer, G Guerra, J Laughlin, J Watkins, L Ricketson, N Greene, N Makris, N O | | Inspector = C Long, C Peabody, C Speer, G Guerra, J Laughlin, J Watkins, L Ricketson, N Greene, N Makris, N O'Keefe, R Kopriva, S Hedger | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A Green licensee-identified non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, function 1.b, for entry into Mode 3 with one train of automatic safety injection actuation operable. In March 2012, while in Mode 5, a portion of procedure STS KJ-001A, Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation Test - Train A, was performed as a required retest for maintenance conducted on the train A emergency diesel generator. After the testing was completed, both safety injection manual reset buttons for train A and B were depressed. Due to the reactor trip breakers being open, the automatic safety injection block status window was still lit. Prior to entry into Mode 4, both trains of solid state protection system were enabled, which reset the actuation logic and relays. But since this was a forced outage and not a refueling outage, performance of procedure STS RE-017, DRPI (Digital Rod Position Indication) Operability Verification, was not required and the reactor trip breakers were not closed, allowing the resetting of the auto safety injection block by closing reactor trip breakers. Failure to maintain an operable safety injection train A prior to entering Mode 3 from Mode 4 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, checklist 4, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Wolf Creek Generating Station Technical Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, function 1.b, requires two trains of automatic safety injection actuation logic in Mode 3. Contrary to the above, on March 19, 2012, Wolf Creek entered Mode 3 with one train of automatic safety injection actuation inoperable. Since the finding is of very low safety significance, was identified by Wolf Creek, and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 50708, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | | description = A Green licensee-identified non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, function 1.b, for entry into Mode 3 with one train of automatic safety injection actuation operable. In March 2012, while in Mode 5, a portion of procedure STS KJ-001A, Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation Test - Train A, was performed as a required retest for maintenance conducted on the train A emergency diesel generator. After the testing was completed, both safety injection manual reset buttons for train A and B were depressed. Due to the reactor trip breakers being open, the automatic safety injection block status window was still lit. Prior to entry into Mode 4, both trains of solid state protection system were enabled, which reset the actuation logic and relays. But since this was a forced outage and not a refueling outage, performance of procedure STS RE-017, DRPI (Digital Rod Position Indication) Operability Verification, was not required and the reactor trip breakers were not closed, allowing the resetting of the auto safety injection block by closing reactor trip breakers. Failure to maintain an operable safety injection train A prior to entering Mode 3 from Mode 4 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, checklist 4, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Wolf Creek Generating Station Technical Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, function 1.b, requires two trains of automatic safety injection actuation logic in Mode 3. Contrary to the above, on March 19, 2012, Wolf Creek entered Mode 3 with one train of automatic safety injection actuation inoperable. Since the finding is of very low safety significance, was identified by Wolf Creek, and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 50708, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:45, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Long C Peabody C Speer G Guerra J Laughlin J Watkins L Ricketson N Greene N Makris N O'Keefe R Kopriva S Hedger |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |