ML17325B551

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems & Associated Bases to Provide one-time Extension of 18-month Surveillance Interval for Specific SRs

ML17325B551
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/19/1999
From:	POWERS R P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17325B553	List: ML17325B551 ML17325B555
References
AEP:NRC:1322, NUDOCS 9904230125
Download: ML17325B551 (27)

Text

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58&:DPR-74,revising TS3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems"8associated basestoprovideone-timeextension of18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificSRs.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLTITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution TS1ZE:Q'fCATEGORYj.REGULARYINFORMATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM(RIDS)A</CESSION NBR:9904230125 DOC.DATE:

99/04/19NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKET¹dACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION POWERS,R.P.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RecordsManagement Branch(Document Control'Desk)NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPD3-1LASTANG,J-COPIESRECIPIENT LTTRENCL,IDCODE/NAME 11LPD3-1PD11COPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL":

FILECENTER0NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/SPSBJUNG,IOGC/HDS3EXTERNAL:

NOAC111111111011NRR/DE/EEIB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DSSA/SRXB 11111111DENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR14ENCL13 IndianaMichiga~PowerCompany~500CircleDriveBuchanan, Ml491071373 INOlAMAMICHIGANPQWMApril19,1999ABP:NRC:1322 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskMailStop0-P1-17Washington, DC20555-0001 Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGEREQUESTELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS,SHUTDOWNPursuantto10CFR50.90,IndianaMichiganPowerCompany(I&M),theLicenseeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantunits1and2,proposestoamendAppendixA,technical specifications (T/S),offacilityoperating licensesDPR-58andDPR-74.IBMproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"

anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements forunits1and2.Thissurveillance willbeperformed priortothefirstentryintoMode4subsequent toreceiptoftherequested T/Samendment.

Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8,whichisnolongerapplicable.

Forunit1only,aneditorial changeismadetoaddtheword"or"toactionstatement 3.8.1.2.Attachment 1providesadetaileddescription andsafetyanalysisoftheproposedchanges.Attachments 2Aand2BprovidemarkedupT/Spagesforunit1andunit2,respectively.

Attachments 3Aand3BprovidetheproposedT/Spageswiththechangesincorporated forunit1andunit2,respectively.

Attachment 4describes theevaluation performed inaccordance with10CFR50.92(c),

whichconcludes thatnosignificant hazardsconsideration isinvolved.

Attachment 5providestheenvironmental assessment.

@gali'qq04230i28

~~0+<+PDRADQCK08000318PDR U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC:1322 AttherequestoftheNRCstaff,wehavealsoconsidered GenericLetter(GL)98-01,"Year2000Readiness ofComputerSystemsatNuclearPowerPlants,"andSupplement 1totheGL,whichrequiresaresponsebyJuly1,1999,confirming year2000readiness oftheCookNuclearPlants.I&M'syear2000programisintendedtoensurethatemergency dieselgenerator controlcircuits, areyear2000readypertherequirements ofGL98-01.Copiesofthisletteranditsattachments arebeingtransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth,inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions, pleasecontactMr.DavidF.Kunsemiller, DirectorofRegulatory Affairs,at(616)466-2405.

Sincerely, gf,'(R.P.PowersVicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS~/DAYOFNotaryPublic1999BERNICEhLBtCKERSNowt)tPuY~o,BerrienCounty,MiIPgCommission ExpbesFeb.16,2001My'Commission ExpiresD/4'/KjaaAttachments c:J.A.Abramson, w/attachments J.L.Caldwell, w/attachments MDEQ-DW&RPD,w/attachments NRCResidentInspector, w/attachments 1Irt ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1322 DESCRIPTION ANDSAFETYANALYSISFORPROPOSEDCHANGES Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1DescritionandSafetAnalsisfortheProosedChanesA.SummaryofProposedChangesI&Mproposesto'eviseTechnical Specification (T/S)3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"

anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs)applicable inModes5and6.Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8,whichisnolongerapplicable.

Forunit1only,aneditorial changeismadetoaddtheword"or"toactionstatement 3.8.1.2.Theamendment requestinvolvessixemergency dieselgenerator (EDG)surveillances thatarenormallyperformed at18-monthintervals duringreactorshutdowns (Modes5and6).Therequestproposestodelayperformance ofthesesixsurveillances, duringthecurrentextendedoutagesonly,untilpriortothefirstentryintoMode4toresumeoperations (Modes1-4).Thedelayisnecessary becausemanyplantcomponents neededforthetestingarenotrequiredtobefunctional duringanoutage,andduetothescopeoftheoutage,arecurrently notfunctional.

Thedelayisjustified becausethesixdeferredsurveillances demonstrate thefulldesignedfunctional capability oftheEDGstosupportmitigation ofaccidents thatmayoccurinModes1through4.Thisfulldesigncapability isnotnecessary tosupportEDGfunctional requirements duringreactorshutdown.

Theshutdownfunctional requirements oftheEDGsareadequately demonstrated bythenondeferred 18-monthsurveillances, the"required 30-daysurveillances andthespecified fueloilchecks.Aconservative estimateutilizing Probabilistic RiskAnalysis(PRA)techniques hasshownthatdeferralofthesurveillances hasaverysmallimpactonEDGunavailability.

Finally,therequestisconsistent withNUREG-1431,

"(Improved)

StandardTechnical Specifications,"

(ITS)inrecognizing thechallenge thistestingrepresents tothelimitedA.C.sourcesrequiredtobeoperablewhileshutdown.

Whenalicenseeknowsofnoreasonthesurveillances wouldnotbesatisfied, thedeferralisallowedbythe.NUREG.Theproposedchangesaredescribed indetailinsectionEofthisattachment.

T/Spagesthataremarkedtoshowtheproposedchangesareprovidedinattachments 2Aand2Bforunit1andunit2,respectively.

TheproposedT/Spages,withthechangesincorporated, preprovidedinattachments 3Aand3Bforunit1andunit2,respectively.

B.Description oftheCurrentRequirements InModes5and6,T/SLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.8.1.2requirestheoperability ofasingleoffsitepowersupplyandasingleemergency dieselgenerator (EDG).Fortheserequiredshutdownpowersupplies, T/Ssurveillance requirement 4'.1.2invokesthesamesurveillances asthosespecified inModes1through4(SRs4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2) withtheoneexception ofSR4.8.1.1.2.a

~5(paralleling theEDGswithoffsitepowerforaone-hour, orgreater,loadtest).Table1listsanddescribes thesurveillances requiredinModes5and6.OnlythoseSRsinboldandparentheses aresubjecttodeferralbythisamendment request.Alsoincludedinthetable,forreference, arethecorresponding SRsoftheITS.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page2T/S4.8.1.2SRsand(frequency) 4.8.1.1.1.a (7das)TABLElCorresponding NUREG-1431 SRs3.8.1.1Testdescription/comments Breakeralignment checksandindicated oweravailabilit 4.8.1.1.1.b (18-months) 3.8.1.84.8.1.1.2.a.1

(*)3.8.1.44.8.1.1.2.a.2

(*)3.8.3.14.8.1.1.2.a.3

(*)3.8.1.6Offsi.tepowertransfercapability.

DatankfuellevelcheckStoraetankfuellevelcheckFueltransferumtest4.8.1.1.2.a.4

(*)3.8.1.2and3.8.1.7StartTestandFastStartTest(4.8.1.1.2.a.4 isperformed asafaststartever184das)4.8.1.1.2.a.6

(*)N/A4.8.1.1.2.b.l

(**)3.8.1.54.8.1.1.2.b.2

(**)3.8.3.54.8.1.1.2.c

(***)3.8.3.33.8.3.34.8.1.1.2.d

(*~)DieselStandbyalinmentverification DaTankaccumulated waterremovalStoraeTankaccumulated waterremovalNewfuelsamlinStoraeTankfuelsamlin4.8.1.1~2.e.l.(18-months) 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.

(18-months) 4.8.1.1.2.e.3.

(18-months)

(4.8.l.1.2.e.4.a)andb))(18-months) 4.8.1.1.2.e.5.

(18-months)

(4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc))(18-months) 4.8.1.1.2.e.7.

(18-months)

(4.8.1.1.2.e.8.)

(18-months)

(4.8.l.l.2.e.9.a),b)andc))(18-months)

(4.8.1.1.2.e.10 a)andb)(18-months)

(4.8.1.1.2.e.ll)

(18-months) 4.8.1.1.2.

f.l(10ears)4.8.1.1.2.f.2 (10ears)4.8.1.1.2.f.3 (10ears)N/A3.8.1.93.8.1.103.8.1.113.8.1.123.8.1.19and3.8.1.133.8.1.14and3.8.1.15Intentmetby3.8.1.19.c.5.

3.8.1.163.8.1.173.8.1.183.8.3.6N/A3.8.1.20Dieselengineinspection permanufacturer's recommendations Single-Load Rejection TestFull-Load Rejection TestLoss-of-Offsite-Power (LOOP)Test.Includesloadsheddingandloadsequencing verifications.

SafetyInjection Actuation Signal(SIAS)Test CombinedSIASandLOOPTestsincluding Protective TripBypassTestEndurance andMarginTestandHotRestarttest.TheMarginTest(loadingtogreaterthanratedpower)isnotperformed atCook.MaximumAuto-Connected LoadTestSynchronizing TestandEmergency LoadTransferTestTestModeChange-Over Testwithconcurrent verification ofenergized safetyloadsLoadsequencer timingverification FueloilstoragetankcleaningFueloilsystemleaktestRedundant UnitStartingIndependence Test*PerT/STable4.8-1onastaggered testbasis(currently every31days)**Every31days***Priortoaddingfueltothestoragetanks J

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page3CDBasesfortheCurrentRequirements Asdescribed inthecurrentBasesforT/S3/4.8.1.2, theoperability oftheminimumspecified A.C.powersourcesduringshutdownandrefuel'ing providesassurance that1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitori'ng andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.D.NeedforRevisionoftheRequirement BackroundThesubjectsurveillances ofthisamendment requestresultinplanttransients thatcannotbesafelyperformed atpower.Therefore, thesurveillances areperformed whiletheplantisshutdown, typically forplannedrefueling outages.However,thenecessary equipment toperformthetestingmaynotbeavailable duringextendedoutages(including important non-safety equipment thatisdemonstrated toautomatically disconnect fromtheemergency bussesduringthetesting).

Furthermore, muchofthesafetyequipment necessary forthetestingisnotrequiredbytheT/SsinModes5and6orisactuallyrequiredtobeinoperable forothersafetyconsiderations (suchasthepotential toinadvertently damagetheplantfromoverpressurization whilecold).Fornormaldurationoutages,thesubjectsurveillances rarelyresultinoutageconflicts becausethe18-monthsurveillance interval(plusallowedextension) accommodates performance ofthetestingafteroutagecompletion andjustpriortoenteringMode4.Atthistimethe~necessary equipment tosupportthetestinghasbeenmadereadyfortheplantrestartsHoweverinthecaseofextendedoutages,particularly whenthedurationwasnotinitially anticipated, thesesurveillances maycomedueinmid.outage.Whenthisoccurs,theonlyavailable optionistosuspendoutageactivities sothattheplantcanbeplacedinacondition toperformthetesting,or,declarethedieselsT/Sinoperable andcomplywiththeapplicable actionsuntilthetestingcanbedone.Eitheroptionresultsinadelayintheoutagewithoutacompensating increaseinsafetybecausethedieselsmaybereliedupontoaccomplish theirfunctioninModes5and6withoutthesubjectsurveillances beingcurrent(seedetailsofCookjustification inF).Inaddition, therequiredtestingsubjectsthelimitedA.C.sourcesrequiredinModes5and6toasignificant transient.

Atestcomplication atthistimecouldresultinlossoftherequiredA.C.supplies.

Thissituation, anditsunnecessary impact,hasbeenanticipated andcorrected bytheITS.TheITSdoesnotrequire"thesubjectsurveillances tobeperformed ontherequiredoperableA.C.sourceswheninModes5and6.However,thisflexibility isnotpermitted bytheCookunit1andunit2T/Ss.CookextendedoutaesCookunits1and2havebeenshutdownsinceSeptember of1997and p~C Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Lcurrently remaininanextendedoutage.Sufficient equipment isnotavailable toperformtherequiredsurveillance testingatthespecified surveillance intervals.

Theunit1surveillance intervalexpiredonMarch1and3,1999,forthe1CDand1ABEDGsrespectively, andbothunit1EDGsweredeclaredT/Sinoperable.

Itisnotedthatatthistime,theunit1andunit2EDGswerealreadydeclaredinoperable duetoseismicqualification issuesinvolving HFArelays(hingedarmatureauxiliary) intheEDGand4KVsafetymotorcontrolcircuits(thiscondition wasreportedvialicenseeEventReport1999-001-00).

Correction, oftheHFArelayproblems, andappropriate postmaintenance testing,willrestoreoperability oftheEDGswithnoadditional outageimpact.However,unlesstheamendment isapproved, EDGinoperability duetotheexpiredsurveillances willcontinuetohaveanadverseimpactuntilthesurveillances canbeperformed.

Currently, unit1isinMode5withplanttemperature maintained atapproximately 125'F.Lowtemperature overpressure protection controlsareineffectwithcorresponding tagoutsonbothsafetyinjection (SI)pumpsandonecentrifugal chargingpump(CCP).Inaddition, thecontainment spraysystem(CTS)isundergoing considerable maintenance/modification topipingandpumps,including installation ofafull-flow recirculation line.Completion oftheCTSworkisnecessary tosupportthetestingandcouldrequiretheunit1EDGstoremainT/Sinoperable untilthesummerof1999.ThissameT/Sreliefwillbeneededforunit2inDecember1999whenthesurveillances becomeoverdue.E.Description oftheProposedChanges1&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2 topermitaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforSRs4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6

'),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.ll forunit1and2.Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeletethereference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.

Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismadetotheactionstatement 3.8.1.2toaddtheword"or"betweenthewords"COREALTERATIONS" and"positive reactivity changes."

Thesurveillance intervalextension willbeaccomplished byadditionofthefollowing, statement toT/Ssurveillance requirement 4.8.1.2:rCommencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.lO.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.ll maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

1&MproposestorevisethebasesforT/S4.,8.1.2todescribethereasonfortheextendedsurveillance intervals.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page5F.BasesoftheProposedChangesSummarofRelevantPoints~Thesurveillance intervalextensions proposedbythisrequestarepermitted bytheITS.~Asimilarrequestwasapprovedforanotherlicenseeduringanextendedoutage.~Eachdeferredsurveillance hasbeenreviewedandisnotessential todemonstrate dieselreliability inMode5and6.~Recentperformance ofthedeferredsurveillances hasnotresultedinfailuresthatwouldchallenge dieselfunctional requirements inModes5and6.~APRAestimatewasperformed oftheincreaseinEDGunavailability, inModes5and6,duetodeferralofthesubjectsurveillances.

Theresultsdemonstrated thatthedeferrals donotsignificantly increaseEDGunavailability inModes5and6.~EventsanalyzedinModes5and6do'nottakecr'editforautostartingoftheEDGsandprocedures existtomanuallystartandloadanEDGifanautostartsequencefails.~Appropriate administrative controlsareinplacetoensureonsiteoutageactivities donotchallenge theoffsitepowertransmission lines.~Thesurveillances thatwillcontinuetobeperformed provideadequateassurance theEDGsarecapableofsupplying emergency powerforthecurrentconditions.

~Theamendment requestdoesnotreducethenumberofrequiredoperablepowersupplies.

~Theamendment requestdoesnotmodifytheactionsrequiredforaninoperable powersupply.~Theplantisdesignedsuchthatanalyzedaccidents credibleinModes5and6wouldnotbeinitiated byaninterruption ofA.C.power.~Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities andfissionproductdecayheatratescurrently existingprovideassurance thattheconsequences ofanyaccidentorinadvertent releaseofradioactive materials areboundedbytheexistinganalysis.

~AlthoughthesubjectT/SrequiresonlyasingleoperableoffsitepowersupplyandasingleoperableEDGinModes5and6,administrative requirements forreducingshutdownrisksupplement theT/Srequirements whenappropriate.

EffectoftheExtendedShutdownonDecaheatandFissionProduct~ActivitNUREG-1431 providesthefollowing introduction tothebasesforACSources-Shutdown:

Ingeneral,whentheunitisshutdown,theTechnical Specifications requirements, ensurethattheunithasthecapability tomitigatetheconsequences ofpostulated accidents.

However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrent lossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.

Therationale forthisisbasedonthefactthatmanyDesignBasisAccidents (DBAs)thatareanalyzedinModes1,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinModes5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinModes5and6becausetheenergycontained Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page6withinthereactorpressureboundary, reactorcoolanttemperature andpressure, andthecorresponding stressesresultintheprobabilities ofoccurrence beingsignificantly reducedoreliminated, andinminimalconsequences.

Thesedeviations fromDBAanalysisassumptions anddesignrequirements duringshutdownconditions areallowedbytheLCOforrequiredsystems.'IThisisparticularly trueforCookunits1and2atthecurrenttimeduetothe18monthsofcontinuous shutdownpreceding thisamendment request.Reduceddecayheatloadswouldprovideadditional time,following disruption ofA.C.power,torestorepowerpriortoreachingthemaximumallowable temperature of200'FforMode5.Currently, forunit1,theestimated timetoreach200'Ffrom130'Fis18hours.ForUnit2,theestimated timetoreach200'Ffrom130'Fis12hours.Fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-claddinggapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18-months represents over70half-lives.

Discussion ofSafetAnalsisEvents1through8,listedbelow,areanalyzedintheunit1and2UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReports(UFSAR)inSection14.2,"StandbySafeguards Analysis":

1.2.3~5.6.7.8.FuelhandlingaccidentWasteliquidreleaseWastegasreleaseSteamgenerator tuberuptureSteampipe"rupture Ruptureofcontrolrodmechanism hous'ing-rodclustercontrol(RCC)assemblyejectionEnvironmental consequences following secondary systemaccidents Ruptureofafeedline(Unit2only)OthereventsandtheirUFSARsectioninclude:9.Uncontrolled RCCA(rodcontrolclusterassembly) withdrawal fromasubcritical condition (Section14.1.1)10.Uncontrolled BoronDilution(Section14.1.5)Therelevance oftheseeventstothisamendment requestisasfollows:1.FuelhandlingaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.

Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruptS.

onorlossofA.C.power Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page7couldnotinadvertently releaseafuelelementandconsequently, theprobability ofthiseventisnotincreased.

Inaddition, administrative controlsandcraneinterlocks precludethemovementofloadsgreaterthan2500pounds,orwiththepotential forexcessive impactenergy,overthespentfuelpool.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.

2.Accidental ReleaseofRadioactive LiquidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded intheChapter14evaluation thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident.

Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired.

3.WasteGasReleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistedinthefuelcladding.

Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltankandthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthatatankrupturesby'anunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.

Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Furthermore, thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysis.

Events4through8arenotrequiredtobeanalyzedinModes5and6duetonegligible storedenergyintheprimaryandsecondary systemsbelowtheMode5temperature limitof200'F.9.Uncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccurwiththereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized.

Withtheexception oftestingorspecialmaintenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.

Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortrip

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page8channelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.

An'interruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable.

Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence of~anuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbeincreased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.I10.Uncontrolled BoronDilutionThesourceofwaterforthiseventisprimarygradewaterviathereactormakeupportionoftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluethatprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution.

Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and6.PDuringcertaintypesofoperation, itisplausible thattheRWSTisatalowerboricacidconcentration thanthereactorcoolantsystemwater.Duetothelargereactivity marginsinherentinthedesignbasisfortheRWSTboronconcentration andslowdilutionprocess,ithasbeendetermined thatthisneednotbeconsidered asadilutionsource(thisconclusion isrecognized byanexistingfootnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2).

Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled borondilutionfromtheRWSTwouldnotbeincreased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Discussion ofStationBlackout(SBO)Stationblackout(lossofallA.C.power)wasevaluated forCookunits1and2inaccordance withtheNuclearManagement andResourceCouncil(NUMARC)87-00,"Guidelines andTechnical BasisforNUMARCInitiatives Addressing StationBlackoutatLightWaterReactors,"

Rev.1.TheNUMARCguidelines assumeaSBOoccursatpowerandisevaluated basedoncopingwiththeeventandmaintaining theplantinhotstandbyforaspecified duration.

Thebasisforthisassumption isprovidedinNUMARC87-00,paragraph 2.'2.2:(1)Thepotential forcoredamagefromastationblackoutisboundedbyeventsinitiated from100%powerduetothepresenceofsubstantial decayheat.(2)Transients initiated fromnormaloperating conditions areconsidered mostprobable.

Therefore, anSBOwasnotrequiredtobeevaluated inModes5and6.Nevertheless, SBOsinModes5and6haveoccurredintheindustryandhavebeenthesubjectofgenericcorrespondence.

Forexample,IEN90-25,Supplement 1,"LossOfVitalACPower Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page9WithSubsequent ReactorCoolantSystemHeat-Up",

describes theVogtlenuclearplanteventinwhichatruckcauseddamageintheelectrical switchyard andinitiated aSBO.Occurrence ofasimilareventatCookisunlikelyduetoadministrative controlsoveraccessandworkintheswitchyard areasduringoutages.Thefollowing discussion isprovidedtodemonstrate thattheprobability ofanSBOinModes5and6willnotbesignificantly increased bydeferralofthesubjectsurveillances.

AspartoftheNUMARC87-00guidelines, 1&Mcommitted toimplement andmaintainanEDGreliability program.Thisprogramisimplemented byprocedure PMI6080,Rev.2,"Emergency DieselGenerator (EDG)Reliability Monitoring Program."

Theprogramisapplicable atalltimes,including Modes5and6.Aspartofthisprogram,CookNuclearPlantisrequiredtomaintaintheEDGscreditedintheSBOcopingassessment atorabovespecified targetreliability levels.1&Mcommitted tomaintainanEDGtargetreliability ofgreaterthan0.975,asdescribed bytheNUMARCguidelines.

-Ifthetargetisnotmet,specificremedialactionsarerequiredtorestoretheEDGstoabovethetargetreliability level.TheCookNuclearPlantunit1and2EDGscurrently meettheirtargetreliability levels.TheSBOprogramwasthesubjectofsafetyevaluation reportsdatedOctober31,1991andApril23,1992'ieselReliabilit InadditiontotheNUMARCprogramdescribed aboveforSBO,EDGreliability istrackedaspartof10CFR50.65"Requirements formonitoring theeffectiveness ofmaintenance atnuclearpowerplants,"(i.e.,theMaintenance Rule)andbyT/Ssurveillance testing.WhenrequiredbyT/STable4.8-1,theEDGsareplacedonanaccelerated testfrequency.

Theunit1CDEDGandtheunit2ABEDGhaveeachbeenonanaccelerated testfrequency ononeoccasionsincethe1997shutdowns.

The1CDEDGwasonanaccelerated testfrequency duetoconsecutive testfailuresfromfueloilleaksatindividual injectors.

The2ABEDGwasonanaccelerated testfrequency duetoconsecutive testfailuresfromabrokenbracketontheexhaustmanifoldononeoccasionandbrokenorleakinginjectorlinesonthreeoccasions.

Thesefailuresareindividual mechanical failuresnotdirectlyrelatedtotheloadshedding, loadsequencing, andemergency startingcontxolcircuitsoftheEDGs.Individual mechanical failuressuchasthesearetypically (andinthiscasewere)detectedandcorrected duringmonthlytestingactivities notinvolving thesubjectdeferredsurveillances.

Currently, allfourEDGsareonnormalT/Ssurveillance schedules.

TheT/Stestfailuresdescribed above,forthe2ABEDG,alsocontributed tothismachinebeingplacedinaMaintenance Rule"(a)(1)"statusundertheMaintenance Ruletrendingprogram.Othercontributors tothe(a)(1)statusinvolvedafailedvoltageregulator andafailedstartingaircheckvalve(thesetwofailuresoccurredpriortothe1997unit2shutdown).

Noneofthesefailuresinvolvedadieselloadshedorloadsequencing controlcircuitmalfunction andwerenotidentified duringperformance ofanyofthesubjectsurveillances.

The(a)(1) 1ItE Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page10statusundertheMaintenance ruleisaclassification indicating thatestablished performance criteriaarenotbeingmet.Specificactionsarerequiredtocorrecttheconditions, andmonitorperformance, untiltheestablished goalsaremet.Thismonitoring iscurrently inprogressanditisanticipated thatthe2ABEDGwillbeoutofthe(a)(1)statuspriortothesubjectsurveillances becomingdue(seeadditional discussion belowunder"Estimate ofEDGunavailabilit duetotheextendedsurveillances").

EstimateofEDGunavailabilit duetotheextendedsurveillances Anassessment oftheloadsheddingandsequencing controlcircuitswasmadetodetermine aboundingincreaseindieselunavailability duetodeferring thesubjectsurveillances.

Theassessment wasperformed usingPRAtechniques.

Thestartingpointfortheassessment wastheMode1PRAEDGunavailability model.EDGfailureduetooverloadwasconsidered intheMode1PRAEDGmodelandwasimplicitly includedinthe"FailtoRun"failuremode.TheMode1EDGmodelalsoincludesunavailability.

oftheEDGscausedbytheunavailability ofrequiredsupportsystems,suchasEssential ServiceWater,250VDC,androomcooling.TheoverallMode1EDGaverageunavailability duetoallcauseswasdetermined asapproximately 13.2daysperyear.Forthepurposesofthisassessment, itwasdecidedtoaddasimplified representation ofloadsheddingandsequencing controlcircuitsintheMode1EDGunavailability modeltoallowanexplicitestimateoftheimpactofthesecircuits.

Onekeyassumption ofthePRAmodeladditionisthatthefailureofanysingleload-shed relaywillresultinanEDGoverload.

Thisconservative assumption ismadetosimplifythemodeledEDGresponse; itisrecognized thatanEDGoverloadcondition isnotacertainty ifasingleload-shedding relayfailstocloseandthatmanyoftheloadsrequiredtobeshedarealreadysecuredinModes5and6.Anotherkeysimplifying assumption ofthePRAmodeladditionisthat,giventheoccurrence ofanSIsignal,thefailureofanysingleSIload-conservation relaywillresultinanEDGoverload.

Finally,themodelalsoconsiders relayfailuresthatcouldresultinsimultaneous startsofsequenced loadstocauseanEDGoverload; inthiscase,simultaneous Black-outandSIsignalsarerequired.

Theaveragecontribution toEDGunavailability duetothefailureofanyoftheserelayswasdetermined usingElectricPowerResearchInstitute (EPRI)data.Theadditionoftheloadsheddingandsequencing controlcircuitmodeljustdescribed totheMode1EDGunavailability modelcontributed 2.8%toEDGunavailability.

Thus,forMode5EDGunavailability wasestimated as13.6daysperyear.Theeffectofincreasing thetimeintervalbetweenperformance ofthesubjectsurveillances wasestimated asfollows.Thefailuredatafortherelaysweremodifiedbylinearlyscalingthenominaldatabytheratiooftheassumedsurveillance intervaltothenominalsurveillance intervalbasedonguidancecontained inNUREG/CR-4550 (Volume1,Revision1,page8-7).Inotherwords,foranassumedsurveillance intervalof30months,thenominalfailuredatawasmultiplied byafactorof30/18or1.67.Similarly, foran,assumedsurveillance intervalof42months,thenominalfailuredatawasmultiplied byafactorof42/18or2.33.Theresultofthisapproachwasanestimated increaseinEDG

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page11unavailability of2.2%to13.9daysperyear,ifthesurveillance intervalwasincreased from18monthsto30months.Theestimated increaseinEDGunavailability was4.0%to14.1daysperyear,ifthesurveillance intervalwasincreased from18monthsto42months.Thesenumbersshowthatincreasing theEDGsurveillance testintervalleadstoverysmallincreases inEDGunavailability.

Theimpactwouldbeexpectedtobesignificantly lowerifamoredetailedrepiesentation oftheload-shedding circuitry wasdeveloped orcreditwastakenforthepossibility ofoperatorrecoveryactions.PlantShutdownSafetandRiskManaementT/S3.8.1.2requiresasingleoffsitepowersupplyandasingleEDGtobeoperableinModes5and6.Thisrequirement isobservedbyadministrative policiesforreducingshutdownrisk(whennotpossibletheT/SActionstatements arecompliedwith).Administrative policiesrequiretheT/Srequirements tobesupplemented inMode5and6whenRCSinventory isbelowspecified minimums~Whenthesespecified minimumsarenotmet,T/Srequirements aresupplemented byrequiring anadditional offsitesourceoranadditional EDGtobeavailable.

WheninMode5andMode6withreducedRCSinventory, anadditional offsitesourceandanadditional EDGarerequiredtobeavailable.

I&M'spoliciesforplantshutdownsafetyandriskmanagement havebeenreviewedrelativetothesubjectdeferrals andarenotimpacted.

Sinificance oftheDeferredSurveillance Reuirements Thefollowing isarestatement ofeachdeferredsurveillance requirement andadiscussion ofitssignificance inModes5and6:4.8.1.1.2.e.4.

Simulating alossofoffsitepowerbyitself,and:a)Verifying de-energization oftheemergency bussesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency busses,b)Verifying thatthedieselstartsontheauto-start signal,energizes theemergency busseswithpermanently connected loadswithin10seconds,energizes theauto-connected shutdownloadsthroughtheloadsequencer andoperatesforgreaterthanorequalto5minuteswhileitsgenerator isloadedwiththeshutdownloads.Afterloadsequencing iscompleted, thesteadystatevoltageandfrequency oftheemergency bussesshallbemaintained at4160+420voltsand60+1.2.Hzduringthetest.Thissurveillance testsimulates alossofoffsitepower(LOOP).Following thisLOOPsimulation, theEDGwouldautomatically startandload.lfproperloadsheddingdidnottakeplace,anEDGcouldbeoverloaded assoonasitenergized theemergency busses.Improperloadsequencing couldcauseamomentary overload.

Thelikelihood ofeitheroftheseoccurrences isconsidered verylowbasedonPRAassessment oftherelayfailurerates,periodiccalibration oftherelaysandtheresultsofthelasttwo4'.1.1.2.e

~4surveillance testsforeachEDG.Reviewofthetestsindicated thatloadsheddingofnon-safety loadsorsequencing ofsafetyloadshadnotresultedinanEDGtest Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page12failure.Inoneinstance, fortheunit2CDEDG,theGroupC4pressurizer heatersfailedtoloadshed.Thefaultwasdetermined tobeinthebreakerandnotintheloadshedrelay.Theadditional loadrepresented bytheseheatersdidnotresultinexceeding theavailable capacityonthismachineandwouldnothaveresultedinlossoftheEDGduringanactualLOOP.IntheunlikelyeventthatanautostartofanEDGwasunsuccessful, approvedprocedures existtomanuallystarttheEDGsandmanuallystartrequiredloads.Basedonreviewofthetestingandavailability ofappropriate procedures, I&Mconcluded thatalossofoffsitepowerinModes5and6wouldresultinasuccessful automatic ormanualstartandloadoftheEDGs.4.8.1.1.2.e.6.

Simulating alossofoffsitepowerinconjunction withaSafetyInjection actuation testsignal,andby:a)Verifying de-energization oftheemergency bussesand'oadsheddingfromtheemergency buses,b)Verifying thatthedieselstartsontheauto-start signal,energizes theemergency busseswithpermanently connected loadswithin10seconds,energizes theauto-connected emergency (accident) loadsthroughtheloadsequencer andoperatesforgreaterthanorequalto5minuteswhileitsgenerator isloadedwiththeemergency loads.Afterloadsequencing iscompleted, thesteadystatevoltageandfrequency oftheemergency bussesshallbemaintained at4160+420voltsand60+1.2.Hz.Thevoltageandfrequency shallbemaintained withintheselimitsfortheremainder ofthistest,andc)Verifying thatallautomatic dieselgenerator trips,exceptengineoverspeed andgenerator differential, areautomatically bypasseduponlossofvoltageontheemergency busandlorSafetyInjection actuation signal.Thistestissimilarto4.8.1.1.2.e.4, above,inthattheloadsheddingfunctionisrepeatedandsafetyloadsaresequenced on.However,intheloadsequencing withaconcurrent safetyinjection actuation signal(SIAS),moreloadsarepickedupandtheCTSpumpsarestarted.ThisresultsinthemaximumEDGload.InModes5and6,startingoftheCTSpumpsisnotrequiredorpermitted.

Additionally, inModes5and6,avalidSIASisnotcredibleandtheSIASactuation logicisnotrequiredtobeoperable.

Therefore, thefullloadsequencedemonstrated bythistestisunlikelytooccurinModes5and6.OnaLOOP,inModes5and6,theEDGwouldrespondasdescribed insurveillance 4.8.1.1.2.e.4 above.4.8.1.1.2.e.8.

Determine thattheauto-connected loadstoeachdieselgenerator donotexceed3500kw.Thistestconfirmsthatallsafetyrelatedloadsautomatically connected totheEDGsunderemergency conditions donotexceedthecontinuous dutyratingoftheEDG.Theimportance ofthis Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page13testinginModes5and6isgreatlyreduced.WhileinModes5and6below200'F,mostoftheemergency corecoolingsystempumpsandtheCTSaremaintained inaconfiguration toprecludeautomatic actuation.'herefore, duetothelimitednumberofsafetyloadsrequiredtobeoperableinModes5and6,thereisadequateassurance thatEDGcapacitywouldnotbeexceededbytheauto-connected loads.4.8.1.1.2.e.9.

Verifying thedieselgenerator's capability to:a)Synchronize withtheoffsitepowersourcewhilethegenerator isloadedwithitsemergency loadsuponasimulated restoration ofoffsitepower.b)Transferitsloadstotheoffsitepowersource,andc)Berestoredtoitsstandbystatus.Theoffsitepowersupplyisconsidered tobethepreferred powersourceduringaccidentmitigation withtheEDGsactingasthebackupemergency supply.IncaseofanEngineered SafetyFeaturesactuation inwhichtheoffsitepowersourcewasnotavailable, theEDGwouldbesupplying theemergency loads.Uponrestoration oftheoffsitepowersupply,itisrequiredthattheemergency loadscanbetransferred backtothepreferred supply,whilerunning,topermitplacingtheEDGbackinastandbylineup.Basedonpastexperience andthecompleted testprocedure reviewsforthistest,I&Mdoesnotanticipate aproblemwithparalleling theEDGsunderanyconditions.

Additionally, thesignificance ofthiscapability underthecurrentplantconditions isgreatlyreduced.Coolingcapability forremovalofdecayheatisanimportant safetyfunctioninmodes5and6.However,interruptions indecayheatremovalcoolingarerecognized byT/S3/4.4.1.4 and3/4.4.1.5 (ColdShutdown-Loops FilledandColdShutdown-Loops NotFilled,respectively) foruptoonehour.Iftheoffsitepowersupplywaslostforasustained periodand'ecayheatremovalwasinprogressusinganEDG,itwouldnotbeessential (uponrestoration ofoffsitepower)thatarunningresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumpbetransferred backtotheoffsitepowersupplywithoutinterruption.

Ifnecessary, thepumpcouldbesecuredwhiletheEDGwasplacedbackinastandbylineupandthenreenergized fromoffsitepower.Decayheatremovalduringrefueling operations isaddressed byT/S3/4.9.F1(Residual HeatRemovalandCoolantCirculation),

whichrequiresatleastoneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopinoperation atalltimes.Typically, theconditions forarefueling aresetverysoonafterplantshutdown, withdecayheatloadsatdesignmaximumvaluesandreducedtimetoreach200'Fifcoolingwaslost.Forthecurrentsituation of18-months ofshutdown, T/S3/4.9.8.1 isextremely conservative.

IfalossofoffsitepowerrequiredaperiodofdecayheatremovalusingtheEDGforpower,andthenoffsitepowerwasrestored, itwouldbetechnically acceptable, ifnecessary, tointerrupt RHRforashorttimewhiletheEDGwasplacedbackinstandby.Atemporary interruption ofRHRisrecognized, forupto1hourper8hourperiod,whenmovingfuelnearthereactorpressurevesselhotlegs.Althoughitistechnically acceptable andpermitted bytheT/Sstointerrupt coolingforashorttimeinmodes5and6,I&Mhas Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page14concluded, basedonprevioustesting,thatRHRcouldbetransferred backtooffsitepowerwithoutinterruption.

Basedontheabove,thebenefitfromperforming surveillance 4'.1.1.2.e.9 istoensurethespecificcapabilities oftheEDGareverifiedpriortothenextentryintoMode4.4.8.1.1.2.e.10.

Verifying thatwiththedieselgenerator operating inatestmodewhileconnected toitstestload,asimulated SafetyInjection signaloverrides thetestmodeby:a)Returning thedieselgenerator tostandbyoperation

,andb)Verifying theemergency loadsareservicedbyoffsitepower.Thebenefitofperforming thistestingatthecurrenttimeisgreatlyminimized becausethereceiptofavalidSIASactuation signalinModes5and6isnotcredible, andtheSIASactuation logicisnotrequiredtobeenergized inModes5and6.4.8.1.1.2.e.ll.

Verifying thattheautomatic sequencetimingrelaysareOPERABLEwitheachloadsequencetimewithinplusorminus5%ofitsrequiredvalueandthateachloadissequenced onwithinthedesignallowable timelimit.Inthecurrentconditions, theonlyloadsthatautomatically startonaLOOParethenonessential servicewater(NESW),auxiliary feedwater (AFW),essential servicewater(ESW),andcomponent coolingwater(CCW)pumps(AFWwouldtypically beprecluded fromstartingwhenRHRisusedfordecayheatremoval).

Startingoftheseloadsoutofsequencecouldresultinatemporary overloadoftheEDGbutthisisveryunlikelyduetothenumberofloadsthatwouldnotstartinthecurrentcondition.

Inaddition, pastperformance ofthissurveillance hasnotdisclosed significant problemswiththeloadsequencing relays.Aspreviously discussed, theserelaysarewithintheircurrentcalibration intervals, andtheHFArelayswillbeappropriately testedpriortodeclaring theEDGsoperable.

Basedonthis,I&Misconfident thattheEDGswouldnotbechallenged byloadsequencing problems.

ReulatorPrecedence GenericLetter(GL)91-04,"ChangesinTechnical Specifications Surveillance Intervals toAccommodate a24-MonthFuelCycle,"waspublished April2,1991.ThepurposeoftheGLwastoprovideguidancetolicensees wishingtotakeadvantage ofimprovements inreactorfuelstoincreasethedurationofthefuelcyclefortheirfacilities.

ThestaffincludedinitsguidanceinGL91-04thefollowing statement:

TheNRCstaffhasreviewedanumberofrequeststoextend18-monthsurveillances totheendofafuelcycleandafewrequestsforchangesinsurveillance intervals toaccommodate a24-monthfuelcycle.Thestaffhasfoundthattheeffectonsafetyissmallbecausesafetysystemsuseredundant electrical andmechanical components andbecauselicensees performothersurveillances duringplantoperation thatconfirmthatthesesystemsandcomponents canperformtheirsafetyfunctions.

Nevertheless, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page15licensees shouldevaluatetheeffectonsafetyofanincreasein18-monthsurveillance intervals toaccommodate a24-monthcycle.Thisevaluation shouldsupportaconclusion thattheeffectonsafetyissmall.Licensees shouldconfirmthathistorical plantmaintenance andsurveillance datasupportthisconclusion.

The24-monthintervaldescribed byGL91-04involvespermanent extensions ofthe18-monthintervalduringperiodsofreactoroperation whentheimportance ofthesurveillances isincreased.

ThespecificEDGsurveillances addressed bythisT/Schangerequestwill,ifgranted,besuspended duringtheoutagebutwillbeperformed priortoentryintomode4.Additional regulatory precedence isestablished inNUREG-1431.

T/SSR3.8.2.1ofNUREG-1431 includesanotestatingthatthesubjectSRsneednotbeperformed onanoperabledieselinModes5and6.Thereasonforthisisdescribed inthebasesandisgenerally toprecludetheoperabledieselfrombeingrenderedinoperable duringperformance ofSRs,andprecludedeenergizing arequired4160VESFbusordisconnecting arequiredoffsi:tecircuitduringperformance ofSRs.WithlimitedA.C.sourcesavailable, asingleeventcouldcompromise boththerequiredcircuitandtheEDG.TheSalemGenerating StationUnitNos.1and2(DPR-70andDPR-75),wereinvolvedinanextendedoutagesimilartothecurrentoutagesforCookunits1and2.Thisresultedinanamendment requesttopermanently extendthesurveillance intervals forallMode5and6EDGsurveillances thatarepermitted tobeextendedbytheITS(thisincludeseachofthesurveillances inthisamendment request).

Thejustification providedfortheamendment reliedprimarily ontheITSBasesforthedeferrals.

Theamendment wasapprovedasAmendment Nos.212and192.Administrative andEditorial ChanesPrevioussubmittal AEP:NRC:0433Q involvedanadministrative changethataffectsunit2T/Spage3/4.8-9.BecauseI&MexpectsthatthecurrentrequestwillbeapprovedpriortoAEP:NRC:0433Q, thisadministrative changeisduplicated inthissubmittal.

Thechangeinvolvesdeletionofreference toT/S4.0.8.T/S4.0.8allowedextensions forcertainsurveillances requiredtobeperformed onorbeforeAugust13,1994,anddesignated as18-monthor36-monthsurveillances (orrequiredasoutage-related surveillances undertheprovisions ofT/S4.0.5).T/S4.0.8alsoaffectedtheinitiation dateestablished duringtheunit21994refueling outage.Eachaffectedsurveillance ismodifiedbyanotestatingthattheprovisions ofT/S4.0.8areapplicable.

Theseextensions weregrantedtoaccommodate scheduled workatthetime.Unit2surveillances arenowscheduled inaccordance withtheapplicable T/Ss.Therefore, forunit2,T/S4.0.8isdeletedfromSR4.8.1.2becauseitnolongerapplies.Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismadetotheactionstatement toaddamissing"or".betweenthewords"COREALTERATIONS" and"positive reactivity changes."

The"or"isproperlyincludedintheunit2T/Sandthiseditorial correction Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322 Page16willmaketheunit1andunit2T/SSR4.8.1.2identical.

Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Conclusions Theproposedamendment involvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdown.ItdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLCO,doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersupplies, anddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfintroduce apotential failuremechanism orsignificantly increasetheprobability ofEDGfailureondemand.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateassurance thattheEDGswillbeavailable ifneeded.Thesingleandfullloadrejection testsofT/SSR4.8.1.1.2.e.2 and4.8.1.1.2.e.3 willbeperformed priortodeclaring theEDGsoperable.

Thistestingdemonstrates propergovernorresponseandprovidesassurance thatadroppedloadduringamanualorautomatic loadingsequencedoesnotresultinlossoftheEDG.'herefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable ifneeded,andrisktopublichealthandsafetyinModes5and6isnotincreased.

Basedontheabove,theA.C.electrical powersystemswouldcontinuetoperformtheirfunctionfollowing anaccidentasdetermined previously.

Therefore, therewouldbenochangeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.Further,becausetherequestisfordeferring normallyperformed SRs,itwasconcluded thatthechangeshavenoimpactonindividual orcumulative occupational radar.ation exposure.

G.ImpactoftheProposedChangesBothunit1EDGsareinoperable duetoexpiration ofthesurveillance

interval, plusextension, ofthesubjectsurveillances ofT/SSR4.8.1.1.2.e.

1&Misperforming therequiredactionsand,ithasbeenshownthatsafetyisnotsignificantly reducedbydeferralofthesubjectSRs.Iftheamendment isnotapproved, theEDGsmustremaininoperable untilplantconditions cansupporttherequiredtesting.Inoperability oftheEDGswillseverelyimpactoutageflexibility andprolongthedurationofmaintenance activities withoutacompensating increaseinsafety.Reduction inthedurationofmaintenance activities isacomponent ofminimizing shutdownrisk.Thepotential outagedurationandscopeforunit2,including thepossibility ofemergentwork,mayresultinasimilarimpacttoUnit2.Thechangeisrequested forunit2inanticipation ofthispotential impact.Ithasbeenshownthatsafetyisnotsignificantly reducedbydeferralofthesubjectSRs.Theadministrative changetounit2andtheeditorial correction tounit1havenoimpact.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1322Page17H.ScheduleRequirements I&Mrequestsapprovalofthisrequestassoonaspossibletopermitreturning theunit1EDGstoanoperablestatus.