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{{#Wiki_filter:RIORITY1CCELERATEDRIDSPROCI'.SSIiG)REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9505010273DOC.DATE:95/04/25NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
{{#Wiki_filter:RIORITY1CCELERATED RIDSPROCI'.SSIi G)REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9505010273 DOC.DATE:
95/04/25NOTARIZED:
NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ApplicationforamendtolicenseDPR-58,incorporating2.0voltinterimSGtubesupportplatepluggingcriterionforfuelcycle15.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRJENCLLSIZE:I++8-TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTESRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LAHICKMAN,JINTERNA~@IL~ENPEINRR/DE/EMCBNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTEXTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDPNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111011ENVOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIEV'TS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEO'KSTE!COVTACT'I'IIEDOC!:KIEV.I'OVTROLDESK,ROOKIPI-37(EXT.504-OS3)TOELDIIiATEYOURNAi!L'ROilDISI'RIBUTIONLIS'ISI:ORDOCUh,IEi'I'SYOUDOi"I'L'I'.D!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR14ENCL13 itjC IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus,OH432168April25,i995DocketNos'0-315AEP:NRC:1166RU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESTOINCORPORATE2.0VOLTINTERIMSTEAMGENERATORTUBESUPPORTPLATEPLUGGINGCRITERIONFORFUELCYCLE15ThisletteranditsattachmentsprovidesupplementalinformationinresponsetotheMarch15,1995,telephonediscussionswithyourstaffregardingourFebruary3,1995,letter,AEP:NRC:1166Q,concerningapplicationforamendmenttothetechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)ofDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitl.Specifically,thissupplementalinformationaddressestheapplicablerequirementsofdraftNRCGenericLetter(GL)94-XX,"Voltage-BasedRepairCriteriafortheRepairofWestinghouseSteamGeneratorTubesAffectedbyOutsideDiameterStressCorrosionCracking."Foryourconvenience,allattachmentspreviouslysubmittedwithAEP:NRC:1166Qarebeingre-submittedandsupersedethosecontainedinthatsubmittal.Attachment1providesatechnicalsummaryofthespecificinspectionpracticesandcalculationalmethodologiesoutlinedinGL94-XXthatwillbeappliedtotheUni.t1interimpluggingcriteriaprogramandthe10CFR50.92nosignificanthazardsevaluation.Theevaluationandresultssupportcontinueduseof2voltinterimpluggingcriteriaforfuelcycle15.Attachment2containsexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttherequestedchanges.Attachment3providestheproposedrevisedT/Spages./95050i0273950425PDRADOCK05000315PDR J45 U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC:1166RWebelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommitteeatthenextregularlyscheduledmeeting.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.TheT/SpagesaffectedbythoseproposedchangesarealsoimpactedbytheT/SpagessubmittedwithourApril13,1995,letterAEP:NRC:1129D,UseofLaserWeldedSleevesforSteamGeneratorTubes.Sincerely,E.E,FitzpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHIS4~DAYOF1995NoryPublicehAttachmentscc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett f't4V'tr~va4 ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1166RDESCRIPTIONOFCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS10CFR50.92EVALUATION  
Application foramendtolicenseDPR-58,incorporating 2.0voltinterimSGtubesupportplatepluggingcriterion forfuelcycle15.DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR JENCLLSIZE:I++8-TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTESRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNA~@IL~ENPEI NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT EXTERNAL:
NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111011ENVOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIEV'TS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEO'KSTE!COVTACT'I'IIEDOC!:KIEV.
I'OVTROLDESK,ROOKIPI-37(EXT.504-OS3)TOELDIIiATE YOURNAi!L'ROil DISI'RIBUTION LIS'ISI:ORDOCUh,IEi'I'S YOUDOi"I'L'I'.D!
TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR14ENCL13 itjC IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH432168April25,i995DocketNos'0-315AEP:NRC:1166R U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESTOINCORPORATE
 
==2.0 VOLTINTERIMSTEAMGENERATOR==
TUBESUPPORTPLATEPLUGGINGCRITERION FORFUELCYCLE15Thisletteranditsattachments providesupplemental information inresponsetotheMarch15,1995,telephone discussions withyourstaffregarding ourFebruary3,1995,letter,AEP:NRC:1166Q, concerning application foramendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)ofDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitl.Specifically, thissupplemental information addresses theapplicable requirements ofdraftNRCGenericLetter(GL)94-XX,"Voltage-BasedRepairCriteriafortheRepairofWestinghouse SteamGenerator TubesAffectedbyOutsideDiameterStressCorrosion Cracking."
Foryourconvenience, allattachments previously submitted withAEP:NRC:1166Q arebeingre-submitted andsupersede thosecontained inthatsubmittal.
Attachment 1providesatechnical summaryofthespecificinspection practices andcalculational methodologies outlinedinGL94-XXthatwillbeappliedtotheUni.t1interimpluggingcriteriaprogramandthe10CFR50.92nosignificant hazardsevaluation.
Theevaluation andresultssupportcontinued useof2voltinterimpluggingcriteriaforfuelcycle15.Attachment 2containsexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttherequested changes.Attachment 3providestheproposedrevisedT/Spages./95050i0273 950425PDRADOCK05000315PDR J45 U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC:1166R Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee atthenextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),
copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.TheT/SpagesaffectedbythoseproposedchangesarealsoimpactedbytheT/Spagessubmitted withourApril13,1995,letterAEP:NRC:1129D, UseofLaserWeldedSleevesforSteamGenerator Tubes.Sincerely, E.E,Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS4~DAYOF1995NoryPublicehAttachments cc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector
-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett f't4V'tr~va4 ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1166R DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 10CFR50.92EVALUATION  
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PsAttachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage1I.INTRODUCTIONThisamendmentrequestproposesachangetoCookNuclearPlantUnit1steamgenerators(SG)T/Ss4.4.5.2,4.4.5.3,4.4.5.4,4.4.5.5,3.4.6.2andBases3/4.4.5and3/4.6.2toallowcontinueduseofSGtubesupportplateinterimpluggingcriteria(IPC)forfuelcycle15.Becauseofthechanges,textshiftandrepagenationarerequired.ThechangeallowsSGtubeswithbobbincoileddycurrentindicationslessthanorequalto2voltsattubesupportplateintersectionstoremaininservice,regardlessofapparentdepthoftubewallpenetration,ifasaresult,theprojectedend-of-cycle(EOC)distributionofcrackindicationsisshowntoresultinprimary-to-secondaryleakagelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulatedsteamlinebreakevent.Indicationsgreaterthan2voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifamotorizedrotatingpancakecoil(MRPC)probeinspectiondoesnotdetectdegradation.Thisamendment,specifictofuelcycle15,wouldreducethenumberofSGtubespluggedduetoindicationsatsupportplateintersections.ReducingthenumberofpluggedtubesprovidesAD@Abenefitsandmaintainsreactorcoolantsystem(RCS)flowmargin.AnassessmentreportaddressingtheeffectivenessoftheIPCmethodologydescribedinWCAP-13187,Revision0,wascompletedfollowingfuelcycle13andreportedinsubmittaldocumentAEP:NRC:1166J.ThereportconcludedthatthevoltagedistributionfoundbyinspectionatEOC13in1994isingoodagreementwiththeprojectionsmadeatEOC12in1992.Thevoltagegrowthratescontinuetobeverysmall,withamaximumgrowthof0.4voltsforfuelcycle13comparedto0.49voltsforfuelcycle12.Notubeswerefoundforwhichthebobbincoilvoltageexceededthe2voltIPCrepairlimitatEOC13.ThemaximumprojectedEOC14voltagebasedonEOC13voltagedistributionis2.0voltsusingtheNRCmodeland1.9voltsusingtheindustrymodel.Consideringtheresultsofthisreport,continuationof2voltIPCisjustifiedforfuelcycle15.SimilarassessmentandprojectionreportswillbepreparedatEOC14basedonGL94-XXreportingrequirements.II'PPLICATIONOFDRAFTGL94-XXREUIREMENTSTOTHCOOKNUCLARPLANTUNIT1SGIPCLICENSEAMENDMENTREVESTFORCYCLE15TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1,2voltIPCwillbeimplementedpertheguidanceofGL94-XXalongwiththelatestindustrydataforburstandleakagedatabases.NRCGL94-XXwillbefactoredintotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCasfollows:
PsAttachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page1I.INTRODUCTION Thisamendment requestproposesachangetoCookNuclearPlantUnit1steamgenerators (SG)T/Ss4.4.5.2,4.4.5.3,4.4.5.4,4.4.5.5,3.4.6.2andBases3/4.4.5and3/4.6.2toallowcontinued useofSGtubesupportplateinterimpluggingcriteria(IPC)forfuelcycle15.Becauseofthechanges,textshiftandrepagenation arerequired.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage2Analystswillbebriefedregardingthepossibilityofprimarywaterstresscorrosioncracking(PWSCC)attubesupportplateintersections.IfPWSCCisfoundatthesupportplateintersectionsitwillbereportedtotheNRCstaffpriortostartup.2)ThesupportingdatasetsforcalculationofburstprobabilityandestimationofprimarytosecondaryleakageduringapostulatedmainsteamlinebreakwillbethoselistedinSections2.a.land2.b.3(1),respectively,oftheGL.3)MainsteamlineburstprobabilityandleakagecalculationswillbeperformedfollowingtheguidanceofGL94-XX,Section2,"TubeIntegrityEvaluation."Calculationsperformedinsupportofthevoltage-basedrepaircriteriawillfollowthemethodologydescribedinWCAP-14277,"SteamLineBreakLeakRateandTubeBurstProbabilityAnalysisMethodsforOutsideDiameterStressCorrosionCrackingatTubeSupportPlateIntersections,"datedJanuary1995'hecalculationswillbeperformedpriortoreturningtheSGstoserviceusingtheas-foundEOC14voltagedistribution.TheprojectedEOC15voltagedistributionresultswillbereportedinthe90dayreport.NodistributioncutoffwillbeappliedtothevoltagemeasurementvariabilitydistributionforcalculationoftheprojectedEOCvoltagedistribution.4)Inspectionscope,dataacquisition,anddataanalysiswillbeperformedfollowingtheguidanceofGL94-XX,Section3,"InspectionCriteria"andAppendixA,"NDEDataAcquisitionandAnalysisGuidelines"submittedbyourletterAEP:NRC:1166Hforthecycle14IPC.Motorizedrotatingpancakecoilinspectionwillbedoneonallindicationsexceeding1.5volts.Motorizedrotatingpancakecoilinspectionwillalsobedoneonallintersectionswherecoppersignals,largemixedresiduals,ordentslargerthan5voltsinterferewithdetectionofflaws.Probewearinspectionsandre-inspectionswillbeperformedusingtheguidelinesofAppendixA,SectionA.2.3,assubmittedbyourletterAEP:NRC:1166H.Ifanyofthelastprobewearstandardsignalamplitudespriortoprobereplacementexceedthe+/-15$limit,byavalueof"X%",thenanyindicationsmeasuredsincethelastacceptableprobewearmeasurementthatarewithin"XS"oftheplugginglimitwillbereinspectedwiththenewprobe.Forexample,ifanyofthelastprobewearsignalamplitudespriortoprobereplacementwere17%aboveorbelowtheinitialamplitude,thentheindicationsthatarewithin2%(17%-15%)oftheplugginglimitmustbereinspectedwiththenewprobe.Alternatively,thevoltagecriterionmaybeloweredtocompensatefortheexcessvariation;forthecaseabove,amplitudesz0.98timesthevoltagecriterioncouldbesubjecttorepair.
ThechangeallowsSGtubeswithbobbincoileddycurrentindications lessthanorequalto2voltsattubesupportplateintersections toremaininservice,regardless ofapparentdepthoftubewallpenetration, ifasaresult,theprojected end-of-cycle (EOC)distribution ofcrackindications isshowntoresultinprimary-to-secondary leakagelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulated steamlinebreakevent.Indications greaterthan2voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifamotorized rotatingpancakecoil(MRPC)probeinspection doesnotdetectdegradation.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage3Bobbincoilprobecalibrationwillbeperformedusingfour20%holesintheASMEcalibrationstandardinsteadofthe100%throughwallholes.ThisapproachwasconcurredwithbytheNRCstaffattheJanuary18,1995,NRC/Industrymeeting.5)GL94-ZX,Section5,"OperationalLeakageRequirements,"willbecontinued.TheSGtubeleakagelimitof150gallonsperdaythrougheachSGwillbemaintainedaspreviouslyapprovedbytheNRCforourlastfuelcycle.CookNuclearPlantleakagemonitoringmethodsprovidetimelyleakdetection,trending,andresponsetorapidlyincreasingleaks.6)GL94-XX,Section6,"ReportingRequirements,"willbeimplemented.Itshouldbenoted,asstatedpreviouslyforSection2,thatthecalculationofleakageandburstprobabilityrequiredpriortoreturningtheSGstoservicewillbeperformedbyuseoftheas-foundEOCvoltagedistribution.AEPSCCOMMENTSEXCEPTIONSTOGL94-XXANDASSOCIATEDMPACTTOEPSCLICENSEAMENDMENTREVESTFORSGPCFORCYCLE15GL94-ZX,Sectionl,b:AnalysesperformedbyWestinghousehaveshownthatnotubesintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGswouldbesubjecttocollapseduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)+safeshutdownearthquake(SSE)event.Therefore,notubesareexcludedbasedonthiscriteria.Itemsl.b.2andl.b.3arenotapplicablesincetheseconditionsdonotexistintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1'SGs.Series51SGsdesignedbyWestinghousedonothaveflowdistributionbaffleplates.2)GL94-ZX,Section3.b.2:BasedontubepullresultsfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1,copperdepositsarenotpresentonthetubeoutsidediameter(OD)surfacesorinthetubesupportplate(TSP)crevicecorrosionproduct.Similarly,CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveevidenceof"largemixedresidualsignals."CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveahistoryofeddycurrentdatawhichisdifficulttointerpret.3)GL94-ZX,Section3.c.2:Bobbincoilprobeswillcontinuetobecalibratedagainstthe20%holesintheASMEcalibrationstandardtoremainconsistentwiththemethodologyusedtodevelopthecriteria.GL94-ZX,Section3.c.4:Therequirementtoreinspectalltubespriortothelastprobechangeoutifthewearmeasurementexceeds15%isunnecessary.As'acknowledgedintheGL,a5.6voltrepaircriterionisjustified,however,therepaircriterioniscurrentlylimitedto2.0volts.Suchindicationsareexpectedtobewell Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage4withinstructurallimitsatEOC15conditions,particularlywhenUnit1growthratesareconsidered.ReinspectionofindicationsnecessitatedbyoutofspecificationprobewearwillbeconductedaccordingtoItem4ofpage2ofthisattachment.5)GL94-XX,Section4,addressestheneedtoperformtubepulls.Tubepullscausesignificantoutageextension,occupationalradiationexposure,andsignificantdirectcost.(Asanexample,removalofthreetubesamplesduringtheupcomingCookNuclearPlantUnit1refuelingoutageisestimatedtoaddtwotothreedaystotheoutagecriticalpath,havedirectcostsintherangeof$0.8-$1.3million,andincurfrom2-5manremexposure.)Therefore,tubesselectedforpullingshouldbejudiciouslychosenandshouldjustifythemonetaryexpenseandradiologicalexposure.Tubesshouldnotbepulledmerelytosatisfyachronologicalrequirement.AEPSCbelievesthattheimpositionofthisrequirementduringthenextscheduledrefuelingoutagewillnotenhancethecurrentburstandleakagedatabasessufficientlytowarranttheaddedcost.JustificationfornotperformingatubepullduringthenextoutageatCookNuclearPlantUnit1issuppliedbelow.A)In1992,nineCookNuclearPlantUnit1TSPintersectionswereremovedformetallographicexamination,bursttestingandleaktesting.Fieldbobbincoilvoltagesrangedfrom1.0to2.0volts,includingfourintersectionsreportedasNDD.Burstpressuresrangedfrom9,100to11,200psig.forthereportedindicationsandnointersectionsleakedduringtestingat2560psid.ExaminationoftubesafterbursttestingshowedcombinationsofaxiallyorientedintergranularstresscorrosioncrackingandintergranularcellularcorrosionoriginatingfromthetubeOD.Degradationmorphologywasdominatedbytheaxiallyorienteddegradation.InadditiontotheUnit1tubepullssupportingSGIPC,significantnumbersofintersectionswereremovedfromUnit2in1984and1986.Inallcases,circumferentiallyorienteddegradationwasnotdetected.B)Outsidediameterstresscorrosioncracking(ODSCC)degradationgrowthrateforCookNuclearPlantUnit1hasdecreasedoverthelasttwocyclesandnointersectionsduringthelastoutagehadTSPintersectionvoltagesexceeding2.0volts.Thishighlevelofperformanceisattributedtotheunitoperatingatreducedtemperatureandpressure,improvedsecondarysidechemistrycontrolandsludgeremoval,andaconservativeinspection/repairprogram.BasedonthelowgrowthratesatUnit1andchemistrycontrolinitiatives,EOC14voltagesareexpectedtobewellbelow3.0volts,andmostlikelylessthan2.0volts.Recenttubepullsatotherplants Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage5wheretheindicationvoltagewasgreaterthan2.0voltsandwherealargernumberofbeginningofcycle(BOC)indicationswereinthe2.0voltrangeindicatednounexpecteddegradationmorphology.TheexpectedEOC14voltagesatUnit1arewellbelowthethresholdforthroughwalldegradationof2.8volts(determinedfromatubepullatanotherplant)andwellbelowthethresholdforSLBleakageofapproximately6.0volts.Duringthecurrentoperatingcycle,Unit1hasnotexperiencedanysecondarysidechemistry"excursions"whichmightsupportunexpectedvoltagegrowthorinitiationof"non-typicaldegradationmorphologies.C)ThecurrentrequirementtoperformanMRPCinspectionofindicationsover1.5voltsissufficienttoidentifynon-typicalmorphologies.Forcasesofsignificantcellularcorrosion(identifiedatotherplants),metallographic.examinationhasshownthataxiallyorienteddegradationhasdominatedthemorphologyandbursttestresults.Forsuch"caseswheresignificantcircumferentialcomponentsinacellularmorphologycaninfluenceburst,associatedaxialcomponentswouldyieldvoltagesfarinexcessofthe5to6voltrange,andsuchcircumferentiallyorienteddegradationwouldbeofsufficientdepthtobedetectedbytheRPCprobe.IV,10CFR5092EVALUATIONBACKGROUNDCookNuclearPlantUnit1T/SAmendment178permittedtheimplementationofa2.0voltSGtubeIPCforthe14thoperatingcycleoftheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Thatlicenseamendment,applicableonlyforthecurrentoperatingcycle(cycle14),requiredtherepairofflaw-likebobbinindicationsabove2.0volts.Weareproposinguseofasimilar2voltinterimrepaircriterionfortheupcomingcycle15.TheproposedIPCprogramfortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsfollowstheguidanceandgeneralintentofGL94-XXtomaintaintubestructuralandleakageintegrity.DESCRIPTIONOFTHEIPCREQUESTAsrequiredby10CFR50.91(a)(l),ananalysisisprovidedtodemonstratethattheproposedlicenseamendmenttoimplementanIPCforthetubesupportplateelevationODSCCoccurringintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsinvolvesanosignificanthazardsconsideration.TheIPCutilizes  
Thisamendment, specifictofuelcycle15,wouldreducethenumberofSGtubespluggedduetoindications atsupportplateintersections.
ReducingthenumberofpluggedtubesprovidesAD@Abenefitsandmaintains reactorcoolantsystem(RCS)flowmargin.Anassessment reportaddressing theeffectiveness oftheIPCmethodology described inWCAP-13187, Revision0,wascompleted following fuelcycle13andreportedinsubmittal documentAEP:NRC:1166J.
Thereportconcluded thatthevoltagedistribution foundbyinspection atEOC13in1994isingoodagreement withtheprojections madeatEOC12in1992.Thevoltagegrowthratescontinuetobeverysmall,withamaximumgrowthof0.4voltsforfuelcycle13comparedto0.49voltsforfuelcycle12.Notubeswerefoundforwhichthebobbincoilvoltageexceededthe2voltIPCrepairlimitatEOC13.Themaximumprojected EOC14voltagebasedonEOC13voltagedistribution is2.0voltsusingtheNRCmodeland1.9voltsusingtheindustrymodel.Considering theresultsofthisreport,continuation of2voltIPCisjustified forfuelcycle15.Similarassessment andprojection reportswillbepreparedatEOC14basedonGL94-XXreporting requirements.
II'PPLICATION OFDRAFTGL94-XXREUIREMENTS TOTHCOOKNUCLARPLANTUNIT1SGIPCLICENSEAMENDMENT REVESTFORCYCLE15TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1,2voltIPCwillbeimplemented pertheguidanceofGL94-XXalongwiththelatestindustrydataforburstandleakagedatabases.NRCGL94-XXwillbefactoredintotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCasfollows:
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page2Analystswillbebriefedregarding thepossibility ofprimarywaterstresscorrosion cracking(PWSCC)attubesupportplateintersections.
IfPWSCCisfoundatthesupportplateintersections itwillbereportedtotheNRCstaffpriortostartup.2)Thesupporting datasetsforcalculation ofburstprobability andestimation ofprimarytosecondary leakageduringapostulated mainsteamlinebreakwillbethoselistedinSections2.a.land2.b.3(1),
respectively, oftheGL.3)Mainsteamlineburstprobability andleakagecalculations willbeperformed following theguidanceofGL94-XX,Section2,"TubeIntegrity Evaluation."
Calculations performed insupportofthevoltage-based repaircriteriawillfollowthemethodology described inWCAP-14277, "SteamLineBreakLeakRateandTubeBurstProbability AnalysisMethodsforOutsideDiameterStressCorrosion CrackingatTubeSupportPlateIntersections,"
datedJanuary1995'hecalculations willbeperformed priortoreturning theSGstoserviceusingtheas-foundEOC14voltagedistribution.
Theprojected EOC15voltagedistribution resultswillbereportedinthe90dayreport.Nodistribution cutoffwillbeappliedtothevoltagemeasurement variability distribution forcalculation oftheprojected EOCvoltagedistribution.
4)Inspection scope,dataacquisition, anddataanalysiswillbeperformed following theguidanceofGL94-XX,Section3,"Inspection Criteria" andAppendixA,"NDEDataAcquisition andAnalysisGuidelines" submitted byourletterAEP:NRC:1166H forthecycle14IPC.Motorized rotatingpancakecoilinspection willbedoneonallindications exceeding 1.5volts.Motorized rotatingpancakecoilinspection willalsobedoneonallintersections wherecoppersignals,largemixedresiduals, ordentslargerthan5voltsinterfere withdetection offlaws.Probewearinspections andre-inspections willbeperformed usingtheguidelines ofAppendixA,SectionA.2.3,assubmitted byourletterAEP:NRC:1166H.
Ifanyofthelastprobewearstandardsignalamplitudes priortoprobereplacement exceedthe+/-15$limit,byavalueof"X%",thenanyindications measuredsincethelastacceptable probewearmeasurement thatarewithin"XS"oftheplugginglimitwillbereinspected withthenewprobe.Forexample,ifanyofthelastprobewearsignalamplitudes priortoprobereplacement were17%aboveorbelowtheinitialamplitude, thentheindications thatarewithin2%(17%-15%)
oftheplugginglimitmustbereinspected withthenewprobe.Alternatively, thevoltagecriterion maybeloweredtocompensate fortheexcessvariation; forthecaseabove,amplitudes z0.98timesthevoltagecriterion couldbesubjecttorepair.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page3Bobbincoilprobecalibration willbeperformed usingfour20%holesintheASMEcalibration standardinsteadofthe100%throughwallholes.Thisapproachwasconcurred withbytheNRCstaffattheJanuary18,1995,NRC/Industry meeting.5)GL94-ZX,Section5,"Operational LeakageRequirements,"
willbecontinued.
TheSGtubeleakagelimitof150gallonsperdaythrougheachSGwillbemaintained aspreviously approvedbytheNRCforourlastfuelcycle.CookNuclearPlantleakagemonitoring methodsprovidetimelyleakdetection,
: trending, andresponsetorapidlyincreasing leaks.6)GL94-XX,Section6,"Reporting Requirements,"
willbeimplemented.
Itshouldbenoted,asstatedpreviously forSection2,thatthecalculation ofleakageandburstprobability requiredpriortoreturning theSGstoservicewillbeperformed byuseoftheas-foundEOCvoltagedistribution.
AEPSCCOMMENTSEXCEPTIONS TOGL94-XXANDASSOCIATED MPACTTOEPSCLICENSEAMENDMENT REVESTFORSGPCFORCYCLE15GL94-ZX,Sectionl,b:Analysesperformed byWestinghouse haveshownthatnotubesintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGswouldbesubjecttocollapseduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)+safeshutdownearthquake (SSE)event.Therefore, notubesareexcludedbasedonthiscriteria.
Itemsl.b.2andl.b.3arenotapplicable sincetheseconditions donotexistintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1'SGs.Series51SGsdesignedbyWestinghouse donothaveflowdistribution baffleplates.2)GL94-ZX,Section3.b.2:BasedontubepullresultsfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1,copperdepositsarenotpresentonthetubeoutsidediameter(OD)surfacesorinthetubesupportplate(TSP)crevicecorrosion product.Similarly, CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveevidenceof"largemixedresidualsignals."
CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveahistoryofeddycurrentdatawhichisdifficult tointerpret.
3)GL94-ZX,Section3.c.2:Bobbincoilprobeswillcontinuetobecalibrated againstthe20%holesintheASMEcalibration standardtoremainconsistent withthemethodology usedtodevelopthecriteria.
GL94-ZX,Section3.c.4:Therequirement toreinspect alltubespriortothelastprobechangeout ifthewearmeasurement exceeds15%isunnecessary.
As'acknowledged intheGL,a5.6voltrepaircriterion isjustified, however,therepaircriterion iscurrently limitedto2.0volts.Suchindications areexpectedtobewell Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page4withinstructural limitsatEOC15conditions, particularly whenUnit1growthratesareconsidered.
Reinspection ofindications necessitated byoutofspecification probewearwillbeconducted according toItem4ofpage2ofthisattachment.
5)GL94-XX,Section4,addresses theneedtoperformtubepulls.Tubepullscausesignificant outageextension, occupational radiation
: exposure, andsignificant directcost.(Asanexample,removalofthreetubesamplesduringtheupcomingCookNuclearPlantUnit1refueling outageisestimated toaddtwotothreedaystotheoutagecriticalpath,havedirectcostsintherangeof$0.8-$1.3million,andincurfrom2-5manremexposure.)
Therefore, tubesselectedforpullingshouldbejudiciously chosenandshouldjustifythemonetaryexpenseandradiological exposure.
Tubesshouldnotbepulledmerelytosatisfyachronological requirement.
AEPSCbelievesthattheimposition ofthisrequirement duringthenextscheduled refueling outagewillnotenhancethecurrentburstandleakagedatabases sufficiently towarranttheaddedcost.Justification fornotperforming atubepullduringthenextoutageatCookNuclearPlantUnit1issuppliedbelow.A)In1992,nineCookNuclearPlantUnit1TSPintersections wereremovedformetallographic examination, bursttestingandleaktesting.Fieldbobbincoilvoltagesrangedfrom1.0to2.0volts,including fourintersections reportedasNDD.Burstpressures rangedfrom9,100to11,200psig.forthereportedindications andnointersections leakedduringtestingat2560psid.Examination oftubesafterbursttestingshowedcombinations ofaxiallyorientedintergranular stresscorrosion crackingandintergranular cellularcorrosion originating fromthetubeOD.Degradation morphology wasdominated bytheaxiallyorienteddegradation.
InadditiontotheUnit1tubepullssupporting SGIPC,significant numbersofintersections wereremovedfromUnit2in1984and1986.Inallcases,circumferentially orienteddegradation wasnotdetected.
B)Outsidediameterstresscorrosion cracking(ODSCC)degradation growthrateforCookNuclearPlantUnit1hasdecreased overthelasttwocyclesandnointersections duringthelastoutagehadTSPintersection voltagesexceeding 2.0volts.Thishighlevelofperformance isattributed totheunitoperating atreducedtemperature andpressure, improvedsecondary sidechemistry controlandsludgeremoval,andaconservative inspection/repair program.BasedonthelowgrowthratesatUnit1andchemistry controlinitiatives, EOC14voltagesareexpectedtobewellbelow3.0volts,andmostlikelylessthan2.0volts.Recenttubepullsatotherplants Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page5wheretheindication voltagewasgreaterthan2.0voltsandwherealargernumberofbeginning ofcycle(BOC)indications wereinthe2.0voltrangeindicated nounexpected degradation morphology.
TheexpectedEOC14voltagesatUnit1arewellbelowthethreshold forthroughwall degradation of2.8volts(determined fromatubepullatanotherplant)andwellbelowthethreshold forSLBleakageofapproximately 6.0volts.Duringthecurrentoperating cycle,Unit1hasnotexperienced anysecondary sidechemistry "excursions" whichmightsupportunexpected voltagegrowthorinitiation of"non-typical degradation morphologies.
C)Thecurrentrequirement toperformanMRPCinspection ofindications over1.5voltsissufficient toidentifynon-typicalmorphologies.
Forcasesofsignificant cellularcorrosion (identified atotherplants),metallographic
.examination hasshownthataxiallyorienteddegradation hasdominated themorphology andbursttestresults.Forsuch"caseswheresignificant circumferential components inacellularmorphology caninfluence burst,associated axialcomponents wouldyieldvoltagesfarinexcessofthe5to6voltrange,andsuchcircumferentially orienteddegradation wouldbeofsufficient depthtobedetectedbytheRPCprobe.IV,10CFR5092EVALUATION BACKGROUND CookNuclearPlantUnit1T/SAmendment 178permitted theimplementation ofa2.0voltSGtubeIPCforthe14thoperating cycleoftheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Thatlicenseamendment, applicable onlyforthecurrentoperating cycle(cycle14),requiredtherepairofflaw-like bobbinindications above2.0volts.Weareproposing useofasimilar2voltinterimrepaircriterion fortheupcomingcycle15.TheproposedIPCprogramfortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsfollowstheguidanceandgeneralintentofGL94-XXtomaintaintubestructural andleakageintegrity.
DESCRIPTION OFTHEIPCREQUESTAsrequiredby10CFR50.91(a)(l),ananalysisisprovidedtodemonstrate thattheproposedlicenseamendment toimplement anIPCforthetubesupportplateelevation ODSCCoccurring intheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsinvolvesanosignificant hazardsconsideration.
TheIPCutilizes  


Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage6correlationsbetweeneddycurrentbobbinprobesignalamplitude(voltage)andtubeburstandleakagecapability.ThepluggingcriterionisbasedontestingoflaboratoryinducedODSCCspecimensandonextensiveexaminationofpulledtubesfromoperatingSGs(industrywide-includingthreetubespulledin1992representingnineintersectionsfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.)CConsistentwithGL94-ZX,theIPCprogramforCookNuclearPlantUnit1willincludethefollowingelementsaslistedunder"1.OverviewoftheVoltageRepairLimitApproach",page3ofGL94-ZX.Performanenhancedinspectionoftubes,particularlyattheTSPintersections.A100%bobbincoilinspectionofhotlegtubesupportplateintersectionsandcoldlegintersectiondowntothelowestcoldlegsupportplatewithknownODSCCindicationswillbeperformed.Allflawindicationswithbobbinvoltagesgreaterthan1.5voltswillbeinspectedbyMRPC.UtilizeNDEdataacquisitionandanalysisproceduresthatareconsistentwiththemethodologyusedtodevelopthevoltage-basedrepairlimits.TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCprogramwillutilizeproceduresandtechniquesconsistentwiththemethodologiesusedtoestablishtheIPCasdescribedinSection3ofEnclosure1oftheGL,withtheexceptionthat20%.throughwallholeswillbeusedinthestandard(Section3.c.2ofGL94-XX).Repairorplugtubesthatexceedthevoltagelimits.Flaw-likesignalsadjacenttotheTSPwithbobbinvoltageslessthanorequalto2.0voltswillbeallowedtoremaininservice.Flaw-likeindicationsadjacenttotheTSPwithabobbinvoltageofgreaterthan2.0voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifMRPCinspectiondoesnotdetectaflaw.'lawindicationswithavoltageofgreaterthan5.6voltswillberepaired.DeterminetheBOOvoltagedistribution.BeginningofCycle15voltagedistributionwillbeestablishedfromtheactualtubeinspectionstobeperformedduringthenextoutageandwillbeestablishedusingcurrentprogrammethodology.ProjecttheEOC15distribution.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page6correlations betweeneddycurrentbobbinprobesignalamplitude (voltage) andtubeburstandleakagecapability.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage7AnEOCvoltagedistributionwillbeestablishedbasedontheEOC14ECTdata.EOC15voltagedistributionwillbeprojectedusingMonteCarlotechniquesasdescribedinWCAP-14277andwillincludeallowanceforeddycurrentuncertaintyasdefinedintheGLandaconservativevoltagegrowthrateallowance.FortheprojectedEOC'voltagedistribution,calculateleakageandconditionaltubeburstprobability(andrepairtubesifnecessary).Steamlinebreakleakagewillbecalculated,asdescribedinWCAP-14277,basedontheEOC15projectedvoltagedistribution.Projectedleakagemustremainbelow12.6gpminthefaultedloopforoffsitedoseestimatestoremainwithin10$ofthe10CFR100guidelines.Thisvaluewascalculated,usingStandardReviewPlanmethodology,priortotheCycle14licenseamendmentrequestandwillnotchangefortheupcomingcycle.ConditionaltubeburstprobabilitywillbecalculatedaccordingtothemethodologydescribedinWCAP-14277.ConsistentwiththeGL,ifburstprobabilityisfoundtobegreaterthan1x102,theNRCwillbeconsulted.AsprescribedinGL94-XX,anevaluationofprimarytosecondaryleakage(andsubsequentlyoffsitedose)isrequiredforallplantsimplementingtheIPC.Allbobbinindicationsareincludedinthesteamlinebreakleakageanalyses,alongwithconsiderationoftheprobabilityofdetection.Iftheprojectedleakageexceeds12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulatedsteamlinebreakevent,thenumberofindicationsinwhichtheIPCareappliedisreducedthroughtuberepairuntiltheprimary-to-secondaryleakagelimitsaresatisfied.EVALUATIONTubeDegradationCharacterizationIngeneral,thedegradationmorphologyoccurringatthetubesupportplateintersectionsatplantsintheU.S.canbedescribedasaxiallyorientedODSCC.ThedegradationmorphologyatCookNuclearPlantUnit1isentirelycompatiblewiththeoverallindustrydatabase.SteamGeneratorTubeIntegrityInthedevelopmentofanIPCforCookNuclearPlantUnit1,RegulatoryGuide(RG)1.121,"BasesforPluggingDegradedPWRSteamGeneratorTubes"andRG1.83,"InserviceInspectionofPWRSteamGeneratorTubes"areusedasthebasesfordeterminingthatSGtubeintegrityconsiderationsaremaintainedwithinacceptablelimits.RegulatoryGuide1.121describesamethodacceptabletotheNRCstaffformeetingGeneralDesignCriteria
Thepluggingcriterion isbasedontestingoflaboratory inducedODSCCspecimens andonextensive examination ofpulledtubesfromoperating SGs(industry wide-including threetubespulledin1992representing nineintersections fromCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.)CConsistent withGL94-ZX,theIPCprogramforCookNuclearPlantUnit1willincludethefollowing elementsaslistedunder"1.OverviewoftheVoltageRepairLimitApproach",
~~4*1~~1t Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage8(GDC)14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobabilityandconsequencesofSGtuberupturethroughdeterminingthelimitingsafeconditionsoftubewalldegradationbeyondwhichtubeswithunacceptablecracking,asestablishedbyinserviceinspection,shouldberemovedfromservicebyplugging.ThisregulatoryguideusessafetyfactorsonloadsfortubeburstthatareconsistentwiththerequirementsofSectionIIIoftheASMECode.For-the.tubesupportplateelevationdegradationoccurringintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs,tubeburstcriteriaareinherentlysatisfiedduringnormaloperatingconditionsbythepresenceofthetubesupportplate.Thepresenceofthetubesupportplateenhancestheintegrityofthedegradedtubesinthatregionbyprecludingtubedeformationbeyondthediameterofthedrilledhole,thusprecludingtubeburst.Conservatively,nocreditistakeninthedevelopmentofthepluggingcriteriaforthepresenceofthetubesupportplateduringaccidentconditions.Basedontheexistingdatabasefor7/8inchtubing,bursttestingshowsthatthesafetyrequirementsfortubeburstmarginsduringaccidentconditionloadingscanbesatisfiedwithEOCbobbincoilsignalamplitudeslessthan9.6volts,regardlessofthedepthoftubewallpenetrationofthecracking.UponimplementationoftheseIPC,tubeleakageconsiderationsmustalsobeaddressed.Itmustbedeterminedthatthecrackswillnotleakexcessivelyduringallplantconditions.Forthe2voltinterimtubepluggingcriteriadevelopedfortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGtubes,noleakageisanticipatedduringnormaloperatingconditionsevenwiththepresenceofpotentialthroughwallcracks.Theexpectedvoltagewhichwouldsupportprimary-to-secondaryleakageatnormaloperatingconditionsisapproximately10volts.Noprimary-to-secondaryleakageattheTSPhasbeendetectedinU.S.plants.Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentconditionloadings,thelimitingeventwithrespecttodifferentialpressureexperiencedacrosstheSGtubesisapostulatedsteamlinebreakevent.For7/8inchtubing,pulledtubedatasupportsnoleakageupto2.81voltsandlowprobabilityofleakagebetween2.81and6.0volts,forbothpulledtubesandmodelboilerspecimens,attheboundingsteamlinebreakpressuredifferentialof2560psi.SteamlinebreakprimarytosecondaryleakagewillbecalculatedasprescribedinGL94-XXandWCAP14277,usingEOC14eddycurrentdata.Thiscalculatedleakagemustbeshowntobelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloop.AdditionalConsiderationsTheproposedamendmentwouldprecludeoccupationalradiationexposurethatwouldotherwisebeincurredbypersonnelinvolvedintubepluggingorrepairoperations'yreducingnon-essentialtubeplugging,theproposedamendmentwouldminimizethelossofmargininthereactorcoolantflowthroughtheSGinLOCAanalyses.Theproposedamendmentwouldavoidlossofmargininreactorcoolantsystemflowand,therefore,assistinmaintainingminimumflowratesinexcessofthatrequiredforoperationat Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage9fullpower.ReductionintheamountoftuberepairrequiredcanreducethelengthofplantoutagesandreducethetimethattheSGisopentothecontainmentenvironmentduringanoutage.The100%eddycurrentbobbinprobeinspectionassociatedwithimplementationoftheIPCwillhelptoidentifynewareasofconcernwhichmayarisebyprovidingalevelofinserviceinspectionwhichisfarinexcessoftheT/Srequirementsutilizingthe.40%depth-basedplugginglimitforacceptabletubewalldegradation.SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSANALYSISInaccordancewiththethreefactortestof10CFR50.92(c),implementationoftheproposedlicenseamendmentisanalyzedusingthefollowingstandardsandfoundnotto1)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or3)involveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafety.Conformanceoftheproposedamendmenttothestandardsforadeterminationofnosignificanthazardsasdefinedin10CFR50.92(threefactortest)isshowninthefollowingparagraphs.1)OperationofCookNuclearPlantUnit1inaccordancewiththeproposedlicenseamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Testingofmodelboilerspecimensforfreespantubing(notubesupportplaterestraint)atroomtemperatureconditionsshowburstpressuresinexcessof5000psiforindicationsofouterdiameterstresscorrosioncrackingwithvoltagemeasurementsashighas19volts.BursttestingperformedonpulledtubesfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1withuptoa2.02voltindicationshows.measuredburstpressureinexcessof10,000psiatroomtemperature.Bursttestingperformedonpulledtubesfromotherplantswithupto7.5voltindicationsshowburstpressuresinexcessof6,300psiatroomtemperatures.Correctingfortheeffectsoftemperatureonmaterialpropertiesandminimumstrengthlevels(asthebursttestingwasdoneatroomtemperature),tubeburstcapabilitysignificantlyexceedsthesafetyfactorrequirementsofRG1.121.Asstatedearlier,tubeburstcriteriaareinherentlysatisfiedduringnormaloperatingconditionsduetotheproximityofthetubesupportplate.Testdataindicatesthattubeburstcannotoccurwithinthetubesupportplate,evenfortubeswhichhave100$throughwallelectric-dischargemachinednotches0.75inchlong,providedthetubesupportplateisadjacenttothenotchedarea.Sincetube-to-tubesupportplateproximityprecludestubeburstduringnormaloperatingconditions,useofthecriteriamust,therefore,retaintubeintegritycharacteristicswhichmaintaintheRG1121marginofsafetyof143timestheboundingfaultedcondition(steamlinebreak)pressuredifferential.
page3ofGL94-ZX.Performanenhancedinspection oftubes,particularly attheTSPintersections.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage10Duringapostulatedmainsteamlinebreak,theTSPhasthepotentialtodeflectduringblowdown,therebyuncoveringtheintersection.Basedontheexistingdatabase,theRG1.121criterionrequiringmaintenanceofasafetyfactorof1.43timesthesteamlinebreakpressuredifferentialontubeburstissatisfiedby7/8inchdiametertubingwithbobbincoilindicationswithsignalamplitudeslessthan9.6volts;-regardlessoftheindicateddepthmeasurement.A2.0voltpluggingcriteriacomparesfavorablywiththe9.6voltstructurallimitconsideringthepreviouslycalculatedgrowthratesforODSCCwithinCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Consideringavoltagegrowthcomponentof0,8volts(40%voltagegrowthbasedon2.0voltsBOC)andanondestructiveexaminationuncertaintyof0.40volts(208voltageuncertaintybasedon2.0voltsBOC),whenaddedtotheBOCIPCof2.0volts,resultsinaboundingEOCvoltageofapproximately3.2voltsforcycle15operation.A6.4voltsafetymarginexists(9.6structurallimit-3.2voltEOC-6.4voltmargin).Forthevoltage/burstcorrelation,theEOCstructurallimitissupportedbyavoltageof9.6volts.Usingthisstructurallimitof9.6volts,aBOCmaximumallowablerepairlimitcanbeestablishedusingtheguidanceofRG1.121.TheBOCmaximumallowablerepairlimitshouldnotpermitasignificantnumberofEOCindicationstoexceedthe9.6voltstructurallimitandshouldassurethatacceptabletubeburstprobabilitiesareattained.ByaddingNDEuncertaintyallowancesandanallowanceforcrackgrowthtotherepairlimit,thestructurallimitcanbevalidated.ThepreviousIPCsubmittalestablishedtheconservativeNDEuncertaintylimitof20%oftheBOCrepairlimit.Forconsistency,a40$voltagegrowthallowancetotheBOCrepairlimitisalsoincluded.ThisallowanceisextremelyconservativeforCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Therefore,themaximumallowableBOCrepairlimit(RL)basedonthestructurallimitof9.6voltscanberepresentedbytheexpression:RL+(0.2xRL)+(0.4xRL)9.6volts,or,themaximumallowableBOCrepairlimitcanbeexpressedas,RL-9.6voltstructurallimit/1.6-6.0volts.Thisstructuralrepairlimitsupportsthisapplicationforcycle15IPCimplementationtorepairbobbinindicationsgreaterthan2.0voltsbasedonRPCconfirmationoftheindication.Conservatively,anupperlimitof5.6voltswillbeusedtorepairbobbinindicationswhichareabove2.0voltsbutdonothaveconfirmingRPCcalls.  
A100%bobbincoilinspection ofhotlegtubesupportplateintersections andcoldlegintersection downtothelowestcoldlegsupportplatewithknownODSCCindications willbeperformed.
Allflawindications withbobbinvoltagesgreaterthan1.5voltswillbeinspected byMRPC.UtilizeNDEdataacquisition andanalysisprocedures thatareconsistent withthemethodology usedtodevelopthevoltage-based repairlimits.TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCprogramwillutilizeprocedures andtechniques consistent withthemethodologies usedtoestablish theIPCasdescribed inSection3ofEnclosure 1oftheGL,withtheexception that20%.throughwall holeswillbeusedinthestandard(Section3.c.2ofGL94-XX).Repairorplugtubesthatexceedthevoltagelimits.Flaw-like signalsadjacenttotheTSPwithbobbinvoltageslessthanorequalto2.0voltswillbeallowedtoremaininservice.Flaw-likeindications adjacenttotheTSPwithabobbinvoltageofgreaterthan2.0voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifMRPCinspection doesnotdetectaflaw.'law indications withavoltageofgreaterthan5.6voltswillberepaired.
Determine theBOOvoltagedistribution.
Beginning ofCycle15voltagedistribution willbeestablished fromtheactualtubeinspections tobeperformed duringthenextoutageandwillbeestablished usingcurrentprogrammethodology.
ProjecttheEOC15distribution.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page7AnEOCvoltagedistribution willbeestablished basedontheEOC14ECTdata.EOC15voltagedistribution willbeprojected usingMonteCarlotechniques asdescribed inWCAP-14277 andwillincludeallowance foreddycurrentuncertainty asdefinedintheGLandaconservative voltagegrowthrateallowance.
Fortheprojected EOC'voltagedistribution, calculate leakageandconditional tubeburstprobability (andrepairtubesifnecessary).
Steamlinebreakleakagewillbecalculated, asdescribed inWCAP-14277,basedontheEOC15projected voltagedistribution.
Projected leakagemustremainbelow12.6gpminthefaultedloopforoffsitedoseestimates toremainwithin10$ofthe10CFR100guidelines.
Thisvaluewascalculated, usingStandardReviewPlanmethodology, priortotheCycle14licenseamendment requestandwillnotchangefortheupcomingcycle.Conditional tubeburstprobability willbecalculated according tothemethodology described inWCAP-14277.
Consistent withtheGL,ifburstprobability isfoundtobegreaterthan1x102,theNRCwillbeconsulted.
Asprescribed inGL94-XX,anevaluation ofprimarytosecondary leakage(andsubsequently offsitedose)isrequiredforallplantsimplementing theIPC.Allbobbinindications areincludedinthesteamlinebreakleakageanalyses, alongwithconsideration oftheprobability ofdetection.
Iftheprojected leakageexceeds12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulated steamlinebreakevent,thenumberofindications inwhichtheIPCareappliedisreducedthroughtuberepairuntiltheprimary-to-secondary leakagelimitsaresatisfied.
EVALUATION TubeDegradation Characterization Ingeneral,thedegradation morphology occurring atthetubesupportplateintersections atplantsintheU.S.canbedescribed asaxiallyorientedODSCC.Thedegradation morphology atCookNuclearPlantUnit1isentirelycompatible withtheoverallindustrydatabase.SteamGenerator TubeIntegrity Inthedevelopment ofanIPCforCookNuclearPlantUnit1,Regulatory Guide(RG)1.121,"BasesforPluggingDegradedPWRSteamGenerator Tubes"andRG1.83,"Inservice Inspection ofPWRSteamGenerator Tubes"areusedasthebasesfordetermining thatSGtubeintegrity considerations aremaintained withinacceptable limits.Regulatory Guide1.121describes amethodacceptable totheNRCstaffformeetingGeneralDesignCriteria
~~4*1~~1t Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page8(GDC)14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobability andconsequences ofSGtuberupturethroughdetermining thelimitingsafeconditions oftubewalldegradation beyondwhichtubeswithunacceptable
: cracking, asestablished byinservice inspection, shouldberemovedfromservicebyplugging.
Thisregulatory guideusessafetyfactorsonloadsfortubeburstthatareconsistent withtherequirements ofSectionIIIoftheASMECode.For-the.tubesupportplateelevation degradation occurring intheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs,tubeburstcriteriaareinherently satisfied duringnormaloperating conditions bythepresenceofthetubesupportplate.Thepresenceofthetubesupportplateenhancestheintegrity ofthedegradedtubesinthatregionbyprecluding tubedeformation beyondthediameterofthedrilledhole,thusprecluding tubeburst.Conservatively, nocreditistakeninthedevelopment ofthepluggingcriteriaforthepresenceofthetubesupportplateduringaccidentconditions.
Basedontheexistingdatabasefor7/8inchtubing,bursttestingshowsthatthesafetyrequirements fortubeburstmarginsduringaccidentcondition loadingscanbesatisfied withEOCbobbincoilsignalamplitudes lessthan9.6volts,regardless ofthedepthoftubewallpenetration ofthecracking.
Uponimplementation oftheseIPC,tubeleakageconsiderations mustalsobeaddressed.
Itmustbedetermined thatthecrackswillnotleakexcessively duringallplantconditions.
Forthe2voltinterimtubepluggingcriteriadeveloped fortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGtubes,noleakageisanticipated duringnormaloperating conditions evenwiththepresenceofpotential throughwall cracks.Theexpectedvoltagewhichwouldsupportprimary-to-secondary leakageatnormaloperating conditions isapproximately 10volts.Noprimary-to-secondary leakageattheTSPhasbeendetectedinU.S.plants.Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentcondition
: loadings, thelimitingeventwithrespecttodifferential pressureexperienced acrosstheSGtubesisapostulated steamlinebreakevent.For7/8inchtubing,pulledtubedatasupportsnoleakageupto2.81voltsandlowprobability ofleakagebetween2.81and6.0volts,forbothpulledtubesandmodelboilerspecimens, attheboundingsteamlinebreakpressuredifferential of2560psi.Steamlinebreakprimarytosecondary leakagewillbecalculated asprescribed inGL94-XXandWCAP14277,usingEOC14eddycurrentdata.Thiscalculated leakagemustbeshowntobelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloop.Additional Considerations Theproposedamendment wouldprecludeoccupational radiation exposurethatwouldotherwise beincurredbypersonnel involvedintubepluggingorrepairoperations'y reducingnon-essential tubeplugging, theproposedamendment wouldminimizethelossofmargininthereactorcoolantflowthroughtheSGinLOCAanalyses.
Theproposedamendment wouldavoidlossofmargininreactorcoolantsystemflowand,therefore, assistinmaintaining minimumflowratesinexcessofthatrequiredforoperation at Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page9fullpower.Reduction intheamountoftuberepairrequiredcanreducethelengthofplantoutagesandreducethetimethattheSGisopentothecontainment environment duringanoutage.The100%eddycurrentbobbinprobeinspection associated withimplementation oftheIPCwillhelptoidentifynewareasofconcernwhichmayarisebyproviding alevelofinservice inspection whichisfarinexcessoftheT/Srequirements utilizing the.40%depth-based plugginglimitforacceptable tubewalldegradation.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSANALYSISInaccordance withthethreefactortestof10CFR50.92(c),
implementation oftheproposedlicenseamendment isanalyzedusingthefollowing standards andfoundnotto1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3)involveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety.Conformance oftheproposedamendment tothestandards foradetermination ofnosignificant hazardsasdefinedin10CFR50.92(threefactortest)isshowninthefollowing paragraphs.
1)Operation ofCookNuclearPlantUnit1inaccordance withtheproposedlicenseamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Testingofmodelboilerspecimens forfreespantubing(notubesupportplaterestraint) atroomtemperature conditions showburstpressures inexcessof5000psiforindications ofouterdiameterstresscorrosion crackingwithvoltagemeasurements ashighas19volts.Bursttestingperformed onpulledtubesfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1withuptoa2.02voltindication shows.measured burstpressureinexcessof10,000psiatroomtemperature.
Bursttestingperformed onpulledtubesfromotherplantswithupto7.5voltindications showburstpressures inexcessof6,300psiatroomtemperatures.
Correcting fortheeffectsoftemperature onmaterialproperties andminimumstrengthlevels(asthebursttestingwasdoneatroomtemperature),
tubeburstcapability significantly exceedsthesafetyfactorrequirements ofRG1.121.Asstatedearlier,tubeburstcriteriaareinherently satisfied duringnormaloperating conditions duetotheproximity ofthetubesupportplate.Testdataindicates thattubeburstcannotoccurwithinthetubesupportplate,evenfortubeswhichhave100$throughwall electric-discharge machinednotches0.75inchlong,providedthetubesupportplateisadjacenttothenotchedarea.Sincetube-to-tube supportplateproximity precludes tubeburstduringnormaloperating conditions, useofthecriteriamust,therefore, retaintubeintegrity characteristics whichmaintaintheRG1121marginofsafetyof143timestheboundingfaultedcondition (steamlinebreak)pressuredifferential.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page10Duringapostulated mainsteamlinebreak,theTSPhasthepotential todeflectduringblowdown, therebyuncovering theintersection.
Basedontheexistingdatabase,theRG1.121criterion requiring maintenance ofasafetyfactorof1.43timesthesteamlinebreakpressuredifferential ontubeburstissatisfied by7/8inchdiametertubingwithbobbincoilindications withsignalamplitudes lessthan9.6volts;-regardless oftheindicated depthmeasurement.
A2.0voltpluggingcriteriacomparesfavorably withthe9.6voltstructural limitconsidering thepreviously calculated growthratesforODSCCwithinCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Considering avoltagegrowthcomponent of0,8volts(40%voltagegrowthbasedon2.0voltsBOC)andanondestructive examination uncertainty of0.40volts(208voltageuncertainty basedon2.0voltsBOC),whenaddedtotheBOCIPCof2.0volts,resultsinaboundingEOCvoltageofapproximately 3.2voltsforcycle15operation.
A6.4voltsafetymarginexists(9.6structural limit-3.2voltEOC-6.4voltmargin).Forthevoltage/burst correlation, theEOCstructural limitissupported byavoltageof9.6volts.Usingthisstructural limitof9.6volts,aBOCmaximumallowable repairlimitcanbeestablished usingtheguidanceofRG1.121.TheBOCmaximumallowable repairlimitshouldnotpermitasignificant numberofEOCindications toexceedthe9.6voltstructural limitandshouldassurethatacceptable tubeburstprobabilities areattained.
ByaddingNDEuncertainty allowances andanallowance forcrackgrowthtotherepairlimit,thestructural limitcanbevalidated.
ThepreviousIPCsubmittal established theconservative NDEuncertainty limitof20%oftheBOCrepairlimit.Forconsistency, a40$voltagegrowthallowance totheBOCrepairlimitisalsoincluded.
Thisallowance isextremely conservative forCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Therefore, themaximumallowable BOCrepairlimit(RL)basedonthestructural limitof9.6voltscanberepresented bytheexpression:
RL+(0.2xRL)+(0.4xRL)9.6volts,or,themaximumallowable BOCrepairlimitcanbeexpressed as,RL-9.6voltstructural limit/1.6
-6.0volts.Thisstructural repairlimitsupportsthisapplication forcycle15IPCimplementation torepairbobbinindications greaterthan2.0voltsbasedonRPCconfirmation oftheindication.
Conservatively, anupperlimitof5.6voltswillbeusedtorepairbobbinindications whichareabove2.0voltsbutdonothaveconfirming RPCcalls.  


Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPagellTheconservatismofthisrepairlimitisshownbytheEOC13(Spring1994)eddycurrentdata.Theoverallaveragevoltagegrowthwasdeterminedtobeonly1.48(oftheBOCvoltage).Inaddition,theEOC13maximumobservedvoltageincreasewas0.40volts,andoccurredinatubewithaBOCindicationof0.96volts.Theapplicabilityofcycle14growthratesforcycle15operationwillbeconfirmedpriortoreturn.toserviceofCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Similarlargestructuralmarginsareanticipated.Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentconditionloadings,ithasbeenpreviouslyestablishedthatapostulatedmainsteamlinebreakoutsideofcontainmentbutupstreamofthemainsteamisolationvalverepresentsthemostlimitingradiologicalconditionrelativetotheIPC.InsupportofimplementationoftheIPC,itwillbedeterminedwhetherthedistributionofcrackindicationsatthetubesupportplateintersectionsattheendofcycle15areprojectedtobesuchthatprimarytosecondaryleakagewouldresultinsiteboundarydoseswithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100guidelines.Aseparatecalculationhasdeterminedthisallowablesteamlinebreakleakagelimittobe12.6gpm.AlthoughnotrequiredbytheCookNuclearPlantdesignbasis,thiscalculationusestherecommendedIodine-131transientspikingvaluesconsistentwithNUREG-0800,andtheT/Sreactorcoolantsystemactivitylimitof1.0microcuriepergramdoseequivalentIodine-131.TheprojectedsteamlinebreakleakageratecalculationmethodologyprescribedinGL94-ZXandWCAP14277willbeusedtocalculateEOC15leakage,basedonactualEOC14distributionsandEOC15projecteddistributions.DuetotherelativelylowvoltagegrowthratesatCookNuclearPlantUnit1andtherelativelysmallnumberofindicationsaffectedbytheIPC,steamlinebreakleakagepredictionperGL94-ZXisexpectedtobesignificantlylessthantheacceptancelimitof12.6gpminthefaultedloop.PriortoissueofGL94-XX,projectedEOC14leakrateswerecalculated,basedondraftNUREG-1477,foratotaloftwelvecases,thecombinationofsixprobability-of-leakcorrelationsandtwoleakratecalculationmethodologies.ResultsofthecalculationsshowthattheprojectedEOC14leakratesrangedfrom0.001gpmto1.360gpm.Theseresultsarewellbelowthe12.6gpmallowable;therefore,implementationofthe2voltIPCduringcycle15wouldnotadverselyaffectSGtubeintegrityandresultsinacceptabledoseconsequences.CurrentGL94-ZXmethodologyrequiresonlythelog-logisticprobabilityofleakagecorrelationbeused.ProjectedEOC14SLBleakageusingthisfunctionwascalculatedtobeonly0.001gpm.BasedontherelativelyfewnumbersofintersectionsatCookNuclearPlantUnit1towhichtheIPCareapplied.andextremelysmallCook Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage12NuclearPlantUnit1plant-specificgrowthrate,asimilarvaluewouldbeexpectedbasedontheEOC14eddycurrentdata.TheinclusionofallIPCintersectionsintheleakagemodel,alongwithapplicationofaprobabilityofdetectionof0.6,willresultinextremelyconservativeleakageestimations,especiallysosincecloseexaminationoftheavailabledatashowsthatindicationsoflessthan2.8voltswillnotbeexpectedtoleakduringSLBconditions.AllUnit1IPCindicationsareexpectedtobebelow2.8voltsattheEOC15conditions.Theproposedamendmentdoesnotresultinanyincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.previouslyevaluatedwithintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1FSAR.2)Theproposedlicenseamendmentdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ImplementationoftheproposedSGtubeIPCdoesnotintroduceanysignificantchangestotheplantdesignbasis.Useofthecriteriadoesnotprovideamechanismwhichcouldresultinanaccidentoutsideoftheregionofthetubesupportplateelevations.NeitherasingleormultipletuberuptureeventwouldbeexpectedinaSGinwhichthepluggingcriteriahasbeenapplied(duringallplantconditions).Specifically,wewillcontinuetoimplementamaximumleakageratelimitof150gpd(0.1gpm)perSGtohelpprecludethepotentialforexcessiveleakageduringallplantconditions.Thecycle15T/Slimitsimposedonprimarytosecondaryleakageatoperatingconditionsare:amaximumof0.4gpm(600gpd)forallSGs'withamaximumof150gpdallowedforanyoneSG.TheRG1.121criteriaforestablishingoperationalleakageratelimitsthatrequireplantshutdownarebaseduponleak-before-breakconsiderationstodetectafreespancrackbeforepotentialtuberuptureduringfaultedplantconditions.The150gpdlimitshouldprovideforleakagedetectionandplantshutdownintheeventoftheoccurrenceofanunexpectedsinglecrackresultinginleakagethatisassociatedwiththelongestpermissiblecracklength.RegulatoryGuide1.121acceptancecriteriaforestablishingoperatingleakagelimitsarebasedonleak-before-breakconsiderationssuchthatplantshutdownisinitiatediftheleakageassociatedwiththelongestpermissiblecrackisexceeded.Thelongestpermissiblecrackisthelengththatprovidesafactorofsafetyof1.43againstburstingatfaultedconditionsmaximumpressuredifferential.Avoltageamplitudeof9.6voltsfortypicalODSCCcorrespondstomeetingthistubeburstrequirementatalower95%predictionlimitontheburst
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R PagellTheconservatism ofthisrepairlimitisshownbytheEOC13(Spring1994)eddycurrentdata.Theoverallaveragevoltagegrowthwasdetermined tobeonly1.48(oftheBOCvoltage).
Inaddition, theEOC13maximumobservedvoltageincreasewas0.40volts,andoccurredinatubewithaBOCindication of0.96volts.Theapplicability ofcycle14growthratesforcycle15operation willbeconfirmed priortoreturn.toserviceofCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Similarlargestructural marginsareanticipated.
Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentcondition
: loadings, ithasbeenpreviously established thatapostulated mainsteamlinebreakoutsideofcontainment butupstreamofthemainsteamisolation valverepresents themostlimitingradiological condition relativetotheIPC.Insupportofimplementation oftheIPC,itwillbedetermined whetherthedistribution ofcrackindications atthetubesupportplateintersections attheendofcycle15areprojected tobesuchthatprimarytosecondary leakagewouldresultinsiteboundarydoseswithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100guidelines.
Aseparatecalculation hasdetermined thisallowable steamlinebreakleakagelimittobe12.6gpm.AlthoughnotrequiredbytheCookNuclearPlantdesignbasis,thiscalculation usestherecommended Iodine-131 transient spikingvaluesconsistent withNUREG-0800, andtheT/Sreactorcoolantsystemactivitylimitof1.0microcuriepergramdoseequivalent Iodine-131.Theprojected steamlinebreakleakageratecalculation methodology prescribed inGL94-ZXandWCAP14277willbeusedtocalculate EOC15leakage,basedonactualEOC14distributions andEOC15projected distributions.
Duetotherelatively lowvoltagegrowthratesatCookNuclearPlantUnit1andtherelatively smallnumberofindications affectedbytheIPC,steamlinebreakleakageprediction perGL94-ZXisexpectedtobesignificantly lessthantheacceptance limitof12.6gpminthefaultedloop.PriortoissueofGL94-XX,projected EOC14leakrateswerecalculated, basedondraftNUREG-1477,foratotaloftwelvecases,thecombination ofsixprobability-of-leak correlations andtwoleakratecalculation methodologies.
Resultsofthecalculations showthattheprojected EOC14leakratesrangedfrom0.001gpmto1.360gpm.Theseresultsarewellbelowthe12.6gpmallowable; therefore, implementation ofthe2voltIPCduringcycle15wouldnotadversely affectSGtubeintegrity andresultsinacceptable doseconsequences.
CurrentGL94-ZXmethodology requiresonlythelog-logistic probability ofleakagecorrelation beused.Projected EOC14SLBleakageusingthisfunctionwascalculated tobeonly0.001gpm.Basedontherelatively fewnumbersofintersections atCookNuclearPlantUnit1towhichtheIPCareapplied.and extremely smallCook Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page12NuclearPlantUnit1plant-specific growthrate,asimilarvaluewouldbeexpectedbasedontheEOC14eddycurrentdata.Theinclusion ofallIPCintersections intheleakagemodel,alongwithapplication ofaprobability ofdetection of0.6,willresultinextremely conservative leakageestimations, especially sosincecloseexamination oftheavailable datashowsthatindications oflessthan2.8voltswillnotbeexpectedtoleakduringSLBconditions.
AllUnit1IPCindications areexpectedtobebelow2.8voltsattheEOC15conditions.
Theproposedamendment doesnotresultinanyincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.previously evaluated withintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1FSAR.2)Theproposedlicenseamendment doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Implementation oftheproposedSGtubeIPCdoesnotintroduce anysignificant changestotheplantdesignbasis.Useofthecriteriadoesnotprovideamechanism whichcouldresultinanaccidentoutsideoftheregionofthetubesupportplateelevations.
NeitherasingleormultipletuberuptureeventwouldbeexpectedinaSGinwhichthepluggingcriteriahasbeenapplied(duringallplantconditions).
Specifically, wewillcontinuetoimplement amaximumleakageratelimitof150gpd(0.1gpm)perSGtohelpprecludethepotential forexcessive leakageduringallplantconditions.
Thecycle15T/Slimitsimposedonprimarytosecondary leakageatoperating conditions are:amaximumof0.4gpm(600gpd)forallSGs'withamaximumof150gpdallowedforanyoneSG.TheRG1.121criteriaforestablishing operational leakageratelimitsthatrequireplantshutdownarebaseduponleak-before-break considerations todetectafreespancrackbeforepotential tuberuptureduringfaultedplantconditions.
The150gpdlimitshouldprovideforleakagedetection andplantshutdownintheeventoftheoccurrence ofanunexpected singlecrackresulting inleakagethatisassociated withthelongestpermissible cracklength.Regulatory Guide1.121acceptance criteriaforestablishing operating leakagelimitsarebasedonleak-before-break considerations suchthatplantshutdownisinitiated iftheleakageassociated withthelongestpermissible crackisexceeded.
Thelongestpermissible crackisthelengththatprovidesafactorofsafetyof1.43againstburstingatfaultedconditions maximumpressuredifferential.
Avoltageamplitude of9.6voltsfortypicalODSCCcorresponds tomeetingthistubeburstrequirement atalower95%prediction limitontheburst
)
)
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage13correlationcoupledwith95/95lowertolerancelimitmaterialproperties.Alternatecrackmorphologiescancorrespondto9.6voltssothatauniquecracklengthisnotdefinedbytheburstpressureversusvoltagecorrelation.Consequently,typicalburstpressureversusthrough-wallcracklengthcorrelationsareusedbelowtodefinethe"longestpermissiblecrack"forevaluatingoperatingleakagelimits.ConsistentwiththeCycle13andCycle14licenseamendmentrequestsforIPCandSection5ofEnclosure1oftheGL,operationalleakagelimitswillremainat150gpdperSG.Axialcracksleakingatthislevelareexpectedtoprovideleakbeforebreak(LBB)protectionatboththeSLBpressuredifferentialof2560psiand,whilenotpartofanyestablishedLBBmethodology,LBBprotectionwillalsobeprovidedatavalueof1.43timestheSLBpressuredifferential.Thus,the150gpdlimitprovidesforplantshutdownpriortoreachingcriticalcracklengthsforsteamlinebreakconditions.Additionally,thisleak-before-breakevaluationassumesthattheentirecreviceareaisuncoveredduringblowdown.'Partialuncoverywillprovidebenefittotheburstcapacityoftheintersection.3)Theproposedlicenseamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninmarginofsafety.TheuseofthevoltagebasedbobbinprobeinterimtubesupportplateelevationpluggingcriteriaatCookNuclearPlantUnit1isdemonstratedtomaintainSGtubeintegritycommensuratewiththecriteriaofRG1.121.RegulatoryGuide1.121describesamethodacceptabletotheNRCstaffformeetingGDC14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobabilityortheconsequencesofSGtuberupture.ThisisaccomplishedbydeterminingthelimitingconditionsofdegradationofSGtubing,asestablishedbyinserviceinspection,forwhichtubeswithunacceptablecrackingshouldberemovedfromservice.Uponimplementationofthecriteria,evenundertheworstcaseconditions,theoccurrenceofODSCCatthetubesupportplateelevationsisnotexpectedtoleadtoaSGtuberuptureeventduringnormalorfaultedplantconditions.TheEOC15distributionofcrackindicationsatthetubesupportplateelevationswillbeconfirmedbyanalysisandcalculationtoresultinacceptableprimarytosecondaryleakageduringallplantconditionsandthatradiologicalconsequencesarenotadverselyimpacted.InaddressingthecombinedeffectsofaLOCAandSSEontheSGcomponent(asrequiredbyGDC2),ithasbeendeterminedthattubecollapsemayoccurintheSGsatsomeplants.Thisisthecaseasthetubesupportplatesmaybecomedeformedasaresultoflateral l
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page13correlation coupledwith95/95lowertolerance limitmaterialproperties.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1166RPage14loadsatthewedgesupportsattheperipheryoftheplateduetothecombinedeffectsoftheLOCArarefactionwaveandSSEloadings.Then,theresultingpressuredifferentialonthedeformedtubesmaycausesomeofthetubestocollapse.'herearetwoissuesassociatedwithSGtubecollapse.First,thecollapseofSGtubingreducestheRCSflowareathroughthetubes.ThereductioninflowareaincreasestheresistancetoflowofsteamfromthecoreduringaLOCAwhich,inturn,maypotentiallyincreasepeakcladtemperature.Second,thereisapotentialthatpartialthrough-wallcracksintubescouldprogresstothrough-wallcracksduringtubedeformationorcollapse.Consequently,sincetheleak-before-breakmethodologyisapplicabletotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1reactorcoolantlooppiping,theprobabilityofbreaksintheprimarylooppipingissufficientlylowthattheyneednotbeconsideredinthestructuraldesignoftheplant.ThelimitingLOCAeventbecomeseithertheaccumulatorlinebreakorthepressurizersurgelinebreak.LossofcoolantaccidentloadsfortheprimarypipebreakswereusedtoboundtheCookNuclearPlantUnit1smallerbreaks.TheresultsoftheanalysisusingthelargerbreakinputsshowthattheLOCAloadswerefoundtobeofinsufficientmagnitudetoresultinSGtubecollapseorsignificantdeformation.AddressingRG1.83considerations,implementationofthebobbinprobevoltagebasedinterimtubepluggingcriteriaof2.0voltsissupplementedbyenhancededdycurrentinspectionguidelinestoprovideconsistencyinvoltagenormalization,a100$eddycurrentinspectionsamplesizeatthetubesupportplateelevationsperT/S,andMRPCinspectionrequirementsforthelargerindicationsleftinservicetocharacterizetheprincipaldegradationasODSCC.Asnotedpreviously,implementationofthetubesupportplateelevationpluggingcriteriawilldecreasethenumberoftubeswhichmustberepaired.TheinstallationofSGtubeplugsreducestheRCSflowmargin.Thus,implementationoftheIPCwillmaintainthemarginofflowthatwouldotherwisebereducedintheeventofincreasedtubeplugging.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthattheproposedlicenseamendmentrequestdoesnotresultinasignificantreductioninmarginwithrespecttoplantsafetyasdefinedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReportoranyBasesoftheplantT/Ss.}}
Alternate crackmorphologies cancorrespond to9.6voltssothatauniquecracklengthisnotdefinedbytheburstpressureversusvoltagecorrelation.
Consequently, typicalburstpressureversusthrough-wall cracklengthcorrelations areusedbelowtodefinethe"longestpermissible crack"forevaluating operating leakagelimits.Consistent withtheCycle13andCycle14licenseamendment requestsforIPCandSection5ofEnclosure 1oftheGL,operational leakagelimitswillremainat150gpdperSG.Axialcracksleakingatthislevelareexpectedtoprovideleakbeforebreak(LBB)protection atboththeSLBpressuredifferential of2560psiand,whilenotpartofanyestablished LBBmethodology, LBBprotection willalsobeprovidedatavalueof1.43timestheSLBpressuredifferential.
Thus,the150gpdlimitprovidesforplantshutdownpriortoreachingcriticalcracklengthsforsteamlinebreakconditions.
Additionally, thisleak-before-break evaluation assumesthattheentirecreviceareaisuncovered duringblowdown.
'Partialuncoverywillprovidebenefittotheburstcapacityoftheintersection.
3)Theproposedlicenseamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety.Theuseofthevoltagebasedbobbinprobeinterimtubesupportplateelevation pluggingcriteriaatCookNuclearPlantUnit1isdemonstrated tomaintainSGtubeintegrity commensurate withthecriteriaofRG1.121.Regulatory Guide1.121describes amethodacceptable totheNRCstaffformeetingGDC14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobability ortheconsequences ofSGtuberupture.Thisisaccomplished bydetermining thelimitingconditions ofdegradation ofSGtubing,asestablished byinservice inspection, forwhichtubeswithunacceptable crackingshouldberemovedfromservice.Uponimplementation ofthecriteria, evenundertheworstcaseconditions, theoccurrence ofODSCCatthetubesupportplateelevations isnotexpectedtoleadtoaSGtuberuptureeventduringnormalorfaultedplantconditions.
TheEOC15distribution ofcrackindications atthetubesupportplateelevations willbeconfirmed byanalysisandcalculation toresultinacceptable primarytosecondary leakageduringallplantconditions andthatradiological consequences arenotadversely impacted.
Inaddressing thecombinedeffectsofaLOCAandSSEontheSGcomponent (asrequiredbyGDC2),ithasbeendetermined thattubecollapsemayoccurintheSGsatsomeplants.Thisisthecaseasthetubesupportplatesmaybecomedeformedasaresultoflateral l
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page14loadsatthewedgesupportsattheperiphery oftheplateduetothecombinedeffectsoftheLOCArarefaction waveandSSEloadings.
Then,theresulting pressuredifferential onthedeformedtubesmaycausesomeofthetubestocollapse.'here aretwoissuesassociated withSGtubecollapse.
First,thecollapseofSGtubingreducestheRCSflowareathroughthetubes.Thereduction inflowareaincreases theresistance toflowofsteamfromthecoreduringaLOCAwhich,inturn,maypotentially increasepeakcladtemperature.
Second,thereisapotential thatpartialthrough-wall cracksintubescouldprogresstothrough-wall cracksduringtubedeformation orcollapse.
Consequently, sincetheleak-before-break methodology isapplicable totheCookNuclearPlantUnit1reactorcoolantlooppiping,theprobability ofbreaksintheprimarylooppipingissufficiently lowthattheyneednotbeconsidered inthestructural designoftheplant.ThelimitingLOCAeventbecomeseithertheaccumulator linebreakorthepressurizer surgelinebreak.LossofcoolantaccidentloadsfortheprimarypipebreakswereusedtoboundtheCookNuclearPlantUnit1smallerbreaks.TheresultsoftheanalysisusingthelargerbreakinputsshowthattheLOCAloadswerefoundtobeofinsufficient magnitude toresultinSGtubecollapseorsignificant deformation.
Addressing RG1.83considerations, implementation ofthebobbinprobevoltagebasedinterimtubepluggingcriteriaof2.0voltsissupplemented byenhancededdycurrentinspection guidelines toprovideconsistency involtagenormalization, a100$eddycurrentinspection samplesizeatthetubesupportplateelevations perT/S,andMRPCinspection requirements forthelargerindications leftinservicetocharacterize theprincipal degradation asODSCC.Asnotedpreviously, implementation ofthetubesupportplateelevation pluggingcriteriawilldecreasethenumberoftubeswhichmustberepaired.
Theinstallation ofSGtubeplugsreducestheRCSflowmargin.Thus,implementation oftheIPCwillmaintainthemarginofflowthatwouldotherwise bereducedintheeventofincreased tubeplugging.
Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheproposedlicenseamendment requestdoesnotresultinasignificant reduction inmarginwithrespecttoplantsafetyasdefinedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReportoranyBasesoftheplantT/Ss.}}

Revision as of 08:02, 29 June 2018

Application for Amend to License DPR-58,incorporating 2.0 Volt Interim SG Tube Support Plate Plugging Criterion for Fuel Cycle 15
ML17332A751
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/25/1995
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17332A752 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1166R, NUDOCS 9505010273
Download: ML17332A751 (27)


Text

RIORITY1CCELERATED RIDSPROCI'.SSIi G)REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9505010273 DOC.DATE:

95/04/25NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Application foramendtolicenseDPR-58,incorporating 2.0voltinterimSGtubesupportplatepluggingcriterion forfuelcycle15.DISTRIBUTION CODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR JENCLLSIZE:I++8-TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTESRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAHICKMAN,J INTERNA~@IL~ENPEI NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT EXTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDP NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111011ENVOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIEV'TS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEO'KSTE!COVTACT'I'IIEDOC!:KIEV.

I'OVTROLDESK,ROOKIPI-37(EXT.504-OS3)TOELDIIiATE YOURNAi!L'ROil DISI'RIBUTION LIS'ISI:ORDOCUh,IEi'I'S YOUDOi"I'L'I'.D!

TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR14ENCL13 itjC IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH432168April25,i995DocketNos'0-315AEP:NRC:1166R U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESTOINCORPORATE

2.0 VOLTINTERIMSTEAMGENERATOR

TUBESUPPORTPLATEPLUGGINGCRITERION FORFUELCYCLE15Thisletteranditsattachments providesupplemental information inresponsetotheMarch15,1995,telephone discussions withyourstaffregarding ourFebruary3,1995,letter,AEP:NRC:1166Q, concerning application foramendment tothetechnical specifications (T/Ss)ofDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitl.Specifically, thissupplemental information addresses theapplicable requirements ofdraftNRCGenericLetter(GL)94-XX,"Voltage-BasedRepairCriteriafortheRepairofWestinghouse SteamGenerator TubesAffectedbyOutsideDiameterStressCorrosion Cracking."

Foryourconvenience, allattachments previously submitted withAEP:NRC:1166Q arebeingre-submitted andsupersede thosecontained inthatsubmittal.

Attachment 1providesatechnical summaryofthespecificinspection practices andcalculational methodologies outlinedinGL94-XXthatwillbeappliedtotheUni.t1interimpluggingcriteriaprogramandthe10CFR50.92nosignificant hazardsevaluation.

Theevaluation andresultssupportcontinued useof2voltinterimpluggingcriteriaforfuelcycle15.Attachment 2containsexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttherequested changes.Attachment 3providestheproposedrevisedT/Spages./95050i0273 950425PDRADOCK05000315PDR J45 U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC:1166R Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee atthenextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.TheT/SpagesaffectedbythoseproposedchangesarealsoimpactedbytheT/Spagessubmitted withourApril13,1995,letterAEP:NRC:1129D, UseofLaserWeldedSleevesforSteamGenerator Tubes.Sincerely, E.E,Fitzpatrick VicePresident SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREMETHIS4~DAYOF1995NoryPublicehAttachments cc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett f't4V'tr~va4 ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1166R DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 10CFR50.92EVALUATION

/~J,~II~&~I~-n~

PsAttachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page1I.INTRODUCTION Thisamendment requestproposesachangetoCookNuclearPlantUnit1steamgenerators (SG)T/Ss4.4.5.2,4.4.5.3,4.4.5.4,4.4.5.5,3.4.6.2andBases3/4.4.5and3/4.6.2toallowcontinued useofSGtubesupportplateinterimpluggingcriteria(IPC)forfuelcycle15.Becauseofthechanges,textshiftandrepagenation arerequired.

ThechangeallowsSGtubeswithbobbincoileddycurrentindications lessthanorequalto2voltsattubesupportplateintersections toremaininservice,regardless ofapparentdepthoftubewallpenetration, ifasaresult,theprojected end-of-cycle (EOC)distribution ofcrackindications isshowntoresultinprimary-to-secondary leakagelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulated steamlinebreakevent.Indications greaterthan2voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifamotorized rotatingpancakecoil(MRPC)probeinspection doesnotdetectdegradation.

Thisamendment, specifictofuelcycle15,wouldreducethenumberofSGtubespluggedduetoindications atsupportplateintersections.

ReducingthenumberofpluggedtubesprovidesAD@Abenefitsandmaintains reactorcoolantsystem(RCS)flowmargin.Anassessment reportaddressing theeffectiveness oftheIPCmethodology described inWCAP-13187, Revision0,wascompleted following fuelcycle13andreportedinsubmittal documentAEP:NRC:1166J.

Thereportconcluded thatthevoltagedistribution foundbyinspection atEOC13in1994isingoodagreement withtheprojections madeatEOC12in1992.Thevoltagegrowthratescontinuetobeverysmall,withamaximumgrowthof0.4voltsforfuelcycle13comparedto0.49voltsforfuelcycle12.Notubeswerefoundforwhichthebobbincoilvoltageexceededthe2voltIPCrepairlimitatEOC13.Themaximumprojected EOC14voltagebasedonEOC13voltagedistribution is2.0voltsusingtheNRCmodeland1.9voltsusingtheindustrymodel.Considering theresultsofthisreport,continuation of2voltIPCisjustified forfuelcycle15.Similarassessment andprojection reportswillbepreparedatEOC14basedonGL94-XXreporting requirements.

II'PPLICATION OFDRAFTGL94-XXREUIREMENTS TOTHCOOKNUCLARPLANTUNIT1SGIPCLICENSEAMENDMENT REVESTFORCYCLE15TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1,2voltIPCwillbeimplemented pertheguidanceofGL94-XXalongwiththelatestindustrydataforburstandleakagedatabases.NRCGL94-XXwillbefactoredintotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCasfollows:

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page2Analystswillbebriefedregarding thepossibility ofprimarywaterstresscorrosion cracking(PWSCC)attubesupportplateintersections.

IfPWSCCisfoundatthesupportplateintersections itwillbereportedtotheNRCstaffpriortostartup.2)Thesupporting datasetsforcalculation ofburstprobability andestimation ofprimarytosecondary leakageduringapostulated mainsteamlinebreakwillbethoselistedinSections2.a.land2.b.3(1),

respectively, oftheGL.3)Mainsteamlineburstprobability andleakagecalculations willbeperformed following theguidanceofGL94-XX,Section2,"TubeIntegrity Evaluation."

Calculations performed insupportofthevoltage-based repaircriteriawillfollowthemethodology described inWCAP-14277, "SteamLineBreakLeakRateandTubeBurstProbability AnalysisMethodsforOutsideDiameterStressCorrosion CrackingatTubeSupportPlateIntersections,"

datedJanuary1995'hecalculations willbeperformed priortoreturning theSGstoserviceusingtheas-foundEOC14voltagedistribution.

Theprojected EOC15voltagedistribution resultswillbereportedinthe90dayreport.Nodistribution cutoffwillbeappliedtothevoltagemeasurement variability distribution forcalculation oftheprojected EOCvoltagedistribution.

4)Inspection scope,dataacquisition, anddataanalysiswillbeperformed following theguidanceofGL94-XX,Section3,"Inspection Criteria" andAppendixA,"NDEDataAcquisition andAnalysisGuidelines" submitted byourletterAEP:NRC:1166H forthecycle14IPC.Motorized rotatingpancakecoilinspection willbedoneonallindications exceeding 1.5volts.Motorized rotatingpancakecoilinspection willalsobedoneonallintersections wherecoppersignals,largemixedresiduals, ordentslargerthan5voltsinterfere withdetection offlaws.Probewearinspections andre-inspections willbeperformed usingtheguidelines ofAppendixA,SectionA.2.3,assubmitted byourletterAEP:NRC:1166H.

Ifanyofthelastprobewearstandardsignalamplitudes priortoprobereplacement exceedthe+/-15$limit,byavalueof"X%",thenanyindications measuredsincethelastacceptable probewearmeasurement thatarewithin"XS"oftheplugginglimitwillbereinspected withthenewprobe.Forexample,ifanyofthelastprobewearsignalamplitudes priortoprobereplacement were17%aboveorbelowtheinitialamplitude, thentheindications thatarewithin2%(17%-15%)

oftheplugginglimitmustbereinspected withthenewprobe.Alternatively, thevoltagecriterion maybeloweredtocompensate fortheexcessvariation; forthecaseabove,amplitudes z0.98timesthevoltagecriterion couldbesubjecttorepair.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page3Bobbincoilprobecalibration willbeperformed usingfour20%holesintheASMEcalibration standardinsteadofthe100%throughwallholes.Thisapproachwasconcurred withbytheNRCstaffattheJanuary18,1995,NRC/Industry meeting.5)GL94-ZX,Section5,"Operational LeakageRequirements,"

willbecontinued.

TheSGtubeleakagelimitof150gallonsperdaythrougheachSGwillbemaintained aspreviously approvedbytheNRCforourlastfuelcycle.CookNuclearPlantleakagemonitoring methodsprovidetimelyleakdetection,

trending, andresponsetorapidlyincreasing leaks.6)GL94-XX,Section6,"Reporting Requirements,"

willbeimplemented.

Itshouldbenoted,asstatedpreviously forSection2,thatthecalculation ofleakageandburstprobability requiredpriortoreturning theSGstoservicewillbeperformed byuseoftheas-foundEOCvoltagedistribution.

AEPSCCOMMENTSEXCEPTIONS TOGL94-XXANDASSOCIATED MPACTTOEPSCLICENSEAMENDMENT REVESTFORSGPCFORCYCLE15GL94-ZX,Sectionl,b:Analysesperformed byWestinghouse haveshownthatnotubesintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGswouldbesubjecttocollapseduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)+safeshutdownearthquake (SSE)event.Therefore, notubesareexcludedbasedonthiscriteria.

Itemsl.b.2andl.b.3arenotapplicable sincetheseconditions donotexistintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1'SGs.Series51SGsdesignedbyWestinghouse donothaveflowdistribution baffleplates.2)GL94-ZX,Section3.b.2:BasedontubepullresultsfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1,copperdepositsarenotpresentonthetubeoutsidediameter(OD)surfacesorinthetubesupportplate(TSP)crevicecorrosion product.Similarly, CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveevidenceof"largemixedresidualsignals."

CookNuclearPlantUnit1doesnothaveahistoryofeddycurrentdatawhichisdifficult tointerpret.

3)GL94-ZX,Section3.c.2:Bobbincoilprobeswillcontinuetobecalibrated againstthe20%holesintheASMEcalibration standardtoremainconsistent withthemethodology usedtodevelopthecriteria.

GL94-ZX,Section3.c.4:Therequirement toreinspect alltubespriortothelastprobechangeout ifthewearmeasurement exceeds15%isunnecessary.

As'acknowledged intheGL,a5.6voltrepaircriterion isjustified, however,therepaircriterion iscurrently limitedto2.0volts.Suchindications areexpectedtobewell Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page4withinstructural limitsatEOC15conditions, particularly whenUnit1growthratesareconsidered.

Reinspection ofindications necessitated byoutofspecification probewearwillbeconducted according toItem4ofpage2ofthisattachment.

5)GL94-XX,Section4,addresses theneedtoperformtubepulls.Tubepullscausesignificant outageextension, occupational radiation

exposure, andsignificant directcost.(Asanexample,removalofthreetubesamplesduringtheupcomingCookNuclearPlantUnit1refueling outageisestimated toaddtwotothreedaystotheoutagecriticalpath,havedirectcostsintherangeof$0.8-$1.3million,andincurfrom2-5manremexposure.)

Therefore, tubesselectedforpullingshouldbejudiciously chosenandshouldjustifythemonetaryexpenseandradiological exposure.

Tubesshouldnotbepulledmerelytosatisfyachronological requirement.

AEPSCbelievesthattheimposition ofthisrequirement duringthenextscheduled refueling outagewillnotenhancethecurrentburstandleakagedatabases sufficiently towarranttheaddedcost.Justification fornotperforming atubepullduringthenextoutageatCookNuclearPlantUnit1issuppliedbelow.A)In1992,nineCookNuclearPlantUnit1TSPintersections wereremovedformetallographic examination, bursttestingandleaktesting.Fieldbobbincoilvoltagesrangedfrom1.0to2.0volts,including fourintersections reportedasNDD.Burstpressures rangedfrom9,100to11,200psig.forthereportedindications andnointersections leakedduringtestingat2560psid.Examination oftubesafterbursttestingshowedcombinations ofaxiallyorientedintergranular stresscorrosion crackingandintergranular cellularcorrosion originating fromthetubeOD.Degradation morphology wasdominated bytheaxiallyorienteddegradation.

InadditiontotheUnit1tubepullssupporting SGIPC,significant numbersofintersections wereremovedfromUnit2in1984and1986.Inallcases,circumferentially orienteddegradation wasnotdetected.

B)Outsidediameterstresscorrosion cracking(ODSCC)degradation growthrateforCookNuclearPlantUnit1hasdecreased overthelasttwocyclesandnointersections duringthelastoutagehadTSPintersection voltagesexceeding 2.0volts.Thishighlevelofperformance isattributed totheunitoperating atreducedtemperature andpressure, improvedsecondary sidechemistry controlandsludgeremoval,andaconservative inspection/repair program.BasedonthelowgrowthratesatUnit1andchemistry controlinitiatives, EOC14voltagesareexpectedtobewellbelow3.0volts,andmostlikelylessthan2.0volts.Recenttubepullsatotherplants Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page5wheretheindication voltagewasgreaterthan2.0voltsandwherealargernumberofbeginning ofcycle(BOC)indications wereinthe2.0voltrangeindicated nounexpected degradation morphology.

TheexpectedEOC14voltagesatUnit1arewellbelowthethreshold forthroughwall degradation of2.8volts(determined fromatubepullatanotherplant)andwellbelowthethreshold forSLBleakageofapproximately 6.0volts.Duringthecurrentoperating cycle,Unit1hasnotexperienced anysecondary sidechemistry "excursions" whichmightsupportunexpected voltagegrowthorinitiation of"non-typical degradation morphologies.

C)Thecurrentrequirement toperformanMRPCinspection ofindications over1.5voltsissufficient toidentifynon-typicalmorphologies.

Forcasesofsignificant cellularcorrosion (identified atotherplants),metallographic

.examination hasshownthataxiallyorienteddegradation hasdominated themorphology andbursttestresults.Forsuch"caseswheresignificant circumferential components inacellularmorphology caninfluence burst,associated axialcomponents wouldyieldvoltagesfarinexcessofthe5to6voltrange,andsuchcircumferentially orienteddegradation wouldbeofsufficient depthtobedetectedbytheRPCprobe.IV,10CFR5092EVALUATION BACKGROUND CookNuclearPlantUnit1T/SAmendment 178permitted theimplementation ofa2.0voltSGtubeIPCforthe14thoperating cycleoftheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Thatlicenseamendment, applicable onlyforthecurrentoperating cycle(cycle14),requiredtherepairofflaw-like bobbinindications above2.0volts.Weareproposing useofasimilar2voltinterimrepaircriterion fortheupcomingcycle15.TheproposedIPCprogramfortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsfollowstheguidanceandgeneralintentofGL94-XXtomaintaintubestructural andleakageintegrity.

DESCRIPTION OFTHEIPCREQUESTAsrequiredby10CFR50.91(a)(l),ananalysisisprovidedtodemonstrate thattheproposedlicenseamendment toimplement anIPCforthetubesupportplateelevation ODSCCoccurring intheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGsinvolvesanosignificant hazardsconsideration.

TheIPCutilizes

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page6correlations betweeneddycurrentbobbinprobesignalamplitude (voltage) andtubeburstandleakagecapability.

Thepluggingcriterion isbasedontestingoflaboratory inducedODSCCspecimens andonextensive examination ofpulledtubesfromoperating SGs(industry wide-including threetubespulledin1992representing nineintersections fromCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.)CConsistent withGL94-ZX,theIPCprogramforCookNuclearPlantUnit1willincludethefollowing elementsaslistedunder"1.OverviewoftheVoltageRepairLimitApproach",

page3ofGL94-ZX.Performanenhancedinspection oftubes,particularly attheTSPintersections.

A100%bobbincoilinspection ofhotlegtubesupportplateintersections andcoldlegintersection downtothelowestcoldlegsupportplatewithknownODSCCindications willbeperformed.

Allflawindications withbobbinvoltagesgreaterthan1.5voltswillbeinspected byMRPC.UtilizeNDEdataacquisition andanalysisprocedures thatareconsistent withthemethodology usedtodevelopthevoltage-based repairlimits.TheCookNuclearPlantUnit1IPCprogramwillutilizeprocedures andtechniques consistent withthemethodologies usedtoestablish theIPCasdescribed inSection3ofEnclosure 1oftheGL,withtheexception that20%.throughwall holeswillbeusedinthestandard(Section3.c.2ofGL94-XX).Repairorplugtubesthatexceedthevoltagelimits.Flaw-like signalsadjacenttotheTSPwithbobbinvoltageslessthanorequalto2.0voltswillbeallowedtoremaininservice.Flaw-likeindications adjacenttotheTSPwithabobbinvoltageofgreaterthan2.0voltsbutlessthanorequalto5.6voltsmayremaininserviceifMRPCinspection doesnotdetectaflaw.'law indications withavoltageofgreaterthan5.6voltswillberepaired.

Determine theBOOvoltagedistribution.

Beginning ofCycle15voltagedistribution willbeestablished fromtheactualtubeinspections tobeperformed duringthenextoutageandwillbeestablished usingcurrentprogrammethodology.

ProjecttheEOC15distribution.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page7AnEOCvoltagedistribution willbeestablished basedontheEOC14ECTdata.EOC15voltagedistribution willbeprojected usingMonteCarlotechniques asdescribed inWCAP-14277 andwillincludeallowance foreddycurrentuncertainty asdefinedintheGLandaconservative voltagegrowthrateallowance.

Fortheprojected EOC'voltagedistribution, calculate leakageandconditional tubeburstprobability (andrepairtubesifnecessary).

Steamlinebreakleakagewillbecalculated, asdescribed inWCAP-14277,basedontheEOC15projected voltagedistribution.

Projected leakagemustremainbelow12.6gpminthefaultedloopforoffsitedoseestimates toremainwithin10$ofthe10CFR100guidelines.

Thisvaluewascalculated, usingStandardReviewPlanmethodology, priortotheCycle14licenseamendment requestandwillnotchangefortheupcomingcycle.Conditional tubeburstprobability willbecalculated according tothemethodology described inWCAP-14277.

Consistent withtheGL,ifburstprobability isfoundtobegreaterthan1x102,theNRCwillbeconsulted.

Asprescribed inGL94-XX,anevaluation ofprimarytosecondary leakage(andsubsequently offsitedose)isrequiredforallplantsimplementing theIPC.Allbobbinindications areincludedinthesteamlinebreakleakageanalyses, alongwithconsideration oftheprobability ofdetection.

Iftheprojected leakageexceeds12.6gpminthefaultedloopduringapostulated steamlinebreakevent,thenumberofindications inwhichtheIPCareappliedisreducedthroughtuberepairuntiltheprimary-to-secondary leakagelimitsaresatisfied.

EVALUATION TubeDegradation Characterization Ingeneral,thedegradation morphology occurring atthetubesupportplateintersections atplantsintheU.S.canbedescribed asaxiallyorientedODSCC.Thedegradation morphology atCookNuclearPlantUnit1isentirelycompatible withtheoverallindustrydatabase.SteamGenerator TubeIntegrity Inthedevelopment ofanIPCforCookNuclearPlantUnit1,Regulatory Guide(RG)1.121,"BasesforPluggingDegradedPWRSteamGenerator Tubes"andRG1.83,"Inservice Inspection ofPWRSteamGenerator Tubes"areusedasthebasesfordetermining thatSGtubeintegrity considerations aremaintained withinacceptable limits.Regulatory Guide1.121describes amethodacceptable totheNRCstaffformeetingGeneralDesignCriteria

~~4*1~~1t Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page8(GDC)14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobability andconsequences ofSGtuberupturethroughdetermining thelimitingsafeconditions oftubewalldegradation beyondwhichtubeswithunacceptable

cracking, asestablished byinservice inspection, shouldberemovedfromservicebyplugging.

Thisregulatory guideusessafetyfactorsonloadsfortubeburstthatareconsistent withtherequirements ofSectionIIIoftheASMECode.For-the.tubesupportplateelevation degradation occurring intheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs,tubeburstcriteriaareinherently satisfied duringnormaloperating conditions bythepresenceofthetubesupportplate.Thepresenceofthetubesupportplateenhancestheintegrity ofthedegradedtubesinthatregionbyprecluding tubedeformation beyondthediameterofthedrilledhole,thusprecluding tubeburst.Conservatively, nocreditistakeninthedevelopment ofthepluggingcriteriaforthepresenceofthetubesupportplateduringaccidentconditions.

Basedontheexistingdatabasefor7/8inchtubing,bursttestingshowsthatthesafetyrequirements fortubeburstmarginsduringaccidentcondition loadingscanbesatisfied withEOCbobbincoilsignalamplitudes lessthan9.6volts,regardless ofthedepthoftubewallpenetration ofthecracking.

Uponimplementation oftheseIPC,tubeleakageconsiderations mustalsobeaddressed.

Itmustbedetermined thatthecrackswillnotleakexcessively duringallplantconditions.

Forthe2voltinterimtubepluggingcriteriadeveloped fortheCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGtubes,noleakageisanticipated duringnormaloperating conditions evenwiththepresenceofpotential throughwall cracks.Theexpectedvoltagewhichwouldsupportprimary-to-secondary leakageatnormaloperating conditions isapproximately 10volts.Noprimary-to-secondary leakageattheTSPhasbeendetectedinU.S.plants.Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentcondition

loadings, thelimitingeventwithrespecttodifferential pressureexperienced acrosstheSGtubesisapostulated steamlinebreakevent.For7/8inchtubing,pulledtubedatasupportsnoleakageupto2.81voltsandlowprobability ofleakagebetween2.81and6.0volts,forbothpulledtubesandmodelboilerspecimens, attheboundingsteamlinebreakpressuredifferential of2560psi.Steamlinebreakprimarytosecondary leakagewillbecalculated asprescribed inGL94-XXandWCAP14277,usingEOC14eddycurrentdata.Thiscalculated leakagemustbeshowntobelessthan12.6gpminthefaultedloop.Additional Considerations Theproposedamendment wouldprecludeoccupational radiation exposurethatwouldotherwise beincurredbypersonnel involvedintubepluggingorrepairoperations'y reducingnon-essential tubeplugging, theproposedamendment wouldminimizethelossofmargininthereactorcoolantflowthroughtheSGinLOCAanalyses.

Theproposedamendment wouldavoidlossofmargininreactorcoolantsystemflowand,therefore, assistinmaintaining minimumflowratesinexcessofthatrequiredforoperation at Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page9fullpower.Reduction intheamountoftuberepairrequiredcanreducethelengthofplantoutagesandreducethetimethattheSGisopentothecontainment environment duringanoutage.The100%eddycurrentbobbinprobeinspection associated withimplementation oftheIPCwillhelptoidentifynewareasofconcernwhichmayarisebyproviding alevelofinservice inspection whichisfarinexcessoftheT/Srequirements utilizing the.40%depth-based plugginglimitforacceptable tubewalldegradation.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSANALYSISInaccordance withthethreefactortestof10CFR50.92(c),

implementation oftheproposedlicenseamendment isanalyzedusingthefollowing standards andfoundnotto1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3)involveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety.Conformance oftheproposedamendment tothestandards foradetermination ofnosignificant hazardsasdefinedin10CFR50.92(threefactortest)isshowninthefollowing paragraphs.

1)Operation ofCookNuclearPlantUnit1inaccordance withtheproposedlicenseamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Testingofmodelboilerspecimens forfreespantubing(notubesupportplaterestraint) atroomtemperature conditions showburstpressures inexcessof5000psiforindications ofouterdiameterstresscorrosion crackingwithvoltagemeasurements ashighas19volts.Bursttestingperformed onpulledtubesfromCookNuclearPlantUnit1withuptoa2.02voltindication shows.measured burstpressureinexcessof10,000psiatroomtemperature.

Bursttestingperformed onpulledtubesfromotherplantswithupto7.5voltindications showburstpressures inexcessof6,300psiatroomtemperatures.

Correcting fortheeffectsoftemperature onmaterialproperties andminimumstrengthlevels(asthebursttestingwasdoneatroomtemperature),

tubeburstcapability significantly exceedsthesafetyfactorrequirements ofRG1.121.Asstatedearlier,tubeburstcriteriaareinherently satisfied duringnormaloperating conditions duetotheproximity ofthetubesupportplate.Testdataindicates thattubeburstcannotoccurwithinthetubesupportplate,evenfortubeswhichhave100$throughwall electric-discharge machinednotches0.75inchlong,providedthetubesupportplateisadjacenttothenotchedarea.Sincetube-to-tube supportplateproximity precludes tubeburstduringnormaloperating conditions, useofthecriteriamust,therefore, retaintubeintegrity characteristics whichmaintaintheRG1121marginofsafetyof143timestheboundingfaultedcondition (steamlinebreak)pressuredifferential.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page10Duringapostulated mainsteamlinebreak,theTSPhasthepotential todeflectduringblowdown, therebyuncovering theintersection.

Basedontheexistingdatabase,theRG1.121criterion requiring maintenance ofasafetyfactorof1.43timesthesteamlinebreakpressuredifferential ontubeburstissatisfied by7/8inchdiametertubingwithbobbincoilindications withsignalamplitudes lessthan9.6volts;-regardless oftheindicated depthmeasurement.

A2.0voltpluggingcriteriacomparesfavorably withthe9.6voltstructural limitconsidering thepreviously calculated growthratesforODSCCwithinCookNuclearPlantUnit1SGs.Considering avoltagegrowthcomponent of0,8volts(40%voltagegrowthbasedon2.0voltsBOC)andanondestructive examination uncertainty of0.40volts(208voltageuncertainty basedon2.0voltsBOC),whenaddedtotheBOCIPCof2.0volts,resultsinaboundingEOCvoltageofapproximately 3.2voltsforcycle15operation.

A6.4voltsafetymarginexists(9.6structural limit-3.2voltEOC-6.4voltmargin).Forthevoltage/burst correlation, theEOCstructural limitissupported byavoltageof9.6volts.Usingthisstructural limitof9.6volts,aBOCmaximumallowable repairlimitcanbeestablished usingtheguidanceofRG1.121.TheBOCmaximumallowable repairlimitshouldnotpermitasignificant numberofEOCindications toexceedthe9.6voltstructural limitandshouldassurethatacceptable tubeburstprobabilities areattained.

ByaddingNDEuncertainty allowances andanallowance forcrackgrowthtotherepairlimit,thestructural limitcanbevalidated.

ThepreviousIPCsubmittal established theconservative NDEuncertainty limitof20%oftheBOCrepairlimit.Forconsistency, a40$voltagegrowthallowance totheBOCrepairlimitisalsoincluded.

Thisallowance isextremely conservative forCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Therefore, themaximumallowable BOCrepairlimit(RL)basedonthestructural limitof9.6voltscanberepresented bytheexpression:

RL+(0.2xRL)+(0.4xRL)9.6volts,or,themaximumallowable BOCrepairlimitcanbeexpressed as,RL-9.6voltstructural limit/1.6

-6.0volts.Thisstructural repairlimitsupportsthisapplication forcycle15IPCimplementation torepairbobbinindications greaterthan2.0voltsbasedonRPCconfirmation oftheindication.

Conservatively, anupperlimitof5.6voltswillbeusedtorepairbobbinindications whichareabove2.0voltsbutdonothaveconfirming RPCcalls.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R PagellTheconservatism ofthisrepairlimitisshownbytheEOC13(Spring1994)eddycurrentdata.Theoverallaveragevoltagegrowthwasdetermined tobeonly1.48(oftheBOCvoltage).

Inaddition, theEOC13maximumobservedvoltageincreasewas0.40volts,andoccurredinatubewithaBOCindication of0.96volts.Theapplicability ofcycle14growthratesforcycle15operation willbeconfirmed priortoreturn.toserviceofCookNuclearPlantUnit1.Similarlargestructural marginsareanticipated.

Relativetotheexpectedleakageduringaccidentcondition

loadings, ithasbeenpreviously established thatapostulated mainsteamlinebreakoutsideofcontainment butupstreamofthemainsteamisolation valverepresents themostlimitingradiological condition relativetotheIPC.Insupportofimplementation oftheIPC,itwillbedetermined whetherthedistribution ofcrackindications atthetubesupportplateintersections attheendofcycle15areprojected tobesuchthatprimarytosecondary leakagewouldresultinsiteboundarydoseswithinasmallfractionofthe10CFR100guidelines.

Aseparatecalculation hasdetermined thisallowable steamlinebreakleakagelimittobe12.6gpm.AlthoughnotrequiredbytheCookNuclearPlantdesignbasis,thiscalculation usestherecommended Iodine-131 transient spikingvaluesconsistent withNUREG-0800, andtheT/Sreactorcoolantsystemactivitylimitof1.0microcuriepergramdoseequivalent Iodine-131.Theprojected steamlinebreakleakageratecalculation methodology prescribed inGL94-ZXandWCAP14277willbeusedtocalculate EOC15leakage,basedonactualEOC14distributions andEOC15projected distributions.

Duetotherelatively lowvoltagegrowthratesatCookNuclearPlantUnit1andtherelatively smallnumberofindications affectedbytheIPC,steamlinebreakleakageprediction perGL94-ZXisexpectedtobesignificantly lessthantheacceptance limitof12.6gpminthefaultedloop.PriortoissueofGL94-XX,projected EOC14leakrateswerecalculated, basedondraftNUREG-1477,foratotaloftwelvecases,thecombination ofsixprobability-of-leak correlations andtwoleakratecalculation methodologies.

Resultsofthecalculations showthattheprojected EOC14leakratesrangedfrom0.001gpmto1.360gpm.Theseresultsarewellbelowthe12.6gpmallowable; therefore, implementation ofthe2voltIPCduringcycle15wouldnotadversely affectSGtubeintegrity andresultsinacceptable doseconsequences.

CurrentGL94-ZXmethodology requiresonlythelog-logistic probability ofleakagecorrelation beused.Projected EOC14SLBleakageusingthisfunctionwascalculated tobeonly0.001gpm.Basedontherelatively fewnumbersofintersections atCookNuclearPlantUnit1towhichtheIPCareapplied.and extremely smallCook Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page12NuclearPlantUnit1plant-specific growthrate,asimilarvaluewouldbeexpectedbasedontheEOC14eddycurrentdata.Theinclusion ofallIPCintersections intheleakagemodel,alongwithapplication ofaprobability ofdetection of0.6,willresultinextremely conservative leakageestimations, especially sosincecloseexamination oftheavailable datashowsthatindications oflessthan2.8voltswillnotbeexpectedtoleakduringSLBconditions.

AllUnit1IPCindications areexpectedtobebelow2.8voltsattheEOC15conditions.

Theproposedamendment doesnotresultinanyincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.previously evaluated withintheCookNuclearPlantUnit1FSAR.2)Theproposedlicenseamendment doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Implementation oftheproposedSGtubeIPCdoesnotintroduce anysignificant changestotheplantdesignbasis.Useofthecriteriadoesnotprovideamechanism whichcouldresultinanaccidentoutsideoftheregionofthetubesupportplateelevations.

NeitherasingleormultipletuberuptureeventwouldbeexpectedinaSGinwhichthepluggingcriteriahasbeenapplied(duringallplantconditions).

Specifically, wewillcontinuetoimplement amaximumleakageratelimitof150gpd(0.1gpm)perSGtohelpprecludethepotential forexcessive leakageduringallplantconditions.

Thecycle15T/Slimitsimposedonprimarytosecondary leakageatoperating conditions are:amaximumof0.4gpm(600gpd)forallSGs'withamaximumof150gpdallowedforanyoneSG.TheRG1.121criteriaforestablishing operational leakageratelimitsthatrequireplantshutdownarebaseduponleak-before-break considerations todetectafreespancrackbeforepotential tuberuptureduringfaultedplantconditions.

The150gpdlimitshouldprovideforleakagedetection andplantshutdownintheeventoftheoccurrence ofanunexpected singlecrackresulting inleakagethatisassociated withthelongestpermissible cracklength.Regulatory Guide1.121acceptance criteriaforestablishing operating leakagelimitsarebasedonleak-before-break considerations suchthatplantshutdownisinitiated iftheleakageassociated withthelongestpermissible crackisexceeded.

Thelongestpermissible crackisthelengththatprovidesafactorofsafetyof1.43againstburstingatfaultedconditions maximumpressuredifferential.

Avoltageamplitude of9.6voltsfortypicalODSCCcorresponds tomeetingthistubeburstrequirement atalower95%prediction limitontheburst

)

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page13correlation coupledwith95/95lowertolerance limitmaterialproperties.

Alternate crackmorphologies cancorrespond to9.6voltssothatauniquecracklengthisnotdefinedbytheburstpressureversusvoltagecorrelation.

Consequently, typicalburstpressureversusthrough-wall cracklengthcorrelations areusedbelowtodefinethe"longestpermissible crack"forevaluating operating leakagelimits.Consistent withtheCycle13andCycle14licenseamendment requestsforIPCandSection5ofEnclosure 1oftheGL,operational leakagelimitswillremainat150gpdperSG.Axialcracksleakingatthislevelareexpectedtoprovideleakbeforebreak(LBB)protection atboththeSLBpressuredifferential of2560psiand,whilenotpartofanyestablished LBBmethodology, LBBprotection willalsobeprovidedatavalueof1.43timestheSLBpressuredifferential.

Thus,the150gpdlimitprovidesforplantshutdownpriortoreachingcriticalcracklengthsforsteamlinebreakconditions.

Additionally, thisleak-before-break evaluation assumesthattheentirecreviceareaisuncovered duringblowdown.

'Partialuncoverywillprovidebenefittotheburstcapacityoftheintersection.

3)Theproposedlicenseamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety.Theuseofthevoltagebasedbobbinprobeinterimtubesupportplateelevation pluggingcriteriaatCookNuclearPlantUnit1isdemonstrated tomaintainSGtubeintegrity commensurate withthecriteriaofRG1.121.Regulatory Guide1.121describes amethodacceptable totheNRCstaffformeetingGDC14,15,31,and32byreducingtheprobability ortheconsequences ofSGtuberupture.Thisisaccomplished bydetermining thelimitingconditions ofdegradation ofSGtubing,asestablished byinservice inspection, forwhichtubeswithunacceptable crackingshouldberemovedfromservice.Uponimplementation ofthecriteria, evenundertheworstcaseconditions, theoccurrence ofODSCCatthetubesupportplateelevations isnotexpectedtoleadtoaSGtuberuptureeventduringnormalorfaultedplantconditions.

TheEOC15distribution ofcrackindications atthetubesupportplateelevations willbeconfirmed byanalysisandcalculation toresultinacceptable primarytosecondary leakageduringallplantconditions andthatradiological consequences arenotadversely impacted.

Inaddressing thecombinedeffectsofaLOCAandSSEontheSGcomponent (asrequiredbyGDC2),ithasbeendetermined thattubecollapsemayoccurintheSGsatsomeplants.Thisisthecaseasthetubesupportplatesmaybecomedeformedasaresultoflateral l

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1166R Page14loadsatthewedgesupportsattheperiphery oftheplateduetothecombinedeffectsoftheLOCArarefaction waveandSSEloadings.

Then,theresulting pressuredifferential onthedeformedtubesmaycausesomeofthetubestocollapse.'here aretwoissuesassociated withSGtubecollapse.

First,thecollapseofSGtubingreducestheRCSflowareathroughthetubes.Thereduction inflowareaincreases theresistance toflowofsteamfromthecoreduringaLOCAwhich,inturn,maypotentially increasepeakcladtemperature.

Second,thereisapotential thatpartialthrough-wall cracksintubescouldprogresstothrough-wall cracksduringtubedeformation orcollapse.

Consequently, sincetheleak-before-break methodology isapplicable totheCookNuclearPlantUnit1reactorcoolantlooppiping,theprobability ofbreaksintheprimarylooppipingissufficiently lowthattheyneednotbeconsidered inthestructural designoftheplant.ThelimitingLOCAeventbecomeseithertheaccumulator linebreakorthepressurizer surgelinebreak.LossofcoolantaccidentloadsfortheprimarypipebreakswereusedtoboundtheCookNuclearPlantUnit1smallerbreaks.TheresultsoftheanalysisusingthelargerbreakinputsshowthattheLOCAloadswerefoundtobeofinsufficient magnitude toresultinSGtubecollapseorsignificant deformation.

Addressing RG1.83considerations, implementation ofthebobbinprobevoltagebasedinterimtubepluggingcriteriaof2.0voltsissupplemented byenhancededdycurrentinspection guidelines toprovideconsistency involtagenormalization, a100$eddycurrentinspection samplesizeatthetubesupportplateelevations perT/S,andMRPCinspection requirements forthelargerindications leftinservicetocharacterize theprincipal degradation asODSCC.Asnotedpreviously, implementation ofthetubesupportplateelevation pluggingcriteriawilldecreasethenumberoftubeswhichmustberepaired.

Theinstallation ofSGtubeplugsreducestheRCSflowmargin.Thus,implementation oftheIPCwillmaintainthemarginofflowthatwouldotherwise bereducedintheeventofincreased tubeplugging.

Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheproposedlicenseamendment requestdoesnotresultinasignificant reduction inmarginwithrespecttoplantsafetyasdefinedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReportoranyBasesoftheplantT/Ss.