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| {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1REGULATOINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9709260327DOC.'DATE:97/09/19NOTARIZED:YES~DOCKETIFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-'316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyInd'iana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk) | | {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1REGULATOINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9709260327 DOC.'DATE: |
| | 97/09/19NOTARIZED: |
| | YES~DOCKETIFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-'316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E. |
| | IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Ind'iana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk) |
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| ApplicationforamendstolicensesDPR-58aDPR-74,deletingrequirementforautomaticvalveclosurefeatureonRHRsyssuctionfromRCS.4DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:EINTERNARECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3LAHICKMAN,JKHXE$4-NRR/DE/EMCBNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3PDNRR/DE/ECGB/ANRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2COPIESLTTRENCL1111111110EXTERNAL:NOAC11NRCPDR11ENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR13ENCL12 LII' IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleOriveBuchanan,Ml491071395INOIAM/lStfCHIGNONPWMSeptember19,1997AEP:NRCr127810CFR50.90DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2REQUESTFOREMERGENCYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONAMENDMENTTECHNICALSPECIFICATION4.5.2.d.1AUTOMATICINTERLOCKSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTCHANGEPursuantto10CFR50.91(a)(5),weproposetoamendtechnicalspecification(T/S)4.5.2.d.loftheCookNuclearPlantunits1and2,andrequestthattheNRCgrantthisasanemergencyamendment.Thisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationfortheemergencyamendment.Thisamendmentwilldeletetherequirementforanautomaticvalveclosurefeatureontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionfromthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Adescriptionofthechange,thebackgroundandreasonforchange,-justificationforemergencyreviewandapproval,justificationforchange,andouranalysesconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationsarecontainedinattachment1tothisletter.Attachment2containsthecurrentT/Spages,marked-uptoreflecttheproposedchanges.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontainedinattachment3.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin:1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite;or2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommitteeandwillbereviewedbythenuclearsafetyanddesignreviewcommitteeattheirnextregularlyscheduledmeeting.V70eaaoaa7V70V<VPDRADQCK050003i5PfDRQ Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.VicePresident8(,SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREME;."(IP.'.'THIS/ADA'Y09~8S77,1997NotaryPublicvlbAttachmentsLINDALBOELCKENotoryPubhc,SemenCountY,MlMyCommissionExpiresjonuory21,200>A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW',RPDNRCResidentInspectorJ.R.Padgett Itt,ttI1'lqtfLl>'1fttr<
| | Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58aDPR-74,deleting requirement forautomatic valveclosurefeatureonRHRsyssuctionfromRCS.4DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal: |
| ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1278DESCRIPTIONOFCHANGERSBACKGROUNDANDREASONFORCHANGEJUSTIFICATIONFOREMERGENCYREVIEWANDAPPROVAL,JUSTIFICATIONFORCHANGEAND10CFR50.92ANALYSES Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page1DescritionofAmendmentReuestTechnicalSpecification(T/S)surveillancerequirement4.5.2.d.1.requiresoperabilityoftwoautomaticinterlocksontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionvalvesZMO-128andZCM-129forbothunits.Oneoftheinterlocks,whichweintendtomaintain,is~designedtoensurethatneitherofthetwosuctionvalvesisopenedwhilethereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)isabovetheRHRsystemdesignpressure.Thesecondinterlock,whichisthesubjectofthisT/Schangerequest,wasdesignedtoautomaticallyclosethetwovalvesifthe,RCSpressureweretoincreaseto600psig.Xtisourintentbythisamendmentrequest,todeletereferencetotheauto-closureinterlockfromtheT/Ssurveillance.ThiswillremovetheT/SrequirementofthisinterlockforRHRsystemoperability.BackroundandReasonforChaneThisT/SsurveillanceiscurrentlyrequiredbytheModes1,2,and3specificationfortheECCSsystem,T/S4.5.2.d.1.Byreference,itisalsorequiredinthemode4specification,4.5.3.1.UFSARChapter9,Section9.3describestheinterlocksassociatedwiththeRHRsuctionvalvesIMO-128andICM-129.ThevalvesareinterlockedthroughseparatechannelsoftheRCSpressureinstrumentationtoprovideautomaticclosureofbothvalveswheneverRCSpressureexceedsRHRdesignpressure.TheUFSARdoesstatethattheinterlockmaybedefeatedwhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere.Therequirementforthisauto-closurecapabilitydatesbacktoouroriginalT/SandUFSARlicensedocuments.TheoverpressureprotectionwasdesignedtopreventanintersystemlossofcoolantaccidentprecipitatedbyanoverpressureconditionintheRCS,whichwouldcauseabreakintheRHRsystem.However,sinceJune1980,thisinterlockhasbeendefeatedonbothunitsanytimetheRHRsystemisoperatinginthenormalcoolingconfiguration.Thispracticebeganinordertopreventinadvertentauto-closureofthevalveswhichwouldresultinlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation.
| | GeneralDistribution NOTES:EINTERNARECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3LAHICKMAN,J KHXE$4-NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3PDNRR/DE/ECGB/A NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2COPIESLTTRENCL1111111110EXTERNAL: |
| Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page2Theinterlockisdefeatedbyremovingpowerfromthevalvesandrackingouttheassociatedbreakers.ThisactionistakenassoonasthevalvesareopenedtoplaceRHRinserviceforshutdowncooling,inmode4.OnSeptember11,1997,withbothunitsshutdowninmode5,itwasdeterminedthatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothedesignbasisasdescribedintheFSARandcontrarytotheT/Sfortheemergencycorecoolingsystems(ECCS).ThereasonforchangingthisT/Sisthat,foroperationinMode4withthenormalRHRcoolingconfigurationinplace,thisauto-closurecapabilitymakestheplantunacceptablyvulnerabletoalossofRHRcooling.CharacterizationofthisvulnerabilityisbasedonindustryandCookNuclearPlantoperatingexperience.InNovember1979,theNRCissuedIEBulletinNo.79-20,"LossofNon-class1EInstrumentationandControlPowerSystemBusDuringOperation."Reviewofthisbulletindeterminedthatoursystemwasvulnerabletolossofeither120voltACvitalinstrumentationbussesCRIDIorCRIDIV,whichwouldgenerateaclosesignaltoitsassociatedRHRsuctionvalve,IMO-128orICM-129.InMayof1980,IEInformationNotice80-20,"LossofDecayHeatRemovalCapabilityatDavis-BesseUnit1WhileinaRefuelingMode"andIEBulletin80-12,"DecayHeatRemovalSystemOperability"wereissuedtotheindustrytohighlightNRCconcernthatlicenseesmaintaindiverseandredundantmeansofdecayheatremoval.InourresponsetoIEBulletin8012,wecommittedtolockoutpowertobothRHRsystemsuctionvalveswhenevertheRHRsystemisinserviceforRCScooling,topreventinadvertentvalveclosureandlossofsuctiontotheRHRpumps.Theauto-closurecapability,ifactive,renderstheLowTemperatureOverpressure(LTOP)systeminoperableinmode4withRHRcoolinginservice.ThishappensbecausetheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalve,aspartoftheLTOPsysteminthisconfiguration,wouldlosecommunicationwiththeRCSifeitherofthesuctionvalvesweretoclose.Thesurveillancerequirementforbothunits,currentlyreadsasfollows:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:VerifyingautomaticisolationandinterlockactionoftheRHRsystemfromthe
| | NOAC11NRCPDR11ENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: |
| | LTTR13ENCL12 LII' IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleOriveBuchanan, Ml491071395 INOIAM/lStfCHIGNONPWMSeptember 19,1997AEP:NRCr1278 10CFR50.90DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen: |
| | DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2REQUESTFOREMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.5.2.d.1 AUTOMATIC INTERLOCK SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT CHANGEPursuantto10CFR50.91(a)(5), |
| | weproposetoamendtechnical specification (T/S)4.5.2.d.l oftheCookNuclearPlantunits1and2,andrequestthattheNRCgrantthisasanemergency amendment. |
| | Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication fortheemergency amendment. |
| | Thisamendment willdeletetherequirement foranautomatic valveclosurefeatureontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionfromthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Adescription ofthechange,thebackground andreasonforchange,-justification foremergency reviewandapproval, justification forchange,andouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arecontained inattachment 1tothisletter.Attachment 2containsthecurrentT/Spages,marked-up toreflecttheproposedchanges.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontained inattachment 3.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin:1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsite;or2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure. |
| | Theseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommittee andwillbereviewedbythenuclearsafetyanddesignreviewcommittee attheirnextregularly scheduled meeting.V70eaaoaa7 V70V<VPDRADQCK050003i5PfDRQ Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.VicePresident 8(,SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREME;."(IP.'.'THIS/ADA'Y09~8S77,1997NotaryPublicvlbAttachments LINDALBOELCKENotoryPubhc,SemenCountY,MlMyCommission Expiresjonuory21,200>A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW',RPDNRCResidentInspector J.R.Padgett Itt,ttI1'lqtfLl>'1fttr< |
| | ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1278 DESCRIPTION OFCHANGERSBACKGROUND ANDREASONFORCHANGEJUSTIFICATION FOREMERGENCY REVIEWANDAPPROVAL, JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGEAND10CFR50.92ANALYSES Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page1DescritionofAmendment ReuestTechnical Specification (T/S)surveillance requirement 4.5.2.d.1.requiresoperability oftwoautomatic interlocks ontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionvalvesZMO-128andZCM-129forbothunits.Oneoftheinterlocks, whichweintendtomaintain, is~designedtoensurethatneitherofthetwosuctionvalvesisopenedwhilethereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)isabovetheRHRsystemdesignpressure. |
| | Thesecondinterlock, whichisthesubjectofthisT/Schangerequest,wasdesignedtoautomatically closethetwovalvesifthe,RCSpressureweretoincreaseto600psig.Xtisourintentbythisamendment request,todeletereference totheauto-closure interlock fromtheT/Ssurveillance. |
| | ThiswillremovetheT/Srequirement ofthisinterlock forRHRsystemoperability. |
| | BackroundandReasonforChaneThisT/Ssurveillance iscurrently requiredbytheModes1,2,and3specification fortheECCSsystem,T/S4.5.2.d.1.Byreference, itisalsorequiredinthemode4specification, 4.5.3.1.UFSARChapter9,Section9.3describes theinterlocks associated withtheRHRsuctionvalvesIMO-128andICM-129.Thevalvesareinterlocked throughseparatechannelsoftheRCSpressureinstrumentation toprovideautomatic closureofbothvalveswheneverRCSpressureexceedsRHRdesignpressure. |
| | TheUFSARdoesstatethattheinterlock maybedefeatedwhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere. |
| | Therequirement forthisauto-closure capability datesbacktoouroriginalT/SandUFSARlicensedocuments. |
| | Theoverpressure protection wasdesignedtopreventanintersystem lossofcoolantaccidentprecipitated byanoverpressure condition intheRCS,whichwouldcauseabreakintheRHRsystem.However,sinceJune1980,thisinterlock hasbeendefeatedonbothunitsanytimetheRHRsystemisoperating inthenormalcoolingconfiguration. |
| | Thispracticebeganinordertopreventinadvertent auto-closure ofthevalveswhichwouldresultinlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation. |
| | Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page2Theinterlock isdefeatedbyremovingpowerfromthevalvesandrackingouttheassociated breakers. |
| | ThisactionistakenassoonasthevalvesareopenedtoplaceRHRinserviceforshutdowncooling,inmode4.OnSeptember 11,1997,withbothunitsshutdowninmode5,itwasdetermined thatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothedesignbasisasdescribed intheFSARandcontrarytotheT/Sfortheemergency corecoolingsystems(ECCS).ThereasonforchangingthisT/Sisthat,foroperation inMode4withthenormalRHRcoolingconfiguration inplace,thisauto-closurecapability makestheplantunacceptably vulnerable toalossofRHRcooling.Characterization ofthisvulnerability isbasedonindustryandCookNuclearPlantoperating experience. |
| | InNovember1979,theNRCissuedIEBulletinNo.79-20,"LossofNon-class 1EInstrumentation andControlPowerSystemBusDuringOperation." |
| | Reviewofthisbulletindetermined thatoursystemwasvulnerable tolossofeither120voltACvitalinstrumentation bussesCRIDIorCRIDIV,whichwouldgenerateaclosesignaltoitsassociated RHRsuctionvalve,IMO-128orICM-129.InMayof1980,IEInformation Notice80-20,"LossofDecayHeatRemovalCapability atDavis-Besse Unit1WhileinaRefueling Mode"andIEBulletin80-12,"DecayHeatRemovalSystemOperability" wereissuedtotheindustrytohighlight NRCconcernthatlicensees maintaindiverseandredundant meansofdecayheatremoval.InourresponsetoIEBulletin8012,wecommitted tolockoutpowertobothRHRsystemsuctionvalveswhenevertheRHRsystemisinserviceforRCScooling,topreventinadvertent valveclosureandlossofsuctiontotheRHRpumps.Theauto-closure capability, ifactive,renderstheLowTemperature Overpressure (LTOP)systeminoperable inmode4withRHRcoolinginservice.ThishappensbecausetheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalve,aspartoftheLTOPsysteminthisconfiguration, wouldlosecommunication withtheRCSifeitherofthesuctionvalvesweretoclose.Thesurveillance requirement forbothunits,currently readsasfollows:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:Verifying automatic isolation andinterlock actionoftheRHRsystemfromthe |
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| Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page3ReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Weareproposingtochangethistoread:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:VerifyingtheautomaticinterlockactiontopreventopeningofthesuctionoftheRHRsystemfromtheReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Thischange,asdiscussedabove,wouldmaintaintheopeninterlockfunction,butallowustoprotectboththeRHRsystemandtheReactorCoolantSystemfromoverpressureusingtheLTOPsystem.JustificationforEmerencReviewandAroyalTheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssrequiretwooperablechargingpumpsinmode4forreactivitycontrol.WiththeRHRpumpsoperable,proceduresadministrativelyrequireanLTOPconfigurationoftwooperablepressureoperatedreliefvalvesandoneRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalvetoprotecttheRCSandtheRHRsystemintheeventofapressuretransient.OurLTOPanalysisformode4takescreditfortheRHRsuctionvalvesbeingopenwiththeauto-closurefunctiondefeated,andthisisessentialtotheoperationoftheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalveaspartofLTOP,becauseifthcsuctionvalvesauto-close,thereliefvalvehasnocommunicationwiththeRCS.WhenLTOPwasdevelopedandimplemented,thisproceduralcontrolhadbeen'inplaceformanyyears,andtheimpactontheT/Sagainwentunidentified.WecannotcomplywiththereactivitycontrolT/SandLTOPadministrativerequirements,andalsocomplywithT/Ssurveillancerequirements4.5.2.d.1and4.5.3.1foroperabilityoftheRHRsuctionvalveauto-closurefunction.WebelievethatachangetotheT/Saswearerequesting,istheappropriateactionrelativetonuclearsafety,andtobestcomplywiththeintentoftheoriginaldesignbasis.Therefore,tomeettheT/SrequirementsoftwooperablechargingpumpsandtomaintainanacceptableLTOPconfiguration,theauto-closureinterlockmustbedefeatedwhileinmode4.Asaresult, Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page4anemergencyT/Schangeisrequiredtoallowstart-upoftheshutdownunits.OnSeptember18,1997,aletterwassenttotheUSNRCprovidingadiscussionoftheactionswearetakingtoaddresstechnicalissuesidentifiedbytherecentlycompletearchitectengineering(AE)teaminspection.WearecurrentlyanticipatingthecommencementofstartupactivitiesonSeptember29,1997,andrespectfullyrequestNRCreviewandapprovalofthischangebythatdate.Weunderstandtheimpactofsuchanemergencyrequest,andrecognizingthattheconditionsandstatusoftheCookNuclearPlantrestartmaychangeinthefuture,weintendtokeepthecommissioninformed,throughourdailycontactwithourNRRprojectmanager,astothestatusofourrestartschedule.Thesituationdescribedaboveoccurredbecause,untilrecently,theneedtomeettheRHRsuctionvalvesurveillancerequirement,inmode4,simultaneouslywiththereactivitycontrolspecificationandtheLTOPadministrativerequirements,wasnotrecognized.Investigationintotherootcauseofthisoversightisstillinprogress.TheAEinspectionteamidentifiedissuesrelatedtoourconfigurationmanagement,designandprocedurecontrol,andourunderstandingoftheplant'designandlicensingbases.Withtheinsightgainedfromtheinspectors'onclusions,weidentifiedthisparticularissueonSeptember11,1997.TheneedforaT/Schangepriortorestartingeitheroftheunits,becameevidentasaresultofourinvestigationofthismatter.JustificationForChaneTherequestedchangehasnorelevancetomodes1,2,and3,sincetheRHRsystemisalwaysinECCSstandbyreadinessinmode3pertechnicalspecificationLCO3.5.2.IntheECCSline-up,IMO-128andICM-129areclosedwithcontrolpowerdeenergized,providingassurance,alongwiththeclosurepreventioninterlock,thatthevalveswillnotbeopenedwiththeRCSathighpressures.Inmode4,withtheRHRsuctionvalves,IMO-128andICM-129blockedopen,theRCSandtheRHRsystemsarebothprotectedfromoverpressurizationbytheLTOPconfigurationasitwasdeterminedandevaluatedinourLTOPanalysis.
| | Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page3ReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Weareproposing tochangethistoread:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:Verifying theautomatic interlock actiontopreventopeningofthesuctionoftheRHRsystemfromtheReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Thischange,asdiscussed above,wouldmaintaintheopeninterlock |
| | : function, butallowustoprotectboththeRHRsystemandtheReactorCoolantSystemfromoverpressure usingtheLTOPsystem.Justification forEmerencReviewandAroyalTheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssrequiretwooperablechargingpumpsinmode4forreactivity control.WiththeRHRpumpsoperable, procedures administratively requireanLTOPconfiguration oftwooperablepressureoperatedreliefvalvesandoneRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalvetoprotecttheRCSandtheRHRsystemintheeventofapressuretransient. |
| | OurLTOPanalysisformode4takescreditfortheRHRsuctionvalvesbeingopenwiththeauto-closure functiondefeated, andthisisessential totheoperation oftheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalveaspartofLTOP,becauseifthcsuctionvalvesauto-close, thereliefvalvehasnocommunication withtheRCS.WhenLTOPwasdeveloped andimplemented, thisprocedural controlhadbeen'inplaceformanyyears,andtheimpactontheT/Sagainwentunidentified. |
| | Wecannotcomplywiththereactivity controlT/SandLTOPadministrative requirements, andalsocomplywithT/Ssurveillance requirements 4.5.2.d.1 and4.5.3.1foroperability oftheRHRsuctionvalveauto-closure function. |
| | WebelievethatachangetotheT/Saswearerequesting, istheappropriate actionrelativetonuclearsafety,andtobestcomplywiththeintentoftheoriginaldesignbasis.Therefore, tomeettheT/Srequirements oftwooperablechargingpumpsandtomaintainanacceptable LTOPconfiguration, theauto-closureinterlock mustbedefeatedwhileinmode4.Asaresult, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page4anemergency T/Schangeisrequiredtoallowstart-upoftheshutdownunits.OnSeptember 18,1997,aletterwassenttotheUSNRCproviding adiscussion oftheactionswearetakingtoaddresstechnical issuesidentified bytherecentlycompletearchitect engineering (AE)teaminspection. |
| | Wearecurrently anticipating thecommencement ofstartupactivities onSeptember 29,1997,andrespectfully requestNRCreviewandapprovalofthischangebythatdate.Weunderstand theimpactofsuchanemergency request,andrecognizing thattheconditions andstatusoftheCookNuclearPlantrestartmaychangeinthefuture,weintendtokeepthecommission |
| | : informed, throughourdailycontactwithourNRRprojectmanager,astothestatusofourrestartschedule. |
| | Thesituation described aboveoccurredbecause,untilrecently, theneedtomeettheRHRsuctionvalvesurveillance requirement, inmode4,simultaneously withthereactivity controlspecification andtheLTOPadministrative requirements, wasnotrecognized. |
| | Investigation intotherootcauseofthisoversight isstillinprogress. |
| | TheAEinspection teamidentified issuesrelatedtoourconfiguration management, designandprocedure control,andourunderstanding oftheplant'designandlicensing bases.Withtheinsightgainedfromtheinspectors'onclusions, weidentified thisparticular issueonSeptember 11,1997.TheneedforaT/Schangepriortorestarting eitheroftheunits,becameevidentasaresultofourinvestigation ofthismatter.Justification ForChaneTherequested changehasnorelevance tomodes1,2,and3,sincetheRHRsystemisalwaysinECCSstandbyreadiness inmode3pertechnical specification LCO3.5.2.IntheECCSline-up,IMO-128andICM-129areclosedwithcontrolpowerdeenergized, providing assurance, alongwiththeclosureprevention interlock, thatthevalveswillnotbeopenedwiththeRCSathighpressures. |
| | Inmode4,withtheRHRsuctionvalves,IMO-128andICM-129blockedopen,theRCSandtheRHRsystemsarebothprotected fromoverpressurization bytheLTOPconfiguration asitwasdetermined andevaluated inourLTOPanalysis. |
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| Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page5Theprotectionaffordedbytheoriginalauto-closureinterlockwasasimpleautomaticisolationoftheRHRsuctionfromtheRCSwhentheRCSpressurereachedthedesignpressureoftheRHRsystem.TheanalysisperformedfortheLTOPsystemspecificallyidentifiestheappropriateprotectionrequiredforthevariousoperationalconfigurationsoftheECCSandtheRCSwhichmightberequiredduringcooldown,shutdown,andheatup.IntheLTOPanalysis,adistinctionismadeforrequirementswithandwithouttheRHRsysteminservice.Inmode4,atCookNuclearPlant,T/SLCO3.1.2.4,"ChargingPumps-Operating"requirestwooperablecentrifugalchargingpumpsforreactivitycontrol.BasedontheLTOPanalysis,withtwochargingpumps,andtheRHRsystemoperableinthemode4configuration,LTOPrequirementsare;twooperablepressurizerPORVsANDtheRHRsuctionsafetyvalveoperableforpressurerelief.Iftheauto-closureinterlockwerealsoenabledtoclosethevalves,andtheRCSpressurereachedthesetpointatanytimeduringthetransient,theRHRsuctionsafetyvalvewouldbewithoutcommunicationwiththeRCS,andthereforeunavailableforpressurerelief.TheconfigurationofallthreeLTOPpressurereliefcomponentsavailableallowsforsinglefailureofanyonereliefcomponent.Theavailablereliefflowrate,withfailureofanyonecomponent,willenvelopetheinjectionratesforone'rbothhighheadcentrifugalchargingpumps.ThisdemonstratesthattheDonaldC.CookPlantissufficientlyprotectedbytheLTOPsystemalone,fromoverpressurizationresultingfrommassinjectioneventsgiventheaboveconstraints.Theoriginaldecisiontooperatewiththepowerremovedfromthesevalvesintheopenposition,wasmadein1980,inresponsetoindustryoperatingexperience.Eventsatanotherplanthighlightedthesituationwherethelossofoneelectricalcontrolpowerbuscouldcausethesuctionvalveauto-closuretooccur.Theconcernaboutlossofdecayheatremovaleventswasheightenedlaterinthe1980'swhenadditionaleventsunderscoredthevulnerabilityofthesystemsintheshutdownmodesofoperation.Defeatingtheauto-closureinterlockprovidesprotectionfromthistype'fevent.
| | Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page5Theprotection affordedbytheoriginalauto-closure interlock wasasimpleautomatic isolation oftheRHRsuctionfromtheRCSwhentheRCSpressurereachedthedesignpressureoftheRHRsystem.Theanalysisperformed fortheLTOPsystemspecifically identifies theappropriate protection requiredforthevariousoperational configurations oftheECCSandtheRCSwhichmightberequiredduringcooldown, |
| | : shutdown, andheatup.IntheLTOPanalysis, adistinction ismadeforrequirements withandwithouttheRHRsysteminservice.Inmode4,atCookNuclearPlant,T/SLCO3.1.2.4,"ChargingPumps-Operating" requirestwooperablecentrifugal chargingpumpsforreactivity control.BasedontheLTOPanalysis, withtwochargingpumps,andtheRHRsystemoperableinthemode4configuration, LTOPrequirements are;twooperablepressurizer PORVsANDtheRHRsuctionsafetyvalveoperableforpressurerelief.Iftheauto-closure interlock werealsoenabledtoclosethevalves,andtheRCSpressurereachedthesetpointatanytimeduringthetransient, theRHRsuctionsafetyvalvewouldbewithoutcommunication withtheRCS,andtherefore unavailable forpressurerelief.Theconfiguration ofallthreeLTOPpressurereliefcomponents available allowsforsinglefailureofanyonereliefcomponent. |
| | Theavailable reliefflowrate,withfailureofanyonecomponent, willenvelopetheinjection ratesforone'rbothhighheadcentrifugal chargingpumps.Thisdemonstrates thattheDonaldC.CookPlantissufficiently protected bytheLTOPsystemalone,fromoverpressurization resulting frommassinjection eventsgiventheaboveconstraints. |
| | Theoriginaldecisiontooperatewiththepowerremovedfromthesevalvesintheopenposition, wasmadein1980,inresponsetoindustryoperating experience. |
| | Eventsatanotherplanthighlighted thesituation wherethelossofoneelectrical controlpowerbuscouldcausethesuctionvalveauto-closure tooccur.Theconcernaboutlossofdecayheatremovaleventswasheightened laterinthe1980'swhenadditional eventsunderscored thevulnerability ofthesystemsintheshutdownmodesofoperation. |
| | Defeating theauto-closure interlock providesprotection fromthistype'fevent. |
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| Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page6Theoriginalbasisfortheauto-closureinterlockwastoprotecttheRHRsystemfromanoverpressurizationeventwhileoperatingwithRHRsuctionfromthenormalRCScooldownline.The'nalyzedLTOPconfiguration,twoPORVsandaRHRreliefvalve,providesthisprotectionandlowersthepotentialforinadvertentisolationofdecayheatremovalcapability.BasisForNoSinificantHazardsDeterminationInaccordancewith10CFR50.92,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationifthechangesdonot:involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thisamendmentrequestdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesanalternativemeansofprovidingoverpressurizationprotectionfortheRHRsystem,andtherebyprotectionagainstpotentialintersystemLOCA.OperatingprocedureadministrativerequirementsestablishthenecessaryLTOPsystemconfigurationandECCSequipmentoperabilityconstraintsformode4operation.TheLTOPsystemhasbeenanalyzedtoshowthat,ifoperatedpertheexistingoperatingprocedureconstraints,itwillprotecttheRHRsystemduringpostulatedoverpressureconditions.Criterion2Theproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeinvolvesadifferentresponsebythesystemtoanoverpressurizationevent,butwehaveshownbyanalysisthatthealternativeLTOPconfigurationiscapableofprovidingequivalentprotectiontotheoriginalsuctionvalveauto-closurefeature.Thesystemremainsprotectedfromsinglefailureofanyoftheavailableoverpressureprotectioncomponents.
| | Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page6Theoriginalbasisfortheauto-closure interlock wastoprotecttheRHRsystemfromanoverpressurization eventwhileoperating withRHRsuctionfromthenormalRCScooldownline.The'nalyzed LTOPconfiguration, twoPORVsandaRHRreliefvalve,providesthisprotection andlowersthepotential forinadvertent isolation ofdecayheatremovalcapability. |
| Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1278Page7ThechangeeliminatesthepotentialforasinglepowersupplyorinstrumentfailureisolatinganddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileoperatingtoremovedecayheatinmode4.Criterion3Thisproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.'hechangemaintainsanequivalentmarginofsafetyagainstintersystemLOCAconce,ns.OperatingwiththesuctionvalvesblockedopenandtheoverpressureprotectionoftheLTOPsystem,thechangealsohelpstoensuretheavailabilityofdecayheatremovalfromtheRCSduringanypostulatedaccidentwhichwouldinvolvepressurizationoftheRCS.Operatingwiththeoriginalauto-closureisolationofthesuctionvalveswouldautomatically'cutoffdecayheatremovalviatheRHRsysteminanysuchpostulatedeventiftheRCSreachedtheauto-closuresetpointandthesuctionvalvesclosed.Thechangeeliminatesthepotential'forapowersupplyorinstrumentfailureisolatinganddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileinmode4.TherequestedchangemaintainsprotectionfrominadvertentlyopeningtheRHRsuctionvalves,therebyexposingtheRHRsystemtohighRCSsystempressure,bymaintainingtherequirementfortheopeninterlockinallmodes.}}
| | BasisForNoSinificantHazardsDetermination Inaccordance with10CFR50.92,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangesdonot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thisamendment requestdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated. |
| | Thechangeprovidesanalternative meansofproviding overpressurization protection fortheRHRsystem,andtherebyprotection againstpotential intersystem LOCA.Operating procedure administrative requirements establish thenecessary LTOPsystemconfiguration andECCSequipment operability constraints formode4operation. |
| | TheLTOPsystemhasbeenanalyzedtoshowthat,ifoperatedpertheexistingoperating procedure constraints, itwillprotecttheRHRsystemduringpostulated overpressure conditions. |
| | Criterion 2Theproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated. |
| | Thechangeinvolvesadifferent responsebythesystemtoanoverpressurization event,butwehaveshownbyanalysisthatthealternative LTOPconfiguration iscapableofproviding equivalent protection totheoriginalsuctionvalveauto-closure feature.Thesystemremainsprotected fromsinglefailureofanyoftheavailable overpressure protection components. |
| | Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page7Thechangeeliminates thepotential forasinglepowersupplyorinstrument failureisolating anddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileoperating toremovedecayheatinmode4.Criterion 3Thisproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.'he changemaintains anequivalent marginofsafetyagainstintersystem LOCAconce,ns. |
| | Operating withthesuctionvalvesblockedopenandtheoverpressure protection oftheLTOPsystem,thechangealsohelpstoensuretheavailability ofdecayheatremovalfromtheRCSduringanypostulated accidentwhichwouldinvolvepressurization oftheRCS.Operating withtheoriginalauto-closure isolation ofthesuctionvalveswouldautomatically'cut offdecayheatremovalviatheRHRsysteminanysuchpostulated eventiftheRCSreachedtheauto-closure setpointandthesuctionvalvesclosed.Thechangeeliminates thepotential |
| | 'forapowersupplyorinstrument failureisolating anddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileinmode4.Therequested changemaintains protection frominadvertently openingtheRHRsuctionvalves,therebyexposingtheRHRsystemtohighRCSsystempressure, bymaintaining therequirement fortheopeninterlock inallmodes.}} |
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ML17334B5501995-06-20020 June 1995
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ML17332A7991995-06-15015 June 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 to Reduce Duration of Surveillance Testing for EDGs During Refueling Operations from 24 H to 8 H
ML17334B5481995-05-26026 May 1995
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ML17334B5461995-05-26026 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Tech Specs 3/4.3.1 (Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation) & 3/4.3.2 (ESFAS Instrumentation) & Bases to Relocate Tables of Response Time Limits to Ufsar,Per GL 93-08
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ML17332A7741995-05-25025 May 1995
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ML17332A7771995-05-25025 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Table 4.3-2 to Change Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Manual Actuation Sys Surveillance Frequency from Monthly to Quarterly
1999-09-23
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS
MONTHYEARML17335A5551999-10-12012 October 1999
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d for Spray Additive Sys to Relocate Details Associated with Acceptance Criteria & Test Parameters to Associated TS Bases
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ML17326A1161999-09-10010 September 1999
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ML17326A0921999-08-17017 August 1999
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ML17335A2631998-10-0808 October 1998
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ML17335A2761998-10-0808 October 1998
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,placing Tighter Restrictions on Amount of Time RWST Water Level Instrumentation Can Be Out of Svc Before Compensatory Actions Are Required
ML17335A2671998-10-0808 October 1998
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ML17335A2311998-09-14014 September 1998
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Application for Amend to License DPR-58,requesting Extension of SG Surveillance,Which TSs Require to Be Performed on or Before 990408,until End of Current Refuel Cycle Currently Scheduled for Mar 2000.W/assessment of SG Degradation & TSs
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Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,revising TS 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 to Reduce Duration of Surveillance Testing for EDGs During Refueling Operations from 24 H to 8 H
ML17334B5481995-05-26026 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Support Operation of Unit 1 at SG Tube Plugging Levels Up to 30%,make One Unit 1 TS More Nearly Like Corresponding Unit 2 TS & Maintain Consistency of Unit 2 Criteria
ML17334B5461995-05-26026 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Tech Specs 3/4.3.1 (Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation) & 3/4.3.2 (ESFAS Instrumentation) & Bases to Relocate Tables of Response Time Limits to Ufsar,Per GL 93-08
ML17332A7661995-05-25025 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Incorporate Cycle & Burnup Dependent Peaking Factor Penalty
ML17332A7741995-05-25025 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS 5.3.1 to Allow Fuel Reconstitution,Per GL 90-02,Suppl 1
ML17332A7771995-05-25025 May 1995
Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying TS Table 4.3-2 to Change Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Manual Actuation Sys Surveillance Frequency from Monthly to Quarterly
1999-09-23
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CATEGORY1REGULATOINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9709260327 DOC.'DATE:
97/09/19NOTARIZED:
YES~DOCKETIFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-'316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Ind'iana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
Application foramendstolicensesDPR-58aDPR-74,deleting requirement forautomatic valveclosurefeatureonRHRsyssuctionfromRCS.4DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:EINTERNARECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3LAHICKMAN,J KHXE$4-NRR/DE/EMCB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3PDNRR/DE/ECGB/A NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SRXB OGC/HDS2COPIESLTTRENCL1111111110EXTERNAL:
NOAC11NRCPDR11ENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR13ENCL12 LII' IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleOriveBuchanan, Ml491071395 INOIAM/lStfCHIGNONPWMSeptember 19,1997AEP:NRCr1278 10CFR50.90DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2REQUESTFOREMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.5.2.d.1 AUTOMATIC INTERLOCK SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT CHANGEPursuantto10CFR50.91(a)(5),
weproposetoamendtechnical specification (T/S)4.5.2.d.l oftheCookNuclearPlantunits1and2,andrequestthattheNRCgrantthisasanemergency amendment.
Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication fortheemergency amendment.
Thisamendment willdeletetherequirement foranautomatic valveclosurefeatureontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionfromthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Adescription ofthechange,thebackground andreasonforchange,-justification foremergency reviewandapproval, justification forchange,andouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arecontained inattachment 1tothisletter.Attachment 2containsthecurrentT/Spages,marked-up toreflecttheproposedchanges.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontained inattachment 3.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin:1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsite;or2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Theseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommittee andwillbereviewedbythenuclearsafetyanddesignreviewcommittee attheirnextregularly scheduled meeting.V70eaaoaa7 V70V<VPDRADQCK050003i5PfDRQ Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted totheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.VicePresident 8(,SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED BEFOREME;."(IP.'.'THIS/ADA'Y09~8S77,1997NotaryPublicvlbAttachments LINDALBOELCKENotoryPubhc,SemenCountY,MlMyCommission Expiresjonuory21,200>A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW',RPDNRCResidentInspector J.R.Padgett Itt,ttI1'lqtfLl>'1fttr<
ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1278 DESCRIPTION OFCHANGERSBACKGROUND ANDREASONFORCHANGEJUSTIFICATION FOREMERGENCY REVIEWANDAPPROVAL, JUSTIFICATION FORCHANGEAND10CFR50.92ANALYSES Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page1DescritionofAmendment ReuestTechnical Specification (T/S)surveillance requirement 4.5.2.d.1.requiresoperability oftwoautomatic interlocks ontheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemsuctionvalvesZMO-128andZCM-129forbothunits.Oneoftheinterlocks, whichweintendtomaintain, is~designedtoensurethatneitherofthetwosuctionvalvesisopenedwhilethereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)isabovetheRHRsystemdesignpressure.
Thesecondinterlock, whichisthesubjectofthisT/Schangerequest,wasdesignedtoautomatically closethetwovalvesifthe,RCSpressureweretoincreaseto600psig.Xtisourintentbythisamendment request,todeletereference totheauto-closure interlock fromtheT/Ssurveillance.
ThiswillremovetheT/Srequirement ofthisinterlock forRHRsystemoperability.
BackroundandReasonforChaneThisT/Ssurveillance iscurrently requiredbytheModes1,2,and3specification fortheECCSsystem,T/S4.5.2.d.1.Byreference, itisalsorequiredinthemode4specification, 4.5.3.1.UFSARChapter9,Section9.3describes theinterlocks associated withtheRHRsuctionvalvesIMO-128andICM-129.Thevalvesareinterlocked throughseparatechannelsoftheRCSpressureinstrumentation toprovideautomatic closureofbothvalveswheneverRCSpressureexceedsRHRdesignpressure.
TheUFSARdoesstatethattheinterlock maybedefeatedwhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere.
Therequirement forthisauto-closure capability datesbacktoouroriginalT/SandUFSARlicensedocuments.
Theoverpressure protection wasdesignedtopreventanintersystem lossofcoolantaccidentprecipitated byanoverpressure condition intheRCS,whichwouldcauseabreakintheRHRsystem.However,sinceJune1980,thisinterlock hasbeendefeatedonbothunitsanytimetheRHRsystemisoperating inthenormalcoolingconfiguration.
Thispracticebeganinordertopreventinadvertent auto-closure ofthevalveswhichwouldresultinlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page2Theinterlock isdefeatedbyremovingpowerfromthevalvesandrackingouttheassociated breakers.
ThisactionistakenassoonasthevalvesareopenedtoplaceRHRinserviceforshutdowncooling,inmode4.OnSeptember 11,1997,withbothunitsshutdowninmode5,itwasdetermined thatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothedesignbasisasdescribed intheFSARandcontrarytotheT/Sfortheemergency corecoolingsystems(ECCS).ThereasonforchangingthisT/Sisthat,foroperation inMode4withthenormalRHRcoolingconfiguration inplace,thisauto-closurecapability makestheplantunacceptably vulnerable toalossofRHRcooling.Characterization ofthisvulnerability isbasedonindustryandCookNuclearPlantoperating experience.
InNovember1979,theNRCissuedIEBulletinNo.79-20,"LossofNon-class 1EInstrumentation andControlPowerSystemBusDuringOperation."
Reviewofthisbulletindetermined thatoursystemwasvulnerable tolossofeither120voltACvitalinstrumentation bussesCRIDIorCRIDIV,whichwouldgenerateaclosesignaltoitsassociated RHRsuctionvalve,IMO-128orICM-129.InMayof1980,IEInformation Notice80-20,"LossofDecayHeatRemovalCapability atDavis-Besse Unit1WhileinaRefueling Mode"andIEBulletin80-12,"DecayHeatRemovalSystemOperability" wereissuedtotheindustrytohighlight NRCconcernthatlicensees maintaindiverseandredundant meansofdecayheatremoval.InourresponsetoIEBulletin8012,wecommitted tolockoutpowertobothRHRsystemsuctionvalveswhenevertheRHRsystemisinserviceforRCScooling,topreventinadvertent valveclosureandlossofsuctiontotheRHRpumps.Theauto-closure capability, ifactive,renderstheLowTemperature Overpressure (LTOP)systeminoperable inmode4withRHRcoolinginservice.ThishappensbecausetheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalve,aspartoftheLTOPsysteminthisconfiguration, wouldlosecommunication withtheRCSifeitherofthesuctionvalvesweretoclose.Thesurveillance requirement forbothunits,currently readsasfollows:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:Verifying automatic isolation andinterlock actionoftheRHRsystemfromthe
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page3ReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Weareproposing tochangethistoread:"Atleastonceper18monthsby:Verifying theautomatic interlock actiontopreventopeningofthesuctionoftheRHRsystemfromtheReactorCoolantSystemwhentheReactorCoolantSystempressureisabove600psig."Thischange,asdiscussed above,wouldmaintaintheopeninterlock
- function, butallowustoprotectboththeRHRsystemandtheReactorCoolantSystemfromoverpressure usingtheLTOPsystem.Justification forEmerencReviewandAroyalTheCookNuclearPlantT/Ssrequiretwooperablechargingpumpsinmode4forreactivity control.WiththeRHRpumpsoperable, procedures administratively requireanLTOPconfiguration oftwooperablepressureoperatedreliefvalvesandoneRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalvetoprotecttheRCSandtheRHRsystemintheeventofapressuretransient.
OurLTOPanalysisformode4takescreditfortheRHRsuctionvalvesbeingopenwiththeauto-closure functiondefeated, andthisisessential totheoperation oftheRHRsuctionsafetyreliefvalveaspartofLTOP,becauseifthcsuctionvalvesauto-close, thereliefvalvehasnocommunication withtheRCS.WhenLTOPwasdeveloped andimplemented, thisprocedural controlhadbeen'inplaceformanyyears,andtheimpactontheT/Sagainwentunidentified.
Wecannotcomplywiththereactivity controlT/SandLTOPadministrative requirements, andalsocomplywithT/Ssurveillance requirements 4.5.2.d.1 and4.5.3.1foroperability oftheRHRsuctionvalveauto-closure function.
WebelievethatachangetotheT/Saswearerequesting, istheappropriate actionrelativetonuclearsafety,andtobestcomplywiththeintentoftheoriginaldesignbasis.Therefore, tomeettheT/Srequirements oftwooperablechargingpumpsandtomaintainanacceptable LTOPconfiguration, theauto-closureinterlock mustbedefeatedwhileinmode4.Asaresult, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page4anemergency T/Schangeisrequiredtoallowstart-upoftheshutdownunits.OnSeptember 18,1997,aletterwassenttotheUSNRCproviding adiscussion oftheactionswearetakingtoaddresstechnical issuesidentified bytherecentlycompletearchitect engineering (AE)teaminspection.
Wearecurrently anticipating thecommencement ofstartupactivities onSeptember 29,1997,andrespectfully requestNRCreviewandapprovalofthischangebythatdate.Weunderstand theimpactofsuchanemergency request,andrecognizing thattheconditions andstatusoftheCookNuclearPlantrestartmaychangeinthefuture,weintendtokeepthecommission
- informed, throughourdailycontactwithourNRRprojectmanager,astothestatusofourrestartschedule.
Thesituation described aboveoccurredbecause,untilrecently, theneedtomeettheRHRsuctionvalvesurveillance requirement, inmode4,simultaneously withthereactivity controlspecification andtheLTOPadministrative requirements, wasnotrecognized.
Investigation intotherootcauseofthisoversight isstillinprogress.
TheAEinspection teamidentified issuesrelatedtoourconfiguration management, designandprocedure control,andourunderstanding oftheplant'designandlicensing bases.Withtheinsightgainedfromtheinspectors'onclusions, weidentified thisparticular issueonSeptember 11,1997.TheneedforaT/Schangepriortorestarting eitheroftheunits,becameevidentasaresultofourinvestigation ofthismatter.Justification ForChaneTherequested changehasnorelevance tomodes1,2,and3,sincetheRHRsystemisalwaysinECCSstandbyreadiness inmode3pertechnical specification LCO3.5.2.IntheECCSline-up,IMO-128andICM-129areclosedwithcontrolpowerdeenergized, providing assurance, alongwiththeclosureprevention interlock, thatthevalveswillnotbeopenedwiththeRCSathighpressures.
Inmode4,withtheRHRsuctionvalves,IMO-128andICM-129blockedopen,theRCSandtheRHRsystemsarebothprotected fromoverpressurization bytheLTOPconfiguration asitwasdetermined andevaluated inourLTOPanalysis.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page5Theprotection affordedbytheoriginalauto-closure interlock wasasimpleautomatic isolation oftheRHRsuctionfromtheRCSwhentheRCSpressurereachedthedesignpressureoftheRHRsystem.Theanalysisperformed fortheLTOPsystemspecifically identifies theappropriate protection requiredforthevariousoperational configurations oftheECCSandtheRCSwhichmightberequiredduringcooldown,
- shutdown, andheatup.IntheLTOPanalysis, adistinction ismadeforrequirements withandwithouttheRHRsysteminservice.Inmode4,atCookNuclearPlant,T/SLCO3.1.2.4,"ChargingPumps-Operating" requirestwooperablecentrifugal chargingpumpsforreactivity control.BasedontheLTOPanalysis, withtwochargingpumps,andtheRHRsystemoperableinthemode4configuration, LTOPrequirements are;twooperablepressurizer PORVsANDtheRHRsuctionsafetyvalveoperableforpressurerelief.Iftheauto-closure interlock werealsoenabledtoclosethevalves,andtheRCSpressurereachedthesetpointatanytimeduringthetransient, theRHRsuctionsafetyvalvewouldbewithoutcommunication withtheRCS,andtherefore unavailable forpressurerelief.Theconfiguration ofallthreeLTOPpressurereliefcomponents available allowsforsinglefailureofanyonereliefcomponent.
Theavailable reliefflowrate,withfailureofanyonecomponent, willenvelopetheinjection ratesforone'rbothhighheadcentrifugal chargingpumps.Thisdemonstrates thattheDonaldC.CookPlantissufficiently protected bytheLTOPsystemalone,fromoverpressurization resulting frommassinjection eventsgiventheaboveconstraints.
Theoriginaldecisiontooperatewiththepowerremovedfromthesevalvesintheopenposition, wasmadein1980,inresponsetoindustryoperating experience.
Eventsatanotherplanthighlighted thesituation wherethelossofoneelectrical controlpowerbuscouldcausethesuctionvalveauto-closure tooccur.Theconcernaboutlossofdecayheatremovaleventswasheightened laterinthe1980'swhenadditional eventsunderscored thevulnerability ofthesystemsintheshutdownmodesofoperation.
Defeating theauto-closure interlock providesprotection fromthistype'fevent.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page6Theoriginalbasisfortheauto-closure interlock wastoprotecttheRHRsystemfromanoverpressurization eventwhileoperating withRHRsuctionfromthenormalRCScooldownline.The'nalyzed LTOPconfiguration, twoPORVsandaRHRreliefvalve,providesthisprotection andlowersthepotential forinadvertent isolation ofdecayheatremovalcapability.
BasisForNoSinificantHazardsDetermination Inaccordance with10CFR50.92,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration ifthechangesdonot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thisamendment requestdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Thechangeprovidesanalternative meansofproviding overpressurization protection fortheRHRsystem,andtherebyprotection againstpotential intersystem LOCA.Operating procedure administrative requirements establish thenecessary LTOPsystemconfiguration andECCSequipment operability constraints formode4operation.
TheLTOPsystemhasbeenanalyzedtoshowthat,ifoperatedpertheexistingoperating procedure constraints, itwillprotecttheRHRsystemduringpostulated overpressure conditions.
Criterion 2Theproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Thechangeinvolvesadifferent responsebythesystemtoanoverpressurization event,butwehaveshownbyanalysisthatthealternative LTOPconfiguration iscapableofproviding equivalent protection totheoriginalsuctionvalveauto-closure feature.Thesystemremainsprotected fromsinglefailureofanyoftheavailable overpressure protection components.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1278 Page7Thechangeeliminates thepotential forasinglepowersupplyorinstrument failureisolating anddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileoperating toremovedecayheatinmode4.Criterion 3Thisproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.'he changemaintains anequivalent marginofsafetyagainstintersystem LOCAconce,ns.
Operating withthesuctionvalvesblockedopenandtheoverpressure protection oftheLTOPsystem,thechangealsohelpstoensuretheavailability ofdecayheatremovalfromtheRCSduringanypostulated accidentwhichwouldinvolvepressurization oftheRCS.Operating withtheoriginalauto-closure isolation ofthesuctionvalveswouldautomatically'cut offdecayheatremovalviatheRHRsysteminanysuchpostulated eventiftheRCSreachedtheauto-closure setpointandthesuctionvalvesclosed.Thechangeeliminates thepotential
'forapowersupplyorinstrument failureisolating anddamagingtheRHRsystemwhileinmode4.Therequested changemaintains protection frominadvertently openingtheRHRsuctionvalves,therebyexposingtheRHRsystemtohighRCSsystempressure, bymaintaining therequirement fortheopeninterlock inallmodes.
