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{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATEDDUTIONDEMONATIONSYSlHMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9002070466DOC.DATE:90/01/31NOTARIZED:NO'OCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONALEXICH,M.P.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DUTIONDEMONATIONSYSlHMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9002070466 DOC.DATE:
90/01/31NOTARIZED:
NO'OCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION ALEXICH,M.P.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.
DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ApplicationforamendtoLicenseDPR-58,changingTechSpec3/4.7.1.5.l.b,"SteamGeneratorStopValves."DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTESRI.D'S/RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LAGIITTER,J.INTERNAL:NRR/DET/ECMB9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11551111111110111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB11NRR/DST/SELB8DNRR/DST/SRXB8EOCQ~QCBREGFILENRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'011'1DDS',I,NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'}CONTACTTHE,DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEEDtTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR21,ENCL19D  
Application foramendtoLicenseDPR-58,changing TechSpec3/4.7.1.5.
~~I indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus,OH432168AEP:NRC:1120DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58EXPEDITEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGEREQUESTSTEAMGENERATORSTOPVALVESU.STNuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyJanuary31,1990
l.b,"SteamGenerator StopValves."DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTESRI.D'S/RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAGIITTER,J.
INTERNAL:
NRR/DET/ECMB 9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB 7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:
LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11551111111110111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB1 1NRR/DST/SELB 8DNRR/DST/SRXB 8EOCQ~QCBREGFILENRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'011'1DDS',I,NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'}CONTACTTHE,DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEEDtTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR21,ENCL19D  
~~I indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH432168AEP:NRC:1120 DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58EXPEDITED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGEREQUESTSTEAMGENERATOR STOPVALVESU.STNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyJanuary31,1990


==DearDr.Murley:==
==DearDr.Murley:==
Thisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforanexpeditedtechnicalspecification(T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1,Specifically,weproposetochangeT/S3/4,7.1.5.1.b,"SteamGeneratorStopValves,"suchthatfullvalveclosureiswithin8secondsonany-closureactuationsignal.ThereasonsforthechangeandourevaluationconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationareprovidedinAttachment1.TheproposedrevisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment2.Attachment3andAttachment4containtheanalysisofmainsteamlinebreakinsidecontainmentandofsteamlinebreakcoreresponse,whichwerenotpreviouslyprovidedtotheNRC.(ThesteamlinebreakinsidecontainmentattachmentwillalsobesubmittedwiththeUnit2fuelreloadsubmittal.)ThisletteralsoproposeschangestoT/STable3.3-55.h,6.h,and7.c.Thesearethesteamlineisolationresponsetimesrequiredfortheaccidentanalyses.Webelievethattheproposedchangewillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.ThechangehasbeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyDesignReviewCommitteeatitsnextregularlyscheduledmeeting.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtoMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.>002070%66900lslPDRADGCK05000315PDC.
Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foranexpedited technical specification (T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1,Specifically, weproposetochangeT/S3/4,7.1.5.1.b, "SteamGenerator StopValves,"suchthatfullvalveclosureiswithin8secondsonany-closureactuation signal.Thereasonsforthechangeandourevaluation concerning significant hazardsconsideration areprovidedinAttachment 1.TheproposedrevisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment 2.Attachment 3andAttachment 4containtheanalysisofmainsteamlinebreakinsidecontainment andofsteamlinebreakcoreresponse, whichwerenotpreviously providedtotheNRC.(Thesteamlinebreakinsidecontainment attachment willalsobesubmitted withtheUnit2fuelreloadsubmittal.)
Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1120ThisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowingCorporateproceduresthatincorporateareasonablesetofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompletenesspriortosignatureoftheundersigned.Sincerely,M.P.AlexichVicePresidentldpAttachmentscc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNFEMSectionChiefA.B,Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector-Bridgman ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1120REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS9002070466 Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page1IntroductionTheprimarypurposeofthesteamgeneratorstopvalves(mainsteamisolationvalve[MSIVs])istopreventexcessiveblowdownofthesteamgenerators.Therearefourtechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1associatedwiththeclosuretimeoftheMSIVs.T/S4.7.1.5.brequiresthateachMSIVbedemonstratedoperablebyverifyingfullclosurewithinfivesecondsonanyclosureactuationsignalwhileinhotstandbywithTavggreaterthanorequalto541Fduringeachreactorshutdownexcept0thatverificationoffullclosurewithinfivesecondsneednotbedeterminedmoreoftenthanonceper92days.ThethieeotherT/SsarethesteamlineisolationresponsetimerequirementslistedinT/S3.3'.1Table3.3-5"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesResponseTimes."Thesearelistedbelow.Item5.hSteamlineisolationresultingfromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincidentwithTavg--low-low(lessthanorequalto10.0seconds)Item6.hSteamlineisolationresultingfromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincidentwithsteamlinepressure-low(lessthanorequalto8.0seconds)Item7.cSteamlineisolationresultingfromcontainmentpressure--high-high(lessthanorequalto7.0seconds)EvaluationTheCookNuclearPlantsafetyanalysesthatassumeactuationoftheMSIVsandsteamlineisolationincludethefollowingevents:,steamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrityanalysis,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforoutsidecontainmentequipmentqualificationanalysis,steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR),andlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheLOCAanalysesdonotassumeactuationtimesfortheMSIVs,butconservativelyassumesteamlineisolationoccursatreactortrip.Theothersafetyanalyseslistedaboveassumeanoverallengineeredsafetyfeatures(ESF)responsetimeforsteamlineisolationfromthetimethattheisolationsetpointisreached
ThisletteralsoproposeschangestoT/STable3.3-55.h,6.h,and7.c.Thesearethesteamlineisolation responsetimesrequiredfortheaccidentanalyses.
Webelievethattheproposedchangewillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
ThechangehasbeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyDesignReviewCommittee atitsnextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),
copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.>002070%66 900lslPDRADGCK05000315PDC.
Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1120 Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures thatincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature oftheundersigned.
Sincerely, M.P.AlexichVicePresident ldpAttachments cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNFEMSectionChiefA.B,Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector
-Bridgman ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1120 REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 9002070466 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page1Introduction Theprimarypurposeofthesteamgenerator stopvalves(mainsteamisolation valve[MSIVs])istopreventexcessive blowdownofthesteamgenerators.
Therearefourtechnical specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1associated withtheclosuretimeoftheMSIVs.T/S4.7.1.5.b requiresthateachMSIVbedemonstrated operablebyverifying fullclosurewithinfivesecondsonanyclosureactuation signalwhileinhotstandbywithTavggreaterthanorequalto541Fduringeachreactorshutdownexcept0thatverification offullclosurewithinfivesecondsneednotbedetermined moreoftenthanonceper92days.ThethieeotherT/Ssarethesteamlineisolation responsetimerequirements listedinT/S3.3'.1Table3.3-5"Engineered SafetyFeaturesResponseTimes."Thesearelistedbelow.Item5.hSteamlineisolation resulting fromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincident withTavg--low-low(lessthanorequalto10.0seconds)Item6.hSteamlineisolation resulting fromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincident withsteamlinepressure-low(lessthanorequalto8.0seconds)Item7.cSteamlineisolation resulting fromcontainment pressure--high-high (lessthanorequalto7.0seconds)Evaluation TheCookNuclearPlantsafetyanalysesthatassumeactuation oftheMSIVsandsteamlineisolation includethefollowing events:,steamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity
: analysis, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforoutsidecontainment equipment qualification
: analysis, steamgenerator tuberupture(SGTR),andlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheLOCAanalysesdonotassumeactuation timesfortheMSIVs,butconservatively assumesteamlineisolation occursatreactortrip.Theothersafetyanalyseslistedaboveassumeanoverallengineered safetyfeatures(ESF)responsetimeforsteamlineisolation fromthetimethattheisolation setpointisreached


Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page2SteamLineBreakCoreResonseTheUnit1licensingbasisanalysisperformedforthereducedtemperatureandpressureprogramassumedanESFresponsetimewhichincludesanadditionalthreesecondsforsteamlineisolationwithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.Thus,athree-secondincreaseintheT/SMSIVclosuretimeandsteamlineisolationESFresponsetimesissupportedbytheanalysis.ThisanalysiswassubmittedinAEP:NRC:1067andapprovedbytheNRCbySERdatedJune9,1989.AlthoughtheWCAP-11902analysisspecifiedthataMSIVclosuretimeofsevensecondswasassumed,Westinghousehasdocumentedthataneight-secondMSIVclosuretimeissupported.Theeight-secondMSIVclosuretimerepresentsanincreaseofthreesecondsfromthecurrentT/Slimitoffiveseconds.Assuch,theWCAP-11902steamlinebreakcoreresponseanalysissupportsarelaxationoftheMSIVclosuretimerequirement.ThisdocumentationiscontainedasAttachment4ofthisletter.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesInsideContainmentAnanalysishasrecentlybeenperformedtosupporttheproposedtransitiontoWestinghouse17x17V-5fuelforUnit2whichincludesanadditionalthreesecondsforsteamlineisolationwithrespecttotheT/Srequirements(WCAP-11902,Supplement1,containedasAttachment3tothisletter).Thisanalysisbounds'bothUnits1and2andisapplicableforbothV-5andANFfueltypes,includingafullcoreofANFfuel,aslongastheT/Slimitsoncoreparameterassumptions(e.g.,moderatorcoefficient)aremet.Thus,themass/energyreleaseinputtothecontainmentresponseanalysisremainsvalidandathree-secondincreaseintheT/SMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationESFresponsetimesissupportedbytheanalysis.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesOutsideContainmentThecurrentlicensingbasismass/energyreleasedataforuseinoutsidecontainmentequipmentqualificationfortheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2areprovidedinWCAP-10961.Units1and2arecoveredbytheWCAPCategory3andCategory1analysesrespectively.Themass/energyreleasecalculationsassumedanESFresponsetimeforsteamlineisolationconsistentwiththeT/Srequirements.OurcurrentequipmentqualificationanalysiswassuppliedbyImpell,(AEP:NRC:0775AJ).Theeffectofincreasingthesteamlineisolationtimeistoslightlyincreasethesteamflowatanygiventimefollowingisolationwhileslightlydelayingtheonsetofsuperheatedsteamreleases.AllcasesanalyzedintheWCAPwouldbeexpectedtobesimilarlyaffectedbythissmalladditionaldelay.TheWCAPCategory1cases1,16and59,alllargebreakcases(4.6ft),were Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page3identifiedaslimitingbyImpellandusedtoboundbothUnits1and2.TheselimitingcaseswerereanalyzedbyWestinghouseassuminganoverallsteamlineisolationtimewhichincludesanadditionalthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.AEPSCevaluatedtheeffectsofthismassandenergyreleaseratechangeonthesteamenclosuretemperaturesandconcludedthattheinstrumentsremainedinsidetheiranalyzedlimits.TheeffectoflongerMSIVclosuretimesimplyshiftsthetemperaturepeakslightlyoutwardintime,butdoesnotincreaseitsseverity.Therefore,theincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting.SteamGeneratorTubeRutureTheSGTRaccidentanalysisforCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2wasreviewedtodeterminetheimpactofanincreaseintheMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesbythreeseconds.IntheSGTRanalysis,theprimary-to-secondarybreakflowwasassumedtobeterminatedat30minutesafteraccidentinitiation,buttheoperatoractionstoterminatethebreakflowwerenotexplicitlymodeledintheanalysis.Theoperatoractionsincludeisolationoftherupturedsteamgenerator,whichrequirestheclosureoftherupturedsteamgeneratorMSIV.SinceMSIVclosureisnotexplicitlymodeledintheanalysisandanadditionalthreesecondstoclosetherupturedsteamgeneratorMSIVisrelativelyshortcomparedtotheassumedtotalrecoverytimeof1800seconds,itisconcludedthattheincreasedtimeforMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationwillnotaffecttheconclusionsoftheFSARSGTRanalysisnortheconclusionsoftherecentanalysescompletedforupratedpowerplusrevisedtemperatureandpressureoperation.AreviewwasperformedbyAEPSCoftheoff-siteradiologicaldoseconsequencesofaddingthreesecondstothesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretime.Theadditionalthreesecondswouldresultinanin]ectionof210poundsofadditionalreactorcoolanttoaninitialtotalmassofreactorcoolantof125,000poundsassumedintheFSARforaSGTR.Thiscorrespondstoafractionalincreaseof0.00168forthetotalreactorcoolantmasstransferredtothesteamgenerator.Withtheoff-sitedosesbeingproportionaltotheamountofactivityreleased,andassumingthatallofthereactorcoolanttransferredtotherupturedsteamgeneratorisreleased,theoff-sitedoseswouldalsoincreaseby0.00168.Thisminutefractionalincreaseintheoff-sitedosescannotbedifferentiatedfromthegraphsofthedoseconsequencesforaSGTRaccident.Basedonthisreview,ithasbeenconcludedthattheadditionalthreesecondsdonotimpacttheFSARenvironmentalconsequencesofaSGTR, Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page4SmallandLareBreakLOCAThesmallbreakandlargebreakloss-of-coolant:(SBLOCAandLBLOCArespectively)analysesarenotadverselyaffectedbyincreasedMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimes.TheSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalysesassumethatsteamgeneratorisolationoccursimmediatelyafterthereactortriplowpressurizerpressuresetpointisreached.Byisolatingthesteamgeneratorsatthetimeofreactortrip,thestoredenergyinthesecondaryisconservativelygreaterthanwhatwouldexistiftheanalysesmodelledalatersteamgeneratorisolation.FortheSBLOCAanalysis,thehigherenergyinthesecondaryisconservativesincetheprimary-to-secondaryheattransferrateisreduced.IntheLBLOCAanalysis,theearliersteamgeneratorisolationtimeincreasesthesecondary-to-primaryheattransfer,whichisconservative.Therefore,anincreaseinMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesbythreesecondsdoesnothaveanimpactonSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalyses.LOCABlowdownForcesHotLeSwitchovertoPrecludeBoronPreciitationPost-LOCALon-TermCoreCoolinSubcriticalitandPose-LOCALon-TermCoreCoolinMinimumFlowReactorvesselandloopLOCAblowdownforces,hotlegswitchovertoprecludeboronprecipitation,post-LOCAlong-termcorecoolingsubcriticality,andpost-LOCAlong-termcorecoolingminimumflowarenotadverselyaffectedbytheproposedchange.IncreasingMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolationtimesdoesnotadverselyaffectthenormalplantoperatingparameters,thesafeguardssystemsactuationsoraccidentmitigationcapabilitiesimportanttoaLOCA;ortheassumptionsusedintheLOCA-relatedanalyses.Inaddition,theproposedchangedoesnotcreateconditionsmorelimitingthanthoseassumedintheLOCAanalyses.JustificationforReuestandSinificantHazardsConsiderationWebelievethatincreasingtheMSIVclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotadverselyimpactpublichealthandsafety.AnincreasedsteamlineisolationresponsetimehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1safetyanalyses.Baseduponpreviouslyperformedanalyses,thesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrityanalysis,SGTR,andLOCAanalysessupportanincreaseintheMSIVclosuretimeisolationtimesofthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements,Forsteamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesoutsidecontainment,limitingcaseshavebeenreanalyzedassumingasteamlineisolationtimethreesecondslongerthanthecurrentT/Srequirements.Also,revisedmass/energydatawereevaluatedbyAEPSC,resultingintheconclusionthattheincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting,  
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page2SteamLineBreakCoreResonseTheUnit1licensing basisanalysisperformed forthereducedtemperature andpressureprogramassumedanESFresponsetimewhichincludesanadditional threesecondsforsteamlineisolation withrespecttotheT/Srequirements.
'f Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page510CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:1)involve,asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Ourevaluationoftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion1BasedonthesafetyanalysesperformedbyWestinghouseforthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrity,SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangetoincreasethesteamlinebreakisolationresponsetimeandthesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Criterion2Thethree-secondincreaseforthesteamlineisolationresponsetimewillnotchangethedesignoroperationoftheplant.Thereforewebelievethatthischangewillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3BasedonthesafetyanalysesperformedbyWestinghouseforthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse,steamlinebreakmass/energyreleasesforinsidecontainmentintegrity,SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangeincreasingthesteamlinebreakisolationresponsetimeandthesteamgeneratorstopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.
Thus,athree-second increaseintheT/SMSIVclosuretimeandsteamlineisolation ESFresponsetimesissupported bytheanalysis.
Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1120Page6Lastly,wenotethattheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingcertainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident,buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablishedasacceptable.Forthereasonsdetailedabove,webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexample.Therefore,webelievethischangedoesnotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsiderationasdefinedin10CFR50.92.}}
Thisanalysiswassubmitted inAEP:NRC:1067 andapprovedbytheNRCbySERdatedJune9,1989.AlthoughtheWCAP-11902 analysisspecified thataMSIVclosuretimeofsevensecondswasassumed,Westinghouse hasdocumented thataneight-second MSIVclosuretimeissupported.
Theeight-second MSIVclosuretimerepresents anincreaseofthreesecondsfromthecurrentT/Slimitoffiveseconds.Assuch,theWCAP-11902 steamlinebreakcoreresponseanalysissupportsarelaxation oftheMSIVclosuretimerequirement.
Thisdocumentation iscontained asAttachment 4ofthisletter.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesInsideContainment Ananalysishasrecentlybeenperformed tosupporttheproposedtransition toWestinghouse 17x17V-5fuelforUnit2whichincludesanadditional threesecondsforsteamlineisolation withrespecttotheT/Srequirements (WCAP-11902, Supplement 1,contained asAttachment 3tothisletter).Thisanalysisbounds'both Units1and2andisapplicable forbothV-5andANFfueltypes,including afullcoreofANFfuel,aslongastheT/Slimitsoncoreparameter assumptions (e.g.,moderator coefficient) aremet.Thus,themass/energy releaseinputtothecontainment responseanalysisremainsvalidandathree-second increaseintheT/SMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation ESFresponsetimesissupported bytheanalysis.
SteamLineBreakMEReleasesOutsideContainment Thecurrentlicensing basismass/energy releasedataforuseinoutsidecontainment equipment qualification fortheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2areprovidedinWCAP-10961.
Units1and2arecoveredbytheWCAPCategory3andCategory1analysesrespectively.
Themass/energy releasecalculations assumedanESFresponsetimeforsteamlineisolation consistent withtheT/Srequirements.
Ourcurrentequipment qualification analysiswassuppliedbyImpell,(AEP:NRC:0775AJ).
Theeffectofincreasing thesteamlineisolation timeistoslightlyincreasethesteamflowatanygiventimefollowing isolation whileslightlydelayingtheonsetofsuperheated steamreleases.
AllcasesanalyzedintheWCAPwouldbeexpectedtobesimilarly affectedbythissmalladditional delay.TheWCAPCategory1cases1,16and59,alllargebreakcases(4.6ft),were Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page3identified aslimitingbyImpellandusedtoboundbothUnits1and2.Theselimitingcaseswerereanalyzed byWestinghouse assuminganoverallsteamlineisolation timewhichincludesanadditional threesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.
AEPSCevaluated theeffectsofthismassandenergyreleaseratechangeonthesteamenclosure temperatures andconcluded thattheinstruments remainedinsidetheiranalyzedlimits.TheeffectoflongerMSIVclosuretimesimplyshiftsthetemperature peakslightlyoutwardintime,butdoesnotincreaseitsseverity.
Therefore, theincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting.
SteamGenerator TubeRutureTheSGTRaccidentanalysisforCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2wasreviewedtodetermine theimpactofanincreaseintheMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesbythreeseconds.IntheSGTRanalysis, theprimary-to-secondary breakflowwasassumedtobeterminated at30minutesafteraccidentinitiation, buttheoperatoractionstoterminate thebreakflowwerenotexplicitly modeledintheanalysis.
Theoperatoractionsincludeisolation oftherupturedsteamgenerator, whichrequirestheclosureoftherupturedsteamgenerator MSIV.SinceMSIVclosureisnotexplicitly modeledintheanalysisandanadditional threesecondstoclosetherupturedsteamgenerator MSIVisrelatively shortcomparedtotheassumedtotalrecoverytimeof1800seconds,itisconcluded thattheincreased timeforMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation willnotaffecttheconclusions oftheFSARSGTRanalysisnortheconclusions oftherecentanalysescompleted forupratedpowerplusrevisedtemperature andpressureoperation.
Areviewwasperformed byAEPSCoftheoff-siteradiological doseconsequences ofaddingthreesecondstothesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretime.Theadditional threesecondswouldresultinanin]ection of210poundsofadditional reactorcoolanttoaninitialtotalmassofreactorcoolantof125,000poundsassumedintheFSARforaSGTR.Thiscorresponds toafractional increaseof0.00168forthetotalreactorcoolantmasstransferred tothesteamgenerator.
Withtheoff-sitedosesbeingproportional totheamountofactivityreleased, andassumingthatallofthereactorcoolanttransferred totherupturedsteamgenerator isreleased, theoff-sitedoseswouldalsoincreaseby0.00168.Thisminutefractional increaseintheoff-sitedosescannotbedifferentiated fromthegraphsofthedoseconsequences foraSGTRaccident.
Basedonthisreview,ithasbeenconcluded thattheadditional threesecondsdonotimpacttheFSARenvironmental consequences
: ofaSGTR, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page4SmallandLareBreakLOCAThesmallbreakandlargebreakloss-of-coolant:
(SBLOCAandLBLOCArespectively) analysesarenotadversely affectedbyincreased MSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation times.TheSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalysesassumethatsteamgenerator isolation occursimmediately afterthereactortriplowpressurizer pressuresetpointisreached.Byisolating thesteamgenerators atthetimeofreactortrip,thestoredenergyinthesecondary isconservatively greaterthanwhatwouldexistiftheanalysesmodelledalatersteamgenerator isolation.
FortheSBLOCAanalysis, thehigherenergyinthesecondary isconservative sincetheprimary-to-secondary heattransferrateisreduced.IntheLBLOCAanalysis, theearliersteamgenerator isolation timeincreases thesecondary-to-primary heattransfer, whichisconservative.
Therefore, anincreaseinMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesbythreesecondsdoesnothaveanimpactonSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalyses.
LOCABlowdownForcesHotLeSwitchover toPrecludeBoronPreciitationPost-LOCA Lon-TermCoreCoolinSubcriticalit andPose-LOCA Lon-TermCoreCoolinMinimumFlowReactorvesselandloopLOCAblowdownforces,hotlegswitchover toprecludeboronprecipitation, post-LOCA long-term corecoolingsubcriticality, andpost-LOCA long-term corecoolingminimumflowarenotadversely affectedbytheproposedchange.Increasing MSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesdoesnotadversely affectthenormalplantoperating parameters, thesafeguards systemsactuations oraccidentmitigation capabilities important toaLOCA;ortheassumptions usedintheLOCA-related analyses.
Inaddition, theproposedchangedoesnotcreateconditions morelimitingthanthoseassumedintheLOCAanalyses.
Justification forReuestandSinificantHazardsConsideration Webelievethatincreasing theMSIVclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotadversely impactpublichealthandsafety.Anincreased steamlineisolation responsetimehasbeenevaluated withrespecttotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1safetyanalyses.
Baseduponpreviously performed
: analyses, thesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity
: analysis, SGTR,andLOCAanalysessupportanincreaseintheMSIVclosuretimeisolation timesofthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements, Forsteamlinebreakmass/energy releasesoutsidecontainment, limitingcaseshavebeenreanalyzed assumingasteamlineisolation timethreesecondslongerthanthecurrentT/Srequirements.
Also,revisedmass/energy datawereevaluated byAEPSC,resulting intheconclusion thattheincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting,  
'f Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page510CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:1)involve,asignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
: analyzed, 2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion 1Basedonthesafetyanalysesperformed byWestinghouse forthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity, SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangetoincreasethesteamlinebreakisolation responsetimeandthesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident.
Criterion 2Thethree-second increaseforthesteamlineisolation responsetimewillnotchangethedesignoroperation oftheplant.Therefore webelievethatthischangewillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.
Criterion 3Basedonthesafetyanalysesperformed byWestinghouse forthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity, SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangeincreasing thesteamlinebreakisolation responsetimeandthesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.
Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page6Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.
Forthereasonsdetailedabove,webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexample.Therefore, webelievethischangedoesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.}}

Revision as of 06:26, 29 June 2018

Application for Amend to License DPR-58,changing Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.5.1.b, Steam Generator Stop Valves, & 3.3-5 5.h, 6.h & 7.c.Amend Ensures Valve Closure within Eight Seconds on Closure Actuation Signal
ML17334B343
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/1990
From: ALEXICH M P
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: MURLEY T E
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17328A555 List:
References
AEP:NRC:1120, NUDOCS 9002070466
Download: ML17334B343 (14)
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Text

ACCELERATED DUTIONDEMONATIONSYSlHMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9002070466 DOC.DATE:

90/01/31NOTARIZED:

NO'OCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION ALEXICH,M.P.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.

DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Application foramendtoLicenseDPR-58,changing TechSpec3/4.7.1.5.

l.b,"SteamGenerator StopValves."DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTESRI.D'S/RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LAGIITTER,J.

INTERNAL:

NRR/DET/ECMB 9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB 7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11551111111110111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB1 1NRR/DST/SELB 8DNRR/DST/SRXB 8EOCQ~QCBREGFILENRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'011'1DDS',I,NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'}CONTACTTHE,DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEEDtTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR21,ENCL19D

~~I indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH432168AEP:NRC:1120 DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58EXPEDITED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGEREQUESTSTEAMGENERATOR STOPVALVESU.STNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyJanuary31,1990

DearDr.Murley:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foranexpedited technical specification (T/S)changeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1,Specifically, weproposetochangeT/S3/4,7.1.5.1.b, "SteamGenerator StopValves,"suchthatfullvalveclosureiswithin8secondsonany-closureactuation signal.Thereasonsforthechangeandourevaluation concerning significant hazardsconsideration areprovidedinAttachment 1.TheproposedrevisedT/SpagesareincludedinAttachment 2.Attachment 3andAttachment 4containtheanalysisofmainsteamlinebreakinsidecontainment andofsteamlinebreakcoreresponse, whichwerenotpreviously providedtotheNRC.(Thesteamlinebreakinsidecontainment attachment willalsobesubmitted withtheUnit2fuelreloadsubmittal.)

ThisletteralsoproposeschangestoT/STable3.3-55.h,6.h,and7.c.Thesearethesteamlineisolation responsetimesrequiredfortheaccidentanalyses.

Webelievethattheproposedchangewillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

ThechangehasbeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyDesignReviewCommittee atitsnextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(1),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.>002070%66 900lslPDRADGCK05000315PDC.

Dr.T.E.Murley-2-AEP:NRC:1120 Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures thatincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature oftheundersigned.

Sincerely, M.P.AlexichVicePresident ldpAttachments cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNFEMSectionChiefA.B,Davis-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector

-Bridgman ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:1120 REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT1TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 9002070466 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page1Introduction Theprimarypurposeofthesteamgenerator stopvalves(mainsteamisolation valve[MSIVs])istopreventexcessive blowdownofthesteamgenerators.

Therearefourtechnical specifications (T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit1associated withtheclosuretimeoftheMSIVs.T/S4.7.1.5.b requiresthateachMSIVbedemonstrated operablebyverifying fullclosurewithinfivesecondsonanyclosureactuation signalwhileinhotstandbywithTavggreaterthanorequalto541Fduringeachreactorshutdownexcept0thatverification offullclosurewithinfivesecondsneednotbedetermined moreoftenthanonceper92days.ThethieeotherT/Ssarethesteamlineisolation responsetimerequirements listedinT/S3.3'.1Table3.3-5"Engineered SafetyFeaturesResponseTimes."Thesearelistedbelow.Item5.hSteamlineisolation resulting fromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincident withTavg--low-low(lessthanorequalto10.0seconds)Item6.hSteamlineisolation resulting fromsteamflowintwosteamlines-highcoincident withsteamlinepressure-low(lessthanorequalto8.0seconds)Item7.cSteamlineisolation resulting fromcontainment pressure--high-high (lessthanorequalto7.0seconds)Evaluation TheCookNuclearPlantsafetyanalysesthatassumeactuation oftheMSIVsandsteamlineisolation includethefollowing events:,steamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity

analysis, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforoutsidecontainment equipment qualification
analysis, steamgenerator tuberupture(SGTR),andlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheLOCAanalysesdonotassumeactuation timesfortheMSIVs,butconservatively assumesteamlineisolation occursatreactortrip.Theothersafetyanalyseslistedaboveassumeanoverallengineered safetyfeatures(ESF)responsetimeforsteamlineisolation fromthetimethattheisolation setpointisreached

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page2SteamLineBreakCoreResonseTheUnit1licensing basisanalysisperformed forthereducedtemperature andpressureprogramassumedanESFresponsetimewhichincludesanadditional threesecondsforsteamlineisolation withrespecttotheT/Srequirements.

Thus,athree-second increaseintheT/SMSIVclosuretimeandsteamlineisolation ESFresponsetimesissupported bytheanalysis.

Thisanalysiswassubmitted inAEP:NRC:1067 andapprovedbytheNRCbySERdatedJune9,1989.AlthoughtheWCAP-11902 analysisspecified thataMSIVclosuretimeofsevensecondswasassumed,Westinghouse hasdocumented thataneight-second MSIVclosuretimeissupported.

Theeight-second MSIVclosuretimerepresents anincreaseofthreesecondsfromthecurrentT/Slimitoffiveseconds.Assuch,theWCAP-11902 steamlinebreakcoreresponseanalysissupportsarelaxation oftheMSIVclosuretimerequirement.

Thisdocumentation iscontained asAttachment 4ofthisletter.SteamLineBreakMEReleasesInsideContainment Ananalysishasrecentlybeenperformed tosupporttheproposedtransition toWestinghouse 17x17V-5fuelforUnit2whichincludesanadditional threesecondsforsteamlineisolation withrespecttotheT/Srequirements (WCAP-11902, Supplement 1,contained asAttachment 3tothisletter).Thisanalysisbounds'both Units1and2andisapplicable forbothV-5andANFfueltypes,including afullcoreofANFfuel,aslongastheT/Slimitsoncoreparameter assumptions (e.g.,moderator coefficient) aremet.Thus,themass/energy releaseinputtothecontainment responseanalysisremainsvalidandathree-second increaseintheT/SMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation ESFresponsetimesissupported bytheanalysis.

SteamLineBreakMEReleasesOutsideContainment Thecurrentlicensing basismass/energy releasedataforuseinoutsidecontainment equipment qualification fortheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2areprovidedinWCAP-10961.

Units1and2arecoveredbytheWCAPCategory3andCategory1analysesrespectively.

Themass/energy releasecalculations assumedanESFresponsetimeforsteamlineisolation consistent withtheT/Srequirements.

Ourcurrentequipment qualification analysiswassuppliedbyImpell,(AEP:NRC:0775AJ).

Theeffectofincreasing thesteamlineisolation timeistoslightlyincreasethesteamflowatanygiventimefollowing isolation whileslightlydelayingtheonsetofsuperheated steamreleases.

AllcasesanalyzedintheWCAPwouldbeexpectedtobesimilarly affectedbythissmalladditional delay.TheWCAPCategory1cases1,16and59,alllargebreakcases(4.6ft),were Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page3identified aslimitingbyImpellandusedtoboundbothUnits1and2.Theselimitingcaseswerereanalyzed byWestinghouse assuminganoverallsteamlineisolation timewhichincludesanadditional threesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements.

AEPSCevaluated theeffectsofthismassandenergyreleaseratechangeonthesteamenclosure temperatures andconcluded thattheinstruments remainedinsidetheiranalyzedlimits.TheeffectoflongerMSIVclosuretimesimplyshiftsthetemperature peakslightlyoutwardintime,butdoesnotincreaseitsseverity.

Therefore, theincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting.

SteamGenerator TubeRutureTheSGTRaccidentanalysisforCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2wasreviewedtodetermine theimpactofanincreaseintheMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesbythreeseconds.IntheSGTRanalysis, theprimary-to-secondary breakflowwasassumedtobeterminated at30minutesafteraccidentinitiation, buttheoperatoractionstoterminate thebreakflowwerenotexplicitly modeledintheanalysis.

Theoperatoractionsincludeisolation oftherupturedsteamgenerator, whichrequirestheclosureoftherupturedsteamgenerator MSIV.SinceMSIVclosureisnotexplicitly modeledintheanalysisandanadditional threesecondstoclosetherupturedsteamgenerator MSIVisrelatively shortcomparedtotheassumedtotalrecoverytimeof1800seconds,itisconcluded thattheincreased timeforMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation willnotaffecttheconclusions oftheFSARSGTRanalysisnortheconclusions oftherecentanalysescompleted forupratedpowerplusrevisedtemperature andpressureoperation.

Areviewwasperformed byAEPSCoftheoff-siteradiological doseconsequences ofaddingthreesecondstothesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretime.Theadditional threesecondswouldresultinanin]ection of210poundsofadditional reactorcoolanttoaninitialtotalmassofreactorcoolantof125,000poundsassumedintheFSARforaSGTR.Thiscorresponds toafractional increaseof0.00168forthetotalreactorcoolantmasstransferred tothesteamgenerator.

Withtheoff-sitedosesbeingproportional totheamountofactivityreleased, andassumingthatallofthereactorcoolanttransferred totherupturedsteamgenerator isreleased, theoff-sitedoseswouldalsoincreaseby0.00168.Thisminutefractional increaseintheoff-sitedosescannotbedifferentiated fromthegraphsofthedoseconsequences foraSGTRaccident.

Basedonthisreview,ithasbeenconcluded thattheadditional threesecondsdonotimpacttheFSARenvironmental consequences

ofaSGTR, Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page4SmallandLareBreakLOCAThesmallbreakandlargebreakloss-of-coolant:

(SBLOCAandLBLOCArespectively) analysesarenotadversely affectedbyincreased MSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation times.TheSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalysesassumethatsteamgenerator isolation occursimmediately afterthereactortriplowpressurizer pressuresetpointisreached.Byisolating thesteamgenerators atthetimeofreactortrip,thestoredenergyinthesecondary isconservatively greaterthanwhatwouldexistiftheanalysesmodelledalatersteamgenerator isolation.

FortheSBLOCAanalysis, thehigherenergyinthesecondary isconservative sincetheprimary-to-secondary heattransferrateisreduced.IntheLBLOCAanalysis, theearliersteamgenerator isolation timeincreases thesecondary-to-primary heattransfer, whichisconservative.

Therefore, anincreaseinMSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesbythreesecondsdoesnothaveanimpactonSBLOCAandLBLOCAanalyses.

LOCABlowdownForcesHotLeSwitchover toPrecludeBoronPreciitationPost-LOCA Lon-TermCoreCoolinSubcriticalit andPose-LOCA Lon-TermCoreCoolinMinimumFlowReactorvesselandloopLOCAblowdownforces,hotlegswitchover toprecludeboronprecipitation, post-LOCA long-term corecoolingsubcriticality, andpost-LOCA long-term corecoolingminimumflowarenotadversely affectedbytheproposedchange.Increasing MSIVclosureandsteamlineisolation timesdoesnotadversely affectthenormalplantoperating parameters, thesafeguards systemsactuations oraccidentmitigation capabilities important toaLOCA;ortheassumptions usedintheLOCA-related analyses.

Inaddition, theproposedchangedoesnotcreateconditions morelimitingthanthoseassumedintheLOCAanalyses.

Justification forReuestandSinificantHazardsConsideration Webelievethatincreasing theMSIVclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotadversely impactpublichealthandsafety.Anincreased steamlineisolation responsetimehasbeenevaluated withrespecttotheCookNuclearPlantUnit1safetyanalyses.

Baseduponpreviously performed

analyses, thesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity
analysis, SGTR,andLOCAanalysessupportanincreaseintheMSIVclosuretimeisolation timesofthreesecondswithrespecttotheT/Srequirements, Forsteamlinebreakmass/energy releasesoutsidecontainment, limitingcaseshavebeenreanalyzed assumingasteamlineisolation timethreesecondslongerthanthecurrentT/Srequirements.

Also,revisedmass/energy datawereevaluated byAEPSC,resulting intheconclusion thattheincreaseinMSIVclosuretimewouldnotaffectthechoiceofwhichsteamlinebreaksizewaslimiting,

'f Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page510CFR50.92CriteriaPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:1)involve,asignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, 2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Ourevaluation oftheproposedchangewithrespecttothesecriteriaisprovidedbelow.Criterion 1Basedonthesafetyanalysesperformed byWestinghouse forthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity, SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangetoincreasethesteamlinebreakisolation responsetimeandthesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Criterion 2Thethree-second increaseforthesteamlineisolation responsetimewillnotchangethedesignoroperation oftheplant.Therefore webelievethatthischangewillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Basedonthesafetyanalysesperformed byWestinghouse forthesteamlinebreakcoreresponse, steamlinebreakmass/energy releasesforinsidecontainment integrity, SGTR,andLOCA,webelievethattheproposedT/Schangeincreasing thesteamlinebreakisolation responsetimeandthesteamgenerator stopvalveclosuretimebythreesecondswillnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1120 Page6Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, buttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.

Forthereasonsdetailedabove,webelievethischangefallswithinthescopeofthisexample.Therefore, webelievethischangedoesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedin10CFR50.92.

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