Technical Specification 3.3.8,
PAM Instrumentation, requires CHRRMs, RIA-57 and RIA-58, to be
operable in Modes 1, 2, or 3. Contrary to the above, from 1998 to October 2016, the licensee failed to maintain operability of the CHRRMs for all three units when they failed to provide reasonable assurance that the CHRRMs would provide accurate measurement of containment radiation levels during a
HELB event in the east
penetration room of the affected unit(s). The CHRRMs are utilized in the Oconee site
emergency plan and implementing procedures to support assessment of the severity of an accident. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the facilities and equipment attribute of the
emergency preparedness cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the licensees capability to implement adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors used
IMC 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued June 19, 2012, and
IMC 0609, Appendix B,
Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, issued September 22, 2015, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because no planning standard function failure occurred due to the availability of other parameters that could be used to validate the indications from the CHRRMs. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as
NCRs 02069527 and 02077587.
