05000269/FIN-2016003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Translate Design Requirements to Prevent the Effects of Waterhammer |
Description | The NRC identified a finding for the licensees failure to translate the limiting flow rate design requirement into station procedures used to start and operate the alternate reactor building cooling (RBC) system, in accordance with the Duke Energy Carolinas Topical Report, Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the limiting flow rate of 170 gallons per minute (gpm) into Procedure AP/0/A/1700/051, Alternate Reactor Building Cooling, Revision (Rev.) 2, to ensure prevention of waterhammer on the A reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) or connecting low pressure service water (LPSW) lines when starting the RBCU Hale pump. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Action Request (AR) 02049903 and revised Procedure AP/0/A/1700/051 to limit the RBCU Hale pump discharge flow to each affected unit to an initial fill rate of 120 gpm or less. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, opening the RBCU Hale pump discharge valve four turns, as specified in the procedure, would have resulted in filling the alternate RBC system at approximately 600-700 gpm and exceeding the design flow rate of 170 gpm established to prevent equipment and piping damage as a result of waterhammer. This provided a reasonable doubt that the alternate RBC system had the capability to reliably perform its intended safety function and, in turn, that the protected service water (PSW) system had the capability to meet its 30-day mission time during a turbine building fire that resulted in a loss of offsite power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in a fire that caused secondary fires outside of the originating fire area due to circuit issues and did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24-hours of a fire event. The inspectors determined the finding was indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of design margin, in the area of human performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to operate and maintain the alternate RBC system equipment within design margins when they did not translate design requirements from Engineering Change (EC) 110008 and Calculation OSC-8107 into station procedures. |
Site: | Oconee |
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Report | IR 05000269/2016003 Section 1R17 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Davis E Crowe F Ehrhardt J Parent J Worosilo M Riley M Thomas M Toth N Childs N Coovert E Powell |
CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - Oconee - IR 05000269/2016003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Oconee) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Oconee)
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