05000461/FIN-2015002-06: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| (2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = S Bell, S Mischke, W Schaup, A Dahbur, C Phillips, E Sanchez | | Inspector = S Bell, S Mischke, W Schaup, A Dahbur, C Phillips, E Sanchez-Santiago, J Bozga, K Stoedter | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement policy for being dispositioned as an NCV. Clinton TS 3.9.4, Control Rod Position Indication, required one control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod shall be operable in Mode 5. If one or more required control rod position indication channels is inoperable then suspend in-vessel fuel movement, suspend control rod withdrawal and initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies or initiate action to fully insert the control rod associated with the inoperable position indicator and initiate action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod. These actions are to be performed immediately if a control rod position indication becomes inoperable. Contrary to the above, on April 30, 2015, control rod 3237 had a position indication probe simulator installed to simulate a fullin position to support generic position indication probe replacements, which did not provide actual position indication, making the control rod inoperable while in-vessel fuel movement was occurring and action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod had not been completed for a period of approximately 7 hours. This exceeded the TS allowed outage time for the limited conditions for operation with a control rod position indication inoperable. The licensee identified the condition during log reviews between shifts and took actions to suspend fuel movement and to disarm the associated control rod drive immediately after the time of discovery. Additionally the licensee entered the issue into the CAP as AR 02494024. The issue was determined to be more than minor because the performance deficiency, if left uncorrected, could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a more significant event. The finding was screened under IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions, as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a shutdown initiating event or increase the likelihood of a fire or external/internal flood that could cause an shutdown initiating event. | | description = The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement policy for being dispositioned as an NCV. Clinton TS 3.9.4, Control Rod Position Indication, required one control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod shall be operable in Mode 5. If one or more required control rod position indication channels is inoperable then suspend in-vessel fuel movement, suspend control rod withdrawal and initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies or initiate action to fully insert the control rod associated with the inoperable position indicator and initiate action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod. These actions are to be performed immediately if a control rod position indication becomes inoperable. Contrary to the above, on April 30, 2015, control rod 3237 had a position indication probe simulator installed to simulate a fullin position to support generic position indication probe replacements, which did not provide actual position indication, making the control rod inoperable while in-vessel fuel movement was occurring and action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod had not been completed for a period of approximately 7 hours. This exceeded the TS allowed outage time for the limited conditions for operation with a control rod position indication inoperable. The licensee identified the condition during log reviews between shifts and took actions to suspend fuel movement and to disarm the associated control rod drive immediately after the time of discovery. Additionally the licensee entered the issue into the CAP as AR 02494024. The issue was determined to be more than minor because the performance deficiency, if left uncorrected, could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a more significant event. The finding was screened under IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions, as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a shutdown initiating event or increase the likelihood of a fire or external/internal flood that could cause an shutdown initiating event. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 10:52, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2015002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Bell S Mischke W Schaup A Dahbur C Phillips E Sanchez-Santiago J Bozga K Stoedter |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |