Information Notice 2002-19, Medical Misadministrations Caused by Failure to Properly Perform Tests on Dose Calibrators for Beta-and-Low-Energy Photon-Emitting Radionuclides: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001June 14, 2002NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-19:MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS CAUSED BYFAILURE TO PROPERLY PERFORM TESTS ON
[[Issue date::June 14, 2002]]


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-19:MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS CAUSED BYFAILURE TO PROPERLY PERFORM TESTS ON DOSE CALIBRATORS FOR BETA- AND LOW-
DOSE CALIBRATORS FOR BETA- AND LOW-
ENERGY PHOTON-EMITTING RADIONUCLIDES
ENERGY PHOTON-EMITTING RADIONUCLIDES


Line 24: Line 23:


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to (1)inform addresses of the lessons learned from an event involving multiple misadministrations due to inaccurate measurement of dosages of beta-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and (2)
:The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to (1)inform addresses of the lessons learned from an event involving multiple misadministrations
remind them of the importance of conducting proper tests of the dose calibrator when measuring beta- and low-energy photon-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and liquid brachytherapy sources (e.g., samarium-153, strontium-89, yttrium-90, phosphorus-32, and iodine-125). It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid incorrect calibrations and similar problem However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
 
due to inaccurate measurement of dosages of beta-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and (2)
remind them of the importance of conducting proper tests of the dose calibrator when
 
measuring beta- and low-energy photon-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and liquid
 
brachytherapy sources (e.g., samarium-153, strontium-89, yttrium-90, phosphorus-32, and
 
iodine-125). It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
 
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid incorrect calibrations and similar
 
problems.  However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:In December 2001, NRC became aware of 61 medical misadministrations at nine Midwesternhospitals that occurred between 1997 and 2001 as a result of inaccurate measurement of the samarium-153 unit dosages by a commercial nuclear pharmac The hospitals were not required to measure the dosages in dose calibrators because they ordered unit dosages of the beta-emitting radiopharmaceutical from a nuclear pharmacy licensed under 10 CFR Part 32
:In December 2001, NRC became aware of 61 medical misadministrations at nine Midwesternhospitals that occurred between 1997 and 2001 as a result of inaccurate measurement of the
[see 10 CFR 35.53(b)]. In these cases, as provided in NRC's regulations, the hospitals relied solely on the nuclear pharmacy to provide the correct dosages of beta-emitting (samarium-153)
 
radiopharmaceutical In 1994, another medical licensee reported potential phosphorus-32 and strontium-89 misadministrations caused by the licensee's use of a dose calibrator that was not properly calibrated for those radionuclides or the geometry of the material being measured. Discussion:Potential Sources of Errors in Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Gamma-emittersThe response of well-type gas-ionization chambers (e.g., dose calibrators) to pure beta-emittingradionuclides as a function of source geometry is comple The spacial shape of the source can result in differences of self-absorption, and different-density containers can result in different attenuations that affect the accuracy of the dose calibrator reading When theprimary radiation measured is bremstrahlung, the effect may be the opposite of that expecte For example, increases in atomic number "Z" of the material containing the liquid beta-emittingradionuclide can in some instances increase the response of the ionization chamber because of the effect of the increased Z number on bremstrahlung productio This is caused both by the increase in average energy, and the intensity of the bremstrahlung radiation produced in higher Z material When measuring liquids containing high-energy photon-emitting radionuclides, the effects ofsource shape or increase of volume is minima However, both low-energy photon-emitters and beta particles show increasing dependence on source volume changes as a function of decreasing energies.Inaccurate Measurement of Samarium-153 On December 14, 2001, an NRC-licensed nuclear pharmacy reported that it had discovered that during the period July 23, 1997, to December 14, 2001, unit dosages of samarium-153 were distributed to nine of its client hospitals with approximately 28 percent less activity than the amount prescribed by the physicia The error was discovered on December 12, 2001, while filling an order of samarium-15 One of the licensee's pharmacists questioned why a 3-cubiccentimeter (cc) plastic syringe known to contain 88 millicuries read 120 millicuries in the dose calibrato Subsequently, the licensee determined that it had failed to determine appropriate geometry and attenuation correction factors for its dose calibrator for the measurement of dosages of samarium-153.NRC determined that the root cause of the misadministrations was the nuclear pharmacy's failure to correct the dose calibrator response to account for attenuation of beta radiation in the plastic syringes used to dispense theradiopharmaceuticals. The licensee was unaware that a correction factor was needed to account for attenuation of the beta radiation and geometrical differences of plastic syringe The licensee was using a correction factor, provided by the original manufacturer and distributer of the samarium-153, that applied only to a 10 cc glass vial and did not account for the effect of using less dense materials, such as plastic syringe The manufacturer stated that its correction factor should be used for all future assays of samarium-153 in 10 cc glass vials onl The nuclear pharmacy did not realize that the correction factor would change if the dosage was measured in a plastic syringe rather than in the 10 cc glass vial.The calibration error subsequently contributed to the incorrect activity reported on theradiopharmaceutical labels and the 61 misadministrations at the nuclear pharmacy's nineclient hospitals. Inaccurate Measurement of Phosphorus-32 and Strontium-89In 1994, an NRC licensee reported 14 potential misadministrations for a strontium-89radiopharmaceutica In that case, the licensee routinely ordered glass vials containing millicuries of strontium-89 from the nuclear pharmacy and remeasured the activity of strontium-89 pulled up into a plastic syring The activity measured in the syringe was always higher than the activity the authorized user requested on the written directiv The licensee, believing its dose calibrator measurements to be more accurate than the value provided by the commercial nuclear pharmacy, adjusted the dose until the dose calibrator registered a value the licensee believed to be 4.0 millicurie The mistake was not identified until the pharmacy delivered one of the dosages in a plastic syringe instead of the requested glass via When the licensee's dose calibrator indicated the activity in the syringe was over 20 percent higher thanthe activity requested from the pharmacy, the pharmacy was contacted.On further investigation by the licensee into the proper dose calibrator procedures formeasuring both phosphorus-32 and strontium-89, it was discovered that in addition to the failure to calibrate the dose calibrator for the differences in geometry between the vials and syringes and the differences in materials between glass and plastic, the wrong dose calibrator settings had been used. Although there were no misadministrations, because some of the licensee's errors counteractedother errors, this case points to the difficulties licensees can have if they do not properly calibrate their dose calibrators for pure beta emitters.Accurate Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Photon-Emitting RadionuclidesThe importance of accurately measuring the activity of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters is a potential problem for all commercial nuclear pharmacy and hospital-based measurements, because of the introduction of new therapeutic products containing pure beta emitters, and the increased use of these products and low-energy photon emitters by larger numbers of licensee In addition to the existing phosphorus-32 and strontium-89 radiopharmaceuticals, licensees are beginning to use new products such as liquid iodine-125 brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 microsphere brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 labeled monoclonal antibodies, phosphorus-32 coated balloons, and gas brachytherapy sources.Commercial nuclear pharmacy licensees preparing radiopharmaceuticals containing beta- andlow-energy photon-emitting radionuclides are reminded of the importance of conducting appropriate dose calibration tests for accuracy, linearity, and geometrical variation, as required in 10 CFR, 32.72(c) and (c)(1). (Medical use licensees required to measure the activity of beta- emitting radionuclides must follow similar requirements in 10 CFR 35.52, "Possession, use,calibration, and check of instruments to measure dosages of alpha- or beta-emitting radionuclides.") When performing these required dose calibration tests, licensees shouldconsider attenuation characteristics of the beta- and low-energy photon-emitter The radiopharmaceutical, liquid brachytherapy source, and gas brachytherapy source manufacturers can be an important source of information for the appropriate test needed to correctly calibrate your dose calibrator to accurately measure their products.A number of manufacturers, recognizing the difficulties involved with accurately measuring theactivities of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters, have gone to considerable effort to provide specific dose calibrator calibration procedures to be used with their product These procedures include unique dose calibrator settings for specific geometries (e.g., settings for measuring the activity of iodine-125 liquid in a 5 cc plastic syringe) that are based on actual tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written respons If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRC regional offic /RA/SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
samarium-153 unit dosages by a commercial nuclear pharmacy.  The hospitals were not
 
required to measure the dosages in dose calibrators because they ordered unit dosages of the
 
beta-emitting radiopharmaceutical from a nuclear pharmacy licensed under 10 CFR Part 32
[see 10 CFR 35.53(b)]. In these cases, as provided in NRC's regulations, the hospitals relied
 
solely on the nuclear pharmacy to provide the correct dosages of beta-emitting (samarium-153)
radiopharmaceuticals.  In 1994, another medical licensee reported potential phosphorus-32 and
 
strontium-89 misadministrations caused by the licensee's use of a dose calibrator that was not
 
properly calibrated for those radionuclides or the geometry of the material being measured. Discussion:Potential Sources of Errors in Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Gamma-emittersThe response of well-type gas-ionization chambers (e.g., dose calibrators) to pure beta-emittingradionuclides as a function of source geometry is complex.  The spacial shape of the source
 
can result in differences of self-absorption, and different-density containers can result in different attenuations that affect the accuracy of the dose calibrator readings.  When theprimary radiation measured is bremstrahlung, the effect may be the opposite of that expected.
 
For example, increases in atomic number "Z" of the material containing the liquid beta-emittingradionuclide can in some instances increase the response of the ionization chamber because of
 
the effect of the increased Z number on bremstrahlung production.  This is caused both by the
 
increase in average energy, and the intensity of the bremstrahlung radiation produced in higher
 
Z materials.  When measuring liquids containing high-energy photon-emitting radionuclides, the effects ofsource shape or increase of volume is minimal.  However, both low-energy photon-emitters and
 
beta particles show increasing dependence on source volume changes as a function of
 
decreasing energies.Inaccurate Measurement of Samarium-153 On December 14, 2001, an NRC-licensed nuclear pharmacy reported that it had discovered
 
that during the period July 23, 1997, to December 14, 2001, unit dosages of samarium-153 were distributed to nine of its client hospitals with approximately 28 percent less activity than the
 
amount prescribed by the physician.  The error was discovered on December 12, 2001, while
 
filling an order of samarium-153.  One of the licensee's pharmacists questioned why a 3-cubiccentimeter (cc) plastic syringe known to contain 88 millicuries read 120 millicuries in the dose
 
calibrator.  Subsequently, the licensee determined that it had failed to determine appropriate
 
geometry and attenuation correction factors for its dose calibrator for the measurement of
 
dosages of samarium-153.NRC determined that the root cause of the misadministrations was the nuclear pharmacy's failure to correct the dose calibrator response to account for attenuation of beta radiation in the plastic syringes used to dispense theradiopharmaceuticals. The licensee was unaware that a correction factor was needed to
 
account for attenuation of the beta radiation and geometrical differences of plastic syringes.
 
The licensee was using a correction factor, provided by the original manufacturer and distributer
 
of the samarium-153, that applied only to a 10 cc glass vial and did not account for the effect of
 
using less dense materials, such as plastic syringes.  The manufacturer stated that its
 
correction factor should be used for all future assays of samarium-153 in 10 cc glass vials only.
 
The nuclear pharmacy did not realize that the correction factor would change if the dosage was
 
measured in a plastic syringe rather than in the 10 cc glass vial.The calibration error subsequently contributed to the incorrect activity reported on theradiopharmaceutical labels and the 61 misadministrations at the nuclear pharmacy's nineclient hospitals. Inaccurate Measurement of Phosphorus-32 and Strontium-89In 1994, an NRC licensee reported 14 potential misadministrations for a strontium-89radiopharmaceutical.  In that case, the licensee routinely ordered glass vials containing 4.0
millicuries of strontium-89 from the nuclear pharmacy and remeasured the activity of strontium-89 pulled up into a plastic syringe.  The activity measured in the syringe was always higher than the activity the authorized user requested on the written directive.  The licensee, believing its dose calibrator measurements to be more accurate than the value provided by the
 
commercial nuclear pharmacy, adjusted the dose until the dose calibrator registered a value the
 
licensee believed to be 4.0 millicuries.  The mistake was not identified until the pharmacy
 
delivered one of the dosages in a plastic syringe instead of the requested glass vial.  When the
 
licensee's dose calibrator indicated the activity in the syringe was over 20 percent higher thanthe activity requested from the pharmacy, the pharmacy was contacted.On further investigation by the licensee into the proper dose calibrator procedures formeasuring both phosphorus-32 and strontium-89, it was discovered that in addition to the
 
failure to calibrate the dose calibrator for the differences in geometry between the vials and
 
syringes and the differences in materials between glass and plastic, the wrong dose calibrator
 
settings had been used. Although there were no misadministrations, because some of the licensee's errors counteractedother errors, this case points to the difficulties licensees can have if they do not properly
 
calibrate their dose calibrators for pure beta emitters.Accurate Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Photon-Emitting RadionuclidesThe importance of accurately measuring the activity of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters is a potential problem for all commercial nuclear pharmacy and hospital-based
 
measurements, because of the introduction of new therapeutic products containing pure beta
 
emitters, and the increased use of these products and low-energy photon emitters by larger
 
numbers of licensees.  In addition to the existing phosphorus-32 and strontium-89 radiopharmaceuticals, licensees are beginning to use new products such as liquid iodine-125 brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 microsphere brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 labeled
 
monoclonal antibodies, phosphorus-32 coated balloons, and gas brachytherapy sources.Commercial nuclear pharmacy licensees preparing radiopharmaceuticals containing beta- andlow-energy photon-emitting radionuclides are reminded of the importance of conducting
 
appropriate dose calibration tests for accuracy, linearity, and geometrical variation, as required
 
in 10 CFR, 32.72(c) and (c)(1). (Medical use licensees required to measure the activity of beta- emitting radionuclides must follow similar requirements in 10 CFR 35.52, "Possession, use,calibration, and check of instruments to measure dosages of alpha- or beta-emitting
 
radionuclides.") When performing these required dose calibration tests, licensees shouldconsider attenuation characteristics of the beta- and low-energy photon-emitters.  The
 
radiopharmaceutical, liquid brachytherapy source, and gas brachytherapy source
 
manufacturers can be an important source of information for the appropriate test needed to
 
correctly calibrate your dose calibrator to accurately measure their products.A number of manufacturers, recognizing the difficulties involved with accurately measuring theactivities of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters, have gone to considerable effort to
 
provide specific dose calibrator calibration procedures to be used with their products.  These
 
procedures include unique dose calibrator settings for specific geometries (e.g., settings for
 
measuring the activity of iodine-125 liquid in a 5 cc plastic syringe) that are based on actual tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity
 
on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or
 
manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written response.  If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.            /RA/SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director   Division of Industrial and   Medical Nuclear Safety
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
 
and Safeguards


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.gov
Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS         (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.govAttachments:1.  List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2.  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity
 
on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or
 
manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written response.  If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.                /RA/ SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director  Division of Industrial and  Medical Nuclear Safety
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


===Attachments:===
and Safeguards
List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written respons If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRC regional offic /RA/ SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.gov
Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS         (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.govAttachments:1.  List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
2.  List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML021620486ADAMS DOCUMENT TITLE:g:\howe\pharmacy\draft INrev1.wpdOFFICEMSIBNMSS/EditorMSIBIMNSNAMEDBHoweEKrausJHickeyDCool/SMFforDATE  5/20/02    5/20/025/22/026/14/02OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License
 
CP = Construction PermitAttachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of
 
===Notice No.        SubjectIssuanceIssued to===
_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New
 
===Requirements for Calibration===
and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees
 
that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye
 
applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2001-18Degraded and FailedAutomatic Electronic
 
Monitoring, Control, Alarming,
 
===Response, and===
Communications Needed for
 
Safety and Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment and fabrication
 
licenses and certificate holders
 
authorized to receive safeguards
 
information.  Information notice is
 
not available to the public
 
because it contains safeguards
 
information.2001-17Degraded and FailedPerformance of Essential
 
===Utilities Needed for Safety and===
Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment, and fabrication
 
licenses and certificate holders
 
authorized to receive safeguards
 
information.  Information notice is
 
not available to the public
 
because it contains safeguards
 
information.2001-08,Sup. 2Update on Radiation TherapyOverexposures in Panama11/20/2001All medical licensees.2001-11Thefts of Portable Gauges07/13/2001All portable gauge licensees.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issuedby subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command inthe message portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname
 
______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License
 
CP = Construction PermitAttachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of
 
Notice No.        SubjectIssuanceIssued to_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-18Effect of Adding Gas IntoWater Storage Tanks on the
 
===Net Positive Suction Head For===
Pumps06/06/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, except those who have
 
permanently ceased operations
 
and have certified that fuel has
 
been permanently removed from
 
the reactor.2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New
 
===Requirements for Calibration===
and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees
 
that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye
 
applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2002-15Hydrogen Combustion Eventsin Foreign BWR Piping04/12/2002All holders of operating licensesfor light water reactors, except
 
those who have permanently
 
ceased operations and have
 
certified that fuel has been
 
permanently removed from the
 
reactor.2002-14Ensuring a Capability toEvacuate Individuals, Including
 
===Members of the Public, From===
the Owner-Controlled Area04/08/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased
 
operations but have fuel on site.2002-13Possible Indicators of OngoingReactor Pressure Vessel Head
 
Degradation04/04/2002All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized water nuclear
 
power reactors, except those who
 
have permanently ceased


===Attachments:===
operations and certified that fuel
List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML021620486ADAMS DOCUMENT TITLE:g:\howe\pharmacy\draft INrev1.wpdOFFICEMSIBNMSS/EditorMSIBIMNSNAMEDBHoweEKrausJHickeyDCool/SMFforDATE 5/20/02 5/20/025/22/026/14/02OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License CP = Construction PermitAttachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of Notice N SubjectIssuanceIssued to
has been permanently removed


_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New Requirements for Calibration and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2001-18Degraded and FailedAutomatic Electronic Monitoring, Control, Alarming, Response, and Communications Needed for Safety and Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment and fabrication licenses and certificate holders authorized to receive safeguards informatio Information notice is not available to the public because it contains safeguards information.2001-17Degraded and FailedPerformance of Essential Utilities Needed for Safety and Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment, and fabrication licenses and certificate holders authorized to receive safeguards informatio Information notice is not available to the public because it contains safeguards information.2001-08,Sup. 2Update on Radiation TherapyOverexposures in Panama11/20/2001All medical licensees.2001-11Thefts of Portable Gauges07/13/2001All portable gauge licensees.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issuedby subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command inthe message portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname
from the reactor.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issued bysubscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command in themessage portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname


______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License CP = Construction PermitAttachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of Notice N SubjectIssuanceIssued to_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-18Effect of Adding Gas IntoWater Storage Tanks on the Net Positive Suction Head For Pumps06/06/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New Requirements for Calibration and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2002-15Hydrogen Combustion Eventsin Foreign BWR Piping04/12/2002All holders of operating licensesfor light water reactors, except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.2002-14Ensuring a Capability toEvacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, From the Owner-Controlled Area04/08/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased operations but have fuel on site.2002-13Possible Indicators of OngoingReactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation04/04/2002All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized water nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently ceased operations and certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issued bysubscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command in themessage portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname}}
}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
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Revision as of 19:36, 6 April 2018

Medical Misadministrations Caused by Failure to Properly Perform Tests on Dose Calibrators for Beta-and-Low-Energy Photon-Emitting Radionuclides
ML021620486
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/14/2002
From: Cool D A
NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
References
IN-02-019
Download: ML021620486 (9)


UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001June 14, 2002NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-19:MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS CAUSED BYFAILURE TO PROPERLY PERFORM TESTS ON

DOSE CALIBRATORS FOR BETA- AND LOW-

ENERGY PHOTON-EMITTING RADIONUCLIDES

Addressees

All nuclear pharmacies and medical licensees.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Information Notice (IN) to (1)inform addresses of the lessons learned from an event involving multiple misadministrations

due to inaccurate measurement of dosages of beta-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and (2)

remind them of the importance of conducting proper tests of the dose calibrator when

measuring beta- and low-energy photon-emitting radiopharmaceuticals and liquid

brachytherapy sources (e.g., samarium-153, strontium-89, yttrium-90, phosphorus-32, and

iodine-125). It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their

facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid incorrect calibrations and similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In December 2001, NRC became aware of 61 medical misadministrations at nine Midwesternhospitals that occurred between 1997 and 2001 as a result of inaccurate measurement of the

samarium-153 unit dosages by a commercial nuclear pharmacy. The hospitals were not

required to measure the dosages in dose calibrators because they ordered unit dosages of the

beta-emitting radiopharmaceutical from a nuclear pharmacy licensed under 10 CFR Part 32

[see 10 CFR 35.53(b)]. In these cases, as provided in NRC's regulations, the hospitals relied

solely on the nuclear pharmacy to provide the correct dosages of beta-emitting (samarium-153)

radiopharmaceuticals. In 1994, another medical licensee reported potential phosphorus-32 and

strontium-89 misadministrations caused by the licensee's use of a dose calibrator that was not

properly calibrated for those radionuclides or the geometry of the material being measured. Discussion:Potential Sources of Errors in Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Gamma-emittersThe response of well-type gas-ionization chambers (e.g., dose calibrators) to pure beta-emittingradionuclides as a function of source geometry is complex. The spacial shape of the source

can result in differences of self-absorption, and different-density containers can result in different attenuations that affect the accuracy of the dose calibrator readings. When theprimary radiation measured is bremstrahlung, the effect may be the opposite of that expected.

For example, increases in atomic number "Z" of the material containing the liquid beta-emittingradionuclide can in some instances increase the response of the ionization chamber because of

the effect of the increased Z number on bremstrahlung production. This is caused both by the

increase in average energy, and the intensity of the bremstrahlung radiation produced in higher

Z materials. When measuring liquids containing high-energy photon-emitting radionuclides, the effects ofsource shape or increase of volume is minimal. However, both low-energy photon-emitters and

beta particles show increasing dependence on source volume changes as a function of

decreasing energies.Inaccurate Measurement of Samarium-153 On December 14, 2001, an NRC-licensed nuclear pharmacy reported that it had discovered

that during the period July 23, 1997, to December 14, 2001, unit dosages of samarium-153 were distributed to nine of its client hospitals with approximately 28 percent less activity than the

amount prescribed by the physician. The error was discovered on December 12, 2001, while

filling an order of samarium-153. One of the licensee's pharmacists questioned why a 3-cubiccentimeter (cc) plastic syringe known to contain 88 millicuries read 120 millicuries in the dose

calibrator. Subsequently, the licensee determined that it had failed to determine appropriate

geometry and attenuation correction factors for its dose calibrator for the measurement of

dosages of samarium-153.NRC determined that the root cause of the misadministrations was the nuclear pharmacy's failure to correct the dose calibrator response to account for attenuation of beta radiation in the plastic syringes used to dispense theradiopharmaceuticals. The licensee was unaware that a correction factor was needed to

account for attenuation of the beta radiation and geometrical differences of plastic syringes.

The licensee was using a correction factor, provided by the original manufacturer and distributer

of the samarium-153, that applied only to a 10 cc glass vial and did not account for the effect of

using less dense materials, such as plastic syringes. The manufacturer stated that its

correction factor should be used for all future assays of samarium-153 in 10 cc glass vials only.

The nuclear pharmacy did not realize that the correction factor would change if the dosage was

measured in a plastic syringe rather than in the 10 cc glass vial.The calibration error subsequently contributed to the incorrect activity reported on theradiopharmaceutical labels and the 61 misadministrations at the nuclear pharmacy's nineclient hospitals. Inaccurate Measurement of Phosphorus-32 and Strontium-89In 1994, an NRC licensee reported 14 potential misadministrations for a strontium-89radiopharmaceutical. In that case, the licensee routinely ordered glass vials containing 4.0

millicuries of strontium-89 from the nuclear pharmacy and remeasured the activity of strontium-89 pulled up into a plastic syringe. The activity measured in the syringe was always higher than the activity the authorized user requested on the written directive. The licensee, believing its dose calibrator measurements to be more accurate than the value provided by the

commercial nuclear pharmacy, adjusted the dose until the dose calibrator registered a value the

licensee believed to be 4.0 millicuries. The mistake was not identified until the pharmacy

delivered one of the dosages in a plastic syringe instead of the requested glass vial. When the

licensee's dose calibrator indicated the activity in the syringe was over 20 percent higher thanthe activity requested from the pharmacy, the pharmacy was contacted.On further investigation by the licensee into the proper dose calibrator procedures formeasuring both phosphorus-32 and strontium-89, it was discovered that in addition to the

failure to calibrate the dose calibrator for the differences in geometry between the vials and

syringes and the differences in materials between glass and plastic, the wrong dose calibrator

settings had been used. Although there were no misadministrations, because some of the licensee's errors counteractedother errors, this case points to the difficulties licensees can have if they do not properly

calibrate their dose calibrators for pure beta emitters.Accurate Measurement of Beta- and Low-Energy Photon-Emitting RadionuclidesThe importance of accurately measuring the activity of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters is a potential problem for all commercial nuclear pharmacy and hospital-based

measurements, because of the introduction of new therapeutic products containing pure beta

emitters, and the increased use of these products and low-energy photon emitters by larger

numbers of licensees. In addition to the existing phosphorus-32 and strontium-89 radiopharmaceuticals, licensees are beginning to use new products such as liquid iodine-125 brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 microsphere brachytherapy sources, yttrium-90 labeled

monoclonal antibodies, phosphorus-32 coated balloons, and gas brachytherapy sources.Commercial nuclear pharmacy licensees preparing radiopharmaceuticals containing beta- andlow-energy photon-emitting radionuclides are reminded of the importance of conducting

appropriate dose calibration tests for accuracy, linearity, and geometrical variation, as required

in 10 CFR, 32.72(c) and (c)(1). (Medical use licensees required to measure the activity of beta- emitting radionuclides must follow similar requirements in 10 CFR 35.52, "Possession, use,calibration, and check of instruments to measure dosages of alpha- or beta-emitting

radionuclides.") When performing these required dose calibration tests, licensees shouldconsider attenuation characteristics of the beta- and low-energy photon-emitters. The

radiopharmaceutical, liquid brachytherapy source, and gas brachytherapy source

manufacturers can be an important source of information for the appropriate test needed to

correctly calibrate your dose calibrator to accurately measure their products.A number of manufacturers, recognizing the difficulties involved with accurately measuring theactivities of pure beta- and low-energy photon-emitters, have gone to considerable effort to

provide specific dose calibrator calibration procedures to be used with their products. These

procedures include unique dose calibrator settings for specific geometries (e.g., settings for

measuring the activity of iodine-125 liquid in a 5 cc plastic syringe) that are based on actual tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity

on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or

manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate

NRC regional office. /RA/SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices tests sponsored by the manufacturers, using National Institute of Standards and Technologytraceable radionuclide standards and commonly used syringes, vials, and dose calibrators.NRC notes that some medical use licensees perform voluntary activity checks for unit dosages. When a medical use licensee finds a significant deviation between its measurement and activity

on the label, the discrepancy should be resolved with the commercial nuclear pharmacy or

manufacturer of the unit dosage before the licensee administers the dosage. This IN requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any questions about theinformation in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate

NRC regional office. /RA/ SMFrant forDonald A. Cool, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Donna-Beth Howe, Ph.D, NMSS (301) 415-7848 E-mail: dbh@nrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML021620486ADAMS DOCUMENT TITLE:g:\howe\pharmacy\draft INrev1.wpdOFFICEMSIBNMSS/EditorMSIBIMNSNAMEDBHoweEKrausJHickeyDCool/SMFforDATE 5/20/02 5/20/025/22/026/14/02OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License

CP = Construction PermitAttachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of

Notice No. SubjectIssuanceIssued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New

Requirements for Calibration

and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees

that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye

applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2001-18Degraded and FailedAutomatic Electronic

Monitoring, Control, Alarming,

Response, and

Communications Needed for

Safety and Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment and fabrication

licenses and certificate holders

authorized to receive safeguards

information. Information notice is

not available to the public

because it contains safeguards

information.2001-17Degraded and FailedPerformance of Essential

Utilities Needed for Safety and

Safeguards12/14/2001All uranium fuel conversion,enrichment, and fabrication

licenses and certificate holders

authorized to receive safeguards

information. Information notice is

not available to the public

because it contains safeguards

information.2001-08,Sup. 2Update on Radiation TherapyOverexposures in Panama11/20/2001All medical licensees.2001-11Thefts of Portable Gauges07/13/2001All portable gauge licensees.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issuedby subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command inthe message portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname

______________________________________________________________________________________OL = Operating License

CP = Construction PermitAttachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of

Notice No. SubjectIssuanceIssued to_____________________________________________________________________________________2002-18Effect of Adding Gas IntoWater Storage Tanks on the

Net Positive Suction Head For

Pumps06/06/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.2002-17Medical Use of Strontium-90Eye Applicators: New

Requirements for Calibration

and Decay Correction05/30/2002All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical licensees

that use strontium-90 (Sr-90) eye

applicators.2002-16Intravascular BrachytherapyMisadministrations05/01/2002All Medical Licensees.2002-15Hydrogen Combustion Eventsin Foreign BWR Piping04/12/2002All holders of operating licensesfor light water reactors, except

those who have permanently

ceased operations and have

certified that fuel has been

permanently removed from the

reactor.2002-14Ensuring a Capability toEvacuate Individuals, Including

Members of the Public, From

the Owner-Controlled Area04/08/2002All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased

operations but have fuel on site.2002-13Possible Indicators of OngoingReactor Pressure Vessel Head

Degradation04/04/2002All holders of operating licensesfor pressurized water nuclear

power reactors, except those who

have permanently ceased

operations and certified that fuel

has been permanently removed

from the reactor.Note:NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are issued bysubscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following command in themessage portion:subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname