ML20206D280

Safety Insp Repts 50-324/87-03 & 50-325/87-03 on 870201-28, 0303-04.Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Unit 2 PWR Fuel Storage Capacity

ML20206D280
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/26/1987
From:	Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206D205	List: IR 05000324/1987003 ML20206D201 ML20206D241 ML20206D280
References
50-324-87-03, 50-324-87-3, 50-325-87-03, 50-325-87-3, NUDOCS 8704130291
Download: ML20206D280 (11)

See also: IR 05000324/1987003

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UNITE 3 STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 a

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Report Nos. 50-325/87-03 and 50-324/87-03

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324

License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62

Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: February 1 - 28, 1987 and March 3-4, 1987

.I. N &

3/16/f7

Inspectors:

g

, H. Ruland

Date Signed

9.6.d

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@ LM W. Garner ,

Date Signed

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3 /2(> [87

Approved by:

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g P4 E. Fredrickson, Section Chief

Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine safety inspection involved the areas of maintenance

observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite

Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, in-office LER review, followup on

inspector identified and unresolved items, Limitorque Operators, spent fuel

storage capacity, and refueling activities.

Results:

One violation - failure to maintain Unit 2 PWR spent fuel storage

capacity, paragraph 11,

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0704130291 870330

PDR

ADOCK 0D000324

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REPORT DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project

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C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction

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J. Holder, Manager - Outages

R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support

E. Bishop, Manager - Operations

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L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)-

R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP

J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager

J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance

G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control

J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support

K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance

A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations

W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor

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B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor

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B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor

R.Creech,I&C/ElectricalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)

R. Warden, ISC/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA

W. Hatcher Supervisor - Security

R. Kitchen,MechanicalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)

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C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist

W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit

Otiler licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force

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members.

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2.

ExitInterview(30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3,1987, with

the general manager and vice-president. The violation, excess capacity in

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the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (paragraph 11), was discussed in detail. The

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inspector stated that the item was unresolved pending inspector discussion

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with regional management.

On March 4, 1987, the licensee was informed by

the inspector that the spent fuel pool issue was a violation.

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licensee agreed to address the issue of board walkdowns/ reviews

(paragraph 6) along with the response to the violation.

The licensee

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acknowledged the findings without exception.

The licensee did not

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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during the inspection.

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3.

Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

4.

Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to

verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,

Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The

inspectors also verified that:

redundant components were operable;

administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel

were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls

were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points

were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was

performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.

The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly

returned to service.

Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave

priority to safety-related maintenance.

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The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance

activities:

MP-09

Dryer / Separator, Cattle Chute, and Fuel Pool Gates

Removal and Installation.

OLP-NVT001

Topaz Static Inverter and Lambda Power Supply.

WR&A-87-AGEB1 Repair of Unit 2 Annunciation Horn Circuit.

During performance of work request 87-AGEB1, the inspector observed a

communication problem between operations and maintenance personnel.

At

first, the annunciator horn being repaired, could not be silenced. Later,

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the horn stopper' continuously sounding and would not sound when another

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annunciator came in.

Operations was aware of this and took proper

compensatory actions, e. g., assigned sections of the board to individuals

to note when a new annunciator came in.

The first problem was correctly

conmunicated to maintenance; however, the change in symptoms was not.

Operations assumed the change was due to Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

trouble shooting activities.

The inspector informed the maintenance

personnel of the second item approximately 30 minutes after it happened.

Although the inspector was confident that the problem would have been

fixed, the failure of operations personnel to recognize that a new

condition existed versus a condition induced by I&C personnel performing

trouble shooting or repair, was a concern.

Inadequate communication can

noticeably increase the length of time an unsatisfactory condition exists.

This matter was discussed with cognizant supervision.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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5.

SurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical

Specifications.

Through observation and record review, the inspectors

verified that:

tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;

administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified;

instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete.

The

inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return

to service of equipment.

The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test

activities:

IMST-DG12R

Diesel Generator DG-2 Loading Test.

2MST-APRM12

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM), (Ch. 8, D & F)

Channel Functional Test (Reactor Protection System

(RPS) Inputs].

2MST-ATWS22M

Anticipated Transcient Without Scram (ATWS) Reactor

High Pressure Trip Instrument Channel Calibration.

2MST-RHR21M

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Pressure Coolant

Injection (LPCI), Core Spray System (CSS) and HPCI Hi

Drywell Pressure Trip Unit Channel Calibration.

PT-12.8

Electrical Power Systems Operability Test.

During performance of IMST-DG12R on February 17, 1987, the licensee

identified that step 7.4.30 had not been performed correctly.

The step

requires stopping of the core spray pump while supplying rated flow to

verify that the DG does not trip.

This is a surveillance requirement

specified in Technical Specification (TS) .4.8.1.1.2.d.2.

The operator

reduced the flow prior to stopping the pumb. This is the method normally

used to stop the pump as required by either the quarterly required

Surveillance Test Procedure PT-07.2.4b, or the Operating Procedure OP-18.

The licensee verified that during another performance of MST-DG12R, the

step was satisfactorily performed.

This item meets all the requirements

to be considered as a licensee identified violation.

The licensee is

preparing an Operating Experience Report (0ER) to address the root cause

of the communication failure between the I&C personnel in charge of the

test and the control operator. The inspector plans to review the OER when

issued.

This is an Inspector Followup Item:

Review of IMST-DG12R

ProcedureViolationOER(325/87-03-03).

One licensee identified violation and no deviations were identified.

6.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct

. observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,

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reviewing of records and independent-verification.of safety. system status.

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The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were-met. . Control room, shift

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supervisor, and clearance logs were reviewed to obtain information-

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concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure

that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting

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Conditions for Operations.

Direct observations were conducted of control

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room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to

verify operability and that parameters were within~ Technical Specification

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limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity

of system status was maintained. :The' inspectors verified the status of

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selected control room annunciators.

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Operability of ' a selected Engineered ' Safety Feature (ESF) train was -

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verified by insuring that:

each accessible valve in the flow path was in

its correct position; each power supply' and breaker,. including control

room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation

signal; removal of power from those - ESF motor-operated valves, so

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identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was. no

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leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling

water available; and a condition did. not exist which might prevent

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fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.

Instrumentation

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essential to system actuation or performance was. verified operable by

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observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if

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accessible.

The

inspectors verified

that the licensee's health physics

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policies / procedures were followed.

This includod a review of area

surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.

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The inspectors verified that:

the security. organization was properly

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manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned

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functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the

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protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and

escorted within the PA; persons within the PA ~ displayed photo

identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and

effective compensatory measures were employed when required.

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On February 1, -1987, the inspector found a vital area door closed but

unlatched.

While an unauthorized person could have opened the door, the

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security computer would have detected the intrusion, enabling the security

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force to respond.

The inspector reported the condition to security.

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security member responded in a timely manner, verified the condition and

took action as required.

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The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified

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position of certain containment isolation valves, and verified ' the

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operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.-

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On February 2,1987, the inspector observed the Unit 2 A and 6 trains of

Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system with loose blower and motor pedestal

mounting rubber bushing retaining bolts.

The licensee issued work

requests 87-ADJIl and 87-ADJJ1 to correct the deficiency.

The licensee

inspected Unit I and issued work requests ADJK1 and ADJL1 to correct

similar deficiencies on Unit 1 SBGT trains A and B.

Technical support

reviewed the "as found" condition and determined that the condition had

not rendered the SBGT trains inoperable.

On February 12, 1987, at 7:50 a.m., the inspector found valve 1-E11-F007B,

the Division II RHR minimuni flow valve, open instead of closed. The valve

had remained open after the licensee had performed OP-17, RHR Operating

Procedure

Section 8.7, draining the suppression pool to radwaste.

Valve]-Ell F007B auto-opened when the RHR pump was started, but no

procedure step existed to manually reshut the valve. Thus, the valve was

in the position required by the last procedure performed on the RHR

system.

However, the licensee reported that the evolution had occurred

two shifts prior to discovery.

Therefore, three shifts and two shift

turnovers failed to identify the mi:; positioned valve.

The Plant General

Manager agreed to address this issue, weakness in board walkdowns and

board review after valve manipulations, when responding to the violation

issued with this report.

This is an Inspector Followup Item:

Inadequate

Board Walkdown and Review (325/87-03-04).

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that the

inforr.ation provided met NRC reporting requirements.

The verification

included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or

planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety

significance of the event.

Onsite inspections were performed and

concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance

with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.

(CLOSED)

LER 1-86-13, Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System

Start Due to Corrosion on Radiation Monitor Sensor Converter.

The

inspector verified that the applicable Maintenance Procedure, MI-26-11A,

was revised July 29, 1986, to include inspection for corrosion as

comitted to in the LER.

A sign-off on the data sheet was also provided

to document the review.

(OPEN)

LER 1-87-01, Failure of Unit 1 HPCI System Turbine Steam Supply

Valve E41-F002 to Open.

The licensee discovered a failed auxiliary

contact adder block assembly during the followup to the valve failure.

The auxiliary contact block assemblies are attached to the main contactor

in each breaker compartment, with from one to six auxiliary blocks per

breaker.

There are over 3000 auxiliary contact blocks on site in both Q

and non Q app'eications.

The licensee sent several auxiliary contact

blocks to General Electric (GE) for failure analysis. GE reported to the

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licensee that the supplied blocks (CR205X100E) failed because dimensional

problems caused excess wear of the movable plunger, allowing the plunger

to eventually stick inside the block, preventing the contact and thus the

valve from moving.

Further licensee investigation revealed a potential generic problem with

the auxiliary cor. tact adder block.

Maintenance record searches by the

licensee turned up over 50 potential auxiliary contactor problems since

1982.

GE has redesigned the auxiliary contact adder block (new part No.

CR305X100E) and it appears that the new design is not susceptible to the

binding problem.

Further inspection of this item will be conducted after

the licensee issues an LER supplement due May 22, 1987.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-13, Failure to Prcperly Verify Reactor Protection

System (RPS) Shorting Links Installed During Testing Causes Full RPS Trip

During Refueling.

The in5pector verified via the training report that

members of the I&C crews were trained on proper verification of

installation of the RPS shorting links.

The training class syllabus

adequately addressed the item.

It required class participants to field

verify that the shorting links were in place.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-16, Automatic Low Water,'or verified that the lesson

. Level Scram During Pipe

Flushing Due to Personnel Error.

The inspect

plan associated with the committed real time training satisfactorily

discussed the circumstances surrounding the event and the lessons which

can be learned.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-24, Inadvertent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Actuation During Refueling Outage Due to Personnel Error.

The inspector

reviewed the documentation which demonstrated that new tags were

installed. The inspector visually verified that the tags were in place on

the Unit 1 Division ECCS inverters and power supplies on February 24,

1987.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

In Office LER Review (90712)

The listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met

NRC reporting requirements.

The verification included adequacy of event

description and corrective action taken or planned, existance of potential

generic problems and the relative safety significance of the avent.

(CLOSED) LER 1-86-17, Late Performance of Required Hourly Fire Watches.

(CLOSED)

LER 1-86-18, Output Breaker EPA-2, Reactor Protection System

(RPS) Motor Generator 1A, Tripped Unexpectedly to De-energize RPS Bus A;

Cause - Undetermined.

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(CLOSED)

LER 1-86-23, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entered Due to

Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Spray Subsystem B and RHR Low

Pressure Coolant Injection Loop.

(CLOSED)

LER 1-86-32, Failure to Functionally Test Relay TR/2 in Logic

Channels A2, A4, B2 and B4 Primary Containment Isolation Instruments

B21-TS-3229-3232; Procedure Deficiency.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-04, Primary Containment Group 6 Isolation / Automatic

Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation System and Automatic Starting of

Standby Gas Treatment System Occurred; Cause - Electrical Shorting.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-07, High Radiation Alarm Trip of Reactor Building

Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D12-RM-N010B; Due to Electrical

Grounding of the Monitor Power Lead.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-09, Upscale Trip of Instrument Trip Unit to Reactor

Building Exhaust Ventilation Monitor D12-RM-N010B: Cause Could Not Be

Determined.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-11, Reactor Water Cleanup System Inlet Primary

Containment Outboard Isolation Valve, Automatically Closed; Cause - Fuse

F18 Blew.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-14, Upscale Trip of Reactor Power Intermediate Range

Monitor D Occurred When Control Rod 02-19 Was Selected in Reactor Manual

Control System While Performing PT-18.1; Cause - Electronic Noise Spike.

(CLOSED)

LER 2-86-22, Unit 2 Shutdown in Accordance With TS 3.4.1.1 Due

to a Lockout / Trip of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701)

(OPEN) Inspector Followup Item, (325/84-04-01 and 324/84-04-01), Licensee

to Identify and Repair Cab *ie Tray Raceway Z Clamps Problems. The I clamps

secure the tray to the horizontal tray support.

The inspector reviewed

completed work requests 1-E84-1658 and 2-E84-2009 which documented

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completion of this particular inspection and repair.

The inspector

performed an inspection of safety related cable trays 50F/DA and 50M/DA in

the Unit 2 control room on February 22. Of twenty four Z clamps installed

on these trays, five were bent such that they were not engaged with the

tray top, four others had loose I clamp nuts, and three others were turned

to the side.

In addition, two Z clamps were missing. The inspector also

observed several tray covers which were not in their proper place. Based

on discussions with the architect / engineer, the licensee determined that

the "as found" condition of these two trays would not render the raceway

inoperble or adversely effect the cables in the trays.

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Discussion with Quality Assurance (QA) personnel revealed that an

outstanding non-conformance report (NCR), number E-86-002, involving cable

tray covers had been issued on July 1,1986, but a review of the NCR

responses by the QC supervisor and the inspector showed that poor work

control practices which allowed the 2 clamp problems to occur had not been

specifically addressed.

Hence, both the licensee and the inspector have

determined that the responses were inadequate.

On February 27, 1987,

licensee QA issued a Notice of Deficiency against this NCR in accordance

with QA procedure 0QA-104, which required correction of the inadequate

response within seven days.

This item will remain open pending final resolution of NCR E-86-002 and

the Notice of Deficiency and subsequent review by the inspector.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. LimitorqueOperators(71707)

The licensee has recently procured information from Limitorque Corporation

concerning actuator sizing and settings on both safety and non-safety

related valves.

The data was recently reviewed (December - January) and

compiled from original design documents into a new format at the

licensee's request.

Review of the data sheets showed that Limitorque was

now recommending upgrade of some actuator motors to a larger size.

Apparently, Limitorque had used 100% full voltage to size the motors,

instead of the currently specified degraded supply of 85%.

Reviews of

documents between the licensee, the valve manufacturer and the valve

manufacturer's subcontractor (Limitorque), has not been able to determine

what was specified to Limitorque (or by whom) when the original plant

equipment was procured.

The licensee has evaluated this condition on the

applicable safety related valves and has determined that these valves

would function under design conditions.

The affected valves are:

E41-F002, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam line

isolation valve; E41-F004, HPCI condensate storage tank suction valve;

E41-F008, HPCI full flow test isolation valve; E11-F017A and B, RHR system

outboard isolation valves; and E11-F024A and B, suppression pool test

return isolation valve.

The inspector has reviewed the justification for

continued operation for Unit 2 contained in Engineering Evaluation

EER-87-0088.

In summary, the evaluation concludes that no safety problem

exists based upon either application and/or electrical distribution

voltage studies. The voltage studies determined that the degraded voltage

of some of the valves would not drop below 85%.

Under these anticipated

voltages, there is no motor sizing concern.

In addition, contact with the

applicable valve vendors, Anchor Darling and Rockwell, revealed that they

perfonn their own sizing and setting calculations.

Of three valves.

reviewed by Anchor Darling, a degraded voltage of 85% was used. A list of

the other valves has been supplied to the vendors to verify exactly what

value was used.

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The licensee has contracted with B&W to review the Limitoroue data sheets,

calculations and generally assist in resolving the concerns. Their review

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has indicated potential problems with Limitorque data sheets.

Two DC

motor powered actuators had been treated as AC powered.

In addition, one

of these had the wrong pull-out efficiency used for the overall unit ratio

(motor design speed-RPM / actuator speed RPM).

Apparently the wrong value

had been taken from the Limitorque Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart.

The actuators involved were SMB-3 and SMB-000.

Another valve with an

SMB-5T actuator also had the wrong pull-out efficiency used in the torque

switch calculation.

This was attributed to using the wrong motor speed

when obtaining values from the Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart.

The licensee is continuing his review.

This is an Inspector Followup

Item: Potential Problems with Limitorque Data Sheets (324/87-03-02).

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Spent Fuel Storage Capacity (59095)

The inspectors reviewed the available storage capacity in the Unit 1 and

Unit 2 spent fuel storage pools to determine if full core offload

capability existed for each unit.

Based on discussions with licensee

personnel and review of the licensee's fuel map, full offload capability

(560 assemblies) existed.

Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) has room for 566

more BWR assemblies:

1839

allowed by TS

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displaced by a PWR rack

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rack not installed

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contains stuck blade guide

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boral sample stations

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not yet installed

1322

available spaces

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assemblies in pool

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BWR spaces available

Unit 1 SFP has room for 925 more BWR assemblies:

1803

allowed by TS

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rack not installed

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boral sample stations

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available spaces

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assemblies in pool

975

BWR spaces available

The above data is as of February 15, 1987.

The inspector noted that each SFP contained 10 PWR spent fuel modules each

capable of storing 16 assemblies for a PWR capacity in each pool of 160

PWR assemblies.

The Unit 1 SFP contained 160 assemblies while the Unit 2

pool contained 144 assemblies.

However, Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.6.3 states that, "the fuel storage pool is designed and shall be

maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 144 PWR fuel

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assemblies and 1839 BWR fual assemblies.

The extra 16 storage locations

in the Unit 2 SFP pose no safety problem since the Unit 1 SFP has been

reviewed and approved by NRR, contains 160 PWR assemblies and locations,

also contains additional high density racks, and is essentially identical

to the Unit 2 SFP.

The excess storage capacity in the Unit 2 SFP is a

violation of TS 5.6.3:

Failure to Meet TS 5.6.3 Regarding Spent Fuel Pool

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PWR Capacity (324/87-03-01).

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One violation and no deviations were identified.

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12. RefuelingActivities(60705)

Selected refueling activities were witnessed and reviewed by the

inspector. These included verification that:

The fuel pool gates were removed per MP-09.

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Surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.9.6 associated

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with refueling bridge interlocks were performed prior to fuel

movement.

Number of operable SRM's per Technical Specification 3.9.2.a. and b.

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were maintained.

Continues communications between the refueling bridge and the control

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room were established per Technical Specification 3.9.5.

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Fuel movements were conducted in accordance with operating procedures

and the Fuel Movement Sheets.

The last activity was performed during a two hour inspection conducted on

the refueling bridge during fuel movements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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