Information Notice 2001-11, Thefts of Portable Gauges

Thefts of Portable Gauges

ML011920238
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/13/2001
From:	Cool D A NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
Pettijohn S L, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822
References
IN-01-011
Download: ML011920238 (6)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555July 13, 2001NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES

Addressees

All portable gauge licensee

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to informaddresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauge It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problem However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licenseesreported a total 156 thefts of portable gauge Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas vulnerable to thef Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been recovere Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauge In both of these cases the gauge was returned to the owne In another two events, gauges were found in scrap metal when radiation monitors alarme In one event, only the source rod was foun In the other case, the gauge was found intact.In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than thelicensees' facilities or job site Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.The following are examples of some typical case Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truckparked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the Texas Bureau of Radiation Contro The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck by chain The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.

A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department. Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truc The truck was located atthe home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florid The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-13 The licensee notified police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Contro The Homestead Police prepared a press release and offered a reward for the return of the gaug A private individual reported finding the gauge four days later, on July 6, 199 The licensee stated that the gauge was not damage It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges be stored at the licensee's facility.Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) ofAmericium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-13 The gauge was taken from the bed of a pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight and 0600 The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured to the vehicle by a chai The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were take The licensee notified the police of the thef Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained towas stolen from the home of an employe The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truc The truck was stolen early on the morning of April 19, 200 The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a reward was offered.Discussion:Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges arestored in vehicles parked in a non-work are In addition to considering deterrents to thefts such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material should extend to ways to minimize the threat of thef The requirements for control and security of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.180 Control and security requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.The NRC's analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large numberof gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chain To help reduce the number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)

requiring gauges to be locked in covered vehicle compartments, (2) not parking vehicles in areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge user training, to increase awareness of this problem.NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (FederalRegister Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).

Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,00 This IN notice requires no specific action or written respons If you have any questions aboutthe information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional office./RA/Donald Cool, DirectorDivision of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Technical Contact:

Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS (301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov This IN notice requires no specific action or written respons If you have any questions aboutthe information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional offic /RA/

Donald Cool, DirectorDivision of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Technical Contact:

Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS (301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.govADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: #ML011920238TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrenceOFCMSIB-B*MSIB-B*Editor*MSIB-A*IMNSNAMESPettijohnFBrownEKrausJHickeyDCoolDATE6/8/20016/19/20016/11/016/19/20017/10/2001OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDate of Notice N SubjectIssuanceIssued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________2001-08, Supplement 1Update on the Investigation ofPatient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy Overexposures06/06/01All medical licensees.2001-08Treatment Planning SystemErrors Result in Deaths of Overseas Radiation Therapy Patients06/01/01All medical licensees.2001-03Incident ReportingRequirements for Radiography Licensees04/06/01All industrial radiographylicensees.2001-01The Importance of AccurateInventory Controls to Prevent the Unauthorized Possession of Radioactive Material03/26/01All material licensees.2000-22Medical MisadministrationsCaused by Human Errors Involving Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE)12/18/00All medical use licenseesauthorized to conduct gamma stereotactic radiosurgery treatments.2000-19Implementation of Human UseResearch Protocols Involving U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulated Materials12/05/2000All medical use licensees.2000-18Substandard Material Suppliedby Chicago Bullet Proof Systems11/29/2000All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees andapplicants.

All category 1 fuel facilities.

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