ML20151L945

Insp Repts 50-321/88-17 & 50-366/88-17 on 880521-0624. Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations, Surveillance Testing Observations & Physical Security

ML20151L945
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	07/21/1988
From:	Holmesray P, Menning J, Rogge J, Sinkule M, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151L928	List: ML20151L925 ML20151L930 ML20151L935 ML20151L945
References
50-321-88-17, 50-366-88-17, NUDOCS 8808040195
Download: ML20151L945 (15)

See also: IR 05000321/1988017

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

'+9 *.* . . 4o

Report Nos.: 50-321/88-17 and 50-366/88-17

License'e:

Georgia Power Company

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P.O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.:

50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch I and 2

Inspection Dates: May 21 - June 24, 1988

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors:

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PeterHolmes-Ray, Senionesident Inspector

Date Signed

WZ CA L

7-20-rf

dokfrE. Menning, Senio M esident Inspector

Date Signed

WA 4

7-AA*W

Jo W Rogge Senior Res4Went Inspector

Date Signed

Plant Vogtle

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Letyh Trocine, Projest Engineer

Date Signed

Reactor Projects Section 3B

Accompanying Personnel:

RandallpMusser

Approved by:

d, h. o

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PW-88

Marvin V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B

Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Surveillance Testing

Observations, ESF System Walkdowns, Radiological Protection, Physical Security,

Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, and Licensee Action on

Previous Enforcement Matters.

Results: Two violations and one deviation were identified. Ona violation was

for failure to adequately establish and implement diesel generator building

ventilation system procedures, paragraph 2.

The second violation was for

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deficient operating procedures, paragraphs 9 and 10.

The deviation was. for

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failure to periodically test diesel generator building ventilation system

thermostats and dampers, paragraph 2.

esoso40195 880721

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PDR

ADOCK 0500

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch

1. C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

1. D. Davis, Manager General Support

J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager

• 1. P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• 1. 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager

1. M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 1. H. Nix, Plant Manager

T. Powers, Engineering Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager

• 1. H. Sumner, Operations Manager

• 1. S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

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NRC Resident Inspectors

P. Holmes-Ray

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1. J. Menning

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• 1. R. Musser

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NRC management on site during inspection period:

V. Brownlee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, Region 11

M. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II

C. Julian, Chief, Operations Branch, Region II

G. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors, NRR

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M. Shymlock, Chief, Operational Programs Section, Region II

M. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, Region II

• Attended exit interview on June 10, 1988

1. Attended exit interview on June 27, 1988

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• 1. Attended both exit interviews

2.

Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

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operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

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members of the plant operating staff.

The inspectors made frequent visits

to the control room, Observations included instrument readings, setpoints

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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

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equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

journals and data sheet entries, control -room manning, and access

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controls. This inspection activity included numerous inforaal discussions

with operators and their supervisors.

Weekly, when on site, selected

Engineering Safety Feature -(ESF) systems were confirmed opercble.

The

confirmation was made by verifying the following:

accessible valve flow

path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,

major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions

of the control. building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited.

Observations included general plant / equipment

conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling

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program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection

equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection

controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile

hazards,. instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment

isolation,

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At start of this reporting period, Unit I remained shutdown pending the

repair of a crack in the discharge piping of Reactor Water Cleanup System

pump

"A".

Restart of Unit 1 commenced at 1125 on May 25,1988.

Criticality was attained at 1214 and the reactor mode switch was placed in

RUN at 2345 on that day.

The Unit 1 turbine generator was synchronized

with to the grid at 0812 on May 26,1988.

Rated power was attained at

1600 on May 28, 1988.

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At the start of this reporting period, Unit 2 was being maintained

critical with reactor vessel pressure at 350 psig pending the completion

of repairs to feedwater injection valve 2N21-F0068.

The repairs were

completed and reactor heatup via control rod withdrawals started at 1030

on May 22, 1988.

The reactor mode switch was placed in RUN at 2135 on

that day.

The Unit 2 turbine generator was synchronized with the grid at

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1137 on May 23, 1988.

A turbine trip subsequently occurred at-1159.

The

Unit was operating at 22 percent power at that time.

Since the Unit was

operating below 30 percent power, the turbine trip did not cause a reactor

scram.

The turbine trip resulted from a Moisture Separator Reheater

"A"

hotwell high level condition.

Subsequent investigation by the licensee

did not conclusively reveal the cause of the hotwell high level condition.

The Unit 2 turbine generator was retied with the grid at 1458 on May 23,

1988.

At 0504 on May 27, 1988, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately

98 percent power while the

"B" condensate pump was being filled and

vented.

This scram is discussed in paragraph 9.

Reactor startup

commenced at 0330 on May 28, 1988, and criticality was achieved at 0845 on

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that day.

During the subsequent approach to rated power, Unit 2

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automatically scrammed from approximately 47 percent power.

This scram

occurred at 1102 on May 29, 1988, during the performance of -turbine control

valve surveillance testing.

This scram is also discussed in paragraph 9.

Reactor startup commenced at 2146 on May 29, 1988, and the Unit 2 reactor

was again critical at 0009 on May 30, 1988. At 0622 on May 31,-1988, the

turbine- generator was synchronized with the grid.

Synchronization

occurred with the No. -3 main turbine stop valve closed.

Personnel were

then unable to open this valve - or identify the cause of .the

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malfunctioning.

The turbine generator was disconnected from the grid at

1545 on that day for trouble shooting.

The reactor remained critical

during the trouble shooting period._ The licensee subsequently found that

the'No. 3 main turbine stop valve would not open due to a flow blockage.

A metal particle was removed from an -inlet orifice to the solenoid

operated test valve for-the main- turbine stop valve.

At 1131 on June 1,

1988, the Unit 2 moda switch was placed in RUN.

The turbine generator was

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synchronized with the grid at 1928 on that day.

Unit 2 achieved rated

power at 0140 on June 3, 1988.

As reported previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and

50-366/88-14, the licensee began their effort to determine the source of

the Unit 1 spent fuel pool liner leak.

The licensee has performed

underwater video camera inspections of a portion of the accessible

surfaces of the pool liner, vacuumed various areas on the liner bottom

surface, and injected dye over possible leak . locations.

Additionally, a

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flow meter has been installed to provide a positive means of monitoring

fuel pool leakage.

The leakage flow rate has been determined to be

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4.7 gallons per minute.

At this point in time, the licensee has been

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unable to determine the source of the spent fuel pool liner leak.

The

licensee plans to continue efforts to locate the leak with the use of

acoustic monitoring, further vacuuming, and visual ' inspection.

The

inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's progress in locating and

repairing the source of the spent fuel pool liner leakage.

During a routine t'our of the diesel generator building on June 8,1988,

the inspector identified several differences between rooms in air-intake

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louver positions, exhaust fan switch positions, and thermostat settings

associated with the building ventilation system.

The diesel' generator

building ventilation system contains the following subsystems in separate

rooms:

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Rooms IC, 1B, 1A, 2C, and 2A

Diesel generator rooms heating and ventilating systems

Battery rooms ventilation systems

011 storage rooms ventilation systems

Rotms 1G, 1F, IE, 2G, 2F, and 2E

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Switchgear rooms heatina and ventilation systems

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These systems are described in Section 9.4.5 of the Unit 2 Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR).

The diesel generator building heating and

ventilation is designed:

to be operable from either normal or emergency power supply systems.

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to perform the intended functions before, during, and after a design

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basis earthquake, and

to provide temperature and air movement control to support optimum

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diesel generator operation.

The inspector conducted a compliance based inspection of the diesel

building ventilation system.

The problems identified are detailed in the

paragraphs that follow.

A.

Diesel generator building tour.

The following items were identified in the tour of the building:

(1) Loose nuts on air louver linkage arms for louvers X41-C005C,

X41-C0058, X41-C005A, X41-C013B, and X41-C013A.

(2) Different thermostat settings for the diesel generator room

exhaust fans.

These thermostats were labeled with a caution

stating,

"Char,ging the setpoint of thermostat' will effect

diesel generator operability."

Two different types of

thermostats were used.

One type has a single setting and the

other a high and low setting.

The settings found are listed

below:

X41-N004C

High - 78 F

Low - 48 F

X41 N004B

High - 78'F

Low - 78'F

X41-N004A

High - 78 F

Low - 70*F

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X41-N011B

Single Setting

66*F

X41-N011A

Single Setting

78'F

Likewise, the room heaters thermostat settings are listed:

X41-N007H

High - 78*F

Low - Offscale

X41-N007E

High - 75 F

Low - Offscale

X41-N007B

High - 80 F

Low - 50*F

X41-N009E

Single Setting

41"F

X41-N009B

Single Setting

75 F

The design data on plant drawing H-12619, Rev. 5,

listed

figure 9.4-7 in the FSAR which gave the following settings:

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Exhaust fans

On - 87'F

Off - 83*F

Heaters

On - 43'F

Off - 47 F

There appeared to be no correlation for the various settings.

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(3) Failed or partially failed air-inlet louvers.

in each switchgear room is a two-section, wall-mounted,

air-inlet damper which operates with the exhaust fan for cooling

the room.

In rooms 1E (louver X41-C007A) and 2F (louver

X41-C015B), one section of the louvers was found to be failed

shut.

In room 2E (louver X41-C015A), one section was partially

shut.

(4) Missing junction box cover

A missing junction box cover was found in switchgear room 2G at

room penetration 2T43-H509B. The licensee replaced the missing

Cover.

(5) Drawing discrepancy

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram H-12619, Rev

5, "Diesel

Generator Building Ventilation System," showed two thermostat

switches in switchgear rooms 1E, 2G, 2F, and 2E for the exhaust

fans but only one switch was actually in the room. The licensee

initiated a drawing change to correct this item.

The inspectors

will verify completion of this corrective action.

(6) Exhaust Fan Alignment

Each of the rooms has two exhaust fans with the hand switch

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aligned for one fan in the RUN or PRIMARY position and the

other fan in the STANDBY position.

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Roth of the 1B diesel generator oil storage rooms fans were

found aligned to RUN and both to the 2C fans in STANDBY. Also,

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both of the 2C battery room exhaust fan hand switches were found

aligned to PRIMARY.

B.

Procedure review

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The inspector reviewed the diesel generator building ventilation

system procedures for Unit 1 (34S0-41-001-1N, Rev. 1, dated 5/16/88)

and Unit 2 (34S0-X41-001-2, Rev. 2, deted 9/6/85).

The inspector

noted the Unit 2 procedure was designated as safety-related and the

Unit 1 procedure was not.

Also, the exhaust fan alignment in the procedures required the fans

switch alignment with one in RUN or PRIMARY and the other in STANDBY.

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The lineup of the IB diesel generator was covered in both procedures

since it is a swing diesel. The exhaust fan thermostat settings were

different. For the' Unit 2 procedure, the settings were:

X41-N004B

87 F

X41-N005B

85'F

but for the Unit 1 procedure, the settings were:

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X41-N004B

55'F

X41-N005B

55'F

Furthermore, none of the Unit 1 settings were in agreement with

design data referenced on drawing H-12619. Rev 5.

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Although the Unit 1 procedure was revised 5/16/88 and a change was in

typing for Unit 2,

none of the above procedure problems were

identified.

Accordingly, a violation will be issued against Technical Specifica-

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tion 6.8.1.a for not adequately establishing and implementing

procedures per Regulatory Guide 1.33 (321,366/88-17-01).

Three

examples will be given involving failure to have the Unit 1 procedure

classified as safety-related, procedure inadequacy, and failure to

have exhaust fan switches aligned per procedure .

The licensee initiated procedure changes to make both procedures

safety-related, did a switch alignment of the_ fans, and reviewed tae

thermostat settings.

C.

Testing Review

The inspector reviewed the testing requirements and found that the

Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.4.5.4, Tests and Inspections, states that all

components of the diesel generator building heating and ventilation

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system were preoperationally tested before placing the system in

service and have been periodically tested thereafter.

FSAR

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Table 9.4-10, Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilation

System Failure Analysis, lists exhaust fans, heaters, and louvers as

components of the system and describes malfunctions of the system as

failure of the louver, heater or controls, and fans or controls.

However, on June 8,1988, the inspector found various thermostat

settings for like controls for the diesel generator room exhaust fans

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and heaters and switchgear room exhaust fans.

One section of a

two-section, wall-mounted, air-inlet louver to switchgear rooms 2G

and 2F was found to have failed in the shut position and one louver

section for room 2E was partially shut.

A review of the instrument

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calibration and surveillance test tracking master listing found that

the thermostat controls are not periodically tested. No instruction

could be found that checks the dampers ability to open. Accordingly,

a deviation will be issued against the FSAR Section 9.4.5.4.

(321,366/88-17-02).

The licensee initiated maintenance work to correct the failed

dampers.

The thermostat . settings were reviewed, but due to

limitations of the thermostat, only a setting of 85'F could be

achieved when the design data required 87*F.

Likewise, where 43*F

was required.only 45'F could be achieved.- The licensee initiated a

review to change the settings to within the range of the thermostats,

possibly at 80 F and 50*F.

One violation with three examples and one deviation were identified.

3.

Maintenance Observations (62703) Units 1 and 2

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities.

The observations included a review of the work documents for.

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

The primary

maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:

Maintenance Activity

Date

1.

Investigation of erroneous high

06/01/88

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radiation alarms on reactor building

equipment drain sump discharge monitor

2D11-K626 per Maintenance Work Order

(MWO) 2-88-2733 (Unit 2)

2.

CheckofHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI)

06/10/88

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turbine stop valve hydraulic cylinder for

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leakage. Check of the HPCI auxiliary oil

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pump discharge pressure and inspection

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for oil leaks, pump cavitation, and vibration

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per 52PM-E41-003-2S and MWO 2-88-1945

(Unit 2)

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Installation of turbine flow indication and

06/10/88

totalization meter per MWO 1-88-2801 to

provide a means of monitoring the flow rate

of the fuel pool liner leak (Unit 1)

4.

Inspection and lubrication of the Reactor

06/24/88

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Building Exhaust System per 52PM-T41-001-0S

and MWO 1-88-1514 (Unit 1)

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During a review of MWO 1-88-1561, the inspectors observed that the HPCI

torus level transmitter (1E41-N0620) was noted to have a response time of

approximately 15-20 minutes.

(This level transmitter swaps the suction of

the HPCI pump from the condensate storage tank to the torus in the event

of high torus water level.)

The licensee replaced the transmitter,

calibrated it, but did not perform a time response test.

The inspector

questioned the licensee on this matter and the licensee has indicated that

.a time response test would be performed on the transmitter in order to

determine if the transmitter is capable of performing its intended

function in a timely manner.

The inspector will continue to monitor the

progress on the above manner.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2

The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances.

The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,

removal from service and return to service of the system or components

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during

this month are suuriarized below:

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Surveillance Testina Activity

Da t_e_

1.

Turbine control valve fast closure

05/31/38

instrument functional test

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Procedure 34SV-C71-005-25 (perUnit2)

2.

Residual Heat Removal pump

06/08/88

operability test per Procedure

345V-E11-001-2S (Unit 2)

3.

ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)

06/10/88

valve operability per Procedures

34SV-E51-001-IS and 42SP-050187-

OR-1-OS (Unit 1)

4.

High scram discharge volume instrument

06/24/88

functional test and calibration per

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Procedure 575V-C11-001-15 (Unit 1)

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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5.

ESF System Walkdown (71710) Unit 1.

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified

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both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in

accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material

conditions were satisfactory.

The Unit 1 RCIC system was walked down in

detail.

During this walk down on June 3,1988, the -inspectors noted. that

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Master Parts List labels were missing from valves 1E51-F519 and F520 ' The

inspectors also noted that a pan under the barometric condenser was filled-

with parts from a flashlight and other debris.

These discrepancies were

brought to the attention of the Unit 1. shift supervisor.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2

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The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological

protection program in the ccurse of the monthly activities.

The

performance of health physics and'other personnel was observed on various

shifts to include:

involvement of health physics supervision, use of

radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of

high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,

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and posting and labeling.

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No violations or deviations were noted.

7.

Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2

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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included-

a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

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activities to include: availability of supervision; availability of armed

response personnel; protected and vital access controls; ' searching of

personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting

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of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.

No violations or deviations were noted.

8.

Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) Units 1 and 2

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A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate.

Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost

consideration.

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Unit 1: 86-22

Reactor Water Cleanup Primary Containment Isolations

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on High Temperature

This LER addresses a design deficiency ~ where the

Reactor Water Cleanup system isolates on'high room

temperature.

This isolation feature was-intended to-

sense a steam leak from the system and prevent a small-

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break loss of coolant accident.

In practice however',

tho room ambient temperature during the summer rises

to the setpoint level and unnecessary actuations -

occur. As a long term. corrective action, the licensee

proposed a higher actuation setpoint of 150 F.

Technical Specification Amendment #144.for Unit 1 and

1. 89 for Unit 2 was issued.on August 10, 1987.

This

completes the required corrective action.

Review of

this LER is closed.

86-31

Fire Hose Station Surveillance Not Performed Oue to

Personnel Error

On July 28, 1986, the licensee determined that the

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monthly surveillance for fire hose stations was not

performed on July 8,1986, as required.

The missed

surveillance was performed satisfactorily on July 29,

1986.

Corrective action included a change of -

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scheduling

maintenance

technical- specification

surveillances. . These schedule changes were reviewed'

and discussed with personnel in maintenance planning.

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The inspector has no further questions regarding this

event. Review of this LER is closed.

86-39

Blown Fuses Make Control Room Environniental System

Inoperable For Automatic Functions

This LER describes an event where two fuses were found

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blown which would prevent the Main Control Room

Environmental Control system from switching to the

pressurization or isolation mode upon receipt of

chlorine gas detection.

Extensive engineering review

of the circuitry failed to identify a cause for-the

fuse failures.

As a result of industry experience

with inadvertent chlorine detection actuations, the

plant has removed the sour:e of chlorine gas from the

site.

A temporary system to inject liquid chlorine

has been installed.

By letter dated June 20, 1988,

the licensee requested a change to the Unit 1 and 2

technical specifications to eliminate the detectors

and actuation circuitry.

The inspector reviewed the

circuit drawings with the system engineer and

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determined that the configuration does not provide for

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power supply monitoring.

To compensate for this type

of. failure, operators would have to implement manual

actuation per annunciator response procedures.

Annunciator Response Procedure, 34AR-601-904-IS,

Rev.1, was verified to include steps directing '

verification that the proper alignment is achieved.

Review of this LER is closed.

87-04

Design Deficiency Could Affect Control

Room

Environmental Control System

On March 26, 1987, personnel discovered during a

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procedure review that if certain fuses were to fail,

then the respective dampers would fail open by design'

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This position is acceptable except for a chlorine gas

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release.

As discussed above (LER 50-321/86-22),the

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licensee has elected to remove chlorine gas from the

site. The inspector had no further questions.

Review

of this LER is closed.

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87-16

Procedure Inadequacy Results in False Chlorine Signal

Causing Control Room Isolation

On December 14, 1987, the Main Control Room

Environmental Control system went into the isolation

mode of operation as a result of a sensed high

chlorine signal.

Root Cause determination revealed

that the electolyte reservoir ran dry and a false high

chlorine

signal

was

generated.

Procedure

57SV-241-003-1S, Rev. 2, was verified to ensure that

specific guidance on filling the reservoir has been

provided. Review of this LER is closed.

88-09

Lack of Procedural Clarification Results in Reactor

Scram

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The events of this LER have been cited as part of

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violation 321,366/88-17-03.

Since this matter will be

tracked with the violation, this LER is closed.

Unit 2: 88-17

Deficient Procedure Causes Loss of Feedwater Resulting

in Reactor Scram

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The events of this LER have been cited as part of

violation 321,366/88-17-03.

This matter will be

tracked with the violation, and the LER is closed.

88-18

Main Turbine Electohydraulic Control Fluid Pressure

Transient Results in Reactor Scram

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The events of this LER and the licensee's corrective

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action are discussed in paragraph 9.

Review of this

LER is closed.

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9.

Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed

reactor events.

The review included determination of cause, safety

significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.

The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,

operations journal entries, and scram reports and also had discussions

with operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as

appropriate.

On May 27, 1988, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately

98 percent of rated power.

At the time of this event, operations

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personnel were in the process of filling and venting condensate pump

2N21-C001B.

An air bubble was apparently released into the condensate

system, and the condensate booster pumps and reactor feed pumps tripped on

low suction pressure.

The reactor scramed on low water level.

Reactor

vessel water level decreased to approximately 66 inches below instrument

zero during the transient.

Vessel water level was subsequently restored

due to injection via HPCI and Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) "B."

Although RCIC

initiated at reactor vessel water Level 2, it failed in inject into the

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vessel.

Investigation revealed that the limit switch on RCIC valve

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2E51-F045 failed to function properly. The limit switch failed to pickup

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the relay that provides the ramp switch signal to the RCIC Woodward

Centroller.

This resulted in the Woodward Controller not responding to

speed demands.

The limit switch was subsequently replaced.

As previously mentioned, the Unit 2 scram on May 27, 1988, occurred as

operations personnel were filling and venting condensate pump 2N21-C001B

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prior to placing the pump in service. Low pressure condensate vent valve

2N21-F021B was initially opened to vent the suction side of the pump.

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Condensate pump suction valve 2N21-F001B was then partially opened to

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allow the piping and pump well to fill with water. When valve 2N21-F001B

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was opened, air inside the pump well and piping entered the comon suction

pipe for the three condensate pumps.

This event appears to have been

caused by a deficient condensate and feedwater system operating procedure.

Mere specifically, Procedure 3450-N21-007-25

"Condensate and Feedwater

System," did not provide instructions for filling and venting a condensate

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pump with the unit at power.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires

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that procedures recomended in Regulatory Guide 1.33

Rev.

2,

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February 1978, be established.

Section 4 of Regulatory Guide 1.33,

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Appendix A recomends procedures for operatier

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t:.e cundensate system.

This matter is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a

and will be tracked as part of violation 321,366/88-17-03 - Deficient

Operating Procedures.

On May 29, 1988

Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately

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47 percent of rated power.

At the time of this event, operations

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personnel were performing routine Turbine Control Valve (TCV)

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surveillances.

The No. 2 TCV had been closed, and the anticipated

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trip of Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel

"A" had been received.

Concurrently, RPS channel "B" tripped for nn apparent reason, resulting in

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a full reactor scram.

The lowest reactor vessel water level reached

during the transient was approximately 8 inches below instrument zero.

Reactor vessel level was restored automatically via operation of RFP "B".

Investigation into this event revealed that a pressure transient in the

Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) system oil manifold most likely caused the

RPS to sense a false TCV closure in the "B" channel. More specifically,

the disc dump valve for TCV No. 2 probably did not reseat properly

resulting in a pressure fluctuation in the EHC supply manifold.

The

licensee has subsequently installed orifices on the relayed hydraulic

fluid trip system inlet to the fast acting solenoid valves in an effort to

reduce pressure transients in the EHC oil manifold header.

The licensee

has also scheduled repair work on the TCV disc dump valves during the next

refueling outage.

One violation was idencified.

10. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Unresolved Item * (URI) 321/88-14-03, Improper drywell pneumatic

system valve lineup which resulted in the automatic scram of Unit 1 on May

20, 1988.

Investigation has shown that this event was caused by a

deficiency in Procedure 34G0-0PS-001-1S, "Plant Startup." The startup

procedure did not specifically require that the swapping of drywell

pneumatic supply from instrument air to backup nitrogen be done in

accordance with Data Package 5 of Procedure 34S0-P70-001-IS, "Drywell

Pneumatic System." This matter is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and will be tracked as part of violation 321,366/88-17-03 -

Deficient Operating Procedures.

11. Exit Interview (30703)

H

The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on June 10 and June 27,

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1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspectors

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the findings listed

below.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material

provided to or reviewed by the inspector (s) during this inspection.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Item Number

Status

pescription/ReferenceParagraph

321,366/88-17-01

Opened

VIOLATION - Failure to Adequately

Establish and Implement Diesel

Generator Building Ventilation

System Procedures (paragraph 2)

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• An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to

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determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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VIOLATION 1 - Deficient Operatin

321,366/88-17-03

Opened

Procedures (paragraphs 9 and 10)g

321,366/88-17-02

0pened

DEVIATION - Failure to Periodi-

.cally Test Diesel

Generator

Building

Ventilation

System

Thermostats and Dampers (paragraph

2)

321/88-14-03

Closed

URI - Improper Drywell Pneumatic

System Valve Lineup (par 69raph 10)

Licensee management was- also informed that the LERs discussed in

pcragraph '

onsidered to be closed.

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